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In the past century the occurrence of natural disasters and man-made disasters have 
steadily increased with a significant loss of life, damage caused to infrastructure and 
property, and destruction of the environment. There is much evidence that natural 
disasters are growing on a global level. Dealing with disasters demand the involvement of 
a range of agencies collaborating and making collaborative decision. This research has 
identified the need for a collaborative platform to bring together a variety of information 
to enable multi-agencies to prepare for disasters and to enhance the resilience of cities. 
Risk assessment is a crucial aspect within the activities of multi-agencies. Risk 
assessment enhances emergency planning which can then be tested by detailed appraisals 
and exercises. Whenever risk assessment is updated, plans are revised and additional tests 
are carried out. Risk assessment helps multi-agency planners decide what resource 
requirements they need and what multi-agency activities need to be planned 
collaboratively in order to prepare for disaster. The aim of this research is to investigate 
the nature of an interactive map that can enhance multi-agency team collaboration in the 
risk assessment process in disaster management.  
This research uses the six-step risk assessment process used in Australia and New 
Zealand which is widely recognized as being good practice. These steps are 
Contextualization, Hazard Review, Risk Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Risk Treatment and 
Monitoring and Reviewing (Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Standard 
Committee, AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009). 
In this research, the characteristics of a suitable interactive map for risk assessment was 
defined in collaboration with the senior practitioners within a multi-agency team in the 
UK. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the senior managers of Category 1 
responders in The Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum (GMLRF) to capture the 
requirements for a multi-agency collaboration platform. The outcome of these interviews 
were used to capture the characteristics and develop the a prototype of the interactive 
map that can support risk assessment. Once implemented, the validation of the interactive 
map prototype was conducted involving senior practitioners of stakeholders in the 
GMLRF development group. The experiment was held in the THINKpod in ThinkLab, at 
the University of Salford. A total of 23 senior practitioners took part in the evaluation 
experiment. After a demonstration of a scenario and using the interactive map, the 
participants evaluated the prototype as a group and then completed questionnaires that 
xvi 
 
featured range of open, closed and rating scale questions. These questionnaires were 
designed to evaluate the perceived effectiveness and impact of the interactive map on 
strengthening collaboration among the multi-agency teams during risk assessment. The 
outcome of the evaluation shows a good level of satisfaction among the practitioners. The 
overall result suggests that the professionals view the interactive map as a good platform 












Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation  
Over the past century the occurrence of natural disasters and man-made disasters has 
steadily increased with a significant loss of life, and destruction of the environment and 
infrastructure. Disasters appear to be increasing in both the rate of occurrence and in 
intensity (Sahani and Ariyabandu, 2003; Moe et al., 2007). As indicated by Warren 
(2010), there is much evidence that natural disasters are growing on a global level. In 
contrast to the 73 disasters reported during 1900 to 1909, 2,788 disasters occurred during 
2000 to 2005 (Kusumasari et al., 2010).  
Natural disasters can impact on regions’ or countries’ economies (e.g. destruction of 
buildings, roads, infrastructure, farms, loss of income, loss of jobs, weakening markets). 
As indicated by Van Westen (2013), there is a need to understand the problems that are 
triggered by disasters and the consequences of them, to study risk assessment and to 
prepare for disasters before they occur in order to mitigate and reduce the impact of 
disasters on people, property and the economy and to improve the response to each type 
of disaster. Such a need has given the impetus to collate and understand local risk levels 
and the vulnerability of cities through a technology platform that can integrate disaster 
related intelligence to support interactive risk assessment involving multi-agencies 
(Kolbe, 2005; Marincioni, 2007). 
As described in the UK Emergency Preparedness Report (Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil 
Contingency Act 2004) from the Cabinet Office (2013c) Integrated Emergency 
Management (IEM) is a comprehensive approach to the prevention and management of 
emergencies which views these activities as a whole. IEM is made up of six steps. 
Emergency Preparedness relates to the first four steps which are anticipation, assessment, 
prevention and preparation, while Emergency Response and Recovery covers the final 
two steps which are response and recovery. The purpose of IEM is to increase and 
maintain resilience in order to meet a variety of potential challenges. A vital aspect of 
IEM is the need for multi-agency collaboration so that there is a common understanding 
across all agencies. In order to meet this need, this research focuses on a collaborative 
platform for risk assessment. It is hoped that this platform can then be used as the basis to 
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support other phases such as anticipation, prevention, preparation, response and recovery 
management in the future.  
The Emergency Preparedness Report from the Cabinet Office (2013c) also suggests that 
risk assessment should form the foundation for emergency planning and business 
continuity plans which can then be tested by detailed appraisals and exercises. When risk 
assessment is updated, plans are revised and additional tests are carried out. Risk 
assessment, therefore, has a clear knock-on effect on the subsequent steps in the IEM 
process: preparation and prevention. Risk assessment helps multi-agency planners decide 
what resource requirements they need and what multi-agency activities need to be 
planned collaboratively in order to prepare for disaster. In order to make sure that plans 
are appropriate for the risks in an area, such plans must be created by a risk assessment 
process which considers, evaluates and then prioritizes local hazards and threats and the 
risks that come with them. Technology plays an important role here as computer software 
modelling of this information can provide significant assistance in assessing risk (Gordon, 
2002; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008).  
Overall, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2002) suggests that risk 
assessment is a vital component in the preparedness step because it increases the 
awareness of risks and thus enables superior mitigation and preparation. Moreover, it is 
argued that if a risk assessment is to be successful, then it must be understood and 
communicated properly. With this point established, the importance of risk assessment is 
clear. In short, preparedness is only as good as the risk assessment that produces the 
preparedness. 
Risk assessment consists of multiple steps. This research uses the six-step risk assessment 
process based on the standard used in Australia and New Zealand which is widely 
recognized as being good practice. These steps are Contextualization, Hazard Review, 
Risk Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Risk Treatment and Monitoring and Reviewing 
(Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Standard Committee, AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009). 
The first step in this process, contextualization, is vital. It is important to give the many 
agencies involved a full picture of the characteristics of the local area and the local risk 
environment, such as an overview contextualization of social intelligence (such as the 
demographic, ethnic and social composition of the community); geographical 
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distributions; the identification of vulnerable groups; the level of community resilience; 
an overview of the local environment and an understanding of local vulnerabilities; the 
characteristics of space (urban, rural, mixed); an overview of scientific sites; an overview 
of the local infrastructure (transport, utilities, business); an overview of the critical supply 
network and critical services (telecommunication hubs, health, finance, etc.) and an 
overview of potential hazardous sites (and their relationships with communities) or 
sensitive environmental sites (FEMA, 2010). This type of information can help the 
various agencies establish a collective understanding of the local risk level and make 
better decisions.   
As noted, risk assessment supports multi-agency teams in achieving preparedness. As a 
result, collaboration in risk assessment is crucial. It has been argued by many scholars 
that the requirement for collaboration between agencies in disaster management is clearly 
an essential element in creating a more accessible and transparent service delivery system 
in any future disasters (GAO, 2002; McEntire, 2008; Kapucu, & Garayev, 2011). 
Williams (2002) identified collaboration as a process of give and take that provides space 
for the construction of solutions that no individual actor could achieve alone. 
Collaboration is the only practical method for dealing with the complex and interrelated 
problems that cross administrative and jurisdictional boundaries. Where collaboration 
does not occur, the result can be delays or inefficiencies, inconsistencies, or even 
ineffective decisions made at a crucial time. Indeed the reason for developing 
collaboration in the risk assessment process is to allow agencies to move towards a 
common understanding of the local risks and develop a common risk mitigation plan.  
Many researchers have identified the need for a collaborative platform for multi-agencies 
to prepare for disasters. The need for a platform that can enhance collaboration and 
collaborative decision-making concerning risk assessment has been argued for in the 
literature (Van Westen, 2013). However, little research is evident on the exploration of 
the nature of such a collaborative platform (Van Westen, 2013). Fleischauer et al. (2006) 
noted that spatial mapping is often not implemented to its full potential. There are many 
possible reasons for this lack of technological support. Little research has been done on 
how best to incorporate cascading effects into risk assessment mapping and this suggests 
that more work needs to be done on how multiple hazards can be mapped in risk 
assessment. It is also argued that, in the main, advances in technology are not translated 
into a form that practitioners and stakeholders can use. This could be due to the 
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complicated nature of the interactions between a user and the platform they are using 
(Van Westen, 2013).  
Past research has concluded that a map system has benefits in the risk assessment process 
because it encourages proactive rather than just reactive thinking. Alexander et al. (2011) 
found that such a map needs to be interactive and allow the user to manipulate scenarios. 
The system needs to enable communication, the sharing of professional knowledge and 
be user-friendly. However, they suggested that more research is required into the kind of 
information and the level of information that can be included in such a platform (Van 
Westen, 2013; MacEachren, 2005). The main purpose of this research is to investigate the 
system characteristics of a collaborative risk assessment environment where agencies can 
work collaboratively in order to enable participants to visualise and analyse various risks 
through an interactive map environment. 
According to UN-Habitat (2007), risk assessment can support decision-making and 
increase risk awareness among various agencies. Furthermore, the visualisation of 
existing and potential hazards, vulnerabilities, capacities and risks has a vital impact on 
the work of agencies, more so than traditional methods (Martin et al., 1997; Husdal, 
2001).  Therefore, there is an assumption that, by adopting a visualisation approach, 
agencies can perceive facts and evaluate various risks through visualisation techniques. 
Interactive visualisation in the risk assessment process can help agencies explore high-
risk areas, assess the location of vulnerable people and vulnerable areas, and view the 
capacities and resources available for those at risk in order to lessen their vulnerability 
(Whiteman, 1998; Rashed and Weeks, 2002; Lagorio, 2001; Kraak, 2006; UN-Habitat, 
2007). Furthermore, the creation of different visual scenarios can improve agencies’ 
collective understanding of risk levels and of their capacities. Visualisation can also be 
used as a common language to facilitate communication amongst the various agencies in 
the risk assessment environment. Interactive visualisation is widely considered as an 
effective and preferable medium for communication compared to other established 
methods, such as paper drawings or static images. Three-dimensional visualisation 
increases perception and enhances the effectiveness of multi-agency decisions (Christie, 
1994; Kolbe et al., 2005; Zlatanova, 2008).  
The above discussion indicates that a collaborative environment is necessary to allow 
agencies to communicate and consult in order to have a common understanding of risks. 
The range of information that supports risk assessment needs to be visualised seamlessly 
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so that the agencies coming from different backgrounds can easily understand the subject 
under view. An interactive map could be used as the basis for risk exploration during the 
risk assessment process (Slocum et al., 2005). However, the nature of an interactive map 
that can support collaborative risks’ assessment by agencies is still not well understood. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to address the following research question: 
What are the keys functional characteristics of an interactive map that can enhance multi-
agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster management? The 
research plans to identify the characteristics of an interactive map that can allow agencies 
to communicate their ideas, exchange information and engage in visual thinking. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
Aim 
The aim of this research is to investigate the nature of an interactive map that can 
enhance multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster 
management. 
Objectives: 
1. To analyse the risk assessment process and capture key stakeholders’ views in 
risk assessment processes.  
2. To identify the key functional characteristics of an interactive map that can 
enhance multi-agency teams’ collaboration in the risk assessment process in 
disaster management. 
3. To design the look and feel of an interactive map that can enhance multi-agency 
team collaboration in risk assessment processes in disaster management. This 
design specification will be used to implement a prototype of the interactive map, 
with the support of a skilled IT person. 
4. To evaluate whether the enhanced features of an interactive map has the potential 
to strengthen collaboration between multi-agency teams in risk assessment 
processes. 
1.3 Research Scope  
Collaboration is a crucial central part of IEM in the UK. Many policies and frameworks 
have been adopted to support multi-agency collaboration, risk assessment and 
preparedness in response to disasters and the guidance followed in the UK demands 
extensive collaboration at national, regional and local levels. As indicated in Figure1.1 
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the focus of this research is on the local level and on the work of the local resilience 
forums (LRFs), taking the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum as an example. 
LRFs are groups made up of various response agencies and, as such, are the mechanism 
for multi-agency collaboration in the UK. The Greater Manchester Local Resilience 
Forum is ideal for the study of the effectiveness of implementing the interactive map 
prototype because of the effective collaborative working undertaken in the Forum; this 














Figure1.1: Likely engagement of Central Government in emergencies occurring in England 
(Cabinet Office, 2013) 
 As shown in Figure 1.1, there are overlaps of interaction in the response for single scene 
local incidents up until incidents that require national coverage and which are 
catastrophic in nature. The researcher is investigating interaction, engagement and 
response arrangement between incidents, scene, impact, communication and different 
organisations at a local level and this further justifies the rationale for selecting Greater 
Manchester Local Resilience Forum.  
1.4 The Research’s Contribution to Knowledge   
This research contributes to the new knowledge on collaborative working within disaster 
management. It specifically focuses on enhancing knowledge by the application of 
interactive maps in supporting the six-step risk assessment process and multi-agency 
collaboration. This research has conducted an in-depth analysis to identify the key 
stakeholders involved in the risk assessment process as well as the information required 




to and analyse in order to create a common understanding of the local risks by conducting 
a thorough risk analysis. This knowledge has been extracted from secondary data as well 
as primary data through interview of the Category 1 responders. This in-depth knowledge 
has been used to establish a viable interactive map that can visually present the risks that 
is required in the six-step risk assessment process. The overall construction of the 
interactive map is also a contribution to knowledge due to its design using different 
system views such as Team Member view, Information view, Process/Activity view and 
Data Visualisation view. 
Finally this research collected and analysed feedback from the Greater Manchester 
Local Resilience Forum development group to capture “perceived effectiveness” of 
such an interactive map in supporting the risk assessment process as well as its 
potential for strengthening the collaboration between multi-agencies. Specifically, 
this research has contributed to knowledge as follows.  
 The identification of functional characteristics on interactive map this knowledge 
could be used by the researcher community to develop different type of 
interactive maps using other technology such as virtual reality (VR) to support 
collaborative risk assessment involving key agencies in a city. 
 The research conducted in this research has lead to the implementation and 
demonstration of an interactive map. The implemented interactive map illustration 
has the data required for the risk assessment could be combined, visualized and 
manipulated to build up a holistic view of local risk and help multi-agency to 
engage in decision during various stage of the risk assessment process.  
 Data an “perceived effectiveness” of an interactive map from category 1 
responder in supporting the six-step risk assessment process as well as multi-
agency collaboration.  This contribution gives confidence to the research 
community that the outcome is not just hypothetical but has been valid by the 
practitioners who are engaged in risk assessment in a major city. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is structured into the following chapters. Chapter 1 generally introduces the 
research’s motivation and aim and objectives. It also presents the contribution to 
knowledge made by this research. The literature review is presented in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, with Chapter 2 outlining the guidelines for disaster management and the 
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organisational structure while Chapter 3 reviews various technological solutions for 
disaster management and the importance of an interactive map for risk assessment. The 
technologies that can provide multi-agency teams with an environment for the exchange 
of information, scenarios’ presentation and a natural interface to present their ideas for 
risk assessment are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical 
foundation for this research, with investigations into the Activity Theory, Critical 
Thinking, models of team collaboration and a theoretical framework for this study. 
Chapter 5 provides detailed information on the research design used in this thesis. The 
chapter is structured under the following major headings: research philosophy, research 
approach and research techniques. Chapter 6 presents the outcome of the interviews 
conducted to identify the user requirements for the interactive map. Chapter 7 describes 
the possibilities for the design of the system and the conceptual framework of the design 
and the implementation of the system. Chapter 8 describes the evaluation of the 
interactive map prototype in order to test its ability to support collaboration and to 
enhancing multi-agency teams’ risk assessment process. After this prototype was defined, 
it was necessary to provide a methodology for the evaluation of the system, which is 
described in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 presents the evaluation results collected during the 
evaluation experiment of the interactive map prototype, while Chapter 10 discusses the 
findings and their implications in reference to the literature. It also presents the 
limitations of this research. Finally, Chapter 11 presents an overall conclusion to this 
research and the extent to which it has achieved its aims and objectives and gives 
recommendations for future research in this field.  
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has described the scope of this research. It introduces the motivations for 
this research and the aim and objectives. Also, the structure of the thesis is outlined. The 
next chapter presents the background to disaster management cycles, the good practices 
undertaken by holistic approaches and the organizational structure of those organisations 







Chapter 2 – Analysis of guideline processes & the organizational 
structure in disaster management   
 
2.1 Introduction   
Throughout the past century the occurrences of natural and man-made disasters have 
steadily increased. With significant loss of life, damage to infrastructure and property and 
destruction of the environment, they appear to be increasing in both the rate of occurrence 
and intensity (Sahani and Ariyabandu, 2003). Indeed, there is significant evidence of the 
growth of natural disasters on a global level: for instance, in the years 1900 to 1909 
natural disasters occurred 73 times, whereas from 2000 to 2005 this number increased to 
2,788 (Kusumasari et al., 2010). As stated by Guha-Sapir et al. (2011) the number of 
victims increased to 232 million in the period 2001–2010, with most of the incidents 
caused by hydrological disasters. 
2.2  Definition of a Disaster  
According to Shaluf et al. (2003), there are many different definitions for a disaster but 
none of them are universally accepted yet. The reason that disasters are defined 
differently is because of the system by which they are explained. As indicated by 
Siriwardena et al. (2007), definitions of a disaster are based on technical, sociological, 
political and medical systems. Moreover, Eshgi and Larson (2008) stated that the 
definition of a disaster could vary based on the geographic, economic and political 
situations of disaster-prone countries. Disasters occur as the result of a combination of 
hazards, vulnerabilities and a lack of measures. Figure 2. 1 shows the elements that 




Figure 2. 1: The elements that constitute disasters. Source: CBSE (2006). 
 
As seen in Figure 2.1, hazards constitute events that trigger disaster when vulnerability 
exists. According to authors such as Coppola (2007), “hazard is an action, event or object 
that maintains a positive likelihood of affecting man, or possibly has a consequence that 
may adversely affect man’s existence”. This indicate that the trigger events listed in 
Figure 2.1 (such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides) will remain hazards with 
the potential to cause harm, until they interact with underlying causes, dynamic pressure 
and unsafe conditions (such as vulnerability) and then disaster will occur. This is perhaps 
why one of the most utilised definitions used in the area of disaster management is 
derived from the United Nations - International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN-
ISDR). UN-ISDR (2009) states that a disaster is “a serious disruption of the function of 
society, causing widespread human or environmental losses which exceed the ability of 
the affected society to cope using only its own resources”. Parker (1992) also reviewed 
the subject area of disasters and described a disaster as  “an unusual natural or man-made 
event, including an event caused by failure of technological systems, which temporarily 
overwhelms the response capacity of human communities, groups of individuals or 
natural environments and which causes massive damage, economic loss, disruption, 
injury, and/or loss of life”.  
In addition, Haigh and Amaratunga (2010) stated that a disaster is an exceptional event 
with overwhelming loss of life and property. While all these definitions on disaster focus 
on a disaster’s impact and causes, the definition given by some authors focuses on the 
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dynamic or manner of occurrence. According to Kelman and Pooley (2004) and Shaluf 
and Ahmadun (2006), disasters are sudden events which bring serious disruption to 
society with massive human, material and environmental losses which go beyond the 
capacity of the affected society to cope with using its own resources. Although the 
definition by Kelman and Pooley (2004) also emphasised the impact of disaster, the 
emphasis on the “sudden” occurrence of events that lead to serious disruption within 
society indicate the unexpected nature of what a disaster is. Therefore, the disaster 
context connotes an unanticipated event and occurrence wherein people are unaware of 
the time it will occur. While the sudden nature, impacts and causes of disaster will 
continue to be debated, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP-APELL, 
2003) has created the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and 
associated websites to define disasters and record them within databases. CRED requires 
that, for any event to be recorded as a disaster in their databases, at least one of the 
following standards have to be achieved:  
 Ten or more people reported killed. 
 One hundred people reported affected. 
 A call for international assistance. 
 A declaration of a state of emergency. 
These criteria help to clarify which data is recorded by CRED. They, however, fail in 
ensuring that disaster or any event that causes serious disruption within a society are well 
managed and their impacts prevented. This gap between the various definitions of 
disaster and the criteria for what constitutes a disaster emphasises the importance of this 
research which aims to investigate the nature of an interactive map that can enhance 
multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster management. 
However, in order to do this, it is important to understand the types of disaster and their 
classifications so that assessing their risks can be better managed.  
2.2.1 Disaster Type 
As with the differences in defining a disaster, scholars classify disasters differently. 
According to Shaluf et al. (2003) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC, 2012), the classification of a disaster depends on the cause of 
the disaster, whether natural or man-made. However, Shaluf and Ahmadun (2006) and 
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Shaluf (2007) have added a third type of disaster, namely a hybrid disaster that is caused 
by a combination of natural and man-made disasters. More detail is given in Table 2. 1.  
The first column indicates disaster type, the second column the sub-disaster name and the 
third column the name of the disaster.  
Table 2. 1: Disaster types (Shaluf and Ahmadun, 2006; Shaluf, 2007) 
Disaster 
type 
Sub-disaster name Name of disaster 









Windstorms (cyclones, typhoons, 
hurricanes) tornadoes, hailstorms and 
snowstorms, sea surges, floods, 
droughts, heat waves/cold waves. 
Biological phenomena infestations Infestations: such as locust swarms, 
mealy bug. Epidemics:  such as 
cholera, dengue, ebola, malaria, 
measles, meningitis, yellow fever, 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis. 
Man-made Socio-technical technological 
disasters 
Fire explosions:  such as munitions’ 
explosions, chemical explosions, 
nuclear explosions, mine explosions. 
Leakage.  
Release of toxic pollutions (pollution, 
acid rain, chemical pollution, 
atmospheric pollution). 
Structural collapse of physical assets. 
Transportation disasters Air disasters. 
Land disasters. 
Sea disasters. 
Stadia or other public places’ 
failures 
Fire, structural collapse, crowd 
stampede. 
Warfare divided 1.National Civil war between armed groups 
from the same country, civil strikes, 
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Conventional war: war between two 
armies from different countries, 
sieges, blockades. 
Non-conventional war: nuclear, 
chemical, biological. 
Hybrid Natural and man-made events Flood causing explosion(s) (fire, 
chemical explosion, etc.) 
Earthquake causing nuclear radiation, 
chemical explosion, etc. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the relationship between the causes of disasters and the trigger points 
that translate a hazard into a major disaster (when there are severe consequences at a 
given location). Thus a better understanding is required of the relationship between a 
hazard (which has been explained as a potential event which has the likelihood of 
affecting man (Coppola, 2007)), vulnerability (which increases the impact of a hazard on 
man’s existence) and resilience (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2005) (which is the inherent 
coping capacities for recovering from, and dealing with, disasters (Perrow, 2011).  
2.2.2  Hazards, Vulnerabilities and Resilience  
Regardless of a specific definition or classification, disasters occur when vulnerability 
and a hazard meet (Blaikie et al., 1994; Guha-Sapir et al., 2004). These terms are critical 
in the understanding of disaster management. In addition, UN-ISDR (2009) suggests that 
resilience is a third important concept.   
2.2.2.1 Hazard  
Hazard is explained by UN-ISDR (2009) as a “dangerous phenomenon, substance, human 
activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property 
damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or 
environmental damage”. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC, 2012) hazards can be classified into two main types which are 
natural and man-made. 
Natural hazards are naturally occurring physical phenomena which can be geophysical 
(earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches, floods), 
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climatological (extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires), meteorological (cyclones, 
storms/wave surges) or biological (disease epidemics, insect/animal plagues). 
Technological or man-made hazards (complex emergencies/conflicts, famine, 
industrial/transport accidents) are events that are caused by humans and occur in, or close 
to, human settlements. These hazards can include environmental degradation and 
pollution (IFRC, 2012). 
2.2.2.2 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is defined by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) (2006), as 
“the extent to which a community, structure, services or geographic area is likely to be 
damaged or disrupted by the impact of particular hazard, on account of their nature, 
construction and proximity to hazardous terrains or a disaster prone area”. McEntire 
(2001) classified vulnerability into the following categories: physical (inappropriate and 
weak construction of buildings), social (restricted education, including insufficient 
knowledge about disasters), cultural (public indifference about disaster), political (limited 
number of institutions that have knowledge of disasters), economic (few resources that 
are important in preventing disasters like planning and management) and technological 
(the lack of using appropriate technology to mitigate the impact of disasters).  
2.2.2.3 Resilience  
The term “resilience” is largely attributed to ecological systems and originated from 
within the body of ecological literature (Adger, 2000a; Gallopín, 2006; Holling, 1973). 
The term has been subsequently applied to a range of subject localities such as 
psychology, materials’ sciences, economics, environmental studies and social sciences 
(Adger, 2000a; McDaniels et al., 2008). The discussion here is limited to the concept of 
resilience from a social sciences’ perspective, addressing hazards, climate change and 
related disciplines.  
Adger (2000) discussed ecological resilience from two perspectives: (a) the amount of 
disturbance a system can absorb before it changes its structure by changing the variables 
and processes that control its behaviour, and (b) the speed of recovery following a 
disturbance. Consequently, social resilience has been defined as “the ability of 
communities to withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure” (Adger, 2000). 
On a similar note, Carpenter et al. (2001) defined resilience as “the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be tolerated before a socio-ecological system moves to a different 
15 
 
region of state space controlled by a different set of processes”. Both these definitions 
infer resistance to disturbance as a key criterion of resilience. However, Carpenter et al. 
(2001) emphasised that resilience has the characteristics of: (a) the amount of change a 
system can undergo whilst retaining the same structure and function, (b) the degree to 
which a system is capable of self-organisation, and (c) the degree to which a system can 
build the capacity to learn and adapt.  
In short, a disaster happens when a hazard in the environment affects an area which has 
vulnerability, for instance, a river flooding (hazard) affects a collection of houses built 
close to the river (vulnerability). The area is resilient to an extent to which it can recover 
from the effects of the flood.  In this simple example, the area would have high resilience 
if it had flood defences which kept the water level to a minimum. In contrast, if no 
defences were in place then the damage would be extensive and it would take a long time 
to recover. The area would, therefore, have low resilience.  
2.2.3 Disaster Management Definition and Cycle   
The aim of disaster management is to reduce or avoid the potential losses from hazards, 
assure prompt and appropriate assistance to victims of disaster, and achieve rapid and 
effective recovery.  Many different definitions exist for disaster management, amongst 
which is that of Deshmukh et al. (2008) who stated that it is an integrated process of 
planning, organizing, coordinating and implementing measures that are needed for 
effectively dealing with impact on people. As described by Clerveaux et al. (2010), the 
disaster management cycle illustrates the process and steps that should be followed in a 
disaster to reduce the impact on society, provide a fast response and ensure the best 
recovery from the consequences of disaster. Four phases presented by Alexander (2002) - 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery - have been widely used by policy 
makers, practitioners, trainers, educators, and researchers. Figure 2. 2 shows the disaster 


















Figure 2. 2: The disaster management cycle (Alexander, 2002) 
 
The key phases of disaster management are identified - before the event - as 
mitigation/preparedness and - after the event - as response and recovery. Mitigation 
involves reducing or eliminating the likelihood or the consequences of a hazard and seeks 
to “treat” the hazard such that it impacts on society to a lesser degree (Alexander, 2002). 
As explained by Haddow et al. (2013) definition of preparedness as plans or preparations 
made to save lives or property and to assist the response and rescue service operations. 
This phase covers implementation/operation, early warning systems and capacity 
building so that the population will react appropriately when an early warning is issued. 
According to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA, 2007,) response is 
“immediate and ongoing activities, tasks, programmes, and systems to manage the effects 
of an incident that threatens life, property, operations, or the environment.  Response 
activities may include the preservation of life, meeting basic human needs, preserving 
business operations, and protecting property and the environment.”  Alexander (2002) 
explained recovery as returning victims’ lives back to a normal state following the impact 
of disaster consequences. The recovery phase generally begins after the immediate 
response has ended and can continue for months or years thereafter. 
2.2.4 Summary  
The preceding sections defined a variety of disasters that can be divided into the 
categories of natural, man-made and hybrid. Connected to each of these disaster types are 
the terms hazard (a danger in an area), vulnerability (the likelihood of this danger 
affecting the area) and resilience (the ability of the area to recover in the event of a 
disaster). These are core concepts in the disaster management cycle which is the cyclical 
process that reduces or avoids the effects of hazards, assists the victims of a disaster and 
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aims to ensure effective recovery if a disaster occurs, taking place before, during and 
after a disaster event.  
2.3 Holistic Approach to Disaster Management 
Several well-known holistic approaches have been published in relation to disaster 
management. In economically developed countries like the USA and the UK, holistic 
approaches are taken. In the USA, a holistic approach includes four main phases of 
emergency management (EM): mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Tierney 
& Cigler, 2009). Meanwhile, in the UK the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) 
consists of six steps; the first four stages are referred to as the Emergency Preparedness 
steps consisting of anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation. The final two 
steps are referred to as Emergency Response and Recovery (Guidance on Part 1 of the 
Civil Contingency Act 2004, Cabinet Office, 2013c). The UK’s holistic approach for 
emergency management is aimed at creating a connected, multi-agency response to 
emergencies at local level up to national levels. The holistic approach explicitly aims to 
boost the coordination and collaboration between multi-agencies and to ensure that new 
information is passed on and that responders at local and regional levels can maintain 
policies passed down from the central government. Since the aim of this research is to 
study risk assessment aimed at supporting emergency preparedness, the key approaches 
used in preparedness is discussed next. These holistic approaches are achieved through 
following specific guidelines which offer models of good practice. 
The guidance presented in these approaches (which focus on collaboration among 
different agencies in preparing for different hazards) is important because different 
agencies may have access to different information that needs to be shared with other 
groups. In the USA, the authorities have adopted the concept of a Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide (CPG) (Fugate, 2010) whereas the UK uses a risk assessment process 
based on the standard used in Australia and New Zealand (Standards Australia/Standards 
New Zealand Standard Committee, AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009). These guidelines are 
explained below. Within these guidelines, risk assessment plays a critical role because it 




2.3.1 USA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 
The CPG aims to ensure that the basic aspects of emergency plans are based on a 
thorough examination of a threat or hazard. The guidelines suggest that plans ought to be 
integrated and coordinated between agencies. The purpose of the guidelines is to build 
systematic planning into all phases of emergency management and emphasizes the need 
for the entire life cycle of an emergency to be accounted for. The guidelines call for a 
clear understanding of hazards, required capabilities and an outline of the roles and 
responsibilities of responders and stakeholders. They emphasize the need for a 
community to address its own specific context in terms of the risks faced and the 
resources available (Fugate, 2010).   
The planning process is an important process in the preparedness phase. The process 
involves different sources of information which are brought together to create plans that 
can be used in an emergency and, therefore, increase preparedness. Collaboration 
between different agencies in planning is crucial because different agencies may have 
access to different information that needs to be shared with other groups in order to plan 
effectively. Moreover, planning is most successful when done as a team. When successful, 
the planning process allows multiple agencies to integrate in order to effectively prepare 
for disasters (Abbott, 2002). The model below in Figure 2. 3 shows the stages of the 
planning process. The model is intended to be flexible and adaptable for different 
emergencies. Each step will now be described in detail.   
 





Step 1 – Form a Collaborative Team 
It is widely suggested that, in order to effectively plan for emergencies, all agencies 
should be aware of their role and responsibilities. Research into emergency management 
has shown that a successful response to a disaster involves all participating agencies 
having a good understanding of their own role and the roles of other agencies. This can 
be best achieved during the preparedness stage. It is, therefore, important for agencies to 
collaborate in the planning process. This can be achieved by creating a planning team 
which includes representatives from different agencies. Collaboration at this stage will 
help improve relationships between agencies and, in turn, support creative and innovative 
planning. In this step, a number of guidelines can be followed by these agencies in order 
to effectively collaborate (Alexander, 2002). These are: 
Plan ahead: Representatives from agencies need to know in advance the time and location 
of the planning meeting.  
Provide information about team expectations: Representatives should be given a clear 
explanation of the purpose of the meeting and an outline of how their contribution will be 
important for the planning process. Essentially, representatives need to be motivated to 
attend.  
Allow flexibility in scheduling after the first meeting: After the first meeting it may not 
be required that all members of the collaborative planning team attend all other meetings. 
Subcommittees could be established to complete the work, but should be given guidance 
about time frames and milestones.  
Consider using external facilitators: Outside third-party organizations could be employed 
to manage the planning process and encourage collaboration between different agencies 
by mediating any disagreements.  
With these guidelines in mind, the core planning team can be established. The leader of 
the team needs to be elected or appointed, usually from within one of the agencies 
involved in the collaboration. While initially the core planning team will be made up of 
representatives from the emergency agencies that are directly involved in risk assessment, 
the team can be supported by other experts from different departments or organizations 
who can provide different information and advice. Moreover, because emergencies and 
disasters affect communities, it is advisable to work with some representatives from the 
local community in preparing for disaster. Depending on the context, representatives 
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could include people from social, religious and educational organizations, voluntary 
organizations and local infrastructure managers and planners. This will help the 
emergency planning team to better understand the local population and identify 
vulnerable places within the area. Representatives from the community can provide 
information about local hazards, the local population and their capabilities. A good 
relationship between the core planning group and the local community enhances trust 
which ultimately helps in preparing for disasters (Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program, 2007; Hewett et al., 2001).  
Step 2 – Understanding the Situation 
Once the core planning team has been established, they can begin to collect information 
relating to the threats and hazards in their area. Resources (such as money, equipment, 
manpower) allocated for emergency management also need to be considered.  The 
information that needs to be collected is varied and includes the potential risks in an area 
and how the geographical features of the area could affect these risks. Furthermore, the 
demographics of the human and animal populations and should be gathered in preparing 
for disaster. This information can come from previous emergency planning work such as 
past threat assessments and mitigation plans. Also, local organizations like businesses and 
utility companies can provide information and guidance. Government and historical 
records can also be used to gather information which will help the planning group fully 
understand the situation (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008).  
After the information has been collected, it needs to be organized and stored in a way that 
can be used effectively by the planning team. The risk analysis process organizes 
information about threats and hazards according to the following factors: 
1) Probability or frequency of occurrence. 
2) Magnitude (the physical force of the hazard). 
3) Intensity/severity (expected damage or impact that could be caused). 
4) Time available for warning. 
5) Location of the incident. 
6) Potential size of the area affected. 
7) Speed of the impact (how quickly a disaster will affect the community). 
8) Duration (how much time the incident will last). 
9) Cascading effects (one impact causing another impact). 
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The risk assessment allows the planning team to decide which threats and hazards should 
be given priority. In turn, this helps them decide what resource requirements they need 
and what multi-agency activities need to be planned collaboratively in order to prepare 
for disaster. Planning teams may take different approaches and employ different 
techniques to assess the risk using this information. Methods include mathematical 
approaches, qualitative ratings (high, medium, low) and the use of index numbers 
(number scales like 1-10, 1-5 or 1-3). Computer software modelling of this information 
can also be a significant help in planning to assess risk (Gordon, 2002; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2008).  
Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives 
After understanding the situation and prioritising the most important threats and hazards 
in an area, the collaborative planning team has to outline what they would want to 
achieve in an emergency situation. This effectively means defining what it would mean 
for an emergency response to be successful, given all the information they have acquired 
about the size and scale of the threat.  
This is achieved by first imagining a disaster situation by drawing on the information 
gathered in the previous step to create a scenario. With the correct information collected, 
this scenario will give a realistic simulation of the entire life cycle of a disaster and its 
impact on the community. Using realistic scenarios, the planning team can collaborate to 
identify their common vision. This common vision incorporates the goals and objectives 
of the agencies involved. In order to achieve these goals and objectives, the agencies need 
to understand their own role and responsibilities and those of the agencies with which 
they are collaborating.  For example, the vision in an emergency could be to save lives 
and prevent damage to property. The related goal could be to evacuate a population as 
quickly as possible. The more specific objective could, therefore, be to evacuate a certain 
number of affected people in a certain amount of time. By clearly defining goals and 
objectives, the multiple agencies involved in emergency planning can ensure that they 
achieve their common vision (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008; Hewett et 
al., 2001).  
Step 4: Plan Development 
With the goals and objectives defined, the planning stage is required to create solutions 
for meeting them. The planning team should aim to generate and compare multiple plans. 
As in Step 3, this is achieved by imagining a scenario and its progression, including the 
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actions and decisions that would need to be taken in the event of such a situation. The 
planning team needs to visualize the scenario using different tools. This can be done 
using, for example, a white board or a notice board but specialized computer planning 
software can also be employed to enhance the visualization and therefore the planning 
process.  
During this part of the planning process, a number of activities are involved. Typically, a 
timeline is established in which the events that could take place in a scenario are given a 
chronological order. Then the scenario is depicted by adding information, developed in 
the previous step, to the timeline. Next, decision points are identified and depicted on the 
timeline. This means determining when key decisions will need to be taken during the 
scenario. After this, the operational tasks need to be depicted on the timeline by asking 
some basic questions about the nature of the task, the responsible parties, the resources 
available and the expected effect of the task. Planners then need to make a decision about 
what action they will take by analysing the costs and benefits of each possible response in 
relation to the objectives they have defined (Quarantelli, 1995; O’Leary, 2004).  
Once the planners have chosen a course of action, they have to assess their resources and 
capabilities. Initially, planners tend to identify the resources needed to carry out their plan 
regardless of the availability of these resources. Subsequently, their requirements should 
be matched to the resources that are available to them. Using this matching process, 
shortfalls can be identified. A list of resources that are lacking can then be produced. This 
list can then be passed on to central government, other partners or private businesses to 
fill the gaps in resources. Similarly, the facilities (for example, hospitals and shelters) 
available in an emergency need to be considered. The effect that a disaster might have on 
these facilities needs to be taken into account. Resources and facilities have to match the 
geographical characteristics of an area. These considerations are put together to create a 
capability estimate which is a description of all the capabilities (such as staff, logistics 
and communications) and resources available to deal with a disaster. The capability 
estimate can be delivered in a number of ways including tables, written documents or 
presentations (Gordon, 2002; Alexander, 2002).  
Alongside the identification of resources is the identification of the information required 
during such an event. The planning group need to identify what information will be 
needed at different stages of the scenario, prior to decision points. Each agency requires 
specific information about the situation on the ground in order to fulfil their 
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responsibilities and make informed decisions during an emergency. In short, the multi- 
agency planning team needs to define what resources agencies will need and what 
information they will need (O’Leary, 2004; Perry and Lindell, 2007; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2008).  
Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review and Approval 
The purpose of this stage is to take the planning done in the previous steps and use it to 
produce a final, definitive plan. The plan is drafted and redrafted collaboratively to 
produce a final version with which the team is happy. This can then be distributed to 
other parties within the multi-agency response for their input and comment. A set of 
criteria can be used to assess the suitability of the plan. The adequacy, feasibility, 
acceptability, completeness and legal compliance of the plan need to be considered 
during the review of the plan. The final plan is then checked against legislation to make 
sure that it meets legal requirements before finally being communicated to all the 
agencies involved in disaster management. Ultimately, it will be their responsibility that 
the plan is carried out (Perry and Lindell, 2007; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2008).  
Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance 
After members of the planning team have agreed the plan, it then has to be distributed to 
the managers of the agencies involved who are then tasked with training their staff to 
implement it. The effectiveness of the plan and the training that is undertaken can be 
measured using a combination of training events, exercises and real world incidents. 
These test whether the plan has achieved its goals or not. It is important that the plan is 
maintained and updated with new information regularly by the team (National Response 
Team. 2001; Perry and Lindell, 2007). 
2.3.1.1 Summary  
The steps outlined above could be matched to the overviews of a collaboration platform. 
Such a platform would allow the multi-agency planning team to navigate the planning 
process. It would provide a means to create and maintain relationships between members 
of the multi-agency planning team. It would also enable users to collaboratively share 
information relating to threats and hazards and use this to assess risk. Moreover, it would 
support collaboration so that team members can arrive at goals and objectives that would 
help them achieve a common vision.  In addition, such a collaboration platform would 
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allow users to collaboratively draw on all their information to simulate disasters and 
develop plans using scenario-based planning. Finally, it would provide a tool for its users 
to test their plans and preparedness. Ultimately, the multi-agency planning process is a 
lengthy, complex and potentially expensive one. Therefore, a platform that can create a 
collaborative visual environment could support and simplify the process and enable 
multiple agencies to collaborate in order to share information, build comprehensive risk 
models, model hazards and their dependencies, test their preparedness, simulate and 
visualise disaster impact, and communicate and collaborate in developing better 
resilience cities. 
2.3.2 UK Risk assessment process  
The six step risk assessment process used within the UK’s IEM guidelines is based on the 
standard used in Australia and New Zealand which is widely recognized as being good 
practice (Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Standard Committee, AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009).  Figure 2.4 below illustrates the six steps. A brief description of each of 




Figure 2.4: The six-step risk assessment process (Cabinet Office 2012, Local responder risk 
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Step 1:  Contextualisation 
The standard suggests that local responders should describe the characteristics of the 
local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the 
community. This would help multi-agency teams to understand the context and to 
identify the vulnerability and resilience of the area to emergencies. To achieve this, multi-
agency teams should identify a number of aspects within their area. Firstly, there needs to 
be an exploration of various social information (such as the demographic, ethnic and 
social composition of the community, the geographical distribution, identification of 
vulnerable groups, level of community resilience). Secondly, multi-agency teams need to 
explore the local environment from a physical, rather than social, point of view. This 
involves understanding the local vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the space (urban, 
rural, mixed), the existence of other notable sites like ones of scientific interest. Thirdly, 
multi-agency teams have to explore the local infrastructure (transport, utilities, business), 
the critical supply network and critical services (telecommunication hubs, health, finance, 
etc.). Finally, multi-agency teams should undertake an exploration of potential hazardous 
sites and their relationships to communities or sensitive environmental sites. All these 
activities would help multi-agencies to understand the likelihood of, and the impact of, 
hazardous events in the local area (Cabinet Office 2012, Local responder risk assessment 
duty of Emergency Preparedness). 
Step 2: Hazard Review  
Hazards that present significant risks are identified on the basis of experience, historical 
data, research or other information. A hazard review should identify a large set of 
national hazards and then should review which of these could potentially affect a given 
area in a set timeframe. These hazards are imparted and discussed at multi-agency team 
meetings with a view to agreeing a list of hazards to be assessed. This hazard information 
helps members of multi-agency collaboration groups to make careful judgements on 
which hazards should be included in further assessment. This step could help multi-
agency teams to capture experience, intelligence and research data and communicate 
them to others during hazard review meetings (Cabinet Office, 2012).  
Step 3: Risk Analysis 
The purpose of this step is to consider the likelihood of, and the outcome and impact of, a 
hazard. Likelihood is estimated within a set timeframe and a rationale for its assessment 
is provided. This work can be divided and shared depending on the organisation of a 
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multi-agency group. What is most important is that all the relevant information and 
expertise is shared and communicated effectively. Input from all relative groups, 
including those that are outside the multi-agency team, should be taken into account. The 
simple definition of risk analysis is estimating the likelihood of a hazard occurring 
(Cabinet Office 2012, Local responder risk assessment duty of Emergency Preparedness). 
The process of analysing risk begins with an initial assessment of the probability of a 
hazard occurring and its probable consequences. While seemingly straight-forward, the 
process differs considerably depending on the nature of the agencies involved and their 
responsibilities. For instance, a multi-agency team made up mainly of representatives of 
the emergency services will usually have a responsibility to be open and informative to 
the public. Therefore, such teams are likely to consider risk analysis to be a more 
complex procedure than, for instance, a single private company would. Any organisation 
must base decisions about the structure and complexity of their risk analysis process on 
their organizational judgment. By their very nature, it is also likely that multi-agency 
teams will need to have a higher level of flexibility in their risk analysis procedures than 
single agencies. It is similarly important that multi-agency teams have robust systems in 
place to pass the outcomes of risk analysis on to the right team members and, in some 
cases, external stakeholders such as government and private enterprises (Cabinet Office 
2012, Local responder risk assessment of Emergency Preparedness).  
Step 4: Risk Evaluation  
The production of a risk matrix is an essential part of the risk assessment process. The 
notion of risk is divided into four risk ratings (very high, high, medium and low). These 
are used to indicate the risk level of a given hazard. Figure 2. 5 below illustrates the 
ratings and gives a brief description of each stage. Members of a multi-agency team 
compare these results to the risk criteria and confirm or modify these assessments. 
Moreover, existing capabilities to deal with potential hazards and threats are highlighted. 
It is common for a particular individual/group within a multi-agency group to be given 
responsibility for making recommendations on risk priorities which are then discussed 
and approved by the wider group. Effective collaboration at this stage can help agencies 
in having a holistic view of hazards in their local areas (Cabinet Office 2012, Local 
responder risk assessment of Emergency Preparedness).  
An essential part of risk evaluation is the creation of a 'risk matrix' which involves 
mapping risks by plotting them on a chart. This is undertaken by giving a hazard a score 
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for both its likelihood and its potential impact. Likelihood scores take into account the 
characteristics of a given site and are accompanied by a brief rationale for the score. 
Impact scores also come with a rationale and outline factors such as estimated numbers of 
casualties, the length of time an area might be cut off from electricity, or the size of an 
area that might be contaminated by a toxic substance. Different formulas are used by 
different emergency management teams to arrive at an overall place on the risk matrix. 
For instance, a risk matrix may place slightly more importance on the impact of a hazard 
than its likelihood. While different formulas and weightings can be used, there must be 
internal consistency. A multi-agency team should apply the same risk matrix repeatedly, 
so that results can be easily compared (Cabinet Office 2012, Local responder risk 
assessment of Emergency Preparedness). 
In giving a numerical value as an output, the use of a risk matrix gives a clear, repeatable 
method for risk evaluation. In addition, it gives a clear way of communicating 
information about risks which can be passed onto relevant members of a multi-agency 
team or on to external groups like the government, private businesses, charities and 
public in a given area.   
 





Definition of risk rating  
Very High (VH) Risk - these are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate 
attention. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential 
consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that 
strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in 
the form of multi-agency planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be 
put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency. Consideration should be given 
to planning being specific to the risk rather than generic. 
High (H) Risk - these risks are classed as significant. As with those in the VH risk 
category, they may have high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential 
consequences are sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate consideration (after those 
risks classed as 'very high'). Consideration should be given to the development of 
strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also mitigation in the form of, at least, 
multi-agency generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and the risk 
monitored on a regular frequency. 
Medium (M) Risk - these risks are less significant but may cause upset and 
inconvenience in the short-term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are 
being appropriately managed and consideration should be given to their being managed 
under generic emergency planning arrangements. 
Low (L) Risk - these risks are both unlikely to occur and are not significant in their 
impact. They should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and 
require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a 
substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category (Cabinet Office 2012, 
Local responder risk assessment of Emergency Preparedness). 
Step 5: Risk Treatment  
Risk treatment has a number of stages, namely assessing the type and extent of the 
capabilities required to respond to hazards; identifying any capabilities in place, 
considering the capability gap and the extent of the risk; rating the risk priority; 
identifying additional treatments required to close the capability gap and to manage the 
risks more effectively, and identifying whose responsibility it is to provide treatment, etc 
(Cabinet Office 2012, Local responder risk assessment of Emergency Preparedness).  
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Step 6:  Monitoring and Reviewing 
This stage implies that risks should be monitored continuously and that the previous steps 
(1-5) should be repeated when new risks are identified. Monitoring and reviewing is 
intended to answer a number of related questions. Firstly, do the risks persist? Secondly, 
have new ones arisen? Thirdly, has the probability or impact of risks changed? More 
generally, this stage involves the reassessment of a team's risk priorities.  
Feedback on the efficiency and effectiveness of previous decisions is provided at this 
stage. It gives multi-agency teams the chance to learn from successes, failures and near-
failures. While risk management consists of the review of risks, this stage is effectively a 
review of risk management itself. It should take place at least once a year with a 
fundamental exploration of all aspects of the risk management process. Moreover, such 
an exploration should make sure that risks, and the activities put in place to minimize 
them, are monitored within an appropriate period of time. In addition, it should ensure 
that systems are put in place to alert the correct sections of the multi-agency teams when 
a new risk arises or changes take place to already identified risks (Cabinet Office 2012, 
Local responder risk assessment of Emergency Preparedness). 
A theme throughout emergency management is the need for roles and responsibilities to 
be clearly defined and understood and this is no different at the monitoring and review 
stage. Part of this involves the efficient communication of information and experiences 
between different elements of a multi-agency team. This may be the ultimate 
responsibility of a team member or a specific role in itself. Effective communication is 
again key in sharing the results of the review and in the monitoring process, especially if 
the results are to be used to adapt and refine the overall risk management framework that 
a team operates within. Moreover, the outcomes of this stage can assist a team in refining 
its internal organization and improving its organizational culture (Cabinet Office 2012, 
Local responder risk assessment of Emergency Preparedness).  
2.3.2.1 Summary  
Having a six-step model for dealing with incidents in the UK (four of which are pre-
incident stages) emphasises the need for a better interactive platform that can enhance 
collaboration between all agencies involved in pre-incident planning. The IEM approach 
to dealing with disaster is not the basic four main phases of EM as operated in the USA, 
but rather four interrelated steps that require continuous assessment and review of risks, 
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(which is required for risks to be effectively managed (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2005)). For 
instance, the impacts of the 2007 summer floods and the 2014 winter floods are 
reminders of the inability of all stakeholders to interact in a way in which they are able to 
jointly engage in anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation for identified risks 
such as a flood and its impacts. This gap in the implementation of a UK model and the 
challenge of being able to engage at the required level of interaction between agencies 
and stakeholders emphasises the relevance of a supportive and interactive platform for 
multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process for dealing with 
disruptive incidents.  
2.3.3 Summary  
Overall, it is clear that the holistic approach to the four main phases of Emergency 
Management (EM) as used in the USA and the Integrated Emergency Management 
(IEM) peculiar to the UK, share commonalities. Both aim to provide an integrated 
approach and stress the importance of collaboration and coordination between multiple 
agencies. However, because the pre-incident steps in the IEM holistic approach are more 
in number than that of the EM four-phase approach in the USA, the cumbersome process 
of continuous interaction between multiple stakeholders within the risk assessment 
process can be challenging, if not almost impossible in some cases. The continuous 
impact of hazards such as floods in different cities across the UK indicate the need to 
enhance collaboration within multi-agency teams and their interaction concerning risks’ 
assessment at the anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation steps that lead to 
emergency response and recovery. Since this research uses the UK as a case study, the 
risk assessment process is critically examined within the context of the requirements for 
IEM, which also provides guidance and focus for this research. 
2.4   Organizational Structures for Disaster Management  
This section aims to identify and introduce the most well-known management system 
standards incorporating the well-organized management of incidents by integrating the 
facilities, personnel, equipment, procedures and communications that operate within a 
common organizational structure. Examples of such standards are the United States 
(USA) Incident Command System (ICS), the Australian Inter-service Incident 
Management System (AIIMS) and the United Kingdom organisational structure for 
disaster. The three countries use an ICS response model for responding. This is because, 
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for risk assessment to be effective and in order to ensure effective risk mitigation, 
reduction, elimination and prevention (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2005), hazards which have 
the likelihood of causing severe consequences to society ought to be examined before 
they actually cause harm to the public (Perrow, 2011). Therefore, this section focuses on 
the organisational structure in the UK, but starts with drawing the context from the 
systems and structures in the USA and Australia which are countries with a similar level 
of development.  
2.4.1 USA Incident Command System (ICS)  
ICS is a management system which allows effective and efficient management of 
domestic incidents (FEMA, 2008). It is a standardized management tool that is applicable 
to a wide range of emergencies, from small to large (FEMA, 2008).  The system: 
 Represents the standard for emergency management across the United States 
(USA) and is seen as “best practice.”  
 May be used for planned events, natural disasters and acts of terrorism.  
 Is a key feature of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (FEMA, 
2008). 
ICS Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of ICS, as shown in the Figure 2. 6, determines how the roles, 
power and responsibilities are assigned, controlled, coordinated, and how information 
flows between the levels of management. Since ICS allows for organizational flexibility, 
the Intelligence/Investigations Function can be embedded in several different locations 
within the organization. All levels of the USA government use ICS, as well as many 
private sector and non-governmental organizations. ICS is applicable across disciplines 
and is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: command, 




Figure 2. 6: ICS organizational structure (Source: FEMA, 2013) 
 
The responsibilities and functions of the ICS system are further outlined in Table 2. 2 
below. 
Table 2. 2: A brief explanation of the various departments within the ICS system (FEMA, 2008). 
Department/Section Purpose/Responsibilities 
Incident Commander Responsible for overall incident 
management, including ensuring clear 
authority and knowledge of agency policy 
and managing planning meetings as 
required. 
Public Information Officer Responsible for providing timely 
information for use in press/media and 
arranging interviews/briefings  
Safety Officer Responsible for managing safety processes 
by reviewing the Incident Action Plan for 
safety implications and approving the 
Medical Plan 
Liaison Officer Responsible for liaising between two 
organizations to communicate and 
coordinate their activities by providing 
specific information and requirements 
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Operations Section Responsible for managing all tactical 
operations at an incident 
Planning Section: Responsible for providing planning 
services for an incident and collects 
situation and resources’ status information, 
evaluates it, and processes the information 
for use in developing action plans 
Logistics Section Responsible for providing transportation, 
communication, facilities, food and medical 
services. 
Finance/Administration Section Responsible for managing all financial 
aspects of an incident. 
 
The ICS Planning Process 
Since poor emergency management is often linked to inadequate planning, ICS uses a 
simple yet thorough process for planning which involves: 
 Evaluating the situation.  
 Developing objectives.  
 Deciding on a strategy.  
 Deciding on appropriate resources (FEMA, 2008).  
During the initial stages of incident management, planners should develop a simple plan 
that can be communicated through concise verbal briefings. The plan, as mentioned here, 
refers to the documentation of statutory obligations for dealing with risks, the procedures 
for responses, the agencies required for the responses and the responsibilities of each 
stakeholder (Alexander, 2005). According to Alexander (2002), the minimum 
requirements for documenting planning arrangements for EM are based on effective risk 
assessment and on communication arrangements between agencies. While the contents of 
an emergency plan may vary based on the risks that the plan aims to manage (Dillon et al. 
2009), the interactions between agencies are expected to be based on an effective 
evaluation of the situation. Under the ICS planning arrangements in the USA which is 
adaptable and scalable (Buck et al. 2006), it may be necessary for such a plan to be 
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developed rapidly and without sufficient information. However, such plans require 
additional lead time, staff, information systems and technologies over time to enable 
more detailed planning. While including the implementation of formalized steps through 
a written Incident Action Plan (IAP) often help such plans, there are limitations in just 
developing a planning process for risk assessment on: evaluating the situation, 
developing objectives, deciding on a strategy and deciding on appropriate resources as 
listed above. The AIIMS system used in Australia seems to identify these limitations in 
the ICS planning process used in the USA by emphasising three key principles.  
2.4.2 The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) 
The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) is a system that 
allows effective and efficient management of domestic incidents (Council 2005). The 
framework allows for the integration of facilities, personnel, equipment, procedures and 
communications, all operating within a common organizational structure (Council, 2005). 
AIIMS is based on three key principles: 
• Management by objectives. 
• Functional management. 
• Span control (Council, 2005). 
These key principles indicate the importance of setting objectives for the risk assessment 
process and also establish the key functional responsibilities and relevance of 
collaboration between multi-agency teams in the risk assessment process.  
AIIMS’ Organizational Structure 
Used by all levels of government (national, state, agencies and local), AIIMS allows for 
organizational flexibility and is normally structured to facilitate activities in four 





Figure 2.7: Functional structure of AIIMS (Source: The Australasian Inter-Service Management 
System, 2004) 
The responsibilities and functions of the AIIMS system are further outlined in Table 2. 3 
below. 
Table 2. 3: A brief explanation of the various departments within AIIMS (Council, 2005). 
Department/Section Function/Responsibility 
Incident Control Oversees all activities necessary to manage 
the incident and distributes the functions to 
each organization.  
Planning Section Responsible for the collection and analysis 
of information and the development of plans 
for an incident.  
Operations Section Responsible for managing all tactical 
operations within an incident. 
Logistics Section Responsible for providing human and 
physical resources, facilities, services, and 
materials to support the management of an 
incident. 
 
It can be noticed that each department and section have specific responsibilities and 
functions which they perform, all aimed at mitigating the impact of any disruptive event. 
However, the AIIMS organisational structure emphasises the importance of the flow of 
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information between all departments and sections which are facilitated by different 
agencies. 
Incident Action Planning and Communication 
The Incident Management System is supported by the process of Incident Action 
Planning which is used to communicate throughout all levels of the structure to those 
involved in an incident, providing information and direction, and ensuring that all the 
section officers have the latest information on the current incident.  A planning meeting 
brings together all members of the incident management team and produces an Incident 
Action Plan (IAP).   
The importance of communication in effective incident management cannot be over-
stressed.  Briefings are a key element of this, ensuring a flow of information between all 
members of the incident management team.  Three types of briefing are used: before the 
team arrives at the incident, upon arrival and at regular intervals during the incident, and 
providing briefing to sector and division commanders (Council, 2005). However, it can 
be noticed that the AIIMS structure focuses largely on the response phase when it is often 
too late to assess risks with respect to prevention since the event is already occurring. 
Regardless, the focus on three types of briefings in the AIIMS structure emphasises the 
role and importance of interaction for dealing with the ongoing risks of an event that is 
happening. It also emphasises the relevance of this research to all phases of EM and to 
the six steps of IEM as seen in the UK model. 
2.4.3 UK Organizational Structure for Disaster  
Although the Australian and American structures give a useful context, the UK’s 
organisational structure is the main structure utilised in this research, given that it focuses 
on the UK. While LRFs is one of the main methods for multi-agency collaboration in 
England, a number of other organizations and policy initiatives also relate to multi-
agency collaboration. One such policy is the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability 
Programme (JESIP) and the one such organization is the DCLG (Pollock et al., 2013). 
While the DCLG links directly to LRFs, JESIP is a policy that runs in parallel in order to 
enhance the collaboration between three Category 1 responders, namely the fire and 
rescue, police and ambulance services (Cabinet Office, 2013; Pollock et al., 2013). 
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2.4.3.1  Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) 
The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) was explicitly created 
to improve the collaboration between the UK’s three ‘blue light’ responders (the police, 
fire and rescue, and the ambulance service). It aims to enhance interoperability by 
fostering a “shared ethos, reducing bureaucracy and improving situational awareness” 
(Pollock et al., 2013). The programme focuses on reworking and training, testing and 
exercising and procurement and equipment activities. JESIP was established following 
recommendations put forward after investigations had been made into a series of man-
made and natural incidents such as the 2010 shootings in Cumbria, the Hillsborough 
football disaster, the 2005 London bombings and the 2007 flooding (Rubin et al., 2005; 
Pitt, 2008; Chesterton, 2011). A common theme in the enquiries into these disasters was 
the need for greater cooperation and interaction between emergency responders. It was 
felt that increasing collaboration would ultimately reduce loss of life (Ellwood and Philip, 
2013). A temporary programme lasting two years, JESIP entails emergency services 
training together rather than in isolation, sharing information and working from a 
common emergency procedure. It, therefore, has been argued that, as a result, JESIP will 
have a lasting positive impact on responders’ interoperability (Pollock et al. and JESIP, 
2013). However, this two years’ programme has no formal or informal platform that 
enhances collaboration, cooperation and interaction between multi-agencies especially 
between Category 1 responders, thus emphasising the importance of this research aim. 
JESIP calls for the police, fire and ambulance services to collaborate on risk assessment 
and information sharing. Although JESIP’s main tasks can be divided into the four main 
features of doctrine and organization, shared situational awareness, operational 
communication and training and exercising, there is no evidence of an interactive model, 
platform or support that enhances multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment 
process. For example, in terms of doctrine and organization, JESIP calls for the three blue 
light responders to commit to interoperability in their doctrines and to include it in 
training manuals (Ellwood and Philip, 2013). In addition, JESIP involves an assessment 
system of the extent of responders’ interoperability and the creation of Joint Operating 
Principles for interoperability. However, there is no enhancement modality to enhance the 
assessment system. One of the programme’s tasks was to set up a governing organization 
that covers all three blue light responders so as to ensure their future interoperability 
(Ellwood and Philip, 2013). Moreover, JESIP aimed at defining a strategy to encourage 
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the recording and sharing of lessons learnt in past emergencies, but there is no stated 
support system for sharing such lessons among agencies.  
In terms of communication, JESIP includes a revision of how responders communicate 
using shared radio technology and on the use of common terminology when responders 
work together (Pollock et al., 2013). But this factor is often used during incident response 
and during joint exercises and is not part of a continuous risk assessment process as 
emphasised in Cabinet Office (2013). JESIP aims to improve shared situational 
awareness through the development of a number of shared models and frameworks, but 
unfortunately, it is mostly used during the response phase without collaborative use 
during the four steps before the response phase. While JESIP allows for the creation of 
guidelines for sharing information between responders, it is yet to be maximised for the 
pre-incident phases and steps in the UK. Finally, JESIP involves the development of 
numerous training courses and packages at different levels of emergency response. JESIP 
calls for the use of common terminology within these training courses which will be 
useful for multi-agency response (Pollock and JESIP, 2013). However, it is equally 
important that collaborative interaction between agencies is enhanced prior to the 
response phase in order to make multi-agency responses more effective.  
The overall aim of JESIP is to save as many lives as possible by ensuring that responders 
work together effectively and efficiently when they need to. This involved creating a 
shared set of principles that can be applied to all major events that require the services to 
collaborate. Moreover, JESIP aims to make sure that incident plans are put into action 
quickly and can be communicated across different agencies. While the outcomes from 
JESIP will affect the performance of agencies that operate within LRFs, it is also possible 
for the JESIP outcomes to be improved and for multi-agency collaboration to be 
enhanced through an interactive map such as the one proposed in this research. The next 
section examines another department that is directly linked to the LRFs, the Department 
of Communities and Local Government. 
2.4.3.2  Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
As previously explained, in the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 the UK’s central 
government gave local governments a set of responsibilities for emergency preparedness, 
response and recovery. This created the need for a connection between these two levels of 
government relating to emergency management. In this respect, the Department for 
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Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is the central governmental department 
responsible for liaising with local governments. The DCLG is responsible for supporting 
LRFs with information that could be useful in preparing and in planning for major 
emergencies, in risk assessment and in responding to disasters (Achour et al., 2015). The 
DCLG works closely with other central government departments as well as local 
authorities and the previously mentioned LRFs (Cabinet Office, 2013).  
Within the DCLG, the Resilience and Emergency Division (RED) interacts directly with 
the LRFs with the goal of providing support for collaboration and co-operation in risk 
assessment and in planning for different types of hazards (Peer Review, United Kingdom, 
2013). RED’s structure involves each LRF having an individual Resilience Advisor to 
foster a strong working relationship between the central and local authorities. By having 
an advisor, each LRF has a point of contact with the DCLG who supports them with data 
and advice about planning, risk assessment, preparation and response (Peer Review, 
United Kingdom, 2013). Resilience Advisors pass on information from central 
government, encourage the sharing of information between responders and LRFs, 
promote good practice and participate in risk assessment, training and exercises (Cabinet 
Office, 2013). By having a small group of advisors, one for each LRF, it is hoped that the 
collaboration between different LRFs can also be improved which will, in turn, improve 
the overall response to wide scale national emergencies. In addition, the DCLG RED 
actively supports preparedness and risk assessment by helping LRFs meet national 
planning requirements through the provision of data, information and policies from 
central government that are relevant to different kinds of hazards (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2012).  
During an emergency, DCLG has a set of procedures designed to support the local 
response (Peer Review, United Kingdom, 2013). Some of these activities are to oversee 
local activities such as ensuring the creation and effective operation of SCGs. Moreover, 
the DCLG ensures that accurate, up- to-date information about a situation is created and 
maintained. Depending on the size of the event, this can relate to one local area or a 
number of different areas. It is the DCLG’s role to establish and maintain communication 
and update information between the responders and the central government, including up 
to the Cabinet Office. The Department may create a central hub for the collection and 
communication of information that can act as a point of contact between local responders 
and the multi-agency co-ordination groups. Furthermore, the DCLG is closely involved 
connecting different LRFs for mutual aid and for the exchange of information about 
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events taking place. The Department is also responsible for helping responders give 
coordinated and clear public information. Finally, the DCLG has responsibility for 
overseeing the fluent, efficient transition from response groups to recovery groups 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012).  
In short, the Department for Communities and Local Government is the branch of the 
UK’s central government which is connected to local government and, therefore, to Local 
Resilience Forums. The DCLG has a specialized resilience team to support LRFs in their 
risk assessment, preparedness for, and response to, emergencies. It links to them directly 
by sharing and exchanging information in preparation for emergencies and supports the 
communication of the requirements that will help create local planning and policies to 
deal with such emergencies.   
To summarise, JESIP and the DCLG represent important elements within multi-agency 
collaboration in England. While JESIP is a policy that aims to improve the collaboration 
between the police, fire and rescue and ambulance services, the DCLG provides LRFs 
with information to help and guide their risk assessment and their preparedness for 
dealing with hazards. Both support multi-agency collaboration and risk assessment in 
their own way.  
2.4.3.3 Local Resilience Forums’ (LRFs) Composition    
Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) are multi-agency partnerships made up of 
representatives from local public services including the emergency services, local 
authorities, the NHS, the Environment Agency and others. These agencies are known as 
Category 1 Responders as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act. LRFs are supported by 
organisations known as Category 2 responders, such as the Highways Agency and public 
utility companies. They have a responsibility to co-operate with Category 1 organisations 
and to share relevant information with the LRFs. The geographical areas that the forums 
cover is based on police areas (Anderson and Adey, 2012). 
There are currently 8 groups of regions in England as shown in Figure 2.8. These are 
North West, North East, Yorkshire and Humber, West Midlands, East Midlands, East of 
England, South West and South East regions. These regions are divided into a further 38 
areas (see Figure 3.8 below). Most of these are counties, although some are metropolitan 
boroughs. Similarly, some of the areas are metropolitan such as Greater Manchester 
while others are predominantly rural such as Cumbria. Each of these has an LRF. These 
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38 LRFs serve communities within the boundaries of the police areas across England, as 
shown in Figure 2. 8. The subjects of this research are the Local Resilience Forums 
(LRFs) in England. This research will explore and investigate the Greater Manchester 



















Figure 2. 8: England’s 38 Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) 
 
In summary, Local Resilience Forums cover the whole of England. Each region has a 
number of LRFs and there are 38 in total. LRFs are partnerships between category 1 
responders and are supported by category 2 responders. The responsibility of each LRF is 
to facilitate collaboration between all emergency responders in a given area in 
preparation for, and response to, emergencies. This research will focus on the Greater 
Manchester LRF. 
2.4.3.4 Local Resilience Forums’ (LRFs) Role 
The national emergency management framework in the UK distinguishes between the 
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recovery from, emergencies. Their roles and responsibilities and the interaction between 
them and between individual agencies are described in the statutory guidance 
accompanying the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act (Cabinet Office, 2012). Distinction is 
also made between the single agency command and control structure (often termed Gold, 
Silver and Bronze) and multi-agency coordination (operating at three levels: strategic, 
tactical and operational). The following section will outline in detail the national, and 
then the local, levels of emergency management in the UK. It explains the connection 
between central government and Local Resilience Forums in England which are the main 
mechanism for multi-agency collaboration at the local level (Anderson and Adey, 2012).  
At the level of central government, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) has been a 
key player in emergency management in the UK since its creation in 2001. It supported 
the passing of the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. The CCS was formed in response to a 
series of incidents in 2000/2001 such as severe flooding, the fuel crisis and the Foot and 
Mouth outbreak of 2001. These events showed weaknesses in the emergency 
management systems in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2004). The CCS has a number of 
responsibilities including implementing the Civil Contingencies Act, directing the 
National Risk Assessment and coordinating the activities of central government in times 
of emergency. Moreover, the CCS organises collaboration between the public, private 
and voluntary sectors and advises Local Resilience Forums (Secretariat, Civil 
Contingencies Act, 2004). 
Local Resilience Forums are the primary vehicle for multi-agency partnerships in 
emergency management. Their role is to identify possible risks, undertake planning, 
preparation, maintenance, response and recovery and also the prevention of extreme 
events. They consist of delegates from local public services, including the police, fire and 
ambulance services, the National Health Service, (NHS), local authorities and other 
Category 1 responders as identified in the Civil Contingencies Act (Sircar et al., 2013). 
Category 2 responders support the work of LRFs. Such Category 2 responders include the 
Highways Agency, transport operators in England and utilities companies. These groups 
are legally obliged to collaborate and share information with the LRF. There are a total of 
42 LRFs in England and Wales, of which 38 are in England (Cabinet Office, 2013a).  
The Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) is a key partner for the CCS and for 
LRFs. RED is part of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). 
The DCLG connects central and local government in England. RED has partnerships with 
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LRFs, the CCS and other central government departments to enhance the preparedness 
for emergencies that go beyond the capacity of a single LRF.  The RED is used to ensure 
that national policies are followed by LRFs. This is achieved by the distribution of 
information to, and between, the 38 LRFs in England. For instance, RED arranges an 
LRF conference every two years which is co-chaired by the DCLG and the CCS. These 
conferences give representatives from each of the English regions a chance to share and 
discuss information.  
The concern of this research is with the strategic level of the multi-agency coordination in 
Local Resilience Forums. In the UK, this is broken down into a counties and metropolitan 
approach. As a result, this research will focus on the strategic role and function of Local 
Resilience Forums (LRFs) which are the principal mechanism for multi-agency 
cooperation as defined under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) (Cabinet Office, 2013a). 
They will be described in more detail later in this chapter.  
The role of Category 1 & Category 2 responders within this framework will be 
investigated in more detail in this research. Other partners such as the military and 
voluntary sectors also provide a valuable contribution to LRF work (Adey and Anderson, 
2012). 
The LRFs’ work is to identify potential risks and produce emergency plans to either 
prevent or mitigate the impact of any incident locally (Cabinet Office, 2013a). A Local 
Resilience Forum (LRF) is not a legal entity. However, the CCA and which regulations 
The CCA’s regulations If yes, change ‘the regulations’ to ‘their regulations’ indicate that 
responders have a collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-
agency environment within the Forum. The representatives from category 1 responders 
must attend the meetings of the Forum which are held once every six months. In short, 
this research will study the LRFs in England because they constitute the main method of 
multi-agency response within the UK (Cabinet Office, 2013b). This study will investigate 
the collaboration, through LRFs, between Category 1 & Category 2 responders in this 
county. More details on LRFs are outlined below.  
The fundamental purpose of the LRFs in England and Wales is mainly strategic in that it 
acts as a coordinating group for local responders involved in preparedness for 
emergencies at the police force area level. Therefore, it provides a local Forum for local 
issues, thus supporting the duty holders, category 1 and category 2 responders in 
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performing their legal responsibilities more effectively than they would if they were 
acting on their own. The Forum enables them to bring issues forward for discussion and 
agreement on a combination of initiatives and to co-ordinate responses to government 
initiatives (Cabinet Office, 2013b). 
The LRFs also help to coordinate risk assessment through the production of the 
Community Risk Register (CRR).   The preparation of the CRR is important in the sense 
that it enables the LRF members to establish a consistent understanding of the hazards 
and threats within the LRF area. The risk assessment also helps determine the priority 
issues with which the coordinating agencies must be ready to deal.  
The LRF does not have an operational role. When an emergency occurs and at least one 
of the Category 1 responders declares a major incident, it only helps determine a 
procedure for the formation of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) usually, though 
not always, led by the police. It is then the task of the SCG to co-ordinate the response to 
the emergency and it is also likely to take a role in the initial stages of recovery. 
Afterwards, if required, it is replaced by a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG). While 
the SCG operates the LRF continues to meet (Anderson and Adey, 2012). 
Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) 
Many agencies are involved in responding to disaster. This requires co-operation and the 
provision of support to one another. The procedures undertaken, and the capabilities held, 
by these agencies have to be successfully integrated in order to respond and recover 
effectively.  
A national framework has been developed that can be applied to emergencies of any size 
and nature. It is a general framework with the flexibility to be adapted to the requirements 
of specific situations. The use of this framework, agreed upon by all agencies, will assist 
in the collaboration between agencies in different geographical locations and make sure 
that each agency has a clearly defined and understood role and responsibility in response 
to an incident.   
It is crucial to separate the different functions of single agencies and multi-agency groups. 
While single agencies have control over their own staff and equipment, multi-agency 
groups are organized to bring together, and co-ordinate, the activities of these agencies. 
Moreover, they define the strategy and the common objectives for the entire multi-agency 
response. The terminology between single agencies and multi-agency groups also differs. 
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Single agencies use “Gold” and “Silver” to refer to different levels of command. In 
contrast, multi-agency groups have a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) and a Tactical 
Co-ordination Group (TCG) (Cabinet Office, 2013b). It is important that different terms 
are used to avoid confusion between agencies. The different roles of individuals can add 
to this confusion; for example, the Gold Commander in a single agency (such as the 
police) might act as the Chair of the SCG. This might lead some people to refer to them 
as the “Gold Commander” within the SCG. However, this is misleading because their 
role in the SCG is fundamentally different. Overall, the top level in a single agency will 
have a command function whereas the top level in the multi-agency group will have a co-
ordination function (Cabinet Office, 2013b).  
Planning at the strategic level is intended to take into account the wider context of an 
emergency. This is achieved by defining and communicating the overall strategy and 
objectives for the emergency responders, as well creating the policies and frameworks 
that will be used by the lower level responders. At the strategic level, the long-term risks 
and impacts are determined and the overall progress of a response is monitored. While 
the single agencies planning at the strategic level, sometimes it is necessary for different 
agencies to collaborate. This is required when an event has a significant impact, involves 
the use of substantial resources, involves many different organizations and/or takes place 
over an extended period of time.  In these circumstances, the multi-agency SCG group 
will be formed.  
The SCG will be located at a safe distance from the site of the emergency. This location 
is referred to as the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. The SCG is often, but not always, 
chaired by the police. The police will co-ordinate other organizations if there is an 
immediate threat to human life or public order. However, in other kinds of emergency the 
chair of the SCG may be from another agency (such as a public health agency) that may 
chair the group in a human health emergency (Anderson and Adey, 2012). Planning and 
response at the strategic level in England is the responsibility of Local Resilience Forums 
(LRFs). LRFs bring together local responders and private businesses. Through LRFs the 
procedure for establishing SCGs is created, in order to co-ordinate the multi-agency 
response in the event of an emergency.  
The function of the SCG is to be ultimately responsible for multi-agency co-ordination 
and to create and communicate the policies and the strategic framework to the lower level 
groups will follow. The SCG outlines the priorities of the lower level responders and 
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takes care of communication with the media and the public. It also plans operations in the 
recovery phase of an emergency. The SCG is able to create specialized supporting groups 
for particular tasks; for instance, while the SCG focuses on the immediate response to an 
emergency, they can establish a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) to co-ordinate the 
longer-term recovery. 
Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) 
The RCG works alongside the SCG, supporting the SCG’s activities and ensuring that 
they do not compromise the medium to longer-term recovery. The collaboration between 
the two groups is often aided by having them in the same location. The RCG is a multi-
agency group working in the recovery stage. It is given the task of creating the recovery 
strategy.  This involves an assessment of the impact of a disaster, the identification of 
possible longer-term economic regeneration as part of the recovery and the early 
identification of any opportunities to strengthen the resilience of the community in the 
future. 
The RCG is founded on a number of principles relating to recovery from a disaster. It 
seeks to support the community to recover by beginning the process as soon as possible, 
working closely with the SCG until eventually it replaces the SCG. It provides specialist 
services, information and resources. It is a collaborative endeavour which aims to be 
accepted and understood by all responders and to include active participation from the 
affected community, including the private sector. It aims to prioritise human welfare. 
Most importantly, it aims for a comprehensive, integrated framework for guiding 
recovery efforts that is flexible enough to deal with the needs of different communities. 
The group meets on a daily, and then a weekly, basis until there is no longer a need for 
multi-agency co-ordination in the recovery stage. The group then stands down.  
To summarise, an LRF establishes a Strategic Co-ordination Group when there is a need 
for multi-agency collaboration to respond to an emergency. As soon as possible, an SCG 
will create a Recovery Co-ordination Group to focus on the recovery phase. While the 
SCG concentrates on the immediate response, the RCG focuses on recovery, with the two 
groups communicating when required. When the SCG stands down, the RCG takes over 
until there is no longer a need for multi-agency collaboration in the recovery effort.  
To conclude, a number of groups are involved in the UK’s emergency planning and 
response. At the level of central government, the CCS created the Civil Contingencies 
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Act in 2001. The act outlines the requirements of all local authorities in the UK. In 
England, this has led to the creation of LRFs in order to enhance the collaboration of 
multiple agencies at the strategic level. LRFs co-ordinate and ensure collaboration 
between local responders in preparing for emergencies. This activity is supported by the 
central government through the Department for Communities and Local Government. 
This department has a specific unit, called the RED, which interacts directly with LRFs 
and has the goal of providing information and advice. Figure 2.9 shows a flow chart of 
this system.  This study is concerned with multi-agency collaboration in the preparedness 
stage, focusing on risk assessment within emergency management. Therefore, it will 
focus on LRFs in England. LRFs are worthy of investigation because they are the 
principle method of multi-agency collaboration for preparedness at the strategic level. 
This research focuses on Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum in England, one of 
the 38 LRFs in England. The research will investigate how these LRFs work and, 
ultimately, evaluate how Category 1 & Category 2 responders collaborate in preparing for 









Figure 2. 9: Flow chart of the system used in England & Wales for emergency planning 
and response (Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act, 2004). 
 
Figure 2. 9 and this entire section indicate the steps in IEM requiring interaction between 
the anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation, response and recovery stages.  
The Local Government Department/Resilience Emergency Division (DCLG-RED) 
inform different forums, groups and departments in the UK which are facilitated by 
different stakeholders and maintained by multi-agency coordination group. The network 
of interaction illustrated in Figure 2.9 and the nature of communication required for risk 
assessment to be effective function through collaboration and thus require an 
enhancement mechanism or model such as the one proposed in this research. Section 
2.4.4 on stakeholders further helps to justify the importance and relevance of an 
interactive map which can assist in enhancing multi-agency team collaboration in the risk 
assessment process. By examining all the stakeholders involved in EM and their various, 
but complementary, responsibilities and roles, the importance of an interactive map will 
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2.4.4 Stakeholders  
This section outlines the roles and responsibilities of the main agencies and sectors that 
are likely to become engaged in disaster management at a local level. Stakeholders are 
people who have, or think they have, a personal interest in the outcome of a policy. This 
interest motivates them to attempt to influence the development of that policy. This 
section explains arrangements in England and includes information on: 
• Police services; 
• Fire and rescue services; 
• Health bodies; 
• HM Coroners; 
• Local authorities; 
• Government agencies and other non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs); 
• The Armed Forces; 
• The private sector; 
• The voluntary sector, and 
• The community. 
The Civil Contingency Act (CCA) divides responders into two categories and puts a 
different set of duties on each of them (Cabinet Office, 2010).   
Category 1 Responders: 
Police services: The police generally co-ordinate the activities of the other responders, 
whilst ensuring that the scene is preserved and evidence safeguarded – particularly where 
terrorism is suspected.  They arrange for any victims to be removed from the area, acting 
on behalf of HM Coroners in the case of deaths, and, if necessary, coordinate search 
activities. 
Fire and rescue services: The main role of the fire and rescue services in an emergency 
is the rescue of citizens trapped by fire or wreckage. They are also responsible for 
extinguishing fires and taking protective measures to prevent the fire from spreading. 
Moreover, they assist other agencies, such as the ambulance service and the police, in the 
removal of bodies and, where exposure to chemicals is involved, decontamination.  
Ambulance services: As part of the National Health Service (NHS) the ambulance 
service is responsible for on-site response to short or sudden emergencies, as well as 
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taking the victims to different hospitals, depending on priority and the types and numbers 
of the injured.  
Acute Trusts and Foundation Trusts: Acute Trusts and Foundation Trusts manage 
hospitals in England. The ambulance service will designate the hospitals that will receive 
casualties in the event of a major emergency.  
Primary and community care services: These cover a range of health professionals 
who would be involved in the recovery phase of an emergency. This category includes 
general practitioners, pharmacists and mental health services, amongst others.  
Primary Care Trusts: Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in England are responsible for 
commissioning health care services locally and cooperate with the Health Protection 
Agency (HPA).  
The Health Protection Agency (HPA): This is a non-departmental public body which 
identifies health hazards caused by infectious disease, hazardous chemicals, poisons or 
radiation by using surveillance activities such as horizon scanning, risk assessment and 
modelling. It provides public health advice to government departments, to the NHS and 
to the general public. 
Port health authorities: Operating at seaports and airports, port health authorities’ main 
duties in an emergency are to control infectious disease. They are also responsible for 
environmental protection, imported food control and hygiene on vessels.  
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA): The MCA is an agency of the Department 
for Transport. The main responsibility of HM Coastguard is the initiation and co-
ordination of maritime search and rescue, whether at sea or on the coastline/shore. 
Furthermore, HM Coastguard can assist other emergency and local authorities during 
civil emergencies.  
Local Authorities (LAs): The local authority structure in England consists of two tiers: 
single tier and two tier. In the latter, a county council and several district councils divide 
responsibilities for local authority services. County councils are responsible for children’s 
social services, whereas district councils are responsible for leisure, environmental health, 
housing and planning control, among others. In the single-tier system, one authority is 
responsible for all local authority functions. Local authorities collaborate with a range of 
bodies to support emergency services during emergency response and recovery from 
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disaster.  Their services may include the provision of shelters, medical support and long-
term survivor welfare. 
Environment Agency (EA): The aim of the EA is to protect and improve the 
environment in England and Wales. The EA deals with many different types of incidents 
affecting the natural environment and human health or property.  This may include 
issuing flood warnings, the prevention/control of pollution, and investigating causes of an 
incident.  It also plays a significant regulatory/advice role. 
Category 2 Responders: 
Utilities, telecommunications and transport providers: These private sector 
organizations, although not regularly involved in emergency response and recovery, do 
play an important role (Cabinet Office, 2010).  They include: 
• Gas and electricity transmitters and distributors 
• Fixed and mobile telecommunications’ providers 
• Water and sewerage services, and 
• A range of transport companies. 
The Highways Agency: As an agency for the Department for Transport, the Highways 
Agency is responsible for, amongst other matters, managing traffic, providing 
information to road users, improving safety and tackling road traffic. Many of its 
functions are relevant to emergency response. 
Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in England: As the local headquarters of the NHS, 
SHAs are responsible for coordinating the health response where an incident is 
widespread and affects several hospitals.  
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE): The HSE’s responsibility is to protect 
people’s health and safety in the workplace by ensuring control of risks. Its remit includes 
the health and safety of other responding agencies. This may include pollution clean-ups, 
inspection of dangerous structures, provision of emergency mortuaries, and providing for 
the welfare of response personnel (Cabinet Office, 2010).  
2.4.5 Summary  
To summarise, disaster management and risk assessment is organised in different ways in 
the USA, Australia and the UK. The UK’s structure is based on LRFs which are regional 
organisations that are composed of Category 1 and Category 2 responders. These 
stakeholders have their own roles and responsibilities within the LRFs.   
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2.5 Analysis of a Disaster Response Exercise  
In order to understand how UK organisations test their preparedness for disaster the 
outcome of an exercise conducted by the LRF in Staffordshire is presented here. 
Although it does not cover the practices worldwide, this analysis has enabled the 
researcher to identify typical challenges faced by agencies when trying to collaborate in 
responding to disasters.  This case study was conducted by the LRF in Staffordshire and 
can be classified as an LRF primary example. However, it provides secondary data for 
this research since the researcher uses this case study of a LRF simulation exercise in 
Staffordshire to further justify the importance of the set of objectives outlined for this 
research.  
One way that LRFs can test their preparedness is by exercises which simulate incidents 
(Staffordshire Prepared, 2013). These simulations highlight the strengths and weaknesses 
of emergency plans and the processes through which multiple agencies collaborate. 
Exercise TRITON was conducted by the LRF in Staffordshire to explore how a particular 
LRF was prepared for multi-agency response to disaster (Staffordshire Prepared, 2013). 
As such, it provides a relevant and useful case study. Exercise TRITON took place over a 
five-day period in June 2013. It was the largest exercise of its kind undertaken by the 
LRF in Staffordshire which aims to organize multi-agency exercises every three years. 
The exercise was based around a simulation of an event affecting Blithfield Reservoir, 
operated by South Staffordshire Water. The exercise simulated the effects of a dam 
failure with the aim of practicing “a multi-agency response to a catastrophic dam failure”. 
The specific objectives of the simulation included the testing of preparedness for disaster 
and the multi-agency “command and control arrangements”.  In other words, TRITON 
was a case study for multi-agency collaboration in response to a disaster (Staffordshire 
Prepared, 2013).  
The outcomes from this case study highlighted the gaps and weaknesses in some aspects 
of multi-agency collaboration in terms of technology, organizational structure and 
process.  
Technology 
Communication technology, including radio, Internet and telephone technology, was a 
source of problems during the exercise. For instance, problems were reported with radio 
communications. At the police HQ the signal for the airwave radio channel was weak and 
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some responders were reported to be using different radio channels. Moreover, the 
wireless Internet signal provided at the Fire Station that was utilised was intermittent and 
was not operational at all for four hours. Furthermore, there was a difference between the 
use of the Internet by the police and by the fire service. While the police HQ had a 
generic wireless account that could be used by all users, the Fire Station employed a 
system where each organization had to set up their own individual account. This caused a 
delay in responders accessing the Internet. Telephone communications between the 
Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) and the Tactical Coordination group (TCG) also 
proved to be problematic. Although teleconferencing equipment was provided across the 
agencies, users experienced difficulties in hearing because some equipment did not come 
with adequate microphones. In addition, although High Integrity Telecommunications 
(HITS) was available to TCG, a number of the responders did not know what the system 
was or how to use it. A majority of them, therefore, did not use the system at all 
(Staffordshire Prepared, 2013).  
Aside from communication, mapping was also a crucial technological problem during the 
exercise. Firstly, neither SCG nor TCG used a Geographical Information System (GIS) 
for mapping. GIS is an effective tool, helping responders to access up-to-date information 
and real time observations quickly. Despite the advantages of GIS, paper maps, which 
took time to be fully understood, were used. When the use of GIS mapping was requested 
by SCG, it was not implemented by TCG. Evaluators suggested that this was due to a 
lack of knowledge of GIS and recommended that training workshops be held to remedy 
this. Secondly, at the planning stage of the exercise, workers at Staffordshire County 
Council could not utilise the GIS maps that were available on the National Resilience 
Extranet because they had to be manipulated before they could be viewed properly. In an 
emergency this would cause costly delays.  
Overall, multi-agency collaboration during this exercise was hindered by a range of 
technical problems with the communication and the information sharing technology 
being used. However, the exercise also demonstrated a series of more general issues 
relating to how the multi-agency response was organized.   
Organizational structure  
In the evaluation of the exercise, it was highlighted that the chairperson of the TCG was 
present, by telephone, in all of the SCG meetings. These four meetings, which lasted up 
to almost two hours, took the TCG chairperson away from dealing with TCG activities. 
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Additional problems with the TCG were also noted. Some participants felt that each 
agency should send more than one representative to attend the TCG meetings, while 
others criticized the fact that the chair of the TCG also represented the fire and rescue 
service. It was suggested that the chair should have a single responsibility rather than two.  
The report reviewing the exercise generally called for a greater emphasis on multi-agency 
collaboration and a higher level of communication between the two main groups, namely 
SCG and TCG. The problems concerning collaboration were most evident, however, 
when the processes underlying the emergency response were investigated (Staffordshire 
Prepared, 2013). 
Planning and Process Problems 
TRITON was intended to test a collection of emergency plans, but some of these plans 
were discussed and used more than others. Many respondents reported that, for example, 
the ‘Reservoir Plan’ was not used at all. This suggests that responders lacked knowledge 
of, or access to, all the emergency plans that had been drawn up. This perhaps relates to a 
lack of interaction and collaboration between the different planning and response groups. 
Without comprehensive, shared access to relevant information to prepare for an event, the 
responders could not utilize certain plans once the event was taking place.  
A lack of collaboration between the strategic and tactical levels was evident. Before and 
during the event, communication between the main two groups, SCG and TCG, was very 
weak. The two groups worked independently of each other, without any strong co-
ordination to exchange information and to understand each other’s actions. The 
evaluation of the exercise called for a “Single Point of contact for communications 
between SCG/TCG” (Staffordshire Prepared, 2013).  
This lack of co-ordination went beyond the two main multi-agency groups; two agencies, 
namely the City Council and the Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories’ Agency 
(AHVLA), should have been involved in the preparation for such an incident. However, 
they were not and, furthermore, they were not contacted when they should have been 
during the event. This highlights the need for better and clearer co-ordination between 
different agencies before an event, to improve responses during an event. This point is 
further stressed by the fact that some Category 2 responders reported misunderstandings 




Moreover, there was a misunderstanding between the multi-agency co-ordination groups 
and the individual response groups. The individual response groups did not fully 
understand the overall concept of the multi-agency groups’ SCG and TCG. It was 
reported that many within the individual response groups were unclear about who their 
counterparts were in the multi-agency structure. The points to a need for all responders to 
have a clear understanding of the organizational structure and the responsibilities and 
roles of each group and, in addition, it points to the importance of good interaction 
between workers in different groups. This needs to happen in the preparation stage to 
avoid confusion during an incident (Staffordshire Prepared, 2013).  
Consistent updates and reporting proved to be a problem in the exercise. The Situation 
Reports used by the responders in TRITON lacked consistency between the groups. In 
the preparation stage, template Situation Reports should be created and made fully 
available for use during an event. In TRITON, participants reported not knowing where 
to access such a template which led to a lack of standardization in these reports. This 
could have been avoided with better collaboration before the event. Clarity and the 
communication of information was a general problem. The report noted “information still 
ended up in the wrong hands where people did not understand why they were 
receiving…messages/emails”. This shows the importance of clear lines of 
communication and the successful exchange of information between participants 
(Staffordshire Prepared, 2013).  
Overall, the exercise demonstrated that while individual groups and agencies may 
undertake their jobs effectively, a lack of communication and organizational co-
ordination between groups can hinder their overall response. In the conclusion to the 
report, the organisation at the centre of the LRF made a recommendation. This 
organization is the Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) which was established 
to ensure that the region meets its legal requirements outlined in the 2004 Civil 
Contingencies Act. All category 1 responders in the region jointly fund the group and its 
role is to promote multi-agency collaboration including the sharing of “resources, 
capabilities and knowledge” (Staffordshire Prepared, 2013) across the different agencies. 
After evaluating the outcome of the TRITON exercise, it was recommended that the CCU 
look into using an IT system that allows for the sharing of information in real time 
between all agencies and groups. This system, it was suggested, should bring together all 
the information and procedures held by the different groups, allowing users to view and 
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access information at different “layers”, enabling users to switch between 
operational/tactical information and strategic level information. Although this 
recommendation relates to the sharing of information during an emergency, the only 
viable way to achieve such a collaboration platform would be to develop it and ensure 
users were trained in it during the preparedness stage. It would have to be part of the 
overall preparedness strategy to be effective in an emergency.  
2.6 Challenges to Multi-agency Collaboration  
Emergency management calls for the completion of dynamic, ever-changing tasks 
(Mendonça et al., 2007 and Salas et al., 2008).  It has been suggested that the scale of 
disasters in recent years has made it important to move away from traditional, centralized 
disaster management activities (Aldunate et al., 2005; Bier, 2006; Perrow, 1984). In light 
of this fact, collaboration between multiple agencies is now seen as vital in disaster 
management (Waugh & Streib, 2006; Eide et al., 2012). Collaboration is simply when 
representatives of difference organizations combine their efforts, resources and 
knowledge to make decisions and produce things for which they share responsibility 
(Kamensky et al., 2004). While the necessity for collaboration has been established, the 
challenges relating to it are considerable. A lack of effective collaboration between 
different agencies is commonly cited in reports in disasters (see, for example, Norges 
Offentlige Utredninger, 2012).  
Kapucu and Garayev (2011) suggested that weaknesses in multi-agency collaboration 
have led to numerous recent failures in emergency management. In the USA, Hurricane 
Katrina was an event in which collaboration between agencies was problematic, 
particularly between governmental agencies under the leadership of FEMA (Kapucu and 
Van Wart, 2006). In the case of 9/11, collaboration between intelligence agencies before 
the event was characterised by confusion and uncertainty, while in the case of Hurricane 
Katrina there was a lack of coordination between responders after the event. In both cases, 
limitations in interaction between agencies was cited as the reason for failures in response 
to these events and it is suggested that an increased focus on collaboration, interaction 
and a better understanding between agencies and stakeholders are required (Kapucu & 
Van Wart, 2006).  
One of the challenges associated with collaboration is that it requires several layers of 
interaction between the managers and leaders of different agencies and stakeholders 
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(Kapucu and Garayev, 2011). This suggests that effective collaboration requires that 
issues concerning communication within, and between, response organizations are 
addressed. These issues can relate to the mobilisation and management of resources, to 
organizational processes and procedures and to decision-making processes (McEntire, 
2002). Decision-making is an essential part of the emergency management process and 
phases and it can be problematic in emergency situations for many reasons. Firstly, there 
is the time factor which is the need to make immediate or quick decisions and this has 
been found to influence the decision-making process (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006 and 
Flueler, 2006). Secondly, emergency situations naturally cause significant stress among 
decision-makers due to limited situation awareness and the widespread impact that the 
situation might be causing (Paton, 2003). Thirdly, the level of past experience in 
managing similar situations also has potential to influence the decision making process 
(Moynihan, 2008). Fourthly, there is often a limit to the amount of information available. 
All these factors have been found to further complicate the collaborative process required 
by multiple agencies in order to provide an effective response (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; 
Carley & Lin, 1997; Sellnow et al., 2002).  
This argument suggests that, the more agencies are involved in EM, the more 
complicated decision-making tends to be. Although research into decision-making is 
widespread, it tends to focus on decision-making at an individual level, team or 
organizational level (Kapucu and Garayev, 2011). While collaboration is fundamental to 
the command and control structure required for ICS during an EM response (Alberts and 
Hayes, 2006), it has also been identified as one of the problematic aspects of EM 
(Bharosa et al., 2009). However, it is worth noting that collaboration presents challenges 
beyond decision-making (McEntire, 2002). For instance, representatives of many 
agencies need have a clear grasp of their role, what they are responsible for and what 
tasks they have to carry out (Dillon et al., 2009). Furthermore, knowledge of an 
emergency situation needs to be shared and accessible to all responders from the different 
agencies, in order to facilitate an effective response (Bharosa et al., 2009). However, the 
entire phase of EM thrives when communication is efficient and the agencies involved in 
collaboration have a clear understanding of how the other participating agencies are 
structured (Eide et al., 2012).  
In summary, multi-agency collaboration is increasingly seen as vital in emergency 
management but it presents a range of challenges relating to decision-making, 
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communication, the sharing of knowledge and the understanding of the structure, clarity 
of roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved.  
2.7 Summary  
This chapter has examined different definitions and has established that a disaster occurs 
when vulnerability and hazard interact to cause a severe impact in a location or society. 
Thus, the goal of disaster management is to reduce the effects of disasters on people and 
the environment. This chapter has examined approaches used in countries such as USA, 
Australia and the UK. Each of these countries adopts a holistic approach based on 
specialized guidelines, in which risk assessment is vital. This research, therefore, focuses 
on the process of risk assessment, specifically within the UK. The complex 
organizational structure of risk assessment in the UK, in which regional LRFs are given 
the task of ensuring preparedness, requires extensive multi-agency collaboration. 
However, collaboration of this kind poses numerous challenges, as shown in the TRITON 
exercise. Challenges can make the responses to, and the ability to reduce, the impact of 
disaster extremely difficult despite the availability of resources. This chapter and the gaps 
identified from the existing approaches emphasise the need and the requirements for a 
platform such as one proposed in this research to enhance collaboration beyond the 
immediate challenges poses. Therefore, the next chapter explores technological solutions 
available for risk assessment which can also help to reduce the challenges to 













Chapter 3: Current Technology Approaches used for Supporting 
Disaster Management  
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the current technology approaches used in the 
field of disaster management. There are different kinds of technology currently available 
and these are described in general and then specific examples of software and 
applications are explored. Additionally, this chapter focuses specifically on identifying 
the importance of an interactive map in disaster management, preparedness and risk 
assessment. 
3.2 Disaster Management Systems 
The following section categorizes and gives examples of currently available technology 
platforms that are used within disaster management systems. It is followed by an 
exploration of specific platforms in depth and an analysis of common aspects and 
weaknesses.  
3.2.1 Various Technology Solutions    
There is a broad range of technologies that can be used in disaster management for 
preparing for hazards/threats. According to Cimons (2011), Botterell et al. (2007) and 
Rao et al. (2007), these technologies can be categorised as Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS), Remote Sensors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), warning systems 
and communication systems. As noted by Rao et al. (2007), a network infrastructure that 
can exploit technologies such as web, wireless, satellite and mobile can be used to 
transfer information between agencies efficiently and on time during disasters. In 
addition to these technologies, mathematical models and simulation software that allow 
teams to predict the impact of disasters under various conditions can be extremely useful.  
A summary of the potential use of these technologies with some examples is summarised 








Table 3. 1: Brief summary of relevant technologies available for disaster management 
 




GIS uses geographical location 
to relate otherwise disparate 
data and provides a systematic 
way of collecting, analysing 
and managing location specific 
information. 
Internet GIS (Peng and Tsou, 
2003), Context Discovery 
Application (CDA) (Tomaszewski, 
2008), 3D GIS System (Marchuk et 




Can be used to predict the 
social, economical and 
environmental impacts of a 
disaster based on mathematical 
models.  
Flood risk assessment in dams’ 
downstream valleys (Viseu,  2007), 
evaluation of maximum storm wave 
run-up and surges (Ciaovola et al., 
2006), specifying seawall crest 




Provide means of obtaining 
information about an 
approaching emergency and 
communicating that 
information to disaster 
management centres and to 
those who need to know. 
Flood early warning system 
(rainfall hydrological analysis) 
(Terzo et al., 2011), Tsunami Early 
Warning System (TEWS) (Hadi et 
al., 2012) and GNSS-based 
geological hazard monitoring 
system (Li-Yang and Xu, 2011). 
Remote 
Sensing 
Valuable in monitoring hazards 
and assessing damage by using 
image sensors over an area of 
interest, collecting optical and 
radar-based imagery and 
transforming it into spatial 
information.  
Monitoring of floods using multi-
source satellite sensors (Zheng, 





Using the internet, mobile 
wireless devices and satellites, 
providing a quick way of 
communicating information to 
relevant agencies and rapid 
response groups. 
 
Personal digital assistants for 
collecting disaster data (Troy et al., 
2007), wireless sensor networks 
(Youssef and Younis, 2008), 
mobile ad hoc network (MANET) 
(Niranjan and Ashok, 2011), 
mobile communication nodes 
(CNs) based on wireless networks 
(Gelenbe and Gorbil, 2012), a 
wireless sensor network based on 
Zigbee/IEEE802.15.4 standard 
(Yawut and Kilaso, 2011) and a 
wireless ad hoc network with 
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WINDS (Suzuki et al., 2011). 
 
The technologies presented in Table 3. 1 are not mutually exclusive and can be combined 
together to create comprehensive disaster management systems.  As shown in Figure 3. 1, 
these technologies can be brought together to produce sub-systems and/or a complete 
disaster management system.  The star diagram in Figure 3.1 represents two main aspects 
that need to be considered in building a disaster management system: a technology view 
(sensing, communication, and models & simulation) and an organizational view 
(structure, process, performance assessment) (Alzahmi et al., 2013). This is because 
sensing helps to provide a better understanding of location which is key to establishing 
the context of risk (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2009). Awareness of the risk context is 
essential in the risk assessment process (Ball and Ball-King, 2013). However, Regester 
and Larkin (2008) argued that being able to effectively manage risk is based on the 
capacity to identify, and prevent, the impact of risk. In a sense, it can be argued that this 
capacity is also based on performance which also includes tangible and virtual capability. 
While communication is an integral part of the risk assessment and management process, 
it can be limited or hindered by organisational structure, process and performance 
(Lundgren and McMakin, 2009).  
Within the technology view, the core technologies can be categorised into sensing, 
communication and modelling & simulation (including GIS). Here the sensing 
technology allows for the monitoring of hazards and the assessing of damage with the 
view of communicating this information to the relevant agencies. According to Regester 
and Larkin (2008), risk and hazard identification and monitoring are insufficient until 
they are translated and communicated to allow for decision making in order to treat, 
mitigate or accept risks. Communication technology, therefore, allows and facilitates the 
transmission of information to the relevant parties (i.e., communities, agencies, 
government) enabling them to undertake rapid reaction for planning and response (Dillon 
et al., 2009). Modelling and simulation technologies allow for the integration of various 
GIS data relevant to disasters and also allow for conducting predictive modelling for 
planning for disasters. Although this awareness of the functions of GIS data is important, 
Ball and Ball-King (2013) argued that data or information on any potential danger should 
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be well utilised for the benefit of risk reduction. Haddow et al. (2011), on the other hand, 
argued that adequate decision making and disaster reduction action can only be 
undertaken when all information has been well integrated. Therefore, the integration of 
these core technologies are important for disaster management systems because they can 
result in three main functional systems:  
1) sensing and communication technology can be used to establish early warning 
systems 
2) the sensing of disaster events and models & simulation can be used to create 
systems that allow agencies to contextualise an incident, 
3) Communication and models & simulation can be used by agencies for 
collaboration during incidents (Alzahmi et al., 2013). 
Regardless of these functional systems and their ability to enhance the risk assessment 
process, it is also important to understand the components of the organisational view. For 
instance, the organisational structure determines how roles, power and responsibilities are 
assigned, controlled and coordinated, and how information flows between the different 
levels of management (Jacobides, 2007). Given this notion, the process required for 
effective risk assessment which informs the disaster management process can be 
described as a network of activities, power, roles and responsibilities that can be mapped 
out for a clarity of purpose and decision making. Thus, the organisation’s disaster 
coordination process provides a ‘map’ of activity which documents roles and 
responsibilities in the event of a disaster.  According to Haddow et al. (2011), any 
disaster management measure should provide a well-coordinated, consistent and 
transparent process for all the stakeholders (acting at various points throughout a disaster 
management cycle) as well as a point of reference for management decision-making. The 
mitigation, preparedness and response measures recommended by Alexander (2002; 
2006) and Haddow et al. (2011) all emphasised this; however very little was debated 
concerning determining the capacity of organisations to carry out the level of integrated 
measures or decisions required for disaster management. While the capability assessment 
framework provides tools for assessing the organisational capabilities for responding to 
disasters (GAO, 2014), collaboration leading to the onset of the incident can still be a 
challenging process (Alexander, 2006).  Thus, the significance of capacity assessment is 
that it allows organisations to assess their degree of preparedness in terms of resources, 
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planning, and training (Alzahmi et al, 2013). However, the ability to effectively integrate, 
collaborate and conduct an adequate capacity assessment of all organisations for the risk 
assessment process can be challenging and demanding, which justifies the need, 
relevance and importance of the disaster management system illustrated in Figure 3. 1.  
 
Figure 3. 1: Components of a disaster management system  
 
As seen in Figure 3. 1, the diagram shows the flow of interactions between the disaster 
coordination process, the organisation structure and the capability assessment framework. 
Having the capability assessment framework at the base of the triangle illustrates the 
crucial role it plays in strengthening the information disaster coordination process and in 
its ability to integrate organisations irrespective of variations in structure for risk 
assessment goals and purposes. Evidently, other components such as early warning, 
collaboration, contextualisation and models, and simulation enhances disaster 
coordination, organisational structure and the capability as shown by the inner lines 
within the Figure. The three hierarchies of activity theory as explained by Kuutti (1996), 
i.e. activity, action and operation and the corresponding terms such as motive, goal and 
conditions, influenced the selection and arrangements of the elements in Figure 3. 1. 
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Therefore, Figure 3. 1 illustrates the levels and the network of interactions required for 
integration, for the risks’ assessment process and for coordination in a disaster 
management system; a design which was possible through the application of activity and 
critical thinking theories.  
3.2.2 The Potential of Technology in Assessment and Preparing for Disaster  
Technology has a vital role in managing disasters effectively and efficiently (Alexander, 
2009). The added value of technology (such as the Internet of Things, cloud computing, 
web technology, GIS (geographic information technologies), mobile information 
technology, remote sensing and satellite) is in assisting in the reduction of the impact of a 
disaster as well as making data available to managers to guide them on how to react in an 
emergency incident. Technology offers an understanding of a natural or man-made 
environment and assists in managing the process of an operation, organizational 
operations, preparing for disaster management (Alzahmi et al., 2013). The role of 
technology in enhancing situational awareness and in analysing/summarising information 
for strategic planning in order to optimise the risk assessment and preparation in the 
disaster management life cycle have also been emphasised (Alexander, 2009). Table 3. 2 
below shows the functional requirements needed for handling various disaster types and 
the role of technology in disaster management systems (Alzahmi et al., 2013). 
Table 3. 2: The functional requirements needed for handling various disaster types 
Disaster type Sub-disaster name Functional requirements 
within a disaster 
management system 
Use of technology 
Natural Natural phenomena beneath 
the earth’s surface 
Marking areas of risks, 
potential structural damage, 
impact on critical 
infrastructure, demography, 















Risk assessment of critical 
infrastructure, evacuation 
planning. Sensing, warning. 
 
Source, depth, velocity, flow, 
structural damage, impact on 
critical infrastructure, 
evacuation planning. Sensing, 
Assessing the 





















Location of incidents. Spread 
of infection over time and 
space. Sensing, warning. 
Ability to see patterns 





Location, impact on critical 
infrastructure, evacuation 
planning. 
Assessing resilience to 
attacks, testing 
evacuation. Transportation disasters 







Hybrid Natural and man-made 
events 
Exploring possible hybrid 
events and their impact.  
Conducting ‘what if’ 
scenarios and ensuring 
disaster teams are 
prepared to handle 
multiple disasters.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the roles and functions of technology in disaster management and also 
indicates the relationship between different types of events and the functional 
requirements that can ensure effective risk assessment. 
3.2.3 Current Systems  
Various commercial systems have been developed and are currently used in different 
countries to support disaster management and risk assessment. A description of these 
systems follows. 
3.2.3.1 HYDRA-MINERVA System 
One example is the HYDRA-MINERVA system used by the UK fire and rescue service. 
The focus of this computer tool is explicitly on simulating emergency situations such as 
fire, chemical spills and heavy snowfall and, therefore, on increasing preparedness and on 
aiding decision-making in real events. As a training tool, the programme logs decisions 
that have been made and then uses them to create a debriefing in which they can be 
assessed. Information is fed into the simulation in real time from many different sources 
(http://www.hydrafire.org/). A similar simulation tool, but designed exclusively for flood 
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hazards, is FloodViewer. It allows users to visualise the impact of different levels of 
flooding, using mapping and animation (Halcrow, 2011). 
3.2.3.2 Incident Command Administrator and Gaist Emergency 
The commercial market for platforms which facilitate multi-agency risk assessment has 
grown in recent years. Gaist, a UK consultancy firm and software developer, has created 
a number of products such as Inca (Incident Command Administrator) and Gaist 
Emergency. The latter is specifically marketed as a multi-agency tool and features a 
universal display and interface and access to online maps (Gaist, 2010).  Gaist 
Emergency has compatibility with the Inca programme which means that users can 
access information from Gaist Emergency (which can inform the decisions they make) 
and execute using Inca (Alexander et al., 2011). 
3.2.3.3 MOSAIC Software 
Socio-demographic information, a key element of risk assessment, has provided the basis 
for a range of commercial products with an appeal for multi-agency teams (Experian, 
2009). Experian's MOSAIC software is one example. It brings together a range of 
demographic, lifestyle and behavioural data from census responses, media and market 
research (Experian, 2009). Although primarily intended for use in commercial and 
business planning, the programme has been used by the fire and rescue service in 
targeting public information communication activities.  The potential use of such 
information in multi-agency planning is clear; by providing information about the 
population of an area and its movements, the software can help multi-agency teams 
assess risk, estimate potential casualties and loss of life, and prioritise their responses 
(Alexander et al., 2011). 
3.2.3.4 Atlas Incident Management System (AIMS) 
The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act is identified as the impetus for the creation of the 
AIMS ATLAS system. As previously noted, the Act gave local authorities legal 
responsibility for better preparation for, and response to emergencies. AIMS ATLAS is 
intended to replace paper-based emergency logging systems used by local councils. In the 
past, information was recorded and disseminated on paper. It was noted that this could be 
confusing, time consuming and liable to result in the loss of important information, 
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especially in a busy, stressful emergency situation in which new information constantly 
appears (Atkins and Partners Ltd, 2006). 
AIMS ATLAS is a piece of computer software for use in local authority emergency 
control centres which aims to organize and store information electronically, allowing 
organizations to “effectively manage and coordinate their response during an emergency”. 
Its general purpose is to help with the coordination of an emergency response, aid the 
assessment and evaluation of an emergency in real time, and to provide access to existing 
emergency plans and information. Moreover, it can organize all incoming information 
into a log which can be used during and after an incident. It allows responders to 
understand their roles and responsibilities in an incident. The software is explicitly 
intended to promote and support collaboration and coordination between and within 
different agencies (Atkins and Partners Ltd, 2006).  
The system records every incoming and outgoing message, as well as actions taken, on a 
log. This helps during an emergency but afterwards also helps to evaluate performance 
and suggest improvements. It allocates response tasks to different individuals or 
departments. Moreover, it allows users to filter the information they view depending on 
their task and role. The programme also generates situation reports and enables the 
communication of these reports by email. Furthermore, it provides access to emergency 
plans and contact information online. It gives users access to different key areas of 
information and communication such as events, briefings, tasks, messages and plans 
(Atkins and Partners Ltd, 2006). 
3.2.3.5   CLIO 
CLIO is a commercial software system developed with input from emergency responders 
such as the police and other emergency services. It was developed by Badger Software, 
one of the main suppliers of emergency management software in the UK. The system 
aims to provide a means for the successful sharing of information in real time, giving 
responders immediate access to information and plans in order to ensure co-ordination 
between responders (Badger Software, 2013).  
In the preparation stage, the software can be used to create and store emergency plans. In 
addition, the system allows for the testing and evaluation of these plans. During an 
emergency, users can work on an interactive map from different locations so that all staff 
can share real time information and thus respond effectively and efficiently to incidents. 
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The system can be used on an internal network or via the Internet. This allows users to 
access it on a number of different devices such as PCs and smart phones. The system is 
intended to increase situational awareness between responders.  
The CLIO system allows for emergency plans to be put into practice in a time of 
emergency, automatically allocating tasks and providing advice to staff members during 
an incident. The system is controlled centrally, but all users can interact with each other 
using the platform. Moreover, all actions that have been taken are recorded which can be 
used when the ‘lessons learnt’ are evaluated after an incident (Badger Software, 2013). 
CLIO is used by a number of organisations ranging from police forces to private 
businesses. While it was not developed specifically for multi-agency response activities, 
it has been used by LRFs in different areas in planning and preparation for incidents.  
Overall, both of these platforms (CLIO and AIMS) can be used during an incident to 
record actions taken and to share information between responders. Both are accessed by 
the Internet and store information electronically. However, CLIO can be used in 
preparation for incidents in creating plans and testing them. In providing a single 
platform for the sharing of information, both of these can be used to enhance 
collaboration between responders.   
3.2.3.6 Depiction Mapping Software 
In the USA, mapping software called Depiction is used to plan, prepare and respond to 
disasters and other events. It is designed to be used not only by emergency management 
professionals but also by concerned members of the public. The software allows users to 
visualise how a disaster might impact a home, neighbourhood, community or business.  It 
also shows infrastructure and resources, simulates what might happen and allows users to 
prepare and respond for any eventuality (Mastin, 2010).   Furthermore, users can explore 
scenarios offline as well as online, in case the Internet is not available. The latest version 
automatically integrates the US National Weather Service 24-hour forecasts into the 
active maps of any local government, planning agency or concerned citizen, and includes 
interactive map elements such as water flooding over roadways, downed power lines, 
power outage reports and landslides. Moreover, the software searches for relevant 
information on the internet specific to a particular region, such as satellite images, street 
maps, road networks, forecasts for precipitation, temperature and winds. As a result, it 
can be customized to show elements such as evacuation routes, blocked roads or possible 
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flood levels, and then shared with other interested parties. Figure 3. 2 shows 
Stillaguamish River flooded in January 2009 in the USA.  
 
 
Figure 3. 2: Stillaguamish River flooded in January 2009 in US as shown by the Depiction 
Mapping Software (Source: Seattle, WA (PRWEB), 2009) 
 
Depiction mapping software is quite distinct in its use as a tool in disaster management. 
Its ability to search for relevant information specific to a given location on any hazard 
and its impact on the environment is useful for deciding risk mitigating measures. Similar 
to this, is another software (GIS) that is designed to capture, process and produce hard 
copies, when needed, of the geographic information of a location. The next subsection 
examines the different facets of GIS which is a more comprehensive model which is 
known for its role in facilitating integration with other systems in disaster management.  
3.2.3.7 Geographical Information System (GIS) 
A Geographic Information System (GIS) is a computer system that is used to capture, 
store and analyse data and information with a geographical aspect. The actual system 
consists of hardware (computer and peripherals such as scanner and printer), software and 
data that are stored on the computer. Users will use the software to analyse the data 
(Eldrandaly, 2007). The geographical aspect of GIS data means that all data accessed is 
related to co-ordinates in 3D space and refers to a location on the earth. The area that the 
data represent can be a point, a line or an area (Mark, Chrisman et al. 1997). Figure 3. 3 












Figure 3. 3: Different GIS information layers, gathered together. (Source: National Coastal Data 
Development Centre (NCDDC), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
USA) 
GIS is an essential tool for supporting disaster management process mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery. This research focuses on the preparedness phase, 
specifically in the risk assessment domain. This section presents a review of the state-of-
the-art GIS products and geospatial information widely used in the disaster management 
preparedness phase and in the risk assessment domain.  
According to Waugh (1995), “GIS uses geographic location to relate otherwise disparate 
data and provide a systematic way of collecting and managing location specific 
information.” Used in disaster management, GIS digitally captures, stores, analyses and 
manipulates data (Senior and Copley, 2008). It is for these qualities, and its ability to 
display geographical information quickly, and present it in an understandable format, that 
GIS is considered critical for disaster management functions (Cutter et al., 2007). As 
stated by Jung et al. (2014), GIS is used to create and combine the various components of 
inundation maps and flooding maps (which indicate which areas would be flooded in a 
particular flood event).  Practically, these maps are made up of layers of GIS providing 
bathymetric, topographic, land use and inundation projections. Recently, Bhattacharya et 
al. (2012) described GIS as a powerful data management tool that strings together 
unconnected data sources for quicker analyses, and for the organization and sharing of 
information.   
Additionally, not only does GIS provide a graphic user interface that enables the user to 
quickly navigate through geospatial data (including complex three-dimensional datasets), 
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it also enables organizations to visualise and maintain overall situational awareness 
during normal operations and emergencies; GIS is flexible technology enabling full 
integration with other information systems. There are many examples in the literature that 
address the use of GIS in disaster management, amongst which are Internet GIS as a 
network-based geographical information service (Peng and Tsou, 2003), Context 
Discovery Application (CDA) (Tomaszewski, 2008), 3D GIS System (Marchuk et al., 
2012) and ArcGIS (Esri, 2012).  
a. 3D GIS System 
The World Agency of Planetary Monitoring and Earthquake Risk Reduction 
(WAPMERR) has developed a 3D GIS Research and Information System for the 
purposes of reducing risk due to natural and man-made hazards and for post-disaster 
rescue planning. As indicated by Marchuk et al. (2012), this 3D GIS system has global 
coverage, full three-dimensionality and is able to manipulate 3D models of buildings.  
Other features include a digital cartographic base design using satellite images, digital 
what, elevation and bathymetry models, a database management system for visualization, 
and software for the numerical modelling of geophysical processes/phenomena and the 











Figure 3. 4: An example of a flooding map of Nagapattinam, India (as shown by WAPMERR) 
(Marchuk et al., 2012).  
Figure 3. 4 shows the GIS’s power of precision which enables the software to capture 
information and model it in 3D. For instance, the ArcGIS is designed in such a way that it 
can support organisational tasks for disaster management. This is further explained below. 
 
b. ArcGIS for Disaster Management 
As stated by Esri (2012), ArcGIS for disaster management is designed to “organize and 
deliver the baseline tools and data typically needed to support a disaster management 
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organization.” From planning to response and recovery, ArcGIS supports and enables 
common workflows across all aspects of the mission. ArcGIS provides, amongst other 
characteristics, public safety-specific features for operational data, a common analytic 
tool and model for risk assessment, vulnerability analysis and impact assessments, a 
situational awareness viewer that supports mission-specific delivery of data and tools, 
configuration guidelines for common authoritative data sources, mobile projects, a public 
information map that integrates social media and data exchange, and a catalogue portal 
for collaboration and data discovery. 
 
Figure 3. 5: Baseline configuration of the ArcGIS platform that works with a common emergency 
management organization structure and mission (Esri, 2012). 
 
Figure 3. 5 illustrates the interactions between logistics, operations, command and other 
components required for emergency management. Ensuring adequate interaction is 
crucial for implementing a national response framework. However, it is important to 
know that the ArcGIS platform can work on different gadgets which facilitate planning, 
analysis and risk assessment models. Regardless of this, the functionality of the ArcGIS 
platform is based on its compatibility with the existing systems put in place for 
emergency management. As a whole, the GIS software has many functions and 
advantages. However, it lacks the essential components shown in Figure 4.1 which links 





3.2.4 A Comparative Summary  
Maps are the most commonly used tools for understanding spatial information in 
commercially developed software. Technical platforms that have been developed to 
support collaboration among responders include the Atlas Incident Management System 
(AIMS) and CLIO, both of which can be used by responders to share information 
electronically using the Internet. Also there are several frameworks are used by different 
organisations to enhance risk assessment such as the HYDRA-MINERVA system, 
(Incident Command Administrator), Gaist Emergency and MOSAIC software. Many 
developers offer users tools to visualise and analyse layers of data on a mapping system, 
in single and multi-user environments (Booth and Mitchell, 2001). 
The HYDRA-MINERVA system used by the UK fire and rescue service simulates the 
emergency situations (such as fire, chemical spills, heavy snowfall and incidents) to 
which the fire service in the UK responds. While it is used to increase preparedness of 
response, it is more reactive to the occurrence of emergency. While it allows different 
level of impacts to be visualised, it is not exactly designed for risk assessment and 
mitigation. The Inca and Gaist emergency tools, being multi-agency tools, have a 
universal display and interface linked to online maps.  
While the issue of safety of usage and access to a confidential decision making process is 
not mentioned, the former informs decision making while the latter supports the 
implementation of decisions. Similar to the HYDRA-MINERVA system, the Inca and 
Gaist tools also focus on the reactive process and on action to deal with the impact of 
risks and not on their prevention and mitigation. These two tools also fail to establish the 
context of risk(s) which is the initial stage that helps to determine the appropriate ways 
for the risk assessment process and how the stakeholders should be involved (Lundgren 
and McMakin, 2009). 
MOSAIC software, on the other hand, is superior in helping to identify and establish the 
context of risk as well as assisting in monitoring risk patterns in a target population or 
location. This tool is key to the inception of the risk assessment process, but is limited in 
ensuring that the capacity for the required response for risk assessment amongst agencies 
is assessed and determined. The AIMS ATLAS system, being a virtual replacement for 
paper documents and plans, provides a clear purpose for its functions. While the intention 
for developing the AIMS ATLAS system was to reduce time, confusion and stress during 
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an emergency situation, and the possibility of loss and liability during critical incidents, it 
is also limited to a reactive mode for disaster management.  
The AIMS ATLAS system in use by local authority emergency control centres is also 
limited and restricted to a specific location; this restrains its use during the planning 
phase and its use as a tool for integrating and collaborating the risk assessment process. 
Its function and relevance is limited to the response and post response phases for 
debriefing and for the assessment of the responsibilities of Category 1 and 2 responders. 
CLIO may be considered as an improvement on the AIMS ATLAS system since it can be 
used by responders such as the police and other emergency services. As it can be used by 
the police (who are mobile during an incident), this means it is not restricted to a specific 
location. Being able to draw on emergency plans for response during an emergency 
situation is also an improvement.  
However, it is also a reactive tool, rather than a tool which can be utilised for the 
collaborative risk assessment process between multi-agencies. The benefits of the CLIO 
system are undeniable but its limitation in not being able to establish the context of risk, 
analyse risk and evaluate risk is a major drawback in the risk assessment process both for 
agencies and stakeholders who are responsible for planning and response. Depiction 
mapping software is another software or tool that is examined in this section. The tool is 
known for its ability to help determine and assess the impact of a disaster on homes, 
locations or businesses. However, this tool also focuses on impacts, not on the wider 
consequences as required for risk assessment process (Lofstedt and Boholm, 2009).  
Although GIS is a more comprehensive model that supports the mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery phases of disaster management, it is identified by the researcher as 
being too comprehensive since this research focuses on the preparedness phase especially 
the risk assessment domain. Therefore, by examining these disaster management tools, it 
is evident that gaps still exist - in terms of technology - for risk assessment that ensures 
integration and collaboration between multi-agencies in order to obtain a more adequate 
response. Additionally, examining the current tools available for disaster management 
systems has helped the researcher determine the essential features and components 
required for the collaborative risk assessment process by agencies and stakeholders 
responsible for disaster planning and response.  
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3.3 Limitations  
Fleischauer et al. (2006) noted that spatial mapping is often not implemented to its full 
potential. There are a number of possible reasons for this. Van Westen (2013) suggested 
that the assessment of multiple hazards requires a great deal of information, not all of 
which is available or accessible. Obtaining such information can also prove to be costly. 
Moreover, even when such information is available, the incorporation of cascading 
effects is difficult and there remains a lack of research into how best to map and assess 
the risks presented by multiple hazards. Decisions about how to categorise the 
information available are problematic and difficult to transfer into a form that 
practitioners and stakeholders can use (because of the complex nature of the interactions 
between a user and the platform with which they are working) (Van Westen, 2013). 
Alexander et al. (2011) pointed out that training is required even for the simplest of 
systems.  
The information required by a disaster management system is a deeply problematic issue. 
There is a generally difficult balance to achieve between the need for comprehensive data 
and the need for a user-friendly platform. The data needs to be simple enough to be used 
effectively, but not too simple so as to make it useless. Moreover, risk assessment is 
based on both hazard data and vulnerability data. These kinds of data can be difficult to 
link. This is because hazard data can be dynamic and changing, whereas vulnerability 
data is often based on information that is only collected periodically, for example in 
censuses. Furthermore, due to its nature, risk assessment has a strong element of 
uncertainty. This poses problems for the designers of systems because this uncertainty 
needs to be represented but not in a way that restricts risk assessment activities by adding 
too much confusion for users, especially when users have to collaborate (Alexander et al., 
2011). Therefore, the purpose of this research is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
data required by agencies to conduct risk assessment and the presentation of this data 
through an easy to use interactive map to enhance collaboration among agencies. This 
research, therefore, aims to build upon the existing technology, but also plans to bring the 
technology closer to the users and to the risk assessment process itself.     
3.4 Importance of Interactive Maps 
Maps are amongst the oldest and most popular forms of graphical communication and 
they are highly regarded for their efficient information transfer. However, irrespective of 
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the efficiency of two-dimensional maps, three-dimensional interactive maps offer 
significant benefits and improvements over their traditional counterparts. According to 
Peterson (1995), a map is interactive if it includes a user interface with graphical icons 
and tools for users to interact with the map, a pointing device and the almost 
instantaneous display of maps. The term ‘interactive maps’ is used here to refer to 
different types of interactive geo-applications where a map displays play a central role. 
The use of interactive maps enables authors to enrich and extend their work, providing a 
means to highlight their findings in a way which is visual and easily accessible, thereby 
allowing the reader to quickly comprehend the relevance of a paper and visualize 
research data. 
The importance of interactive techniques in mapping has been gaining recognition since 
the 1970s (Moellering, 1975). According to Nielsen, “interaction possibilities are often 
being considered as the most important user question, because the interaction between 
computer and user is vital to the relevance of digital systems,” (Nielsen, 2004). 
Moreover, in general, 3D maps allow for more accurate identification of positions. 
Results suggest that they are better for understanding distances, environment and 
topography, while 2D maps allow for better recall of place names (Kraak, 2006). One of 
the most well-known interactive maps is Google Maps. This online mapping service 
(which provides interactive maps and satellite/aerial imagery information around the 
world) is user-friendly with easy panning and zooming undertaken through a mouse or 
keystrokes.  Street names and road outlines are displayed and a search ability allows 
searching for everything from the name of a business or point of interest to a city or an 
address (Haklay et al., 2010). 
Google Earth goes a step further by using maps, geography and satellite data to build a 
virtual globe. Users enter the name or address of a location and are given full access to 
the geography, sites and physical components of an area. 3D mockups of buildings, 
historical imagery, satellite views, and perspectives of the skies and oceans can also be 
accessed.  Able to handle an impressively large dataset over the internet at an acceptable 
speed, Google Earth has a convenient layers’ feature: a list of common search items that 
can be overlaid on any satellite image, such as a road, bank or shopping centre. Google 
Earth differs from Google Maps in that it combines a graphical information system (GIS) 




Via maps, GIS has the power to visualise the results of decisions and deliberation 
processes (Ramsey, 2009; Couclelis and Monmonier, 1995, and Elwood, 2006) allowing 
users to perform tasks and activities in an intuitive and efficient way. Furthermore, in the 
context of flood hazards’ management, GIS provides a fast and powerful tool which can 
be used to create interactive map overlays showing precisely which areas of a community 
are in danger of flooding. Such maps can then be used in mitigation efforts before an 
event and for recovery after the event (Awal, 2003). As an example, Figure 3. 6 illustrates 
the Flood Simulation of Brisbane which was used extensively by the Australian and 
global media during the recent flood crisis in Brisbane in January 2011. The flood level 
simulations were produced interactively. This was a very effective way of 
communicating the impact of a flood on buildings and infrastructure and it provided a 
valuable tool in assessing the potential risk for the city in the days leading up to, and 
during, the flood peak. 
 
Figure 3. 6: 3D Flood Simulation of Brisbane 2011.(Source: GISCafe, 2011, AAM Modelling 
Aids Brisbane Flood Crisis). 
Interactive mapping tools can be also used in environmental planning and impact 
assessment, oil and gas planning and simulation, wind farm and offshore turbine 
planning, ocean management and geology (Gold and Condal, 1995; Goralski and Gold, 
2007b). When combined with data mining, interactive maps provide a highly effective 
and powerful exploratory environment for large spatial databases (Andrienko et al., 2001; 
Guo 2003; Koua and Kraak, 2005). According to Roth (2012), interactive maps may 
support or even enhance a map user’s ability to uncover unknowns about the map data by 
encouraging interactive exploration of the data. The provision of multiple representations 
of map data, enabling readers to see changes in spatial patterns or distributions, is one 
method of promoting this exploration. Pelzer et al. (2015) added that map legends should 
be interactive, linking the legends to the display of the map content thus enhancing their 
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explanatory power. An interactive mapping device, therefore, is the interface between 
spatial information and participants. 
In geovisualisation (the interactive exploration of geographically-referenced information 
graphics) (Slocum et al., 2005), a map may provide a realistic reconstruction of a city or a 
planned landscape, as in geospatial virtual environments (GeoVEs) (MacEachren et al., 
1999). Indeed, GeoVEs visualizations are used for urban and landscape planning and 
environmental impact assessment, amongst other things. Furthermore, such maps have 
also become indispensable as interfaces for many complex systems. 
This interaction is important not only for the need to overcome the limitations of 3D 
presentations but also to increase the efficiency and usability of maps. Moreover, an 
important role of maps is to support visual thinking and decision-making. As pointed out 
by Gold when discussing a decision support system for forestry planning, for decision 
systems in general, “it is necessary that the interaction be simple and rapid, permitting the 
suggestion of several ‘what-if’ queries in a short time period, while the manager is 
actively engrossed in assessing a particular problem” (Gold, 1993). Equally, Sieber et al. 
(2013) pointed out that the process of visualisation requires a high level of interactivity. 
According to Kraak (2006), “three dimensional displays require an interactive viewing 
environment that allows one to view the objects from any direction to avoid obstruction 
and allow the query of all objects in the representation.” 
Although more tests are required, indications are that maps offer significant benefits, 
efficiently and reliably transferring information while supporting spatial reasoning and 
offering a practical means for engaging the users (Kraak, 2006). In the words of Kraak, 
“the availability of a three dimensional world that can be queried, analysed and viewed 
would improve insight and is likely to result in better decisions” (Kraak, 2006).  
3.4.1 Visualisation   
Alongside the commercial growth of computer software that can aid multi-agency 
emergency management teams, the last twenty years has seen a technological growth in 
the area of visualisation (Maceachren, 1998). The ability to map and visualise areas and 
situations is of great use for multi-agency teams and their work in planning responses to 
disaster. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have brought about a shift in how 
spatially-referenced data can be stored, depicted and analysed and in how users can 
interact with the data.  
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An obvious area of interest for multi-agency disaster management teams is mapping. 
Mapping has become the keystone for risk assessment and communication. Indeed, it has 
been shown how a map is presented and, therefore, visualised has an important effect on 
how the user is able to communicate the information presented by the map (Alphen et al., 
2009). Although computers can create photo-realistic 3D models (Kot et al., 2005), what 
is most important is the user's ability to manipulate maps to highlight and emphasize the 
most relevant information for their purpose (Maceachren and Ganter, 1990). This can be 
done by altering scales and using symbols.   
Basically, there are two ways of approaching mapping which can be used as part of a 
platform for multi-agency emergency planning. Firstly, the 'communication approach' 
stresses the need for maps to accurately represent and display the reality of an area. On 
the other hand, the 'visualisation approach' suggests that maps can also be used to predict 
and simulate hypothetical events (Maceachren and Ganter, 1990). The main concept in 
the first approach is to transfer what is known about an area or situation. However, 
mapping can also be used to encourage users of visual thinking about a problem in a new, 
visual way (DiBiase et al., 1992) and, therefore, possibly come up with new solutions to a 
problem. It has been suggested that interactivity, an effective user interface and 
visualisation tools can encourage users to be more flexible in their approaches to 
problems (McCarthy et al., 2007).  Underlying this is the view that the user of a mapping 
programme should be thought of as an active participant and not just as a passive receiver 
of information (Morss et al., 2005) especially given that multi-agency decision-making is 
an active, dynamic process.  
3.4.2 The Importance of Visualisation in Risk Assessment  
Disaster is a function of a range of factors (such as hazards, human vulnerability and lack 
of capacity) while risk is defined as the expected losses (such as lives, personal injuries, 
property damage and economic disruption) due to particular hazard for a given area and 
reference period. Risk, therefore, is the product of hazard, vulnerability and coping 
capacity (WMO, 2002).   
 
One of the key elements within a disaster management strategy is risk assessment. 
Consequently, in dealing with issues such as accepted levels of risk and identification of 
areas at risk and those vulnerable, risk assessment allows for better mitigation and 
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preparation through increased risk awareness as a critical element in the preparedness 
phase. It is also vital that risk assessment is understood and communicated in an 
appropriate way (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). Furthermore, 
studies have shown that the presentation of hazards, vulnerability, coping capacity and 
risk in the form of digital maps has a higher impact than traditional information 
representations (Martin et al., 1997; Husdal, 2001). As a result, with the increasing use of 
digital maps by disaster managers, it is expected that visualisation, provided in the proper 
way, has the potential to be a highly effective communication tool (Kolbe, 2005; 
Marincioni, 2007; Raper, 1989; Zlatanova et al., 2002a). In order to achieve a good 
standard of 3D visualisation, two aspects must be observed: appropriate presentation and 
appropriate tools for interactions. According to Kemec et al. (2010), urban modelling is 
generally a holistic process of conceptualisation, data capture, sampling and data 
structuring, depending on the aim of visualization; in risk management, 3D modelling is 
very much dependent on the kind of disasters represented and the kind of users involved 
in the risk management process. 
Interactive hazard maps provide an effective medium for visualising risk information and 
bridging communication barriers among varying stakeholders. Moreover, these maps aid 
in the assessment, analysis and mitigation of risks (Dransch et al., 2005). When 
fabricating a hazard map, one must keep in mind the purpose of the map, the intended 
audience, how data will be displayed, and where it will be used (Friedmannova et al., 
2007). Also the creation of effective interactive hazard maps takes into consideration 
community knowledge through the utilisation of participatory mapping methods. These 
methods aim to involve locals in the mapping process, to reflect local views in 
governmental policy, and to develop a mutual understanding of surrounding risks 
(Institute for Ocean Management, 2007). If constructed appropriately, community-based 
hazard maps can help bridge the knowledge gap between community members, local 
governments, non-governmental organizations, and members of the international disaster 
response and risk reduction community. As a result, efforts continue to educate local 
communities in the utilisation of hazard maps in order to identify vulnerabilities and 
increase communication among stakeholders. 
3D models are also used by urban vulnerability analysts for correlating societal and 
biophysical factors when working in unfamiliar locations (Rashed and Weeks, 2002; 
Whiteman, 1998; Lagorio, 2001). Additionally, Alexander (1993) and Shaluf (2007) have 
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identified urban vulnerabilities as a spatial science and as having geographical concerns, 
for instance: Urban objects (such as residential and commercial buildings, pedestrians 
and vehicles), urban features (such as, shops, roads, pavements) and Natural features 
(such as green spaces, rivers and the seismic vulnerability of places}. 
These “urban ensembles” (Benenson et al., 2004) (such as buildings, streets, bridges, 
roofs, facades and green spaces) are obviously highly interrelated and can be visualised 
using design plans, drawings and video data records (Pissinou et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
various layers such those giving information on houses and industrial sectors can be 
overlaid together for visualization and subsequent spatial analysis. Some researchers have 
used simulation methods to view the roles of these ensembles in urban amenities 
(Torrens, 2006). Rasheed and Week (2003) related urban vulnerabilities to natural 
hazards such as earthquakes and to human behavioural adaptations. They argued that 
urban vulnerabilities are intertwined with socio-economic systems.  
Researchers have also found visualisation techniques useful in examining the effects of 
adjacency (what is next to what), containment (what is enclosed by what), proximity 
(how close one geographic object is to another), accessibility (how an object can be 
reached from a certain road) and visibility (how far certain objects are visible from 
certain locations) (Pullar and Egenhofer, 1998). However, as in simple two-dimensional 
features, it is essential in 3D features to either associate distance or direction with an 
object, or to compute the distance and direction between, for example, roads and houses 
along with the height or depth of individual objects. This requires the storage of extra 
attribute information, i.e., latitude, longitude, height or depth (and/or time). In earlier 
times, 3D visualisations were possible only in computer-aided design (CAD) (Lee, 2007; 
Zlatanova, 2000) and cadastral mapping (Billen and Zlatanova, 2003). Today, ArcGIS 
9.4 beta version incorporates 3D functions in its Network Analyst (ESRI, 2010) making it 
accessible and functionally more useful to planners and researchers alike within 
accessibility analyses (Kwan, 2002).  
Others have used 3D visualization to display remotely sensed images and to analyse 
ozone and nitrous oxide concentration and dispersal patterns (Matejicek et al., 2006). The 
use of 3D is also increasing in transportation planning with the use of a lane-oriented, 
road-network model (Demirel, 2004). Interactive maps have not only increased the 
understanding of planners and experts in the field of disaster management but have also 
82 
 
caused an increase in the interest of the participating public through better visualisation 
and by allowing direct participation with the models (Shen and Kawakami, 2010). 
3.4.3 Interactive Map Data Analysis 
Interaction with map objects, as described above, is a part of a broader category 
concerning interaction with data in general. Other parts of this broader category concern 
different types of interactive data analysis, i.e., the use of special tools to facilitate spatial 
reasoning. The most relevant to typical 3D maps are basic measurements supporting 
typical uses of a map, such as tools for measuring different types of distances (straight 
line distance, horizontal distance, and distance over the ground) and angles in horizontal 
planes, as well as a true angle in space. The use of interactive tools to supplement 3D 
presentations overcomes the problems of distortion of dimensions and distances 
associated with perspective, where manual measurement is not possible (Pegg, 2013). 
With the advent of GIS and geovisualisation, the role of maps has been redefined in 
recent decades to extend beyond the traditional understanding and to embrace their use as 
interfaces for GIS (Kraak and Ormeling, 2003; Ribarsky, 2005) and exploratory data 
analysis (Tukey, 1977; Andrienko and Andrienko, 1999). This application of 3D maps in 
GIS requires more advanced interactive tools and the extension of operations known from 
two-dimensional systems and of their underlying spatial relationship models, such as the 
9-intersection model by Egenhofer and Franzosa (1991). Key requirements include 
support for the analysis of intersection, adjacency, connectivity, containment and 
disconnectedness (Ellul and Haklay, 2006). 
However, due to the large volumes of data combined with the complexity of the required 
algorithms and data structures, development of spatial analysis tools seems to be slower 
than the progress that has been made in visual representations. Following an analysis of 
the leading commercial GIS systems available on the market undertaken by a team led by 
Zlatanova, it was concluded that all the systems reveal little provision of 3D GIS 
functionality in terms of 3D structuring, 3D manipulation and 3D analysis (Zlatanova et 
al., 2002b). Indeed, Musliman et al. (2006) called 3D GIS systems not much more than 
just “pretty models.”  
Exploratory data analysis, enabled by interactive techniques, is based on a variety of tools 
which allow more advanced interaction with the data than simply controlling the view. 
These include tools based on techniques from statistical graphics such as dynamic 
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classification, filtering, brushing and focusing (Andrienko et al., 2002; Crampton, 2002). 
Such elaborate methods of interaction are not used with popular maps but are rather 
reserved for professional data analysis of specific types of map, such as choropleth maps 
(Dykes, 1997). So what of the future of exploratory analysis?  According to Rauschert et 
al. (2002), it lies in multi-modal interfaces, including not only mouse actions but also, 
possibly, voice commands and gestures. MacEachren (2005) believed that, particularly in 
the realm of visual analytics, the greatest insight would come from the combined efforts 
of many analysts working in collaboration.   Theoretical and empirical examinations of 
the influence of the globalization of visualization may also be necessary, however, to 
maximize the capabilities of interactive maps for spatial data exploration.  With the 
Internet, the ability to carry out international collaboration with users from diverse 
cultural backgrounds will prove to be powerful, although it may be necessary to examine 
differences in social interaction and symbolic conventions so as to design representations 
and interactions to involve these diverse users (Marcus, 2001; Shen et al., 2006; Edsall, 
2007). 
3.4.4 Summary  
In summary, software that aids multi-agency risk assessment and decision-making has 
emerged and will continue to emerge, given technological progress. This chapter has 
examined different tools and the significant roles that technology plays in disaster 
management systems. While some have specific functions, others are more generic and 
comprehensive in their functions within the disaster management system. Based on the 
gaps identified in this chapter from examining different tools in disaster management, it 
is evident that limitations exist with respect to the technology tools that ensure an 
adequate risk assessment for the planning phase, especially for multiple agencies and 
stakeholders. Therefore, there is a clear need for platforms that can bring together the 
diverse information which planners need in their efforts to enhance risk assessment and 
preparation (if risks, hazards and disasters are be to better managed and their impacts 
mitigated and reduced). Furthermore, visualisation and the layering of information have 
emerged as the key aspects of this need for an enhancing platform as evaluated in this 
chapter. Thus, this research aims to fully investigate this need, focusing on the GMLRF 
because of the gaps identified in this chapter. The next chapter provides a theoretical 
foundation for this research, with investigations into the Activity Theory, into Critical 
Thinking, models of team collaboration and into a theoretical framework for this study. 
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Chapter 4 - Related Theoretical Frameworks 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a brief review of a number of related conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks that are useful in understanding and supporting collaboration and which 
could form the basis for supporting multi-agency risk assessment activities in disaster 
management. Significant evidence has emerged through research on the importance of 
social science theoretical frameworks in understanding humans’ interaction through their 
use of tools and artefacts and in dealing with real-world cases in their surroundings 
(Wenger, 1998; Loo and Lee, 2001; Reddy et al., 2003). The theories and models that 
will be analysed are the activity theory (Engeström, 2001), the critical thinking model 
(Fischer et al., 2009) and the team collaboration model (Patel et al., 2011). The team 
collaboration model will incorporate insights from the field of Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI), Computer-Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW) and Information 
Systems (IS). This chapter analyses how these theories and models guide the researcher 
in identifying the requirements of a collaborative environment platform for risk 
assessment activities. Starting with the activity theory, these models will be analysed in 
turn and the elements that are relevant to this research will be extracted. 
4.2 Description and Justification of the Activity Theory 
Managing any form of incident that can cause disruption in society and threaten lives can 
be challenging (Alexander, 2005). The management of incidents such as emergencies or 
disasters involves the coordination and integration of all activities necessary in order to 
build, sustain and improve all capacity and capability to prepare for, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from, the impact of such incident (CCA, 2004; Alexander, 2005). 
This infers that, in order to effectively or better manage incidents, it is important to 
engage in a critical thinking process that enables good decisions to be made (Flin et al., 
2008). According to Fagel (2011), it is not so much thinking, as being able to integrate 
and coordinate all necessary tasks, actions and activities, that will translate mitigation and 
planning into effective responses and recovery from any impact that an incident can cause. 
Thus, the nature of disaster or emergency management suggests that any theoretical 
underpinning and explanation ought to focus on the thinking process, on thinking 
preferences or on critical thinking that can translate decisions into effective actions (Flin 
et al., 2008). There is also an emphasis on the importance of coordination and 
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collaboration especially since the process involves different stakeholders and 
communication processes (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). The context and requirements for 
emergency and disaster management, therefore, stresses the relevance of theories such as 
the activity theory which is key for achieving goals (Jonassen and Rohrer-Murphy, 1999). 
The vertical and horizontal manner of coordination and integration required for effective 
emergency management (Bullock, 2006) also justify the relevance of the activity theory 
and the collaborative model. While these theories are relevant, this section further 
justifies their selection for critical review and for application to this research area.  
The cultural historical theory (CHT) of activity was introduced by a group of Russian 
psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s determined to find a new approach to understanding 
and transforming human life (Vygotsky, 1978; Leont’ev, 1978; Raeithel, 1992). 
Vygotsky’s main idea was to find human “cultural-historical science” with the aim of 
providing a unified account of “the nature and development of human behaviour” 
(Lantolf, 2006). The idea was to find a key for understanding human practices such as 
learning and doing and for developmental, cultural, historical and environmental contexts 
(Schatzki, 1996; Wenger, 1998; Stetsenko and Arievitch, 2004). However, the notion of 
activity in Soviet psychology (Wertsch, 1979) derives from the Marxist-Leninist tradition 
of dialectical historical materialism with its roots in the German classical philosophical 
tradition of Kant and Hegel. The main concept of the Marxist-Leninist tradition, upon 
which the philosophy of the activity theory is based, is the Marxist understanding of mind 
and consciousness, as these cannot be separated from the physical conditions of human 
existence (Marx and Engels, 1970). 
The cultural historical theory supports a helpful analytical framework to assess the 
activities and artefacts that can be useful in a disaster management collaboration system 
(Bharosa et al., 2012). Robbins (2006) identified “theory” or “metatheory” as a 
philosophical framework exploring the “development of human culture and individual 
personality based on dialectical materialism”. The purpose of CHT is to understand the 
structural subtleties that arrange people’s historically-developed traditions of actions in 
conducting their tasks inside a work environment (in relation to available tools and 
technologies) and in producing services that meet the needs of a group of people 
(Chaiklin, 2011). Furthermore, CHT has the ability to explore the relationship between 
activity and context and can also interpret work practices as the social distribution of an 
individual’s and a group of people’s actions (Engeström, 1987). As a result, Chaiklin 
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(2011) stated that CHT is the basic unit of analysis in the activity theory of an 
individual’s and a group of people’s actions over a period of time. 
An activity system seeks to describe the basic principles of CHT to understand the unity 
of realization (the human mind) and the activity (what we do) (Bannon and Bødker, 
1991). Emphasis is placed throughout on human practices at the level of existing 
interactions of individuals acting in a purposeful social context (Chaiklin, 2007). It 
includes many notions relating to the capacity of the mind to refer to different kinds of 
objects such as history, mediation, collaboration, interpretation and development in 
constructing consciousness within, and out of, everyday practices (Nardi, 1996; 
Kaptelinin, 1996; Kuutti, 1996). However, the evolution of the activity theory which 
started from the works of Russian psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s, as explained 
earlier in this paragraph, provides the context and the influence on subsequent work and 
on the development of the theory. For instance, Engeström (2001) stated that the third 
generation activity theory is the appropriate method to study the mutual relationship 
between agencies where the activity systems of two or more agencies are collaborating. 
This argument shows an advancement upon the initial work by the Russian psychologists 
that merely sought to understand human life. While the initial work on the activity theory 
was fundamental to exploring the theory, the third generation activity theory indicated an 
advancement that is more specific to the relationship between entities for performing 
tasks. 
The activity theory is a theoretical framework for the analysis and understanding of 
humans’ interaction through their use of tools and artefacts. Furthermore, the activity 
theory provides a general discovery method that can be used to support qualitative and 
interpretative research. It is also recommended for use in the processes of rapid and 
constant change within organizations (Hashim and Jones, 2007). The activity theory is 
significant as a framework for analysing how to achieve a goal, not only by using 
psychological and technical tools but also by utilising social structures such as rules, the 
division of labour and community (Jonassen & Rohrer-Murphy, 1999). Therefore, the 
activity theory provides a theoretical framework for exploring multi-agency collaboration 
which is the focus of this research.  
Regardless of the critiques of some authors about the activity theory (critiques such as the 
nature of interactions required for achieving goals (Jonassen & Rohrer-Murphy, 1999)), 
(Bannon and Bødker, 1991), the activity theory has been used in a number of empirical 
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studies with regard to the areas of human computer interaction (Korpela et al., 2002). 
This research focuses on studies of collaborative work in a diversity of fields and on 
examining the use of tools to help with this work. Furthermore, according to Korpela et al. 
(2002), the activity theory is used not only to study the work of system design but also 
can be used to look at the collaboration between a designer and a client with their 
different cultures, thoughts and experience. As identified by Engeström (1999, 2001), this 
type of unit is mainly used to gain benefit from expert work and in dealing with complex 
work such as education and healthcare in critical times in order to organize cross-
boundary work that has different objects and cultures; it allows more emphasis to be 
placed on complex work in order to create or design methods, models and artefacts 
(Miettinen and Hasu, 2002).   
Furthermore, the activity theory is a powerful descriptive tool that can be used in various 
disciplines (Nardi, 1996). It can explain phenomena as a set of factors, processes and 
techniques which can be used in investigations to find solutions for different complex 
problems (Kaptelinin et al., 1999; Korpela et al., 2000; Mwanza, 2001). Researchers use 
the activity theory as a framework that can support and determine user requirements for 
analysis or to support the evaluation phases of a scheme (Kaptelinin et al., 1999). In 
fields which, in general, incorporate approaches involving human activity (such as in 
psychology, education, management, culture and information systems), the activity 
theory has been an inspiration for theoretical reflection (Crawford & Hasan, 2006; 
Hakkinen & Korpela, 2006). 
4.2.1 The First Generation: Vygotsky’s Foundation 
According to Vygotsky's first generation of activity theory, focusing on individuals, tools 
are used to mediate between the subject and the object of an activity. The activity is 
completed in order to achieve a needed outcome. Vygotsky (1978) also indicated that the 
human mind is mediated by a third element, and humans can access the world only 
indirectly, or mediately, rather than directly, or immediately (Wertsch, del Rio & Alvarez, 
1995). The notion of mediated activity as the unit of analysis has a deep influence on 
psychology as it means that the individual might no more be known without his or her 
cultural means; society might no more be known without the group of individuals who 
use and produce artefacts (Engeström, 2001). Cultural artefacts have mediated human 
consciousness which consists of voluntary attention, planning, problem solving, 
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evaluation, conceptual thought, logical memory and learning (Cole & Engeström, 1993; 
Lantolf & Appel, 1994). 
“The use of artificial means, the transition to mediated activity, fundamentally changes 
all psychological operations just as the use of tools limitlessly broadens the range of 
activities within which the new psychological functions may operate. In this context, we 
can use the term higher psychological function, or higher behaviour as referring to the 
combination of tool and sign in psychological activity” (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Therefore, these cultural artefacts can be physical tools (for example, a computer or a 
mobile or a radio) that are outwardly oriented or symbolic tools (for example, strategies, 
arithmetics, language and signs) that are more inwardly oriented (Cole & Engeström, 
1993). The symbolic tools’ role is to mediate human consciousness; therefore, humans 
might be able to exchange and improve their mental activities and performance (Lantolf 
and Appel, 1994). Humans still try to control nature by creating tools that will support 
them in collaborating with other people in order to achieve their goals (Lantolf and Appel, 
1994).  
4.2.2 The Second Generation: Leont’ev’s General Structure of Activity 
The second generation of the activity theory as expanded by Engeström (1999) added the 
influence of social components within an activity. These social factors consist of 
community, rules and the division of labour (see Figure 2.1). Engeström’s model also 
described how the new social factors influence each other. In this model, community 
involves all subjects (i.e., individuals/organisations) sharing the same object.  Figure 4. 1 
below represents the theoretical framework that supports this study, and consists of the 
six interactive components in an activity system: subject, object, tools, rules, community 
and division of labour. The subject can be one person or a group of people who share the 
same object and subjects can be involved in a variety of activities, each with different 
objects, forming many different activity systems. With the subjects’ activities directed 
towards the object (goal), the objects of various subjects involved in a process should 
overlap or be shared to some extent in order to achieve a common outcome. Tools are the 
artefacts that are used by the subjects to carry out the activity in order to achieve an 
object, and may be physical tools such as pen and paper and computer software; they can 
also be cognitive properties such as language and methods of communicating. Rules refer 
to the explicit or implicit routines, policies and guidelines that determine and govern the 
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activity within the community. Division of labour refers to how the tasks and work are 
divided among members of the community (i.e., all subjects who espouse similar values, 
beliefs and rituals in an activity). Rules mediate subjects and the community and 
influence how the community functions as a whole, while division of labour dictates how 
the community functions towards the shared object (Engeström, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 4. 1: The Activity Theory (Engeström, 2001). 
 
A general structure of activity, as indicated by Kuutti (1996), shows three hierarchies, 
activity, action and operation, which can be individuals or groups. Also there are 
corresponding terms; these are motive, goal and conditions. According to Leont’ev 
(1981), activities consist of actions or chains of actions and these actions consist of 
operations. This hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 4. 2  Kuutti (1996) explained these 
levels by defining the activity (motive) of “building a house”, the action level of “fixing 
the roof, transporting bricks by truck” and the operation level as “hammering, changing 
gears when driving”.  
 
Figure 4. 2: The three levels of activity (Leont’ev, 1981). 
 
These abstract concepts are also illustrated by Leont’ev (1981) as ‘hunters searching for 
food'. Specifically, it is the overall need to find food for the group which motivates the 
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activity, although each individual member of the group performs specific actions in order 
to realise this need. The hunter who beats a drum to scare animals towards other hunters 
(action), when taken in isolation, may appear to have no connection to the need to obtain 
food; when seen as a step in a wider activity, however, its meaning is clear. In turn, 
actions are composed of operations, such as walking or beating the drum, and these 
operations are shaped by conditions, such as the making of the drum and drumstick or the 
nature of the physical surroundings and climate (Barab et al., 2004). Leont’ev, therefore, 
illustrates the difference between individual and collective actions and their relation to 
one another (Engeström, 2001). 
4.2.3 The Third Generation – Interacting Activity Systems as the New Unit of 
Analysis 
The third generation of the activity theory, commonly known as the cultural historical 
activity theory (CHAT), is an appropriate method for inter-organization analysis when 
the activity systems of two or more agencies are interacting. Additionally, it has the 
ability to expand the unit of analysis from one activity system to at least two interacting 
activity systems as the minimal unit of analysis (Engeström, 2001). The reason that it is 
useful for multi-agencies to use this theory is that among multi-agencies it is essential to 
analyse interaction and model each activity system individually (Engeström, 2001). The 
concept of boundary crossing is being developed within the activity theory (Engeström et 
al., 1995), for example, it has been used in the area of education to test connections 
between work and universities (Finlay, 2008). Consequently, the new unit of analysis 
expands from one activity system to “two or more collaborating activity systems that are 
embedded in a social, cultural and historical process” (Tuomi-Gröhn et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the third generation of activity theory could provide a crucial solution to 
expanding the inside working of individual in an activity system to two or more activity 



















Figure 4. 3: The third generation of activity theory (Engeström, 2001) 
 
The activity theory may be summarized with the help of five principles (Engeström, 1993, 
1995, 1999): 
1. A collective, artefact mediated, object-oriented activity system, in its network relations 
to other activity systems, is the prime unit of analysis. 
2. An activity system is a multi-voiced community with different viewpoints, histories 
and interests, which is multiplied in the networks of activity systems. Engeström noted 
the division of labour as being one source of these differences. This principle is “a source 
of trouble and a source of innovation, demanding actions of translation and innovation” 
(Engeström, 1993, 1995, 1999). 
3. The principle of historicity: activity systems evolve and develop over lengthy periods 
of time and researchers must understand this via the systems’ relationship to the 
development of objects, tools and culture, etc. 
4. Contradictions are the source of change and development. In the case of multiple 
interacting activity systems, contradictions are manifest both within and between activity 
systems. 
5. The principle of the possibility of expansive transformations in activity systems. 
Activity systems move through relatively long cycles of qualitative transformations. An 
expansive transformation is accomplished when the object and motive of the activity are 
reconceptualized in order to embrace a radically wider horizon of possibilities than in the 
previous mode of the activity. 
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4.2.4 Contradictions within Activity Systems 
Contradictions are basic elements of activity systems that are reflected as conflicts, 
problems, tensions or collapses inside the activity system or among different systems 
(Kuutti, 1996). In fact, there are many stress points and stable activity systems are rare: 
“tensions, disturbances, and local innovations are the rule and the engine of change” 
(Cole & Engeström, 1993). Thus, contradictions should not be taken as being negative 
but as difficulties that need to be resolved which serve as a guide to the transformation of 
activity (Issroff & Scanlon, 2002). Contradictions can be at different levels of the activity 
system and in each node (element) of the activity system; for instance, tensions inside 
subjects, among nodes, between the community and the division of labour, or between 
diverse activity systems such as the fire service and the police service (Barab et al., 2004). 
Contradiction can develop between nodes when a new tool is introduced into a 
community that has no understanding of how to use it yet. Engeström (1997) defines four 
sources of contradictions which are summarised in Table 4. 1. 
Table 4. 1: Summary of levels of contradiction in activity systems (Engeström, 1997) 
Level  Description Example 
Primary Inner contradiction within each 
constituent component of the central 
activity. The tensions found within an 
element of a single activity. 
Doctors working in a health 
care system where the 
instruments of their activity 
(drugs, etc.) answer the 
needs of patients (use 
value), but are also 
commodities that have to be 
provided within a budget 
(exchange value). 
Secondary Appearing between the nodes of the 
triangle – where there is a mismatch 
between the actual and the required 
level of development of one of the 
nodes, and the relationship between 
them breaks down. Those found 
between two elements of a single 
activity. 
Mismatches between the 
conceptual diagnostic tools 
of traditional medical 
practice and the object – the 
increasingly ambiguous and 
evolving complaints of 
patients. 
Tertiary Appears when a more “culturally 
advanced” form of the object/motive of 
activity is introduced into the system 
which needs to develop to support it. 
New procedures or values 
introduced by administrators 
or governors which are 
formally introduced, but 
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The imbalances found between an 
activity and a culturally more advanced 
version of this same activity (co-
constructed with the stakeholders). 
which may be resisted by 
practitioners. 
Quaternary Contradictions between the central 
activity system being studied and its 
neighbouring activity systems. The 
tensions between different activities. 
Differences between doctors 
and patients, or between 
local and centralised 
healthcare providers in their 




Primary contradictions can be understood in terms of a breakdown between actions or 
sets of actions that realise the activity. Such actions are poly-motivated which means that 
the same action may be executed by different people for different reasons or by the same 
person as part of two separate activities. Poly-motivation may be the cause of subsequent 
contradictions. Secondary contradictions are those that occur between the constituent 
nodes, eg, between the subject’s skills and the tool he/she is using, or between rules and 
tools. Tertiary contradiction occurs between an existing activity and a more advanced 
form of that activity, such as when an activity is remodelled to take into account new 
motives or new ways of working. Quaternary contradictions are those between the central 
and neighbouring activities, e.g. instrument producing, subject-producing and rule 
producing. A more detailed explanation of the meaning of activity tension and 














4.2.5 Adaptation of the Activity Theory for Multi-agency Collaboration   
According to Mishra et al. (2011a), the activity theory has been shown to be a valuable 
tool for analysing information sharing among multi-agencies involved in risk assessment 
in disaster management. The activity theory also described by Mishra et al. (2011b) as a 
powerful methodological and analytical tool to study the information practices of the 
emergency services. Given that the activity theory provides a way to model and 
understand the actions of groups in pursuit of common goals (especially when the transfer 
of information is important to their efforts) then it seems that the third generation activity 
theory (Engeström, 2001), in particular, provides a strong analytical framework to 
analyse multi-agency activities. This version of the activity theory is suitable when 
studying inter-organizational activity systems, whereby two or more agencies are 
interacting. The theory stresses the importance of collaboration between members of 
multi-agency groups. The work of the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum 
members can be analysed from an activity theory perspective. This is illustrated in table 
4.2, figure 4.5 and figure 4.6 shows example of multiple activity models.  
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In this case, it is the completion of risk assessment activities and the 
understanding of local risks.  
Outcome Confidence in disaster resilience and preparedness.      
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Figure 4. 6: Example of multiple activity models for the senior commanders of agencies looking 
at risk assessment. 
 
The activity theory provides an important framework for understanding the collaboration 
between multi-agencies in risk assessment research. The activity theory highlights the 
need to understand the interaction between the members of multi-agency teams in general 
by analysing subjects, object, rules, tools and community. 
Numerous elements of the activity theory were looked at during the literature review. 
Firstly, there is the community aspect. In this case, the community is made up of 
Category 1 & 2 responders in The Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum in 
England. Within this community, the activity theory provides a way of defining the 
subjects who need to be targeted for the collection of primary data; in this case, the 
commanders of Category 1 agencies (such as the Greater Manchester Police service, the 
Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue service, the National Health Service, the NW 
Ambulance Service, the Greater Manchester Local Authority, the Environment Agency, 
Transportation for Greater Manchester and representatives from the UK’s central 
government). Furthermore, the activity theory suggests that the division of labour 
between these subjects is important, so the literature review aims to identify their roles 
and responsibilities. 
Another aspect of the activity theory that guides this research is the rules that are 
followed in the UK for a comprehensive approach to disaster management which, in this 
Police 
agency 






























case, are known as Integrated Emergency Management. Of specific importance are the 
risk assessment processes that are carried out by the multi-agency teams in the Greater 
Manchester LRF to understand local risks. The understanding of local risk is the common 
objective of the stakeholders involved. Therefore, the activity theory has also guided the 
identification of the research problem and the research questions because, without 
knowing the common objectives of the stakeholders, there is no way of fully 
understanding their activities. This has guided the literature review which looked to 
identify the problems and challenges faced by multi-agency teams in meeting their 
common objectives.   
Tools are another element of the activity theory which has guided the literature review to 
investigate the technological platforms currently available and which are applied in the 
collaboration, communication and information sharing between agencies in general and 
in the Greater Manchester LRF in particular. Moreover, the activity theory helps to guide 
the development of tools that are successful in supporting multi-agency teams in 
collectively understanding their context and in sharing information about their local area.  
As previously noted, the activity theory underscores the importance of collaboration in 
the activities of the Greater Manchester LRF. As the LRF is made up of representatives 
of different agencies, each with access to their own knowledge and experience, then the 
sharing of information between these agencies is vital in order to support collaboration. 
Therefore, this research focuses on the sharing of information, on the technology 
platforms that allow this sharing and on the stakeholders who have this information and 
access this information in order to meet their common objectives.  
As a result, from an activity theory perspective, this research focuses on subjects and 
tools. Of particular importance and interest to this research is the activity theory’s 
concept of contradiction. As previously described, contradictions result from the 
problems, tensions and gaps at different levels within an activity system. Professionals 
engaged in collaborative risk assessment face numerous problems in their work. For 
instance, professionals might lack good communication within their team, which in the 
activity theory would be a primary contradiction. Similarly, team members might be 
unable to correctly use the technological tools at their disposal in order to assess risk or 
they may not be fully able to read and understand the data presented to them in a visual 
way. These are examples of secondary contradictions in the activity theory. In terms of 
the activity theory, this research is aimed at resolving some of the contradictions relating 
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specifically to the communication and sharing of information between members of multi-
agency teams and the contradictions relating to their interaction with their tools 
(technology platforms).   
Overall, an analysis of the activity theory provides a strong influence on this research, 
including the collection of secondary data in the literature review, defining the research 
questions and in highlighting the importance of collaboration in the activities of the 
Greater Manchester LRF. 
4.3 Critical Thinking in Disaster Management 
According to Sagun et al. (2009), because of the evolving and uncertain nature of the 
risks of hazards due to human interference, the information available to emergency 
managers can be unreliable and inconsistent. This makes critical thinking crucial within 
the disaster management processes, including disaster risk management. As a result, 
research into critical thinking skills is important in order to support strategic commanders 
in their risk assessment activities (Moore et al., 2007). Critical thinking is essential for 
managers in risk assessment. This type of thinking is required in the planning and 
preparedness phase (Alexander, 2005). CT is needed in order to be able to deal with the 
massive data received in order to determine the relevant ones to prioritise for the risk 
assessment process (Fagel, 2011). Furthermore, inferences need to be made for 
comparison, for information analysis and for coordination and collaboration between 
stakeholders for risk management actions (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). The emergency 
managers design the plan which means that they have to be aware of all the needs to meet 
and of how suitable the plan is for the context to which it will be applied.  
Critical thinking (CT) has become an important area in various disciplines in the last 
twenty years. Professionals in areas such as military leadership, healthcare, education and 
emergency management have seen the importance of CT grow (e.g., Cohen et al, 1994; 
Fallesen et al, 1996; Miller & Malcolm, 1990; National Education Goals Panel, 1991; 
Tucker, 1996; Comfort, 2007). 
As indicated by Haddow et al. (2008), emergency management starts at the local level. 
The professionals at the local level are essential in the creation of collaborative 
emergency mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Col, 2007; Henstra, 2010; 
Waugh & Streib, 2006). Local emergency managers have to identify risks and manage 
vulnerable people and communities. This involves taking into account a complex range of 
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factors such as critical infrastructure, population and the socio-economic makeup of the 
community. Moreover, Wang and Kapucu (2008) noted that when local emergency 
managers create their strategic plans they must create and use different methods to 
communicate threats and warnings to the public before and during disasters. They noted 
that critical thinking skills must be employed at the preparedness and strategic planning 
stage. In short, critical thinking is crucial to the work of local government emergency 
managers (Perry, 2003) in their work in identifying and anticipating incidents, solving 
problems and making effective decisions in an efficient way (Comfort, 2007). The 
cognitive processes that go into critical thinking have been identified as being the basis 
for emergency management by Comfort (2007). Due to the importance of CT skills, this 
is a growing area of interest for researchers.  
4.3.1 Literature Review on Critical Thinking  
Critical thinking can be understood as a process that involves two different modes of 
thought. Bloom (1956) wrote extensively on modes of thinking that can be used to 
introduce the underlying idea of critical thinking. In Bloom’s model (1956), the cognitive 
domain of reasoning relates to knowledge and intellect. Bloom’s model divides the 
cognitive domain into six areas: knowledge and recollection of information, identifying 
and understanding problems, applying existing concepts to new demands, analysis of 
information, forming patterns and evaluating ideas and making judgments about the value 
of ideas (Bloom, 1956).  
Bloom’s model also involves an affective domain. In contrast to the cognitive domain, 
which relates to ideas and facts, the affective domain relates to other areas such as 
emotions, attitudes and motivations. Bloom’s model has been very influential on 
educators in a range of disciplines and has led to a growing interest in critical thinking, 
which effectively brings together the cognitive and affective domains that Bloom 
identified.  
There are a number of different definitions for critical thinking expressed by a number of 
scholars. For instance, Tama (1989) described it as ‘a way of reasoning that demands 
adequate support for one's beliefs and an unwillingness to be persuaded unless support is 
forthcoming’. Chance (1986) defined it as ‘the ability to analyse facts, generate and 
organize ideas, defend opinions, make comparisons, draw inferences, evaluate arguments 
and solve problems’. Mayer and Goodchild (1990) outlined it as the ‘active, systematic 
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process of understanding and evaluating arguments. An argument provides an assertion 
about the properties of some object or the relationship between two or more objects and 
evidence to support or refute the assertion. Critical thinkers acknowledge that there is no 
single correct way to understand and evaluate arguments and that all attempts are not 
necessarily successful’. Common to each of these definitions is the notion that critical 
thinking relates to the critical evaluation of ideas and the subjection of ideas to reason.  
The most comprehensive and commonly used definition comes from The National 
Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking which draws upon the work of hundreds of 
writers and researchers. Its definition of critical thinking is: ‘the intellectually disciplined 
process of actively and skilfully conceptualizing, applying, analysing, synthesizing, or 
evaluating information gathered from or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, 
reasoning or communication, as a guide to belief and action’ (National Council for 
Excellence in Critical Thinking, 2008, 1). 
In addition to these definitions, scholars have proposed models to describe critical 
thinking. Brookfield (1987) identified four elements of critical thinking. These are 
assumptions, context, alternatives and reflective scepticism.  
Assumptions: Brookfield describes the challenging and testing of assumptions as an 
important element of critical thinking. In his analysis, critical thinkers are mindful of how 
their existing assumptions about the nature of the world might influence their perceptions, 
explanations and judgments of different phenomena.  
Context: Closely linked to assumptions, critical thinking involves the awareness of how 
underlying assumptions provide the context for a person’s thinking.  
Alternatives: Brookfield suggests that thinking with creativity and imagination is a 
foundation of critical thinking. He suggests that critical thinking always looks for 
alternative ways to look at problems.  
Scepticism: Brookfield’s view is that critical thinkers approach their own beliefs and 
ideas with scepticism and are constantly testing and refining them, without taking 
seemingly obvious ideas for granted. 
Paul and Elder (2005) developed Brookfield’s model into a more detailed taxonomy of 
critical thinking. They organized it into eight elements of thought that follow on from 
each other. They described critical thinking as a person’s ability to find important and 
worthwhile questions and problems, to find and evaluate information that is relevant to 
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these questions or problems and then to use abstract ideas to interpret this information 
and arrive at rational, reasonable conclusions. These conclusions are then subjected to 
evaluation against relevant criteria or standards. Moreover, critical thinking involves 
constant recognition of biases, openness to alternative ideas and an understanding of the 
implications of an idea. In short, the process of critical thinking starts with the 
identification of a problem and develops a workable solution based on reason.  
While Brookfield’s model is a general description of critical thinking, Paul and Elder’s 
model provides a formalized procedure to follow which can be applied to many situations 
and disciplines. It forms a checklist of activities to follow and explicit questions to ask 
that are related to each element of the process. This is shown below in Table 4. 3. 
Table 4. 3: Scientific thinking (Paul and Elder, 2005) 
The Elements of 
Scientific Thought 
A Checklist for Scientific 
Reasoning 
Questions Using the 
Elements of Scientific 
Thought 
Scientific Purpose  Take time to state your 
purpose clearly.  
 Distinguish your purpose 
from related purposes. 
 Check periodically to be 
sure you are still on 
target.  
 Choose realistic 
scientific purposes. 
 What am I trying to 
accomplish?  
 What is my central aim? 
My purpose? 
 
Scientific Questions  Take time to clearly and 
precisely state the 
question at issue. 
 Express the question in 
several ways to clarify its 
meaning and scope. 
 Break the question into 
sub-questions. 
 Determine if the question 
has one right answer, or 
requires reasoning from 
more than one hypothesis 
or point of view. 
 What question am I raising?  
 What problem am I 
addressing? 
Scientific Information  Restrict your claims to 
those supported by the 
data you have. 
 Search for data that 
opposes your position as 
well as alternative 
theories. 
 Make sure that all data 
used is clear, accurate, 
 What data am I using in 
coming to that conclusion? 
 What information do I need 
to settle the question? 
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and relevant to the 
question at issue. 
 Make sure you have 
gathered sufficient data. 
Scientific Inferences/ 
Conclusions 
 Infer only what the data 
implies. 
 Check inferences for 
their consistency with 
each other. 
 Identify assumptions 
which led you to your 
conclusions. 
 How did I reach this 
conclusion?  
 Is there another way to 
interpret the information? 
Scientific  
Concepts 
 Identify key scientific 
concepts and explain 
them clearly. 
 Consider alternative 
concepts or alternative 
definitions of concepts. 
 Make sure you are using 
concepts and theories 
with care and precision. 
 What is the main concept, 
theory, or principle here? 
 Can I explain the relevant 
theory? 
Assumptions  Clearly identify your 
assumptions and 
determine whether they 
are justifiable. 
 Consider how your 
assumptions are shaping 
your point of view. 
 What am I taking for 
granted?  
 What assumption has led 
me to that conclusion? 
Implications/Consequences  Trace the implications 
and consequences that 
follow from your data 
and reasoning. 
 Search for negative as 
well as positive 
implications. 
 Consider all possible 
implications. 
 What are the implications 
of the data I have collected? 
 What are the implications 
of my inferences? 
Points of View  Identify your point of 
view. Make sure it is 
scientific. 
 Seek other scientific 
points of view and 
identify their strengths as 
well as weaknesses. 
 From what point of view 
am I looking at this issue? 
 Is there another point of 
view I should consider? 
 
Fischer et al. (2009) proposed another model of critical thinking. Their model was 
developed with military decision makers in mind and brings together a great deal of 
previous literature on the subject of critical thinking. Although it draws on previous work 
on the subject, the model departs considerably from previous models in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the model is concerned with describing the cognitive processes that occur in 
103 
 
people who are thinking critically, rather than prescribing useful procedures for them to 
follow. Also, the goals of the model are fundamentally different. While many models of 
critical thinking aim to give individuals a set of techniques to use, this model views 
critical thinking as a psychological event.  
The model looks to describe what goes on inside the mind of a critical thinker during 
periods of critical thinking. These periods are assumed to be quite short, ranging from 5 
to 30 minutes. In the model, critical thinking is viewed and explained as a state of mind 
that begins and ends depending on the situation. Moreover, this model suggests that 
critical thinking involves small units of information which have an effect on the thinker. 
The authors suggest that, while other models might involve a stimulus like a book or 
report, their own model assumes that a stimulus is a much smaller unit of information 
such as a photograph or a sentence. In summary, most models of critical thinking 
describe it as a way of life, while this model describes it as a temporary state of mind.  
Finally, and most relevant to this research, this model departs from others in that it gives 
practical considerations for the provision of stimuli. The writers suggest that because 
small units of information bring on critical thinking, then this information can be 
manipulated and structured to encourage and influence critical thinking, as shown in 











Figure 4. 7: Process model of critical thinking (Fischer et al., 2009) 
 
The model begins with a context that produces a period of critical thinking. This context 
is an event or piece of information in the external environment which starts the 
psychological process in the mind of the critical thinker. To produce critical thinking, a 
situation must involve the introduction of important information that is of interest to the 
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thinker and time must be available for the thinker to process it. These are the “defining 
conditions” of critical thinking. Other factors that might lead to critical thinking include 
the presence of information that is complex or uncertain. These factors are referred to as 
“predictive’ conditions in the model. To summarise, this context is an event that 
stimulates two related mental processes.  
The first process is automatic and unconscious, similar to the assumptions that were 
identified in Brookfield’s model. This is labelled as System 1 in the model. This system 
influences System 2 which is conscious and deliberate in the mind of the thinker. System 
2 begins with a “meta-task” which is the objective that a thinker has to achieve. This 
could be something to understand, a judgement to make, a decision to make or a problem 
to solve. This meta-task governs the critical thinking that follows in System 2. 
System 2 is the overall act of critical thinking. It is influenced by a series of factors 
shown with arrows in Figure 2.6. These include the unconscious beliefs from System 1 
and a range of other factors. The first two factors are “Predisposing Individual Difference 
Factors” and “Moderating Variables”. These are both individual differences that differ 
from thinker to thinker. Predisposing Individual Differences affect the likelihood of 
critical thinking taking place. They relate to the thinker’s personality, values and style of 
thinking. Examples include a thinker’s “open mindedness”, “confidence” and 
“adaptability”.  
By contrast, Moderating Variables influence the quality of the critical thinking that takes 
place. Rather than the personality of the thinker, they relate to the thinker’s situation. For 
example, the education, recent experience, alertness and health of the thinker could all 
affect how well they critically think.  
In addition, “Negative Experiential Consequences” also influence the execution of critical 
thinking. This relates to how difficult and demanding a period of CT is for the thinker. 
The creators of this model suggest that CT is hard work, leading to negative effects for 
the thinker such as tiredness, anxiety and social awkwardness.  The greater the negative 
effects, the worse the experience of critical thinking is for the thinker and the greater the 
potential negative effect on the process of critical thinking itself. Furthermore, the 
negative effects of one experience of critical thinking could negatively impact on future 
situations of critical thinking and, therefore, the decisions produced in them. 
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Finally, the model provides an outcome of critical thinking, referred to as the “Product of 
CT Skill”. This is, in effect, the final decision made after a period of critical thinking or, 
in other words, the solution to the meta-task.  
Fischer et al.’s model has a number of advantages over its counterparts and is particularly 
useful in the context of this research. Firstly, the model has produced predictions that 
have been empirically tested. As a result, the model has been adopted as part of American 
military training courses. This demonstrates how useful the model has been in a practical 
context that is similar to emergency management.   
More generally, the model is useful to this research because it does not only focus on the 
people engaged in critical thinking. In fact, it offers guidance for the designers of the 
information that these people are given. Furthermore, by describing the negative effects 
of critical thinking, such as tiredness, anxiety and social awkwardness, the model reflects 
the goal of this research which is how best to create a collaborative risk assessment 
environment in emergency management. The model shows that a collaborative platform 
should reduce negative effects and promote the effective critical thinking that is so 
important for emergency management professionals. The model suggests that an effective 
platform should free up users’ attention. If, for example, information is visualized, then 
users do not have to spend mental effort on imagining a scenario. They can, therefore, 
spend more mental effort on critical thinking. This is an example of how a platform could 
reduce negative effects and promote critical thinking during users’ strategic planning.  
Moreover, Fischer et al. (2009) outlined the critical thinking skills that each individual 
possesses to a greater or lesser extent. These include interpretation skills such as the 
ability to retrieve the gist of material, to break overall goals into smaller sub-goals, to 
question a matter deeply and to identify and challenge previously held assumptions. 
Reasoning skills, which are included in the critical thinking model, are a person’s ability 
to think logically, to apply general principles to specific cases and to determine if the 
evidence available is enough to justify conclusions. The assessment skills included in 
critical thinking skills include the ability to understand new information (and know how it 
supports or contradicts conclusions), to consider new evidence that becomes available, to 
balance a variety of different factors when needed and to evaluate the quality of 
judgments based on patterns. Finally, the meta-cognitive skills within critical thinking 
skills include a person’s capacity to take into consideration a number of alternative 
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explanations, to produce multiple ideas and to account for a whole situation when making 
decisions.  
These critical thinking skills are crucial for multi-agency collaboration because this 
collaboration involves evidence-based decision-making and strategic planning. Therefore, 
the design of a platform to enhance collaboration needs to take these skills into account. 
Moreover, these skills will provide a way of evaluating the success of a prototype in 
enhancing critical thinking among multi-agency team members in their risk assessment 
activities.  
4.4 Team Collaboration Model  
Several models of good practice for team collaboration have been put forward from 
various disciplines. For instance, Kusumasari et al. (2011) have developed a model of 
collaboration in the field of software development, as shown in Figure 4. 8. This model 
defines a cycle of 5 stages for team collaboration. These stages begin with 
communication with stakeholders or clients (as this model comes from the field of 
software design), followed by a planning stage. The plans that have been created are then 
modelled and then put into practice in the construction stage. The constructed project is 
then released in the deployment stage. The cycle is completed when communication once 
again takes place between the designers and the stakeholders or clients, gaining feedback 
on the project. Underlying this cycle is the need for face-to-face and electronic 
communication between team members and the use of collaborative tools so that they can 
work on together to achieve their goal.  
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Figure 4. 8: Collaboration model of software development (Kusumasari et al., 2011) 
 
While the Kusumasari et al. model essentially focuses on the kinds of communication 
required in each stage of collaboration and the tools that can be used to support this 
communication, other models of collaboration have looked at from a different perspective. 
Warner et al. (2005) outlined a cognitive model of team collaboration which focuses 
particularly on the processes of reasoning and decision-making amongst teams. The 
model starts with a series of inputs that contextualize the collaboration such as a 
description of the problem, the experience and skills of the team members, the structure 
of the team and the team members’ roles and responsibilities. Aside from these inputs, 
the model then outlines four connected but separate stages of team collaboration which 
form a feedback cycle. The stages are knowledge construction, collaborative team 
problem-solving, team consensus and outcome and, finally, evaluation and revision. The 
model emphasizes the constant dynamic communication that is required throughout the 
process.  
A well-known model of collaboration which has been tested empirically is the one put 
forward by Patel et al. (2012). They proposed the Co-spaces Collaborative Working 
Model (CCWM) which describes the factors that affect collaborative work. The CCWM 
is now a recognized model of collaboration in a number of disciplines including academic, 
industrial and ICT circles (Patel et al., 2012; Lee & Paine, 2015). Moreover, research in 
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the field of medicine has shown that the model can be applied in that field too. Overall, in 
focusing on human factors affecting collaboration, the CCWM provides a useful standard 
for collaboration in many fields (Patel et al., 2012). The model identifies the following 
categories for these factors: context, support, tasks, processes, teams, individuals and 
overarching factors. 
Context is the setting for collaborative work, such as its physical location, the 
organizations involved and the individuals involved. Support relates to the assistance, 
resources and tools available to a team as well as the team’s ability to get advice and 
expertise from outside. Tasks are the activities that teams must undertake and they can be 
analysed according to the type of task (for example, routine, predictable, complex) but 
also by task structure. Interaction processes are the ways in which the members of a 
group interact (e.g., in the areas of learning, coordination, communication and decision-
making). CCWM also includes a team category which consists of the roles and 
responsibilities of team members, the sharing of knowledge, the common ground held by 
team members, the procedures a group follows and the composition of the team. In the 
model’s individual category are the skills of the individual team members. These skills 
can be technical but cognitive, such as reasoning skills, the ability to perceive and process 
information, the capacity for concentration and learning style. The final category in the 
model is overarching factors which influence all the previously mentioned categories. An 
example of an overarching factor is trust between, and within, teams. 
In order to explore the multi-agency collaboration needed in risk assessment activities in 
LRFs in England, this research will further investigate the human factors involved in 
these activities, including interaction processes, individuals, teams and tasks. These 
factors are important in the context of this research because interaction processes relate 
both to the interaction between team members and to the interaction between users and 
their technological tools, such as the interactive map. Teams and individuals are also 
relevant in this research because this research focuses on teams made up of individuals 
from multiple agencies. Therefore, there needs to be collaboration between the 
individuals who are part of the LRF team and also between the agencies that represented 
in the LRF. Finally, tasks are important to this research because this research needs to 
understand the tasks faced by multi–agency team members so it can enhance the 
interaction and communication needed. Computer Supported Collaborative Working 
(CSCW) provides a way of applying computers to enhance collaboration. CSCW is a 
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multi-disciplinary approach to the tools that support and enhance groups of people 
working together. Since its inception in the 1980s, it has been conceptualized and revised 
by numerous writers such as Howard (1988), Kling (1991) and Clement & van Besselaar 
(1993). However, at the centre of CSCW is the study of the reality of human 
collaboration and how computer tools should be developed in light of this, in order to 
enhance and promote collaboration (Koschmann et al., 1996). To best understand how 
multi-agency activities are conducted (and, therefore, how they can be supported and 
enhanced), it is valuable to look at the model of multi-user interfaces developed by Miles 









Figure 4. 9: Conceptual model of multi-user interfaces as represented 
by Miles et al. (1993) 
As shown in figure 4.9, this model illustrates various modes or “channels” of 
communication between team members either directly or through a tool or “artifact”. The 
goal of the collaboration in the model is (e). In the model, (a) relates to direct 
communication between team members through speech, eye contact and physical 
gestures. Similarly, (d) also relates to direct communication, but it relates to the ways that 
team members direct each other’s attention to aspects of a shared artifact.  Examples 
include indicative gestures like pointing with the hands or the use of a laser pointer to 
draw the other team members’ attention to an aspect of a shared artifact. In the model, 
indirect communication comes when team members change or manipulate the artifact 
privately (b) or do this collaboratively, together in public (c). The essential difference 
between channels (d) and (c) is that the first is showing aspects of a shared artifact 
whereas the second is the changing, editing or manipulation of the shared artifact.  
Huifen et al. (2003) defined four different modes of multi-agency collaboration which 
can be linked to the model above. These modes are face-to-face (team members working 
110 
 
at the same location at the same time), synchronous distributed (working in different 
locations but at the same time), asynchronous (working at the same location but at 
different times) and asynchronous distributed (working in different locations at different 
times).  
Multi-agency partnerships in emergency management in England are made up of 
representatives from Category 1 and 2 responders (Sircar et al., 2013). In risk assessment 
activities, these representatives are co-located, meaning that they are in a face-to-face 
environment with a significant opportunity for direct and indirect communication. 
Research has found that this is the most productive way for groups to operate (Ocker, 
2001). As a result, this research will focus on ways to enhance multi-agency collaboration 
in a co-located space by the creation of an artifact which enables and promotes direct and 
indirect communication. 
Figure 4. 10 shows how Miles et al.’s model of multi-user interfaces (1993) has been 
applied to the risk assessment process by the author. This framework gives the stages of 
the risk assessment process, an explanation of the activities relating to each one, and the 
channels of interaction and communication required between the team members and 








Figure 4. 10: A framework to illustrate the communication and the integration of risk assessment 
activities in co-located multi-agency meetings. 
This model shows the channels of communication in a face-to-face co-located working 
environment for multi-agency teams in their risk assessment activities. In the 
contextualization stage, team members have to understand the context and the level of 
local risk by exploring social vulnerability, the local environment, the local critical 
infrastructure and hazard sites’ information in their area. This requires direct 
communication as in channel (a) when team members verbally discuss local risks and in 
channel (d) when they collectively view and discuss the artifacts that they are using (such 
as maps, tables, reports, photographs etc.). It also requires indirect communication as in 
channel (c) when they navigate, annotate and manipulate these artifacts.  
At the hazard review stage, team members identify risk hotspots based on past experience, 
historical data, research or other information. This involves direct communication as in 
channel (a) when individuals verbally discuss their experience and thoughts and in 
channel (d) when they, for example, view and discuss reports and studies. Moreover, 
indirect communication as in channel (c) is required when they edit and manipulate such 
Nature of activity  
Contextualization 
Risk assessment process 
Risk analysis  
Hazard review 
Risk evaluation   
Risk treatment   
Explore and understand the context of the 
local risk 
 
Identify risk hotspots 
 
Predict the outcome and likely impact of 
risks 
 
Priorities risk hotspots 
 
Identify current capabilities and gaps 
 
Monitoring and 
reviewing Discuss and update on recent activities 
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reports and studies. In the next stage, risk analysis, multi-agency teams seek to predict a 
local risk’s outcome and impact. This stage will require direct communication as in 
channel (a) when team members share their thoughts and speculate on a risk’s likely 
impact and in channel (d) when they view, for example, maps of an area. Indirect 
communication as in channel (c) is needed if they highlight areas of a map which may be 
under threat from a local risk. 
At the fourth stage, risk evaluation, members of multi-agency teams aim to 
collaboratively identify and prioritise local risk hotspots. This needs direct 
communication as in channel (a) in which team members give and justify their opinions 
and negotiate a list of priorities as well as in channel (d) if they view artifacts to support 
their opinions. Indirect communication as in channel (c) is needed if they annotate these 
artifacts to help them in prioritising.  
In risk treatment, team members attempt to identify their current capabilities to deal with 
risks and locate gaps in their resources. This requires channel (a), direct communication, 
whereby team members verbally summarize their agencies’ resources; channel (d), direct 
communication, if they collectively view maps showing the location of equipment, and 
(c) indirect communication if they annotate and highlight these maps.  
Finally, at the monitoring and reviewing stage, multi-agency teams will require channel 
(a), direct communication, in order to discuss and update each other on recent activities 
and changes. Additionally, they will need channel (d), direct communication, if they use 
visual artifacts like maps or photographs to show the outcomes of activities and channel 
(c), indirect communication, when they update or edit their documents and records.  
4.5 A Theoretical Framework for Facilitating Multi-agency Collaboration in Risk 
Assessment Activity  
An analysis of the activity theory and critical thinking and team collaboration models has 
guided the researcher to identify the requirements of a collaborative environment 
platform for risk assessment activities. As shown in Figure 4. 11, various elements from 
these models have been extracted to undertake this, with each model highlighting 




Figure 4. 11: A theoretical framework for facilitating multi-agency collaboration in risk 
assessment activity 
 
This research has applied the activity theory to a specific professional body working 
towards city resilience, namely the Greater Manchester LRF. When applied to this 
example, the activity theory highlights the importance of collaboration and analyses the 
requirements for this collaboration. The elements of the activity theory that guide this 
research are: community, subjects, objects, rules and tools. The community in this 
context is Category 1 and 2 responders in Greater Manchester. From this community, the 
researcher defined the subjects who need to be targeted for the collection of primary data. 
These were the commanders of each agency within Greater Manchester LRF. Another 
key element are their objectives which, in this case, is the completion of risk assessment 
activities and the understanding of local risks. Rules in this context cover the 
comprehensive approach to disaster management which, in this case, are the Integrated 
Emergency Management guidelines and, specifically, risk assessment processes. Tools 
are the final aspect of the activity theory guiding this research investigating the 
technological platforms currently available, and guiding the development of tools that are 
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successful in supporting multi-agency collaboration. The activity theory’s concept of 
contradiction has also guided this research, because professionals engaged in 
collaborative risk assessment face numerous problems in their work, such as a lack of 
good communication within their team (a primary contradiction) or difficulties in using 
their technical tools (a secondary contradiction). 
The team collaboration model has highlighted the communication and interaction 
required for collaboration within a multi-agency team. The key elements within this 
model are interaction processes, teams, individuals and tasks. Interaction processes give 
an understanding of the direct and indirect channels of communication between team 
members and their tools and artifacts (such as interactive maps). Teams and individuals 
have also been utilised to guide this research because LRFs are teams made up of 
individual members. Similarly, an understanding of the tasks faced by multi–agency team 
members is required in order to enhance the interaction and communication needed for 
effective collaboration.  
The critical thinking model highlights the individual skills required within multi-agency 
teams during collaboration in risk assessment activities. This model guides the design of 
a collaborative platform, highlighting the need for the design to reduce the negative 
effects of critical thinking such as tiredness, anxiety and social awkwardness. Moreover, 
this model outlines the critical thinking skills that such a platform should promote in 
order to support multi-agency team members’ collaboration. These skills are 
interpretation skills (such as the ability to grasp the gist of material quickly) reasoning 
skills (such as the ability to think logically), assessment skills (such as evaluating old 
information in light of new information) and meta-cognitive skills (such as the ability to 
consider a number of alternative explanations for an event). In addition, the critical 
thinking model provides a means of evaluating the success of the prototype platform. The 
next section discusses the specific influence of theories on prototype design.  
4.5.1  Influence of Theories & Model on Prototype Design  
The application of the activity theory in the design of the prototype: The activity theory 
provides an analysis and an understanding of humans’ interaction through their use of 
tools and artefacts, as identified in previous sections in this chapter. This is achieved 
through providing the users with artefacts (Engeström, 2001) which, in the case of this 
study, is an interactive map that can present the risk models via various visual layers on 
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top of the map to the users. Google Earth is used by this map as a plugin in a web 
browser that can run on the user’s computer. 
The application of the Critical Thinking Model: the ability to retrieve the gist of any 
material is achievable in that the users can retrieve the information in each layer of the 
interactive map and scrutinise a piece of information they particularly need (Fischer et al., 
2009). Each layer of the interactive map provides a type of information so the task of the 
user is broken into sub-tasks and so are their goals. In the first layer the users can 
recognise the levels of flood in a particular area where the high-risk areas are coloured 
with dark blue and the low-risk areas are coloured with light blue. Demographic 
information is provided on another layer, and so on. In this case, users are able to make 
decisions and judgements based on balancing different factors. Additionally, the users 
have come to the task with previous assumptions. The information provided by the layers 
of the interactive map can encourage the users to think logically and compare between 
their schemata about the subject and what is discovered within the layers; either they 
confirm their already existing schema or they challenge them.   
Team Collaborative Model: the workgroup approach has been used in this study. The 
participants will be involved in a discussion and they will be monitored while discussing 
and exchanging points of view and comments. During the task, they exchange opinions 
and comments on the information provided by the map. They model a plan based on what 
they have found in the interactive map layers. They set a deployment stage to which the 
plan is released. A round of communication takes place between the participants and 
designers and they give feedback on the project.   
Overall, the activity theory is used as a way of guiding the development and use of tools 
and systems to achieve a specific objective. In the case of this research, the activity 
theory provides a way of analysing the activities undertaken between multi-agency LRFs 
as they work towards their common objective, which is to meet and complete risk 
assessment activities in order to achieve resiliency and preparedness in the local 
community. The collaboration model helps to understand how the multi-agency teams 
can communicate, interact and collaborate, while the critical thinking model provides a 
means of understanding and improving the way that these teams should understand the 
information to which they have access. Overall, the analysis of the above models points 
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to the need to identify the specific requirements for a collaborative platform for risk 
assessment activities.  
4.6 Summary  
This chapter has analysed the activity theory, the critical thinking model and the team 
collaboration model to identify the theoretical aspects that should be considered in 
developing a collaborative environment for risk assessment activities. Firstly, the activity 
theory guided the collection of secondary data in the literature review and the research 
questions. Moreover, it gave a way of understanding the community, subjects, objects, 
rules and tools involved in collaborative risk assessment. Secondly, the critical thinking 
model has identified the critical thinking skills needed in order to support multi-agency 
team members’ collaboration and the negative effects that need to be minimised. Finally, 
the team collaboration model has been used to identify the communication and 
interaction channels necessary for multi-agency collaboration. In the next chapter, 
detailed information is presented on the research design, the research philosophy, the 

















Chapter 5 – Research Design 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this part of the thesis, detailed information on the methodology adopted for this 
research is discussed and justified. This chapter is divided into different sections with 
each section discussing and justifying the research philosophy, approaches, strategies and 
choices of techniques used for this research. Other sections in this chapter also examine 
the techniques and procedures utilised for data collection and analysis which are an 
integral part of the research outcome. This chapter uses the ‘research onion’ put forward 
by Saunders et al. (2009) as a working guide to explain the research process. As a lead in 
to this, this chapter starts with discussing the context for research methodology as 
undertaken by the researcher for this research. 
5.1.1 Definition and Discussion on Research Methodology  
Antony et al. (2002) explained research methodology as the steps and processes needed 
to guide a researcher in order to achieve the objective of the research. But additionally, 
Hussey et al. (1997) defined research as “different things to different people” so there is 
no consensual definition of what research is. Nevertheless, Sekaran (2009) argued that 
research is simply the process of finding solutions to a problem after a thorough study 
and analysis of the situational factors. On the other hand, Collis and Hussey (2009) 
identified research methodology as referring to the overall approach to the research 
process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of the data. 
According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), the purpose of research can be explained as 
follows: “to explain a new phenomenon, to investigate some existing situation or problem, 
to provide solutions to a problem, to explore and analyse more general issues, to 
construct or create a new procedure or system, to review and synthesise existing 
knowledge, to generate new knowledge, or any combination of the above”.  
There are several methodological frameworks that have been presented and explained by 
different writers. However, for the sake of clarity, this research adopts the Saunders et 





Figure 5. 1: Research Onion (Source: Saunders et al., 2009) 
 
As shown in Figure 5. 1, Saunders et al. (2009) explained the research methodological 
process as one with different, but related, layers that interact in order to ensure the 
successful completion of the research process. The 6-layer process is used to explain and 
justify the decision taken by the researcher to use the methods discussed in this chapter 
for conducting the research study. According to Saunders et al. (2009), the first layer 
which is the philosophical stance is important as the starting point for any researcher. 
Travers (2001) explained that it is vital for a researcher to understand the underlying 
philosophy of research in order to adopt the most appropriate research approaches and 
methods.  
5.2 Research Philosophy 
An understanding of philosophical issues is very significant. Mostly, it can help to clarify 
the research design, detect which research design will work and which will not, and 
identify (and even create) designs that may be outside the researcher's past experience 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The term 'research philosophy' relates to "the development 
of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge" (Saunders et al., 2007). The research 
philosophy that a researcher adopts contains important assumptions about the way in 
which they view the world (Saunders et al., 2007). These assumptions support the 
research approach and the methods chosen as part of that approach (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Whereas, from time to time, the researcher’s practical experience in the subject area can 
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also play a role in deciding the philosophical assumptions, inferring that the foremost 
deciding factor is the researcher's particular view of the relationship between knowledge 
and the process by which knowledge is developed (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Saunders et al. (2009), in the ‘research onion’, identified six different philosophical 
stances which can be adopted by any researcher to explain and justify their views, the 
research inquiry process and the validity of results. Positivism generates a hypothesis or 
research questions that can be tested and allows for explanations that are measures 
against accepted knowledge (Creswell, 2012). This philosophy is similar in concept to 
objectivism which recognises that social phenomena and their meanings exist separately 
to social actors or to any social influence factors (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). Another 
philosophy in the ‘onion’ with a similar assumption to scientific, objective and non-social 
influence is realism philosophy. This philosophy shares the positivism assumption that 
processes and beliefs are scientifically generated.  The researcher and other social actors 
are independent of any findings generated by this philosophy and thus the results are not 
biased (May, 2011).   
Therefore, interpretivism, pragmatism and constructivism are similar in their underlying 
assumptions which emphasise the impact and the meaningful influence of people’s 
participation in the existence and construction of social phenomena (Creswell, 2012). 
Therefore, it can be argued that all philosophical traditions or underlying assumptions are 
from two main stems i.e., 'positivism' and ‘interpretivism’ (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). 
"The key idea of positivism is that the social world exists externally and that its 
properties should be measured through objective methods, rather than being inferred 
subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition" (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). In 
contrast, the interpretivism paradigm assumes that "reality is not objective or external but 
is socially constructed and given meaning by people" (Saunders et al. 2012). In 
accordance with the discussion above, Table 5. 1 shows how Saunders et al. (2012) 








Table 5. 1: The differences between the positivist and interpretive research approaches (Saunders 
et al., 2012) 
Question  Positivism  Interpretivism  
What is the nature of 
reality? (Ontology)  
Something that is external 
to the social world.  
Something that exists in the 
socially negotiated meanings 
that people give to it.  




Knowledge based on 
observable phenomena.  
 
Suitable for   
generalisation  
Knowledge about subjective 
meanings.  
 
Details of specific cases  
What is the role of 
values? (Axiology)  
Research should be value-
free.  




Saunders et al. (2012) outlined the main differences between positivism and 
interpretivism: Firstly, positivism uses large samples, has an artificial location, and is 
often concerned with hypothesis testing, producing precise and objective quantitative data, 
producing results with high reliability but low validity, and allowing results to be 
generalised from the sample to the population only. Secondly, interpretivism uses small 
samples, has a natural location, and is concerned with generating theories, producing 
‘rich’ subjective, qualitative data, and producing findings with low reliability but high 
validity based on social phenomena. 
As can be seen from all these clarifications, this research intends to explore and 
investigate the influence of a collaborative risk assessment environment that can enhance 
multi-agency collaboration in risk assessment in order to enable participants to visualise 
and analyse various risks through an interactive map. This research is an example of 
social phenomena in that it deals with attitudes, experience, realities and beliefs in a 
specific environment, and also the way in which these ideas are changed between persons. 
This research adopts the interpretivist philosophical stance due to the above explanations 
and the justification presented throughout this chapter. As such, all corresponding 
characteristics of interpretivism was also adopted by the researcher for conducting this 
research. For instance, qualitative data, the use of small samples, and an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomena were all adopted with the rationale for their selection 
justified subsequently in this chapter. 
In the context of philosophical assumptions, there are three major ways of thinking about 
research philosophy as summarised by Engle (2008). Firstly, Ontology is the "the science 
of being" of substances. The object of ontology is to determine ‘What is'.  Secondly, 
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Epistemology is the science of knowledge that is the theory of how we know that which 
we know. Epistemology is by nature self-referential or recursive. Finally, Axiology is the 
science of moral choice, of fundamental values. 
Although ontology, epistemology and axiology are different from each other, each one 
influences the technique by which a researcher thinks about the research process (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003; Creswell, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2007). 
The following sections, sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, discuss ontology, epistemology 
and axiology in detail. 
5.2.1 Ontology  
'Ontology' is a starting point for philosophical assumptions and is concerned with the 
assumptions that researchers make about the nature of reality (Creswell, 2007; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008). In an ontological assumption, there are two different worlds: the first 
world is objective and external to the researcher, whereas the second world is subjective 
and is only understood by examining the perceptions of human actors (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). In the objective stance, the external world has a predetermined nature and 
structure which is known under different terms by different authors, such as 'realism' by 
Johnson and Duberly (2000) and 'objectivism' by Saunders et al. (2007). On the other 
hand, in the subjective stance, the external world does not have a pre-determined nature 
or structure. In other words, it is an unknowable reality perceived in different ways by 
individuals; this is called 'subjectivism' by Saunders et al. (2007) and 'idealism' by 
Gummesson (1991).  
Qualitative research is a field of investigation concerned mainly with the subjective 
interpretations of people (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). As indicated by Deniz and Lincoln 
(2005), the qualitative researcher’s purpose is to gather an in-depth understanding of 
human behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. Therefore, in this context, 
this research has taken more of an ‘idealist' stance because the meanings given to disaster 
management and to a collaborative risk assessment environment for multi-agencies may 
differ from one to another depending on their understandings.  
5.2.2 Epistemology 
The epistemological assumptions of a researcher are useful in guiding him/her to take up 
methods that are consistent with his or her initially accepted epistemology (Easterby- 
122 
 
Smith et al., 2008). Hence, having a clearer idea about the epistemological undertakings 
of the research study is crucial. The main two philosophical traditions in epistemology 
have been classified into Positivism which believes that researchers should use objective 
measures, and Interpretivism which believes that they should measure using subjective 
measures. 
In positivist research, the epistemological assumption adopted is the use of objective 
measures in order to search for general laws and cause-effect relationships by rational 
means (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). In contrast, in interpretivist research, the 
epistemological assumption adopted is the use of subjective measures in order to search 
for explanations of human action by understanding the way in which the world is 
understood by individuals (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Under this extreme 
epistemological assumption, it is assumed that properties of reality can be measured 
through interpretivism (subjective measures) and determined by examining the 
perceptions of people (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The 
epistemological assumption in interpretivist research means that, in a qualitative study, 
researchers try to become as close as possible to the participants (Creswell, 2007). 
Therefore, in this research study the epistemological assumption of interpretivist research 
has been adopted using subjective measures. In order to collect the characteristics of an 
interactive map for use in multi-agency risk assessment activities, it was necessary to 
conduct face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders. As such, this study 
adopted the interpretivist stance, with the researcher getting directly involved with the 
participants.  
5.2.3 Axiology  
Axiology is the last step within research philosophy and studies judgments about value 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Moreover, Creswell (2007) and Saunders et al. (2007) identified 
'axiology' as the assumptions about the nature of values that the researcher places on the 
study.  Collis and Hussey (2003) explained that, within axiology, a value-free study 
means that the choice of what to study and how to study it can be determined by objective 
criteria, i.e. in value-free research. Positivists believe that the objects they are studying 
are unchanged by their research actions. On the other hand, value-laden follows an 
extremely different opinion as choices in the research are determined by human beliefs 








nature and structure  
Positivism  
A search for a 






value free and 
objective 
experiences in the field of collaboration in risk assessment in disaster management, it 
adopted a value-laden stance in relation to axiology. By being asked about their 
preferences and then introduced to a prototype interactive map, participants were altered 
by the actions taken by the researcher. This approach was necessary in order to achieve 
the aims of the research.  
Figure 5.2 depicts the placing of this research within ontological, epistemological and 
axiological stances. The Figure includes three lines representing the epistemological, 
ontological and axiological spectrums. As can be understood from the explanations given, 
interpretivism is the research philosophy that was most appropriate for this study because 
the study is concerned with the actions of people and the meanings behind these actions. 
As a result, the research is positioned at the intepretivist end of the epistemological 
spectrum in the Figure. Moreover, because the research has explored an interactive map 
that can enhance multi-agency collaboration in risk assessment in disaster management, 
the 'idealist' stance was more appropriate in terms of ontological assumptions. Therefore, 
on the Figure the research is located at the idealist end of the ontological spectrum. 
Finally, the research is positioned at the value-laden end of the axiological spectrum 
because it sought to influence the behaviour of its participants by developing an 
interactive map for them to use. 




5.3 Research process  
The research design process is explained in the figure 5.2. The first chapter is the 
identification of the research problem, the setting of a specific research question and then 
the provision of detailed clear aims and objectives for the research. The second chapter 
focuses on evaluating existing organisational structure for disaster management across 
the world in order to make comparison and identify gaps and problems. This chapter 
provided context for the research especially for the focus in chapter three which is 
dedicated to technology approaches used for supporting disaster management. Chapter 
four provide a theoretical foundation for this research, with investigations into the 
Activity Theory, Critical Thinking, models of team collaboration and into a theoretical 
framework for this study. The next chapter is the research’s design. This involves 
describing its philosophy and outlining the research approach and research techniques for 
the collection of data. Chapter 6 presents the outcome of the interviews conducted to 
identify the user requirements for the interactive map. Chapter 7 describes the 
possibilities for the design of the system and the conceptual framework of the design and 
the implementation of the system. Chapter 8 describes the evaluation of the interactive 
map prototype in order to test its ability to support collaboration and to enhancing multi-
agency teams’ risk assessment process. After this prototype was defined, it was necessary 
to provide a methodology for the evaluation of the system, which is described in Chapter 
8. Chapter 9 presents the evaluation results collected during the evaluation experiment of 
the interactive map prototype, while Chapter 10 discusses the findings and their 
implications in reference to the literature. It also presents the limitations of this research. 
Finally, Chapter 11 presents an overall conclusion to this research and the extent to which 
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5.3.1 Theoretical Justification for Interpretivism 
The theoretical underpinning for this research also justifies the choice of the 
interpretivism philosophical stance. As explained in the previous chapter on theories, the 
activity theory (which is the theoretical framework for analysing and understanding 
human interactions) aligns with the characteristics and processes for the interpretivism 
explanation of the phenomena being researched. Through a philosophical stance, the 
application of the activity theory enables a thorough discovery of the approaches that can 
encourage collaborative working for risk assessment between agencies involved in 
emergency and disaster management. As explained by Hashim and Jones (2007), the 
application of the activity theory facilitates rapid processes and constant change within 
organisations and this theory is utilised through the interpretivism philosophical stance in 
this research.  
The activity theory is able to facilitate the analysis of research results in a manner that 
helps to identify structures and in a manner in which collaborative risk assessment can be 
more effectively undertaken by multiple agencies. The influence of the activity theory 
does not only align with the inherent characteristics of the interpretivism philosophy, it 
also enables the exploration of knowledge of multi-agency collaboration as intended by 
the researcher. It ensures that the researcher focuses on collaborative work between all 
agencies, thereby emphasising the role of the team collaboration model as well as the 
critical thinking model in achieving valid research outcomes.  
The domain for the critical thinking model relates to six areas which are knowledge and 
recollection of information, identifying and understanding problems, applying existing 
concepts to new demands, analysis of information, forming patterns and evaluating ideas 
and making judgments about the value of ideas. These six cognitive areas also influence 
the selection of the research participants on the basis of their ability to engage, to provide 
information, and to identify and understand problems associated with collaborative 
working for risk assessment. By utilising these areas the researcher is able to form 
patterns from the responses provided as well as being able to make rational decisions on 
their classification based on their ontology and relevance to the epistemology in this 
subject area. In order to understand this process better, sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 explain 




5.4 Research Approach, Strategy and Choice 
This section discusses the second, third and fourth layers in Saunders et al.’s ‘research 
onion’. According to Saunders et al. (2009), there are two main approaches for reasoning 
and knowledge in a research. These two approaches are deductive and inductive logic or 
reasoning. Invariably, deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more 
specific (Saunders et al., 2009). Sometimes this is informally called a "top-down" 
approach, as a research might begin with thinking up a theory about a topic of interest 
and then narrowing the thought down into more specific hypotheses that can be tested 
(Trochim, 2006). It can be even further narrowed down when observations are collected 
to test the hypotheses, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 below. The inductive approach, on the 
other hand, is the opposite, as shown in the same Figure, 5.3. 
 
Figure 5. 3: Deductive and Inductive reasoning approaches (Trochim, 2006). 
 
Although Figure 5.3 is lucid enough, Trochim (2006) and Saunders et al. (2009) argued 
that the hypothesis in each case can be research questions. Inferring that for deductive 
reasoning, the aim is solely to test the validity of the research hypothesis or question, 
without any intention to build knowledge or contribute to advancing a research area. This 
approach is consistent with the positivism philosophy and with scientific experiments 
conducted in laboratories to test a theory or confirm a hypothesis (Saunders et al., 2009). 
However, the inductive process may start from a set of observations, research questions 
and social phenomena subjected to critical inquiry or an investigation process. According 
to Trochim (2006), patterns of outcomes are then aligned to explain the research 
questions from which a new theory, knowledge or framework can be developed based on 
the research outcome(s). According to Yin (2009), these two approaches can be 
exploratory in nature. But as explained by Saunders et al. (2009), inductive logic is 
128 
 
known to be descriptive, analytical and explanatory in nature when subjected to a theory 
or knowledge, developing a process as illustrated in Figure 5.3.  
Since this research has adopted the interpretivism philosophy, inductive is the approach 
specific to interpretivism. As shown in Figure 5.3, the intention of the researcher is to 
investigate the nature of an interactive map that can enhance multi-agency team 
collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster management. This investigation 
process has been initiated based on a set of assumptions and research objectives that 
focus on developing an interactive map. The influence of the activity theory, the 
collaborative model and the critical thinking theory have all provided patterns that 
suggest an interactive map can be designed to enhance multi-agency team collaboration. 
However, there is need to further investigate the essential features and the extent to which 
risk assessment in disaster management can be enhanced, hence the need for primary data 
collection and an inquiry process beyond secondary data and existing theories.  
Using primary data for this research stresses the importance of the third layer in the 
‘research onion’ which is strategy. As seen in the strategy layer, there are the options of 
action research, experiments, archival research, ethnography, grounded theory, surveys 
etc. that can be used for conducting research (Saunders et al., 2009). However, selecting 
the most suitable strategy or strategies is also vital to the success of a research project 
(Robson, 2002).  For example, Saunders et al. argued that more than one strategy can be 
selected to conduct a research; a choice can be made based on the nature of the inquiry, 
objectives and problems being investigated. This possibility leads to the fourth layer, 
choices. Choices, as mentioned in the ‘research onion’, refer to the research style adopted 
for collecting and analysing the data. The ‘research onion’ has identified three types of 
method, namely, the mono method, mixed methods and multi-methods.  
The mono method can be defined as either using quantitative or qualitative data for a 
research project (Saunders et al., 2009).  Mixed methods refers to the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative data which are analysed using a data analysis method peculiar 
to each type of data (Saunders et al., 2012). Multi-methods is when the researcher uses 
both quantitative and qualitative data, but the researcher’s philosophical stance is rooted 




This research focuses on developing a platform to support collaboration in risk 
assessment activities among multi-agency teams in disaster management. Therefore, due 
to the need to develop a platform, the inductive approach is adopted. Also, to achieve the 
research aim, the context and nature of the problem must be identified, which is why the 
inductive approach is relevant and important to this research investigation. Therefore, this 
research investigation process began by identifying the organizational problems faced by 
the Manchester LRF in its risk assessment activities. The semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the senior managers within Category 1 responders in The Greater 
Manchester Local Resilience Forum (GMLRF) to capture the requirements for a multi-
agency collaboration platform. The outcomes from the interviews’ analysis was used to 
capture the characteristics and to develop the prototype of an interactive map that can 
enhance multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster 
management. 
The validation of the interactive map prototype was conducted by involving senior 
practitioners from stakeholders in the GMLRF development group. The experiment was 
held in the THINKpod in ThinkLab, at the University of Salford. A total of 23 senior 
practitioners took part in the evaluation experiment. After a demonstration of a scenario 
using the interactive map, the participants evaluated the prototype via a work group 
discussion and then completed questionnaires that featured a range of open, closed and 
rating scale questions. The data collected from the work group discussions and the open 
and closed ended questions in the questionnaire were analysed qualitatively. However, 
some of the data that had been collected from the rating scale questions were manipulated 
statistically for descriptive analysis. The outcomes from the analysis process of the data 
were used to measure the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of the potential of the interactive map 
in supporting risk assessment processes and in strengthening the collaboration between 
multi-agencies. 
Due to this combined technique, the research choice is mixed methods, in order to ensure 
that both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. Most of the research outcomes 
were based on qualitative data analysis. However, the data that was collected from the 
rating scale questions was used for descriptive analysis and also for system evaluation. 
Adopting the mixed-methods approach for this research is justified within the 
interpretivism philosophy and the inductive approach for building knowledge in this 
research area. This is because both types of data are important to validate the platform 
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that this research aims to develop for enhancing the collaborative process for risk 
assessment. 
Using the inductive approach for this research also helped to identify and investigate the 
themes that emerged when end users were involved in the evaluation of the interactive 
map prototype in a co-located environment at the Think Lab at the University of Salford. 
This real life scenario and engagement contributed to increasing the validity and 
reliability of the results. An observation and demonstration of the platform was followed 
by user feedback in the form of a discussion and a questionnaire utilising open, closed 
and ratings’ scale questions. Using this mixed methods approach helped to collect 
different, but complementary, types of data that made triangulation possible, thereby 
increasing the validity and reliability of the results. 
5.5 Research Horizons and Procedures 
The horizon, techniques and procedures are the fifth and sixth layers of the ‘research 
onion’ respectively. This section discusses the time horizon for this research and the 
techniques and procedures utilised for analysing the data collected. The horizon refers to 
the time in which the research was conducted. According to Saunders et al. (2009), there 
are two time horizon choices, one being cross-sectional which refers to a study conducted 
over a short period of time. The second option is the longitudinal time horizon which 
refers to a research conducted for a protracted period of time i.e. studying concentrated 
samples for a long period of time (Saunders et al., 2012). The cross-sectional time 
horizon was used to conduct this research, as several research activities were carried out 
during a fixed period of time. During the fixed period utilised for conducting this research, 
the research techniques i.e. the questionnaire administration and the semi-structured 
interview sessions (briefly mentioned in the last section) were simultaneously conducted.  
5.6 Research Techniques 
This section discusses the research techniques used in this study.  Firstly, data collection 
techniques were decided through the influence of interpretivism, theoretical constructs 
and the ability to ensure that the research objectives were achieved. Secondly, data 
analysis (which is the procedure by which data were coded, interpreted and analysed) 
completed this part of the procedure. In section 5.6.1 data collection techniques are 
explained in general and then later with regard to this particular research (which included 
semi-structured interviews to capture the views and reactions of stakeholders. The 
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questionnaires (including open, closed and rating scale questions) were administered and 
a work group and discussions were held to evaluate the effectiveness of the interactive 
map prototype. Section 5.6.2 explains the data analysis procedures and the different types 
of techniques used for analysing all the data collected during the cross-sectional time 
horizon. 
5.6.1 Research Techniques for Data Collection  
The many different research techniques for data collection are explained in this section. 
Techniques include interviews, observations, questionnaire surveys, audio-visual 
materials and document reviews. Although Saunders et al. (2009) classified these 
techniques as strategies for data collection in layer 3 in the ‘research onion’, Yin (2009) 
recommended six major sources of data collection techniques or strategies which can be 
used for data collection. Table 5. 2 outlines these six major data sources and explains 
their strengths and weaknesses. 




Documentation - Stable: Can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
- Unobtrusive: not created 
as a result of the case 
study 
- Exact: contains exact 
names, references and 
details 
- Retrievability can be low  
- Biased selectivity, if 
collection is incomplete 
- Reporting bias: reflects bias 
of the author 




- Same as above  
- Precise and quantitative 
- Same as above 
- Accessibility may be limited 
for privacy reasons 
Interviews - Targeted: focuses 
directly on case studies 
- Insightful: provides 
perceived causal 
inferences 
- Bias due to poorly 
constructed questions 
- Response bias 
- Inaccuracies: interviewees 
say what they think the 
interviewer wants to hear 
Direct 
observation 
- Reality: covers events in 
real time 
- Contextual: covers 
context of event 
- Time consuming 
- Selectivity: poor, unless 
broad coverage 
- Reflexivity: events may be 
processed differently  
Participation / 
direct 
- Same as for direct 
observation 





The importance of utilizing interviews, as explained by Yin (2009), can be attributed to 
the fact that they give access to people’s views, to deep insights into a situation, into the 
sense and identification of a situation, and deal with human concerns. Furthermore, Jonse 
(1985) and Punch (2005) stressed the importance of interviews in understanding a 
situation: “in order to understand other persons’ construction of reality, we would do well 
to ask them …. and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in their terms (rather 
than those imposed rigidly and prior by ourselves) and in a depth which addresses the 
rich context that is the substance of their meaning”. On the other hand, questionnaire 
survey techniques are the best way of gathering data from a large sample of participants 
(Saunders et al., 2007).  
In this study, there was not one overarching period of data collection. The study involved 
firstly capturing the characteristics of a desired system from the stakeholders. In this 
phase, the researcher collected the data from different agencies (from senior managers in 
the field of risk assessment) with a view to capturing the characteristics which constitute 
the system requirements for a collaborative risk assessment environment in the form of an 
interactive map that can enhance multi-agency collaboration in risk assessment. This was 
a distinct part of data collection. Then, after the system had been developed, a second 
distinct phase of data collection followed, in which the system was evaluated.  
Therefore, in the first phase, the researcher employed semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews as the main method of data collection to capture the characteristics of the 
desired system. Then, in the second phase, a questionnaire survey (made up of open, 
closed and rating scale questions), a workgroup, and discussions were used to evaluate 
the interactive map prototype. This combination of different techniques was used in this 
study to minimize the weaknesses of each individual technique and to satisfy the 
requirements for research validity and reliability. This is in line with the recommendation 
of Yin (2009) who suggested that using more than one method to collect data is important. 
Thus, in this study the triangulation technique was adopted by its use of many sources of 
observation - Insightful into 
interpersonal behaviour 
and motives 
- Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical 
Artifacts 
- Insightful into cultural 
features 






evidence. According to Ghauri et al. (1995), triangulation uses a combination of methods 
in order to get an accurate result/accurate results concerning the same phenomena under 
study. This method improves the accuracy of the outcome of the study by using different 
methods to collect data for the research (Ghauri et al., 1995). The next section provides 
more details on the different types of data collection techniques used in this research. 
5.6.1.1 Interviews as a Research Technique for Data Collection   
As a means of collecting data, an interview is one of the most important research 
techniques used in field of research approaches. As indicated by Yin (2009), an interview 
is a crucial method of data collection. Furthermore, Remenyi et al. (1998) stated that the 
interview is a famous qualitative method for collecting data. Collis and Hussey (2009) 
explained interviews as a “method of collecting data in which selected participants are 
asked questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel.” Interviews are most 
appropriate for research when a researcher wants to learn about an individual’s beliefs, 
values, experience and knowledge in depth (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). There are three 
types of interview generally used in the research community: structured interviews, semi-
structured interviews and open-ended (unstructured) interviews (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008; Punch, 2005). 
According to Easterby-Smith et al (2008), a structured interview is a set of questions 
prepared by the researcher in the same order for all the interviewed respondents. In open-
ended (unstructured) interviews, the interviewees are allowed to talk freely without any 
interference from the researcher (Saunders et al., 2009). Furthermore, Robson (2002) 
described semi-structured interviews as a mix of structured and unstructured interviews 
where the questions are pre-set but the order in which they are raised and the period of 
time utilised can be changed within each topic during the interview. In addition, an 
advantage of semi-structured or open-ended interviews is that richer data is obtained, as 
the interviewees provide much more detailed information and insight in their responses 
(Creswell, 2012). 
Moreover, as indicated by Jankowicz (2005), the semi-structured interview gives the 
flexibility needed for a particular kind of study, as it gives the researcher flexibility in 
asking the questions in the interview; additional questions can be added if the researcher 
feels this assists with the research. Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2009) stated that semi-
structured interviews are used in qualitative research not only to show and understand the 
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‘what’ and ‘how’, but also to place more emphasis on explaining the ‘why’ of a given 
situation, especially if the research places an emphasis on words rather than numbers: on 
connections, on people’s behaviour, on cultural change, and on experiences and attitudes. 
As explained by Yates (2007), the interview is an appropriate way of exploring an 
interviewee’s personal views.  
In short, semi-structured interviews allow for the capturing of participants’ opinions in 
depth and with flexibility, but with some level of organization. Such organization was 
required in this study in order to link the data that were captured closely to the risk 
assessment process. To ensure that the data corresponded to the risk assessment process, 
the steps of the process were used to structure the questions that were asked. For instance, 
some questions related to contextualisation, hazard review, risk analysis, risk evaluation 
and risk treatment. The aim of the interviews was to collect as much in-depth data as 
possible, but also to ensure that the data was closely linked to the risk assessment process. 
As a result, the use of semi-structured interviews was an appropriate research technique 
for capturing the characteristics of an interactive map that stakeholders (in this case, 
senior managers and departmental manager in different agencies in the field of risk 
assessment in the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum in England) found 
desirable. 
Before arranging interviews with the strategic managers or tactical managers of agencies 
involved in disaster management, a pilot study was undertaken. Saunders et al. (2007) 
explained a pilot study as “small-scale study to test a questionnaire, interview checklist or 
observation schedule, to minimise the likelihood of respondents having problems in 
answering the questions and of data-recording problems as well as to allow some 
assessment of the questions’ validity and the reliability of the data that will be collected”. 
In addition, there are many reasons for conducting a pilot study in this phase; to validate 
the interview questions, to increase the value of questions, to explore the success of 
research method (Yusof and Aspinwall, 1999). Yin (2009) indicated that a pilot case 
study helps investigators to refine their data collection plans with respect to both the 
content of the data and the procedures to be followed. 
The researcher conducted a pilot case study in order to examine whether the questions 
were clear to the interviewees, whether they covered the research problem and whether 
they avoided repetition. Moreover, this pilot study helped the researcher to estimate the 
duration of the interviews that would follow. The pilot study was conducted in January 
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2014 with four participants. Taking on board the comments made during this pilot study, 
the researcher modified the interview questions. 
An interview guideline was prepared prior to interviewing the respondents using semi-
unstructured interviews. Yin (2009) recommended preparing a brief introduction on the 
aims of the research and the purpose of interview which should be presented to each 
interviewee, otherwise the data collection could be unsuccessful. This was achieved by 
giving a brief to the participants on the aim of study, the aim of interview, and the 
benefits of this study to the organization. It was felt that this would motivate the 
participants and encourage them to think clearly about the topic of their risk assessment 
activities and their needs in this area.  
5.6.1.2 Sampling 
Sampling was required for this research as collecting data from the whole population is 
not possible. Some limits to the research included time and practicability. The study was 
conducted with the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum in England one of the 
UK’s Local Resilence Forums (LRFs). The population is the whole people or phenomena 
under study (Somekh and Lewin, 2005) while sampling has been defined as “the 
selection of cases from wider populations” (Bloor, 2006). Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) 
provided a comprehensive definition of sampling as “selection of units (for example, 
events, people, groups, settings, artifacts) in a manner that maximizes the researcher’s 
ability to answer research questions that are set forth in a study”. 
Sampling techniques are of two types; probability sampling and non-probability sampling 
(Saunders et al., 2009; Easterby-Smith, 2012). Probability sampling is often associated 
with quantitative research and employs procedures to ensure that a representative sample 
is chosen from the population under study. This, in turn, allows the researcher to make 
generalizations from the sample to the population it represents. In contrast, qualitative 
researchers use non-probability sampling as it does not require the selection of a large 
sample and random sampling procedures (Easterby-Smith, 2012). The choice of which 
technique should be applied depends on the nature of the research. 
This research focuses particularly on understanding a current phenomenon in-depth, 
which is the collaboration among multi-agencies in a risk assessment environment. This 
research requires participants who have experience and knowledge in multi-agency 
collaboration in a risk assessment environment. As a result, non-probability sampling is 
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the suitable method for conducting the research (Easterby-Smith, 2012).  Abowitz and 
Toole (2010) emphasized that non-probability sampling methods are very common 
because approaching individuals can enhance the response values. 
As indicated by Saunders et al. (2009), non-probability sampling can be classified into 
five types: quota sampling, snowball sampling, convenience sampling, purposive 
sampling and self-selection sampling. Denscombe (2010) explained that purposive 
sampling is one that is chosen based on the knowledge of a population and the purpose of 
the study, with the subjects chosen because of certain characteristics. In the case of this 
research, the subjects needed to have specialized expert knowledge in the field that was 
under investigation. Furthermore, selecting the purposive sampling technique is important 
to in terms of the quality of data gathered; therefore, the reliability and competence of the 
informants must be ensured. According to Bernard (2002) and Lewis et al. (2006), the 
researcher selects what needs to be identified and seeks out people who are willing to 
provide the information by the quality of their knowledge or experience.   
Therefore, this research adopted the purposive sampling technique, for both the initial 
capture of the stakeholders’ desired characteristics from then semi-structured interviews 
and then later in the evaluation of the interactive map prototype which utilized a 
questionnaire survey (made up of open, closed and rating scale questions), observation, 
and discussion. During the first step, the researcher established a list of respondents who 
with whom the researcher already had contact and who had experience of collaboration 
among multi-agencies in the risk assessment environment. In choosing the sample, two 
principles had to be satisfied by the potential respondents. Firstly, they had to have had 
experience in multi-agency collaboration in the area of risk assessment environments and, 
secondly, they had to have worked in the risk assessment area and, therefore, had to had 
have membership of LRFs. These principles confirmed the validity of the respondents 
and were followed for both phases of the data collection. For the initial capture of 
stakeholders’ preferred characteristics for the interactive map, the sample involved 16 
participants from Category 1 response organizations. All participants at this stage were 
senior managers (see Table 1 for their profile). Category 1 stakeholders were chosen 
since they are the ones involved in the risk assessment process within LRFs.   
In short, a total of 16 participants were interviewed and their responses recorded to 
capture the characteristics that would be suitable for an interactive map. These 
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participants were selected on the grounds of their role and experience, so as to provide 
the highest quality of information possible.  
5.6.1.2.1 Semi-structured Interviews with Senior Managers 
In this stage of the research, senior managers from Category 1 responders in The Greater 
Manchester Local Resilience Forum in England were interviewed. The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 16 participants based on their position in the agencies. 14 
of the participants gave written feedback. (This written feedback was given by their 
completing the questionnaire shown in Appendix A, during the interview.) These 
participants were senior managers and deputy managers of agencies of Category 1 
responders in the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum, such as the Greater 
Manchester Police service, the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue services, the National 
Health Service, NW Ambulance Service, Greater Manchester local authority, the 
Environment Agency, Transportation for Greater Manchester and from the UK’s central 
government. Details on the participants are listed in Table 5. 3. 
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As noticed in Table 5.3, Category 2 responders or organisations were not included in the 
semi-structured interviews because Category 2 organisations are ‘co-operating bodies’ 
which are not likely to be involved in the core of planning and risk assessment pre-event, 
but are more heavily involved in any incident that affects their sector and in a ‘supporting’ 
capacity to Category 1 responders (CCA, 2004). In this sense, Category 2 responders 
have a lesser set of duties as compared to Category 1 responders who were interviewed 
for this research. Due to the lesser set of duties of Category 2 responders, they are 
unlikely to engage in the rigorous critical thinking required of the Category 1 responders. 
So while the collaborative model and the activity theory influenced a consideration for 
including Category 2 responders, the critical thinking model (which is where prompt and 
logical ideas for risk assessment is required) helped to limit the semi-structured interview 
participants to Category 1 responders only. 
In this research, the interview method was used to capture user requirements for an 
interactive map system to support the collaborative risk assessment process and the 
questions were designed based on these captured requirements. The process utilised is the 
six-step risk assessment process. The process involves contextualisation to collectively 
understand the social, natural, infrastructure and the hazard site risks in a local area. Next 
comes a hazard review to collaboratively identify significant risks, followed by a risk 
analysis relating to the identification of the likelihood, outcome and impact of local risks. 
The next stage is risk evaluation, involving the collective identification and prioritisation 
of local risk hotspots, followed by risk treatment in which team members collaborate to 
handle the risks they have identified. The final step of the process is monitoring and 
reviewing, involving the updating, reviewing and maintaining of the information held by 
the multi-agency teams. The stakeholders’ information requirement in this environment is 
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the collection of social, natural, critical infrastructure and hazard site information. This 
information enables the stakeholders to obtain an overview of the local area risks, its 
geography, vulnerabilities and population. Furthermore, a small set of questionnaires was 
used to capture their agreement with the importance of an interactive map for various risk 
assessment tasks. This constituted the first phase of the data collection. Once the 
interactive map prototype had been created according to the characteristics identified, 
then a second phase of data collection began in order to evaluate the system. The 
following section outlines the method of data collection used in the prototype evaluation. 
5.6.1.3 The Questionnaire Survey as a Research Technique for Evaluation    
The questionnaire survey technique is an efficient method of data collection from a large 
sample of respondents (Saunders et al., 2007), in order to obtain information that is 
difficult to observe or is not readily available in computerized form (Remenyi et al., 
1998). Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) described the questionnaire survey 
technique as a helpful method of collecting data the on the views and behaviour of a large 
number of people. As indicated by Remenyi (1998), there are two types of questionnaire 
survey: close-ended (structured) or open-ended (unstructured). 
In the second phase of the data collection (the evaluation of the prototype), a scenario 
was presented to the participants before a workgroup discussion was held in which the 
subjects talked about the prototype's potential usefulness. A questionnaire survey was 
selected to follow this discussion, as a means of capturing the opinions of individual 
group members. The questionnaire utilised open, closed and rating scale questions, and 
was followed by a workgroup discussion. A detailed description of the evaluation 
methodology, including a discussion of the choices made in relation to the techniques 
used, the questions involved, the participants and the procedure is given in Chapter 7. 
5.6.2 Research Techniques for Data Analysis  
This research used different techniques for the data analysis for the capture of 
characteristics and for the evaluation of the prototype interactive map. As previously 
described, the capturing of characteristics involved qualitative data produced from semi-
structured interviews. Once this data had been collected, it was analyzed. Yin (2009) 
identified data analysis as “examining, categorising, tabulating, testing or otherwise 
recombining evidence, to draw empirical based conclusions”. Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2008) stated that a researcher should be careful in choosing the appropriate technique for 
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analysing data depending on the philosophical and methodological assumptions made in 
the research design. Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) explained six different 
methods of analysing data: content analysis, grounded analysis, discourse analysis, 
narrative analysis, conversation analysis and argument analysis. In grounded analysis, 
views are determined from the empirical data itself but no pre-determined codes play a 
role in the analysis while, in content analysis, the researcher classifies structure and ideas 
that have been decided beforehand by testing the data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The 
other four techniques are concerned with the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of individuals’ 
language used in a specific social context. The researcher in this study used content 
analysis techniques to interpret the collected data rigorously in order to identify the 
characteristics that stakeholders felt would be useful for an interactive map.  
The second collection of data in this study came after the prototype had been developed. 
As previously discussed, this entailed a questionnaire survey which combined open, 
closed and ratings’ scale questions. This provided both quantitative and qualitative data. 
The results from the rating scale questions were analysed quantitatively, with the 
maximum, minimum, median and mean average scores analysed. However, this 
quantitative analysis was supported (and further discussion upon the data gained) by the 
content analysis of the open and closed questions, and by group discussion. More detail 
on this is given in Chapter 8. 
5.6.3 Validity and Reliability  
The selection of the research strategies used for the data collection for this research were 
all based on a careful consideration of their impact on the validity and reliability of the 
research results. As explained by Collis and Hussey (2009), validity is the extent to which 
a research result reflects the actual scenario or issues that influence the subject being 
studied. While several factors such as biases, the nature of data collection techniques, and 
participants’ emotional views on the subject matter can influence the validity of data 
(Denscombe, 2008), Yin (2009) argued that validity of results can be tested especially 
when using subjective methods such as interviews. Validity can be tested using construct, 
internal and external validity and reliability (Yin, 2009).  
The construct validity adopts the use of multiple sources of evidence to establish a chain 
of evidence and case study or past incidents to review the information provided (May, 
2011). This was done in this research by using the mixed methods approach which 
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ensures that the limitation of one data collection technique is mitigated by using another 
complementary data collection technique, hence the use of a questionnaire, semi-
structured interviews and multiple sources for the secondary data that are discussed in the 
literature review and in the chapters preceding this chapter. Internal validity, as explained 
by Yin (2009), relates to the ability to create a link between credible causal relationships 
and ensuring that the influence of theory is consistent. Within this research, the methods, 
sources and choice of participants were based on their relevance and ability to provide 
information that relates to the research area. Furthermore, the influence of the activity 
theory, the collaboration model and critical thinking were stressed throughout this 
research and assisted in helping to determine the extent to which the information and the 
methods were valid. 
External validity, on the other hand, relates to being able to determine the domain in 
which the research results fits into and the context for which the information, knowledge 
and theory generated can be generalised (Yin, 2009). In this case, the research domain 
was disaster management, with an emphasis on the planning phase where risk assessment 
is required and necessary. This infers that any information provided outside this context 
was irrelevant to this research area and was either discarded or treated as information for 
awareness purposes only. All this scrutiny helped to ensure that the researcher’s and 
participants’ biases and personal views did not overshadow the focus of this research.  
Reliability entails the level to which the information provided by people and research 
results is credible and can be ascertained (Bryman, 2008). Reliability in this research 
focused strictly on ensuring that the appropriate research participants were selected 
through the sampling process, that references consulted were within published materials 
and that the information provided by participants was verified in the preparedness phase 
and in the disaster management system as a whole. Reliability was also enhanced through 
the triangulation of data and the results (May, 2011). Ascertaining the participants’ 
information utilising existing knowledge within this field helped to increase the reliability 
and validity of the results as well as identifying the new or emerging orientations in risk 
assessment. All these were managed by the researcher in accordance with the ethics’ 
requirements for this research. 
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5.7 Research Ethical Considerations 
The researcher considered all the ethical considerations in order to conduct this research. 
In the invitation letter, it was made clear that the data given were confidential and would 
not be distributed to third parties, and that anonymity was assured. Moreover, as 
previously mentioned, all the participants received a full explanation of the research, and 
it was ensured that they gave full, informed consent. Furthermore, in the evaluation of the 
prototype, participants were given the chance to express their opinions in a group 
discussion but also via the written questionnaire, meaning that they did not have to 
express certain opinions in front of their colleagues and partners if they did not wish to. 
5.8 Summary  
This chapter has outlined how this research is based on an interpretivist, idealist 
philosophy and takes a value-laden approach, concerned as it is with the actions, beliefs 
and needs of people, specifically in multi-agency risk assessment activities. Due to the IT 
nature of this research, the design science in information systems (IS) approach was 
chosen as the approach. In the first phase of the data collection, the researcher employed 
semi-structured, face-to-face interviews as the main method of data collection to capture 
the characteristics of the system. Then, in the second phase, a questionnaire survey (made 
up of open, closed and rating scale questions), observation and discussions were used to 
evaluate the interactive map prototype. This combination of different techniques was 
used in this study to minimize the weaknesses of each individual technique and to satisfy 
the requirements for research validity and reliability. 
Semi-structured interviews were preferred when in the process of capturing the 
characteristics for the interactive map, because this technique produces in-depth data 
while maintaining a structure within the interview process. This structure was required in 
order to ensure that the questions being asked were linked to the stages of the risk 
assessment process. Stakeholder senior managers involved in disaster management in a 
Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum in England were interviewed. The semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 16 participants based on their position in 8 
different agencies. Content analysis was used to analyse the data from these interviews 
and to define the user requirements for the interactive map system. Once a platform had 
been built based on these requirements, its prototype was analysed using a methodology 
that used quantitative analysis supported by the content analysis of the qualitative data 
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produced from discussions, and from the open and close questions in the feedback 
questionnaires. Throughout this process, participants gave full, informed consent and 
their anonymity was ensured. The next chapter presents the design of the questionnaire 

























Chapter 6 – User and system requirements  
 
6.1 Introduction  
Following the inductive approach this research first conducted interviews with senior 
managers of category 1 responders in The Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum 
(LRF) to capture the requirements for the multi-agency collaboration platform. This 
chapter summarises the design of the questionnaire and presents the analysis of the 
outcome. This chapter analyzing   
6.2 Method Used to Collect Data  
For this research, 16 senior managers of Category 1 responders in The Greater 
Manchester Local Resilience Forum (LRF) were interviewed and the responses recorded. 
14 participants gave written feedback via the questionnaire that was presented at the same 
time as the verbal questions. They comprised senior managers from the police service, 
fire and rescue service, ambulance service, National Health Service, the local authority, 
the Environment Agency and Transport for Greater Manchester. Senior managers were 
used as the subjects as they occupy positions at a strategic and tactical level.  
6.3 Process of Data Collection  
Initial invitations were sent to the respondents. These invitations explained the research’s 
aim and objectives and included a copy of the structure of the interview. Participants 
were then given a face-to-face presentation about the purpose of this research. The use of 
an interactive map in other applications such as urban regeneration was presented and this 
was used to inspire participants about the potential of an interactive map in risk 
assessment. Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with the participants were then held. 
This format of interviews (which Robson (2002) described as a mix of structured and 
unstructured interviews) is where the questions are presented in sequence and the period 
of time taken to respond can be changed in each topic during the interview. In addition, 
an advantage of semi-structured or open-ended interviews is that richer data can be 
obtained, as the interviewees provide much more detailed information and insight in their 
responses (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).  
These interviews were recorded and transcribed by the researcher, with the length of each 
interview varying between 90 and 120 minutes. The interviews were rich in information 
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and participants offered various views.  The researcher applied the content analysis 
approach for the analysis of the data.  
6.4 Questionnaire Design  
To ensure that the data received corresponded to the risk assessment process, the steps of 
the risk assessment process were utilised in the designing of the questions. The 
questionnaire utilized for the semi-structured interviews was based on the six-step risk 
assessment process proposed in the Australian/New Zealand Emergency Preparedness 
report (based on the standards used in Australia and New Zealand) and widely recognized 
as being of good practice (Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act, 2004). The 
six steps of the risk assessment process are illustrated in Figure 6. 1 below. 
 
Figure 6. 1: The Six-step risk assessment process (Cabinet Office 2012, Local responder risk 
assessment of Emergency Preparedness). 
A number of questions were created, corresponding to each step in the risk assessment 
process. In the contextualization stage, questions were designed to capture the kinds of 
information that would be most useful in order to build up a common understanding of 
the local risk context. Moreover, participants were asked about how the social, natural, 
infrastructure and hazard site risks in the local area could be combined and visualized 
most effectively and whether this would improve their understanding of local risk. 
Questions relating to the hazard review stage focused on participants’ perceptions of how 
useful an interactive map would be in helping users to capture past experience, 
intelligence and research data and in communicating this to other team members during 
hazard review meetings with the goal of collectively identifying significant local risks.  
Step 1 
Contextualisation 




Step 3  
Risk Analysis 











Risk analysis questions were designed to capture participants’ views on the usefulness of 
an interactive map in visualizing cascading effects to simulate the impacts of hazards. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire aimed to capture the kinds of simulation data, historical 
data and experiences that participants felt to be useful. A question relating to the risk 
evaluation stage was designed to capture whether participants felt that representing risk 
ratings on an interactive map could help agencies to have a holistic view of hazards. A 
question connected to the risk treatment stage asked what the participants’ views were on 
the visualizing required and on the current capabilities of the map and whether this would 
help them to understand the capability gaps and address the additional treatments 
required to close the capability gaps and manage the risks more effectively. Additional 
questions aimed at discovering what types of capabilities participants wanted to be 
visualized and how these could be useful. The final part of the questionnaire investigated 
the overall usefulness of an interactive map in helping multi-agency teams to 
collaboratively update, review and maintain information regarding local risks in order to 
continuously improve risk management strategies and to build resilient communities. In 
the following section the questions derived from the risk assessment process were used to 
elicit data via the semi-structured interviews with Category 1 responders. 
6.5  Analysis of the Data 
Step 1:  Contextualisation  
The Emergency Preparedness report suggests that Category 1 responders should describe 
the characteristics of the local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an 
emergency in the community. The following questions have been defined to explore if an 
interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders build up a common 
understanding of the local risk context. 
Q1.1:  The ability to explore various social intelligence (such as the demographic, ethnic 
and social composition of the community, the geographical distribution, identification of 
vulnerable groups, the level of community resilience) in an interactive spatial map could 
help Category 1 responders establish a collective understanding of the local risk level. 
What additional social data is important for you to be displayed on the map? How could 




     Figure 6. 2: Respondents’ rating on the contextualisation of the social information 
 
With regard to the contextualisation of social information, the overall results highlight 
that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the ability to explore various 
social intelligence could help Category 1 responders establish a collective understanding 
of the local risk level. The remaining respondents agreed that social information is 
important in the understanding of the local risks. Most participants stated that the ability 
to identify and locate vulnerable people was the most important aspect of contextualising 
social information. 
In emergency management, risk is a function of hazard and vulnerability. The term 
‘vulnerability’ has a variable nature as it depends on the ability of a person to save 
himself/herself in the presence of a risk. It also varies depending on the size and type of 
the hazard, as indicated by all the respondents. Most of the respondents noted that it is 
important to identify the vulnerable, to know their location and take into account the 
cultural characteristics of the community to which they belong. Interviewees B1 and B2 
observed that data sets throw up demographics that can help understand the risk posed, 
the potential consequences, and the impact of that risk locally, but that then this would 
also start to inform the response.  There was agreement among the respondents from the 
different agencies that knowing and understanding demographic data and displaying it on 
an interactive map is useful for planning and evacuation in order to build resilience and 
mitigate risk. According to Interviewees C1 and C2, the identification of vulnerable 
groups and the level of local resilience is very important in understanding the ability to 

























Exploring various social intelligence on an interactive map could help 
responders establish a collective understanding of the local risk level.  
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While some respondents categorised the vulnerable according to the community to which 
they belong, others categorised them according to their needs. Interviewees A1 and A2 
referred to vulnerable people those having language or communication problems or 
healthcare and mobility needs. The ‘vulnerable’ are also referred to as either communities 
or as individuals. Interviewee B1 noted that the mapping of demographic data, for 
example in Greater Manchester, helped to identify which communities have a community 
plan in place and those who need a specific response plan to be set. Interviewee B1 also 
indicated that demographic data would also help to know how to communicate and 
engage with vulnerable groups, whether communities or individuals, to inform and warn 
them.  Interviewees B1 and B2, as well as interviewees A1 and A2, stated that some 
communities have their own networks in order to pass messages on to one another. 
Interviewees B1, B2 and D referred to communities such as the Chinese and the Somali 
communities as self-helping and self-mobilising communities.  
The data on vulnerable individuals and groups helped to identify the people at risk. 
According to Interviewee E1, using flooding as an example, such people can be graded in 
terms of their ability to evacuate or the reasons why they may, or may not, be able to do 
so. The aim is to understand the size of the evacuation support required (such as medical 
support) and to where they might need to be evacuated.  
Interviewees A1 and A2, as well as C1 and C2, described the vulnerable in terms of old 
age or young age as well as those having physical disability. However, Interviewees B1, 
B2 and D argued that the elderly or disabled might not be vulnerable if they have 
contingency plans or a support package. Both of these sets of interviewees referred to 
social relationships, such as neighbours or networks with other members of the 
community.    
According to Interviewee D, social demographics would help to identify the location of 
vulnerable communities and individuals, but that vulnerability would be slightly different 
within different scenarios. Interviewee B noted that vulnerability depends on the size of 
the incident, the threat and the nature of the emergency. 
The vulnerability or resilience of a student population depends on the type of risk 
according to Interviewees B1 and B2. Such a category is more resourceful and more 
resilient in the case of a flood but in the case of pandemic flu, if the disease targets the 20 
years’ old male age group (which was one of the demographics) and some of them were 
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living alone away from some of their normal support networks, then that could make 
them more vulnerable. 
With regard to the interface of the interactive map and the use of the interactive 
environment, Interviewees G1 and G2 emphasized the benefits of an interactive 
environment by comparing the display of data on the interactive map with a simple 
spreadsheet. Interviewees C1 and C2 specified that, in a flood situation, they would 
certainly want population densities to be put on such a map and overlaid on top of that, an 
indication of the vulnerable. According to interviewees C1 and C2, the display of data via 
the layers or simulation would help in planning an evacuation in case there is a threat.  In 
the case of a flood in an area with a nearby COMAH site there could be a need for an 
evacuation (of vulnerable communities) and, therefore, interviewees stated that it 
definitely helped to see the scenario visually.  Similarly, these participants noted that, for 
example in the case of an incident involving a release of chemicals near the Lowry 
complex in Manchester, it would be extremely valuable if the members of the LRF were 
able to see it in the form of a simulation.   
Interviewees E1 and E2 added that, in the case of a flood or a potential gas leak, it would 
be useful mapping out the number of people that may need to be evacuated. This would 
help them plan and decide as to where they would evacuate the people, the routes that 
they may need to keep open or closed, the transportation methods and the holding centres. 
According to Interviewees F1 and F2, knowing the demographics of the users of public 
transport would help them to identify any weaknesses in services. Knowing the 
demographics of people who are going to different events such as music concerts or 
football matches would also help in evacuation plans. Other interviewees underlined the 
problem of capturing data of a changing nature, such as the daytime and nighttime 
populations of specific sites; for example, interviewee A3 referred to the changing data 
on population in different parts of the city center or Piccadilly Gardens during the course 
of a day and the difficulties in capturing these differences in order to plan and evacuate if 





To sum up, characteristics have been derived as requirements from the data analysis with 
regard to the Contextualisation of social information. The following have been identified 
as the main characteristics. 
Social information 
 Demographics 
1. Population densities 
2. Population changes daytime/night-time  
 Community 
1. Ethnic communities who are not well integrated with society generally and have language difficulties  
2. A transient population (travellers’ communities, students) 
 Mobility needs 
1. Elderly people 
2. People with disabilities  
3. Families with children (infants) 
4. Pregnant ladies  
 
 Health care needs  
1. Serious medical needs (requiring special medical equipment for evacuation) 
2. Specific types of illnesses (needs special procedure for evacuation) 
3. Those with chronic health conditions 
 




Q1.2:  The ability to explore the local environment and understand the local 
vulnerabilities and characteristics of the space (urban, rural, mixed), scientific sites, etc. 
on an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders receive a better collective 
understanding of the likelihood of, and the impact of, an emergency in the community. 
What additional data on the local environment would be of importance for you to be 
displayed on the map? In your view, how could such an interactive exploration of the 




Figure 6. 3: Respondents’ rating on the contextualisation of the local environment 
 
With regard to the contextualisation of the local environment, the results indicated that all 
the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the ability to explore the local environment 
and understand the local vulnerabilities and characteristics of the space (urban, rural, 
mixed, scientific sites, etc.) on an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 
responders receive a better collective understanding of the likelihood of, and the impact 
of, an emergency in the community. Participants identified a number of features that 
would be valuable to include on an interactive map, agreeing that workplaces and 
residences should be mapped but also that sites which could have knock on effects if they 
were affected by a disaster (such as COMAH sites, laboratories and cooling towers) 
would also prove useful to include.  
As far as the mapping of data relating to the impact of hazards on the local environment 
was concerned, the respondents from the different agencies mentioned a variety of 
buildings that needed to be mapped and displayed on the interactive map. These ranged 
from residential and business properties to university labs, hospitals and COMAH sites. 
They also emphasized the usefulness of the interactive map environment in bringing 
together the various stakeholders involved in the multi-agency risk assessment.  
The display of the mapped data could help the multi-agency teams (Category 1 
responders) to understand the risks posed and enable them to use such data in planning 
and mitigation. According to E2 and E3, a flood map showing the properties that are at 
risk overlaid with information on vulnerable groups, critical infrastructure and COMAH 
























Exploring the local environment & understanding local vulnerabilities and 
characteristics of the space on interactive spatial map could help responders 




for planning and mitigation purposes (evacuation). They found displayed or visualized 
date useful not only for COMAH sites which impact on the environment, but also for 
presenting the features within the location around COMAH sites, such as rivers. Other 
interviewees also emphasized the value of visualisation of interdependencies and 
aggregated risks. According to the interviewees, it is useful to know the location of a 
hospital and to see whether there are any COMAH sites next to it. Interviewees B1 and 
B2 noted that the mapping of buildings etc. helped to identify any high-risk areas if 
flooding occurs. This information can be overlaid by any suitable data, for example about 
any chemical works nearby. The participants also wanted to see what else might be 
affected by a river flooding (such as a reservoir) and the effect of any aggregated risks 
caused by such an event on the population.  
Interviewees B1 and B2 referred to the geographic nature of risks. According to these 
participants, knowing the geographic nature of a risk might help in improving warning 
and informing, in encouraging members of a community to warn their family, friends and 
neighbours. Interviewees C1 and C2 noted that data about the topography of an area in 
the case of a flood, when the water level rises to a certain point, will enable the 
responders to know exactly which houses are going to be flooded.  This will help in 
dealing with flash floods or surface water floods when it is difficult to predict as to where 
the water will flow. Having information about the local topography would help 
responders in putting in certain flood barriers and in knowing exactly how many homes 
could be protected. This view was shared by interviewees A1 and A2 who described the 
limits of their existing mapping techniques compared to what they expected from an 
interactive map.  
A1 and A2 stated if would be useful to show different types of accommodation on the 
interactive map (such as bungalows, traditional two-storey houses and flats) as, in the 
case of a flood, knowing which accommodation had more than one level (i.e. not just 
ground level) would be beneficial for evacuation planning. 
Providing accurate data about buildings as well as population data (on one layer), with 
another layer containing information about vulnerable people, can help set priorities for 
evacuations. From such information the responders can identify those who need to be got 
out first because they are going to take longer to be evacuated. In a flood scenario if the 




Displaying information in layers would enable agencies to share the data on the layers 
within the collaborative environment. Interviewees C1 and C2 stated that the value of this 
platform would be to bring together the local authority, planners and ‘blue light’ 
organisations in the planning stage, and in planning about COMAH sites, industry sites, 
waste sites, and so on. Interviewees noted that, within a collaborative environment, some 
agencies would know who holds what information required and thus it could be 
visualized and included in their planning; for example, the Environment Agency would 
be able to access the police’s information about traffic congestion, and thus plan their 
activities to avoid congested areas.  
For interviewees G1 and G2, knowing the location of biological and nuclear facilities 
would help in understanding the risks posed by them in cases of an emergency and thus 
planning could be undertaken taking this in account.  For such types of sites, the risk is 
low but the impact would be huge. In the case of concerns with regard to biological or 
biometric type labs, interviewees A1 and A2 noted that local authorities would have 
information about the location of these sites, because the authority grants them licenses. 
At present, such information is provided, generally, only if the multi-agency teams ask 
for it. [Interviewees B1 and B2 explained that obtaining informational data about sites 
such as cooling towers (which use water to reduce heat in buildings and which, if badly 
managed, can be breeding grounds for legionella which causes Legionnaire’s disease) can 
help manage risks.  
To sum up, characteristics were derived as requirements from the data analysis with 
regard to the Contextualisation of natural environment. The following have been 
identified as the main characteristics. 
Natural environment 
 Reservoirs  
 Topography 
 Area with risks of land slide  
 Rivers 
 National parks  
 Forests  





Q1.3:  The ability to explore the local infrastructure (transport, utilities, businesses), the 
critical supply network and critical services (telecommunication hubs, health, finance, 
etc.) on an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders receive a better 
understanding of the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community. What 
additional data on the infrastructure is of importance for you to be displayed on the map? 
In your view, how could such an interactive exploration of the local infrastructure be 
useful for multi-agency teams? 
 
Figure 6. 4: Respondents’ rating on the contextualisation of the local infrastructure 
 
With regard to the contextualisation of the local infrastructure, the majority of the 
respondents agreed that an ability to explore the local infrastructure (transport, utilities, 
businesses), the critical supply network and critical services (telecommunication hubs, 
health, finance, etc.) on an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders 
receive a better understanding of the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the 
community.  Other respondents (namely, 5 of the interviewees) strongly agreed with this 
statement.   
The infrastructure information that needs to be mapped and visualised on an interactive 
map, as mentioned by most of the respondents, relates to utility services etc. such as gas, 
electricity, water, telecommunications, bridges, schools and hospitals. The respondents 
emphasised the impact of a risk (that could be caused by these elements) to the 
population such as failures of substations and damage to gas pipes attached to bridges. 
They also stressed the interdependencies between various risks. Most of them referred to 























Exploring the local infrastructure etc on an interactive spatial map could 
help responders receive a better understanding of the likelihood and impact 
of an emergency in the community  
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According to interviewees A1 and A2, infrastructure sites are particularly valuable to 
map in terms of flooding in order to know what could be damaged or destroyed by a 
flood.  If an electricity substation is about to get flooded or it is predicted that it will be 
flooded, prioritisation has to be undertaken based on how many people would be affected. 
There is also a need to know the interdependencies of a risk; for instance, Electricity 
North West would be asked how many people and what key infrastructure would be 
affected by a substation failure as this would affect homes and also hospitals and 
transport. Interviewee E1 felt that it is important to understand the interdependency in 
order to mitigate the risk or to build resilience. If a substation supplies a hospital that thus 
is very dependent on that substation’s electricity, then it might become a priority because 
it is not ideal for the hospital to run on generators, in the case of an emergency, for a 
significant length of time. 
Participants commonly suggested that all substations should be mapped. Interviewees E2 
and E3 observed that substations are important regardless of where they are located and 
commented that “it could be something as mundane as a substation in a field in the 
middle of nowhere but if that gets flooded and taken out of operation, you could be losing 
power to 50,000 houses”. They recommended that the interdependencies between 
substations should also be identified. Interviewees G1 and G2 explained that knowing the 
location of all the substations in an area would help to identify the impact in that area. It 
might be, should some be lost in a disaster, that each of them just causes the loss of 
power to several thousand buildings; it might be, however, that a particular substation on 
the map is the feeder for all of them, so if that one is lost the consequences are much 
greater. This is where the industry experts’ knowledge is needed in the risk assessment. 
Interviewees B1 and B2 put forward another example of interdependency, citing the 
collapse of a bridge and the possible effect of this on the utility services. They suggested 
that a bridge collapse would make a utility network particularly vulnerable (as utility 
providers have to ensure a way of getting cables and pipes over rivers and, therefore,  
bridges present an obvious way of doing this and thus are generally used for this purpose). 
Interviewee E1 also observed that, in general, utility supplies become more vulnerable 
when they are above ground rather than underground. This interviewee showed the 
importance of mapping telephone exchanges and communication networks so as to raise 
the issue of business continuity in relation to the building of resilience. This participant 
noted that any hazard that would remove an area’s communication network would have a 
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large knock-on impact for businesses. Interviewee A3 noted that agencies’ focus is not 
only on responding to an incident but also on building resiliency by understanding the 
potential impacts of hazards. 
As an example of risks that can occur that can affect local infrastructure, E1 mentioned a 
fire in Manchester that had broken out under a BT building. This affected the telephone 
exchange and wiped out a significant proportion of central Manchester communications, 
including the emergency service number 999. This is an example of the kind of 
infrastructural risk that should be displayed on an interactive map, as it shows that a 
relatively small incident can have very significant impacts.  
All respondents agreed that an understanding and visualisation of interdependencies and 
aggregated risks helps in planning and in agreeing evacuation plans between agencies. 
According to interviewees B1 and B2, for a better understanding of such 
interdependencies, there may be a need for gap analysis in order to know where the gaps 
and vulnerabilities are which, in turn, will make it possible to plan for them and to try and 
mitigate them. According to interviewee E1, an understanding of utilities services and 
supply networks would definitely help with undertaking exercises and realistic modelling 
and would really help, particularly at a tactical and strategic level. Visualisation of 
utilities services and supply networks would have a big impact on the undertaking of 
exercises and testing plans.  
Data displayed on the interactive map is useful for communication and collaboration as 
well as decision-making and collective planning. For Interviewee D, an interactive 
meeting with the other agencies, with all the representatives being able to see the same 
visualization, would improve collaborative decision-making and communication. 
Interviewee D even suggested that the simulation technique could incorporate aspects of 
computer gaming and emphasized its benefit for the multi-agency collaboration. He 
stated that simulation means that “you can explore the area where there are floods, for 
instance, schools, and can actually see it unfolding and I think that has a value for 
collaborative decision-making and planning for evacuation. The relationship between the 
agencies is collaborative rather than confrontational and adversarial”.  
With regard to decision-making and collective planning, interviewees C1 and C2 
observed the potential use of the interactive map platform in terms of collective planning 
for risks. When it is known that an incident has occurred, they can position equipment in 
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the most useful locations and can make decisions effectively. The participants suggested 
that, for high risk sites, they could look at the site, take into account factors such as wind 
direction, and quickly know whether their first activity should be to close certain roads.  
Interviewee G1 observed that the health infrastructure is critical in all types of incidents. 
The interviewee mentioned local GPs, nursing homes and hospitals and utilising mapping 
data on them. This participant also emphasized the visual pattern of what is in an area as 
well as working collaboratively and gave an example of a road closure that may block the 
entrance of a hospital. G1 described how police could close a particular road, without 
anticipating that it would prevent access to a key healthcare site such as a hospital. The 
participant suggested that, with better collaboration and an interactive map upon which to 
look, such a situation would be less likely to arise because agencies would be alerted to 
such a fact. 
To sum up, characteristics were derived as requirements from the data analysis with 
regard to the Contextualisation of infrastructure. The following have been identified as 
the main characteristics. 
Infrastructure 
 Utility services (hubs) 
1. Electrical Substations (Electricity supply networks, electricity transformers) 
2. Telecom substation (Telecom supply networks, Green boxes, Mobile phone towers and masts, 
Premises of data hubs of communications’ centres) 
3. Gas substations (Gas supply networks) 
4. Water distribution points (Water supply networks) 
5. Pumping stations (Waste water systems, drainage systems)   
 
 Transport 
1. Bridges  
2. Tram networks   
3. Rail networks  
4. Road networks (existing  & highways, major roads) 
5. Bus stations (bus stops) 
6. Traffic lights 
7. Airports  
 
 Buildings 
1. Major financial institutions 
2. Shopping centres  
3. Football grounds   
4. Health buildings; Local GPs, Walk-in clinics, Doctors, Nursing homes & Hospitals, Pharmacists 
5. Residential houses; Bungalows, Traditional two storey houses  & Flats 
6. Buildings of interest; Police, Ambulance & Fire stations 
7. Business premises  
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8. Heritage buildings & sites  
9. Density of housing  
10. Universities 
 
Q1.4: The ability to explore potential hazardous sites and their relationships to 
communities or sensitive environmental sites on an interactive spatial map could help 
multi-agencies to understand the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazardous events in the 
local area. What hazardous sites are of importance for you to be displayed on the map? In 
your view, how could such an interactive exploration of hazardous sites be useful for 
multi-agency teams?  
 
Figure 6. 5: Respondents’ rating on the contextualisation of the hazardous sites 
 
With regard to the contextualisation of hazardous sites, all the respondents strongly 
agreed or agreed that the ability to explore potential hazardous sites and their 
relationships to communities or sensitive environmental sites on an interactive spatial 
map could help multi-agencies to understand the likelihood of, and the impact of, 
hazardous events in the local area. From the interviews it emerged that participants felt 
that it would be most useful to include COMAH, chemical and waste sites.   
There was agreement amongst all the respondents that a knowledge and understanding of 
any chemicals stored and their potential effects on the population would be useful in 
assessing risk and in taking preventive safety measures and in setting in place specific 
plans for mitigation. Some participants also referred to wildfires, forest fires or fires 
within oil rich sites. All the interviewees emphasised the usefulness of the interactive 























Exploring potential hazardous sites on an interactive spatial map could help 
multi-agencies to understand the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazardous 
events in the local area  
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Interviewees B1 and B2 thought that all COMAH sites should be mapped, not just the 
top-tier ones which are likely to cause the biggest emergencies. The example given in the 
interview was the Buncefield fire in December 2005 in the Hertfordshire Oil Storage 
Terminal, UK. This oil storage facility was not a top-tier COMAH site, but was just 
below the top-tier level. According to Interviewees C1 and C2, knowing the location of a 
waste site, and what surrounds it, is useful in the planning stages. They suggested that it 
would be very beneficial to produce a ‘COMAH plan’ with the local authority to create 
plans of action in the case of certain incidents. Interviewee E1 referred to building the 
resilience of communities that are within the area that surround a COMAH site. In such a 
case, the relevant agencies should communicate to people within this area regularly, so 
residents know what to do if an alarm goes off on the COMAH site.  The same view was 
expressed by an interviewee who noted that members of public living close to facilities 
like chemical plants should have knowledge concerning possible emergencies and what 
to do if they occur.  
Interviewees G1 and G2 noted that reservoir inundation is a sensitive threat and may be 
the most difficult threat to handle. Thus reservoir inundation planning is undertaken in 
advance in case such a threat occurs. Interviewees E2 and E3, considering flooding or 
forest fires, also stated that they had started putting measures in place to deal with such 
possibilities, building such likelihoods into their risk assessment so as to identify the risks. 
They were also putting in intervention measures in the form of a plan, so that if 
something does happen, they will know what their procedure is in order to deal with such 
a possibility. 
All the interviewees would recommend the use of an interactive map and data sharing 
within the collective working offered by an interactive map to members of the LRF from 
different agencies. A1 and A2 raised again the issue of licenses, which is information that 
only local authorities and the Environment Agency hold at present. Other agencies can 
only obtain such information if they ask for it. They referred to a fire at a recycling plant 
in Stockport in August 2012. The plant affected had licences issued by the Environment 
Agency. They suggested that, although the fire service was aware of the risks at that plant 
none of the other agencies were particularly aware of the risks (other than the 
Environment Agency). This, the participants argued, revealed many issues as a result of 
what was being stored at the plant, issues that some of the agencies had not previously 
been aware of. Individual agencies were aware of them but, as a collective, they were not. 
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Therefore, this showed that sometimes information is held by individual agencies but is 
not shared at a collective level, and that sometimes, therefore, it is only when they have to 
collaborate because of an incident that has occurred that all the agencies actually 
understand what is there at the incident site.   
Displaying data about hazard sites and the risk they may pose for the environment is 
useful in assessing and understanding the aggregated risks as well as in the planning.   
Interviewees A1 and A2 noted that risk assessment covers the risks posed by COMAH 
sites and the impact on the water supply. Interviewee A3 explained that if there is a 
release of a chemical from a chemical site and that the wind is blowing, an interactive 
map could show them where it would go and its potential impact (as examples, it might 
mean the closure of a motorway and agencies would have to think about the risk of the 
chemical getting into the water supply).  
Interviewees C1 and C2 noted if they had a process that covered everything, such as the 
interactive map platform, they could feed the data in and produce something that 
everyone from all the agencies could understand. They would then be able to reassess the 
risks. They could prioritise the risks based on economic, environmental, public safety and 
other key considerations. Interviewees C1 and C2 gave an example of a scenario in which 
all the agencies could be involved. “There was a fire near London which I believe closed 
the M1 for two days. It was from a waste fire so there were impacts on people from the 
smoke and the dust. There was transport disruption which led to major economic impacts 
because one of the arterial roads was closed. The cost to UK PLC rose by the hour. 
Environmentally, there was firewater run off into the river potentially polluting the river. 
There was a substation nearby which looked likely to be taken out”. Such an incident in 
the example above made the participants think about potential fire sites that could cause 
problems either by damaging substations, by firewater running off and damaging the 
environment, by train travel disruption and by major road blockages, and so on. 
Interviewees G1 and G2 in their comments gave an example of a visualization of the 
Trafford Centre in Manchester where they would be reliant upon the fire service to give 
them a layout plan of the building.  
According to Interviewees G1 and G2, the interactive map platform would be useful as it 
allows them to identify all the vulnerable areas. They considered it as one tool that would 
suits all the agencies, designed specifically with multi-agency collaboration in mind. 
They felt that the platform could take on board all the relevant information from all the 
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relevant agencies that would be needed when dealing with a particular type of hazard. At 
present, according to these interviewees, sometimes some data is not shared openly, but 
rather has to be requested.  
To sum up, characteristics were derived as requirements from the data analysis with 
regard to the Contextualisation of hazardous sites. The following have been identified as 
the main characteristics. 
Hazardous sites 
 Recycling plants 
 Waste disposal sites 
 Chemical sites (Chemical storage sites, Chemical factories, Oil rich sites) 
 Oil refineries 
 High pressure gas lines 
 University labs; Biological, Biometric & Radiological risks  
 Nuclear facilities 
 Cooling towers (Legionella) 
 Dam failures 
 
Q1.5: The ability to visualize a combination of risks (social, environmental, 
infrastructure, hazardous sites) in an interactive map could help Category 1 responders 
build up an integrated view of the local risk context. What combinations of risks would 
be useful to be shown on the map? 
 
Figure 6. 6: Respondents’ rating on the contextualisation of the combination of risks (social, 
environmental, infrastructure, hazardous sites) 
With regard to the contextualisation of a combination of risks, more than half of the 
























Visualising a combination of risks on an interactive map could help 




environmental, infrastructure, hazardous sites) in an interactive map could help Category 
1 responders build up an integrated view of the local risk context. The other respondents, 
which represented less than half of the interviewees, strongly agreed with this statement.  
All the respondents emphasised the importance of the interactive map for the display of 
various data and indicated how they would want the layers to be shown on the map. All   
interviewees agreed that it is useful to have a combination of risks shown, such as 
chemical releases, flooding, fire and social unrest (i.e. riots) affecting sites, critical 
infrastructure and the population. All agencies would like to be able to see various data 
displayed all at once; the layering of different kinds of information emerged as being 
particularly desirable. According to Interviewees C1 and C2 such an environment would 
allow for sharing of data a lot more freely.  
Interviewees A1 and A2 noted that they definitely needed to overlay layers on other 
layers; for instance, in the case of a chemical release, they wanted to have information on 
the chemical sites and the demographics in the areas around them. For Interviewees C1 
and C2, various levels on the spatial map would also be extremely useful; for example, a 
flood map with properties that are at risk which was overlaid with information on 
vulnerable groups, critical infrastructure and COMAH sites would aid decision-making 
both prior to an incident for planning purposes and during an incident. According to 
Interviewees G1 and G2, the more information that the platform could provide about 
risks, the more they could put resources into dealing with, and mitigating, those risks. 
The participants’ responses also suggested that the interactive map platform would also 
be helpful in planning and prioritising. G1 and G2 suggested that if data about national 
infrastructure is displayed, then this would help in the understanding of knock-on effects 
which would be useful in the planning stage to mitigate impacts. According to B1 and B2, 
it is vital to have this platform which enables all the agencies to understand the impact on 
the human population, the natural environment, other infrastructure and on cascading 
risks posed by things that happen simultaneously. B1 and B2 referred to aggregated risks 
which involve river flooding and failure of reservoir dams and electricity substations.  
Interviewees A1 and A2 gave an example to explain how the overlaid data about sites and 
demographics could help in evacuation plans. If there was a chemical fire incident in 
Trafford Park and the wind was blowing towards Sale, they argued that it would be very 
useful to know what the population of Sale is, which parts of it could be under threat and 
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how long it would take to evacuate people. This social information could be connected 
with environmental information such as wind speed. Demographics’ information, they 
argued, is always useful when one is looking at an evacuation of any sort, be it because of 
a chemical cloud or an explosion or a flood. All this information helps to understand the 
potential impact and how quickly they can get people out.  Interviewees C1 and C2, as 
well as E1, emphasised the usefulness of the interactive map for the display of multiple 
risks and complex situations. Interviewees C1 and C2 observed that the mind can only 
hold information on a certain number of risks, but the platform might show a couple of 
keys areas upon which it is necessary to focus amongst the multiple risks in a particular 
area. Accordingly, this would help practitioners to have a broader view. With regard to 
prioritisation, Interviewees F1 and F2 emphasised the importance of information on 
hazards as these can have a massive impact on social, economic and heath aspects and 
which  could, for example, assist them in making decisions about prioritising roads which 
lead to facilities such as schools, hospitals and police stations.  
Step 2: Hazard Review  
Hazards that present significant risks are identified on the basis of experience, research or 
other information.  These hazards are shared and discussed at LRF meetings with a view 
to agreeing a list of hazards that need to be assessed.  The following questions have been 
defined to explore if an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders capture 
experience, intelligence and research data and communicate them to others during hazard 
review meetings.  
Q2.1:   Utilising your past experience, an interactive map with appropriate graphical 
illustrations could be used to represent the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazards.  
What type of experiences would you like to present on the interactive map to enhance 





Figure 6. 7: Respondents’ rating, utilizing past experience, on the usefulness of an interactive map 
in the Hazard Review step  
The majority of the participants agreed that experience should be included in an 
interactive map, with 2 strongly agreeing and 4 remaining neutral on the fact that it is 
useful. Historical data emerged as a popular element of an interactive map reality 
platform. This was noted by a number of participants who tended to suggest that such 
data would help users learn from past experiences of similar emergencies.  G1 and G2 
described using past experience of planning as a foundation. Interviewees A1 and A2 
suggested that historical data about past flu pandemics should be included on the 
interactive map. B1 and B2 pointed to a similar level of interest in Legionella outbreaks. 
Similarly, A3 called for the inclusion of historical records relating to the floods of the 
River Irwell. The participants noted that including such records would help users learn 
from the actions undertaken and the problems encountered in past emergencies. E2 and 
E3 wanted to see detailed information on past experiences, such as casualty numbers, 
incident size and where the problem began.  A1 and A2 noted that historical data from 
other parts of the country should be included, in order to learn from the actions and 
experiences of others. They suggested that data on the impact of previous severe flooding 
in Somerset would be useful.  
Participants who called for the inclusion of historical data generally linked it to 
simulation. A1 and A2 commented that information about previous flu outbreaks, for 
example in London, would help them to model the impact that similar pandemics would 
have in Manchester. B1 and B2 also expressed concern over flu pandemics and 






















An interactive map with appropriate graphical illustrations could be used to 
represent the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazards  
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predict. The use of past experience in simulating events was also outlined by H, who 
suggested that the sharing of previous experiences of crowd problems, fires and industrial 
accidents and their impacts would be useful learning and simulation tools. Moreover, E2 
and E3 argued that historical details help give a clear picture about current priorities and 
hazard identification.  
Suggestions as to how this experience should be presented pointed to the information 
being presented visually. C1 and C2 suggested that a map, which could be viewed by 
everyone, would be helpful, as did E1, E2 and E3 in their interviews. Similarly, G1 and 
G2 stated that maps could show the development of, and hotspots involved in, previous 
emergency experiences. They suggested that this would be a very useful tool for a multi-
agency team. 
Q2.2:  An interactive map with appropriate graphical illustrations could be used as a 
medium to present the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazards derived from research 
data. What type of research data would you like to present on the interactive map to 
enhance communication and discussion during hazard review meetings?  Comment on 
other types of data that could be beneficial within an interactive map.  
 
 
Figure 6. 8: Respondents’ rating on the use of research data in the interactive map in the Hazard 
Review step 
Research data was commonly suggested as being a useful tool that should be included in 
a multi-agency platform. Majority of all the participants agreed with his point, while a 
three strongly agreed. Participant H described the importance of being able to access and 




















An interactive map with appropriate graphical illustrations could be used as 
a medium to present the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazards derived 




the importance of taking an evidence-based approach to a disaster response, rather than 
relying on intuition and gut feeling. They noted that understanding the likelihood of 
events has to be a scientific process. The research data that participants would like to see 
fall into three categories – social, environmental and industrial.  
Interviewees described social research into the behaviour of people (specifically crowds) 
during an emergency as being useful to show on an interactive map platform. E2 and E3 
expressed interest in work being undertaken by Manchester University into crowd 
dynamics. Research into the behaviour and movement of large groups of people during 
an incident would help responders factor in the potentially unpredictable behaviour of the 
pubic during their hazard review. A3 supported this idea, suggesting that predicting how 
people will react is equally important as what is going to happen.  B1 and B2 also called 
for the inclusion of research, but from a legislative perspective. They suggested that 
having access to information about the regulatory regime that governs an area would be 
useful. 
Many interviewees described a need for environmental research to be included in a 
platform. Phenomena such as wildfire (suggested by E1, E2 and E3), climate and weather 
(E1, G1 and G2), flooding (E2 and E3) and volcanic ash (A1 and A2) emerged from the 
interviews as being areas of research to which participants would like to have access. E2 
and E3 noted that research from Australia into wildfire can be applied to the hazards 
faced in moorland areas, while E1, G1 and G2 noted the usefulness of data relating to 
weather and heat wave cycles.  
Finally, research into the nature of emergencies at industrial sites was also suggested as 
being useful. E2 and E3 suggested that research into impacts of emergencies at COMAH 
sites and chemical plants would be beneficial to access as part of a multi-agency platform.  
Q2.3:  The use of an interactive map, integrated with hazard information, could help 
members of the Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) and the Local Resilience 
Forum (LRF) make careful judgments on which hazards should be included in further 




Figure 6. 9: Respondents’ rating on the use of an interactive map, integrated with hazard 
information in the Hazard Review step 
Interviewees were in favour of an interactive map integrated with hazard information. 
Half of participants suggested agreement while a third suggested strong agreement and 2 
remained neutral. There were four main reasons for this support. Firstly, participants felt 
that such a platform would help them prioritise risks more effectively and efficiently. C1 
and C2 felt that it would make the prioritising of risks quicker. Similarly, D suggested 
that an interactive, integrated platform would help quantify the risks that should be given 
priority.  
Secondly, participants felt that a platform with an interactive map, combined with 
information about hazards, would improve the quality of decisions made by multi-agency 
teams. E1 noted that, by giving users access to quality information, the platform will help 
them make better decisions, while E2 and E3 argued that a platform would increase the 
amount of information available to multi-agency teams and thus improve their 
judgements.   
Thirdly, interviewees suggested that a platform like this would enhance judgements 
because it would allow users to connect and contextualise hazards and impacts; for 
example, E1 argued that an integrated platform would allow users to see the wider picture 
and not only see hazards in isolation. F1 and F2 also supported this view, suggesting that 
the platform would benefit them by bringing different scenarios together.  
Finally, the visual nature of an interactive map and integrated hazard information 
emerged as something that participants supported. G1 and G2 argued that demonstrating 





















The use of an interactive map, integrated with hazard information, could 
help RAWG and LRF members make careful judgments on which hazards 
should be included in further assessments  
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and B2 suggested that displaying information visually helps multi-agency teams reach a 
common understanding.  
Step 3: Risk Analysis 
The purpose of this step is to consider the likelihood of, and the outcome and impact of, a 
hazard. The Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG) from central government should 
provide a basis for this work, but the local knowledge available within the Risk 
Assessment Working Group (RWAG) and other local organisations should allow the 
RAWG to elaborate on the assessment.  The purpose of this section is to explore how the 
collaboration of Category 1 responders could be enhanced in elaborating this assessment.  
Q3.1:  The use of an interactive spatial map to present the local risks’ context (social, 
infrastructure, environmental, hazardous sites) and the outcome of a hazard (derived from 
computer simulation or experience) could help Category 1 responders to collectively 
elaborate the assessment of a hazard and measure its impact. What types of simulation 
data, historical data and experiences could be useful for visualizing on the interactive 
map and why?  How could the integration of the local risks’ context and the outcome of 
hazards be useful? 
 
 
Figure 6. 10: Respondents’ rating on the use of an interactive map to present the local risks’ 
context in risk analysis step 
Interviewees identified numerous kinds of data that they would like to have access to as 
part of an interactive map. The majority said they agreed with an interactive map showing 
social, infrastructure and environmental data as well as the location of hazard sites. 3 
participants went further and strongly agreed, while 1 remained neutral. Interviewees also 



















The use of an interactive spatial map to present the local risks’ context 
(social, infrastructure, environmental, hazardous sites) and the outcome of a 
hazard (derived from computer simulation or experience) could help 
Category 1 & 2 responders to collect 
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responses about what data they would like to see. Areas at high and medium risk of 
flooding (A3, C1 and C2, E1, E2 and E3 and H), data about weather phenomena such as 
wind direction and speed, rainfall and snowfall (A1 and A2, A3, B1 and B2) and an 
analysis of threats to key infrastructure like bridges, reservoirs, dams, railways and roads 
(B1 and B2, E1, E2 and E3) all emerged as the kinds of data that participants would like 
to be provided with in an interactive platform.  
Data relating to economic impact was something else that the interviewees would like to 
see. C1 and C2 suggested that being able to consider the economic impact that hazards 
present would be useful for them. They used the example of the average cost of a flooded 
house as an example of financial data that would help in risk analysis. Similarly, D called 
for the consideration of the financial aspects of risk analysis, while F1 and F2 talked of 
the need for modelling the impact, for example, that road closures have on businesses in a 
given area. Another notable type of data that emerged from the interviews was Internet 
access by the public in different areas. A1 and A2 suggested that the public’s access to 
the Internet can influence how well agencies are able to inform and warn the residents 
about emergencies. This has a knock-on effect for risk analysis, because it influences how 
the public will respond.  
Broadly, interviewees give similar responses as to how these kinds of data would help 
them in risk analysis. A3 suggested that such data would help multi-agency teams 
identify areas that are at risk when this risk is high enough to be obvious. The 
identification of wider, knock-on effects also emerged from the interviews. G1 and G2 
described the importance of analysing the risks of a number of areas, while F1 and F2 
stressed the need to anticipate the impact that an incident can have on the whole transport 
network. Similarly, A3 described the knock-on effects that snow can have on areas in 
which the population is not accustomed to snow. Most broadly, B1 and B2 suggested that 
this sort of data will, generally, help planners to have a greater understanding of the areas 
that they are analysing and the populations within them.  
Q3.2:  The use of an interactive spatial map to present cascading effects would help 
Category 1 responders to build up a broader perspective of the outcome of hazards and 




Figure 6. 11: Respondents’ rating on the use of an interactive map to present cascading effects in 
the risk analysis step 
Half of the interviewees agreed that an interactive map would be useful in modelling 
cascading effects, while the remaining participants either strongly agreed or were neutral. 
Participants outlined the cascading effects that they would find useful. Half agreed that 
these should be modelled on an interactive platform, with fewer participants strongly 
agreeing and a minority remaining neutral. In general, the cascading effects that the 
participants outlined related to the wider impact that a disaster of one kind could have on 
the human population.  
Interviewees B1 and B2 and C1 and C2 explained how they would discover the cascading 
effects of an environmental disaster like a flood on the wider human population. Both sets 
of participants noted the importance of knowing the location of substations in relation to 
areas of flooding, because if flooding causes the loss of a substation then the electricity 
supply to thousands of households can be cut off. C1 and C2 noted the cascading effect 
that this loss of electricity would have, not only on individuals, but also on businesses and, 
therefore, the local economy. Most interviewees had an interest in the cascading impact 
of river and reservoir flooding (A1 and A2, A3, B1 and B2, C1 and C2 and D). 
The knock-on effects of chemical fires were also noted in more than one interview. B1 
and B2 suggested that information about the population close to a chemical fire would be 
useful. They argued that if a chemical fire released different gases into the atmosphere, 
then knowing the percentage of the local population that is affected by respiratory 
illnesses would be important. E2 and E3 also express interested in having access to the 
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Other participants showed interest in the cascading effects that would impact on the 
population of an area in different ways. D, for example, explained the importance of 
knowing the cascading effects experienced by a lack in the supply of electricity. D noted 
how a electricity power shortage means that people cannot heat their homes in winter and 
would be unable to withdraw money from ATMs and, as a result, be unable to refuel their 
cars to go out and purchase a generator. Interest in cascading public health effects was 
also expressed by B1 and B2 who noted the public health hazard posed by wastewater 
and sewage in the event of a flood. E2 and E3 expressed a similar interest in this area.  
Other cascading effects identified included the effects that an outbreak of an illness 
would have on essential services (F1 and F2), the effects that snow would have on traffic 
and transport (E1, A3, F1 and F2) and the knock-on effects that terrorist strikes would 
have on public buildings and infrastructure (A1 and A2, C1 and C2). 
Overall, participants expressed a strong desire for information regarding cascading effects 
and their impact on the population of an area. However, E1 argued that modelling 
cascading effects can be both a positive and negative process. This participant pointed out 
that it can be natural, when considering cascading effects, to become distracted by 
hypothetical issues and move too far away from the core problem and its impact. This 
suggests that an interactive platform should balance the need to consider cascading 
effects with the risk that a user may lose sight of the initial problem.  
Step 4: Risk Evaluation  
The production of a risk matrix is an essential part of the risk assessment process.  Four 
risks’ ratings (very high, high, medium and low) are used to indicate the risk level.  
Q4.1:   The representation of risks’ ratings on an interactive map could help agencies to 
have a holistic view of hazards in their local areas. What additional information on the 




Figure 6. 12: Respondents’ rating on the use of risks’ ratings on an interactive map in the Risk 
Evaluation step 
The most popular response to the representation of risk ratings on an interactive map was 
agreement. 4 further participants strongly agreed, while 4 others remained neutral. 
Participants’ responses were mixed on the nature of an interactive map to be used in risk 
evaluation. The majority agreed or strongly agreed, but a similar number remained 
neutral. For instance, A1 and A2 reported that it was difficult for them to envisage, but H 
suggested that it could be useful for LRFs in their risk evaluation.  
Most participants stressed the need for a map to represent complicated risk evaluation 
data visually. B1 and B2 suggested that the map should present colour-coded areas 
according to their risk assessment. D argued that the map should model risk hotspots. C1 
and C2 described how an interactive map would be most useful if it allowed users to see 
the risks of events occurring at the same time. That said, the map would have to allow 
users to take different viewpoints, and perhaps change the map according to different 
variables. 
Some participants were keen to stress that an interactive map would have to be flexible 
and allow for risks to be layered and also differentiated depending on the situation. For 
instance, B1 and B2 described how a substation may be evaluated and displayed on a 
map as being at low risk. However, the substation could be in a larger area of higher risk. 
Therefore, an interactive map would have to display both of these aspects and allow users 
to zoom in and out. Similarly, E1 noted that an interactive map would have to be able to 
display changes to risks depending on other factors, such as time of year. E1 gave the 




















The representation of risks’ ratings on an interactive map could help 
agencies to have a holistic view of hazards in their local areas.  
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certain times of the year. This would then effect the evaluation of the risk of the wider 
area. E1 argued that an interactive map would, therefore, have to account for this, perhaps 
allowing the user to move between different views.   
There was agreement between the participants on how risk evaluation should be based on 
priorities. D suggested that risks should be evaluated and weighted according to their 
potential environmental, economic and social impacts. E1 described approaching risk 
evaluation with the intention of doing the best for the most people. F1 and F2 echoed this 
principle.  
Step 5: Risk Treatment  
Risk treatment has a number of stages: assess the type and extent of the capabilities 
required to respond to hazards; identify capabilities in place, consider the capability gaps 
and the extent of the risk; rate the risk priority; identify additional treatments required to 
close the capability gaps and manage the risks more effectively, and identify whose 
responsibility it is to provide treatment, etc.  
Q5.1:   The visualisation of the capabilities required and the capabilities in place on an 
interactive map would help agencies to collectively understand the capability gaps and 
address the additional treatments required to close the capability gaps and manage the 
risks more effectively. What types of capabilities should be modelled and visualized? 
How could the modelling and visualization of capability data on an interactive map be 
useful at the risk treatment stage? 
 
Figure 6. 13: Respondents’ rating on the use of the visualisation of the capabilities required and 




















The visualisation of the capabilities required and the capabilities in place on 
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The most common response to this question was agreement, but the same number of 
participants who expressed strong agreement, namely 3, expressed disagreement. The 
remaining 2 participants remained neutral. The need for the sharing information relating 
to agencies’ capabilities was a clear theme in the interviews. C1 and C2 described a clear 
need for the sharing of information relating to capabilities to be improved, so that multi-
agency teams have a clearer understanding of their collective capability. Moreover, E2 
and E3 pointed out the government’s promotion of inter-operability. 
However, many interviewees stressed how difficult achieving this would be. A1 and A2 
suggested that mapping capabilities at a local level would not give a comprehensive 
understanding because some disasters receive a national response. H agreed with this 
assessment, while A3 pointed out how keeping track of capabilities is made difficult 
because of how dynamic and changeable these capabilities are. A3 gave the example of 
how the numbers of staff available to an agency depends on the time of day. B1 and B2 
were more optimistic, noting that simple data like the numbers of fire, police and 
ambulance stations in an area is quite simple to map. However, they noted that more 
specific data on capability (and how it might be impacted upon by a disaster) is more 
difficult to map.  
This said, some interviewees reported having quite clear ideas about how capabilities can 
be mapped. C1 and C2 described the benefits they would see from a multi-layered map 
showing the different levels of equipment and staff held by each agency in different areas. 
They stated that the benefits would come from being able to see which agency has what 
equipment in which areas, and then being able to move such equipment and staff into 
other areas. F1 and F2 also favoured the use of layered map. There was some evidence 
that some agencies already have a good grasp of their own capabilities. For instance, G1 
and G2 observed that the fire, police and ambulance services have a working knowledge 
of where their capabilities are at any one time. They suggested that this information could 
be shared with other agencies. Moreover, A3 noted that agencies can use self-assessment 
frameworks to map their own capabilities and noted that the fire service has a strong 
understanding of its own capabilities. Ultimately, it seems that, as C1 and C2 argued, 





Step 6:  Monitoring and Reviewing 
This stage implies that risks should be monitored continuously and that the previous steps 
(1 -5) should be repeated when new risks are identified.  
Q6.1:  The availability of intelligence collected from Step 1 to Step 5 within an 
interactive map in an integrated form could help Category 1 responders to continuously 
improve their risks’ management strategy and build resilient communities.  
 
Figure 6. 14: Respondents’ rating on the importance of intelligence collected from Step 1 to Step 
5 within an interactive map in an integrated form in the Monitoring and Reviewing step 
 
All participants either agreed or strongly agreed with the idea that an interactive map 
would help with the ongoing monitoring of risks. There was broad support among 
interviewees for the creation of an interactive, integrated map. A1 and A2, A3 and H all 
responded favourably to this idea.  
More specific input came from the other participants. B1 and B2 brought up the 
importance of security for such a platform, noting that if such comprehensive data were 
brought together into a single platform, then it would be vital that it did not become 
available to the wrong users. Many participants (B1 and B2, C1 and C2, D, E2 and E3) 
stressed the need for such a system to be properly updated, reviewed and maintained if it 
is to have longevity. The value of having a visual, interactive platform was asserted by 
C1 and C2 and D. C1 and C2 noted how having access to visual information helped with 
understanding and D suggested that an interactive environment supports communication 
between multiple users. B1 and B2, D, G1 and G2 all pointed to the usefulness of having 
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Q6.2:   Having understood the risks, how do you check if you are prepared for 
disaster?  
A number of participants (C1 and C2, E2 and E3 and H) stated that risk assessment 
discussions were important in checking their preparedness, while D noted the importance 
of using past experiences in assessing preparedness. Review and undertaking exercises 
were identified most commonly by the participants when they described checking their 
preparedness. A3 described a process of planning, undertaking exercises and then 
checking this against real world experience. After mentioning undertaking exercises, A3 
also outlined the role of reflection in checking preparedness. This interviewee suggested 
that there are two tiers of reflection. The first is assessing how well teams performed 
from an operational perspective. Did they, for example, know their roles and work well 
together? The second tier relates to the performance of the tactics that were used. Did, for 
example, their flood plans work? A3 suggested that both tiers are important in checking 
preparedness. 
Other participants also mentioned undertaking exercises. A1 and A2 asserted that the 
most common form of undertaking exercises was ‘tabletop’ which is an office-based 
simulation of an emergency. The participants mentioned the live undertaking of 
exercising, with staff on the ground. This, they stated, is a much more expensive activity 
and, therefore, happens less often than tabletop exercises. B1 and B2 also described using 
tabletop exercises to test their preparedness. They noted that this can involve putting 
different groups through the same scenario to test differences in performance. E1 also 
noted that there is an annual cycle of reviewing risks and of undertaking exercising. As 
with the previous participants, E1 stated that undertaking exercising is often table top 
because it is impractical to run live exercises on large numbers of different hazards.  
6.6 User requirements   
The user requirements that emerged from the interviews with the members of the multi-
agency team can be categorised in order to define some of the characteristics of the 
collaborative environment for risk assessment in disaster management.  The information 
required by the interviewees can be presented under four main themes: Social (S), 
Natural (N), Critical infrastructure (CI) and Hazard sites (HS).  These themes need to be 
plotted on a map and visualised by the stakeholders. This interactive map environment 
would enhance stakeholders’ decision-making by giving an overview of the area that they 
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wish to concentrate on, including the area’s natural geography, its vulnerabilities, critical 
infrastructure and the location of its hazards. This information is classified into:  
 (S) Social      Information relating to the human population of an area and its 
vulnerabilities  - the vulnerability of people, demographics, safety and welfare. 
 (N) Natural      Information relating to the natural environment of an area and its 
vulnerabilities - environmental, ecological, natural resources. 
 (CI) Critical Infrastructure – Information about the location and nature of key 
transport, communication and utilities in an area - buildings, community 
infrastructure, substations, utilities and rural life, heritage buildings & sites.  
 (HS) Hazard sites - information relating to the location and nature of sites in an 
area that present a hazard - COMAH sites, flood, forest fire, pandemic. 
Table 6. 1 below presents a detailed list of information that should be considered. The 
first column presents aspects of social information, the second column presents aspects of 
the natural environment, the third column presents elements of critical infrastructure and 
the fourth column displays possible hazardous sites. This information is intended to be 
comprehensive, but not exhaustive; more aspects could be added.  
Table 6. 1: Defining the characteristics of the collaborative environment for risk assessment in 
disaster management that are required within an interactive map 
Social information Natural    
Environment 
Infrastructure Hazardous Sites 
 Demographics 
3. Population densities 
4. Population changes 
daytime/nighttime  
 Community 
3. Ethnic communities 
who are not well 
integrated with 
society generally and 
have language 
difficulties  





 Mobility needs 
5. Elderly people 
 Reservoirs  
 Topography 
 Area with risks of 
land slide  
 Rivers 
 National parks  
 Forests  
 Animal sanctuaries  
 













phone towers and 
masts, Premises of 
data hubs of 
communications’ 
centres) 
8. Gas substations 
(Gas supply 
 Recycling plants 
 Waste disposal sites 
 Chemical sites 
(Chemical storage 
sites, Chemical 
factories, Oil rich 
sites) 
 Oil refineries 
 High pressure gas 
lines 
 University labs; 
Biological, Biometric 
& Radiological risks  
 Nuclear facilities 
 Cooling towers 
(Legionella) 




6. People with 
disabilities  
7. Families with 
children (infants) 
8. Pregnant ladies  
 
 Health care needs  





5. Specific types of 
illnesses (needs 
special procedure for 
evacuation) 
6. Those with chronic 
health conditions 
 
 Building hosting 
vulnerable people  
3. Hospices 
4. Schools  
 
networks) 
9. Water distribution 
points (Water 
supply networks) 
10. Pumping stations 
(Waste water 
systems, drainage 
systems)   
 
 Transport 
8. Bridges  
9. Tram networks   
10. Rail networks  
11. Road networks 
(existing  & 
highways, major 
roads) 
12. Bus stations (bus 
stops) 
13. Traffic lights 
14. Airports  
 
 Buildings 
11. Major financial 
institutions 
12. Shopping centres  
13. Football grounds   
14. Health buildings; 
Local GPs, Walk-
in clinics, Doctors, 
Nursing homes & 
hospitals, 
Pharmacists 
15. Residential houses; 
Bungalows, 
Traditional two 
storey houses  & 
Flats 
16. Buildings of 
interest; Police, 
Ambulance & Fire 
stations 
17. Business premises  
18. Heritage buildings 
& sites  





6.7 Summary  
This chapter has shown the process by which the characteristics of an interactive map that 
can enhance multi-agency collaboration in the risk assessment process were captured 
from stakeholders. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders based 
on a questionnaire which utilised questions relating to each of the six stages of the risk 
assessment process in the Emergency Preparedness report (Guidance on Part 1 of the 
Civil Contingency Act, 2004). These face-to-face interviews were recorded and 
transcribed before being analysed according to content analysis techniques. The 
visualisation of various kinds of social, natural environment, critical infrastructure and 
hazardous sites’ information (presented in the Table above) emerged as the characteristics 
that stakeholders require for an interactive map system to enhance their collaboration in 
risk assessment activities. In the next chapter, the design and implementation of the 





















Chapter 7 – Design and implementation of the collaborative risk 
assessment environment  
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the design of the collaborative risk assessment environment based 
on the requirements that emerged from the literature review and from the interviews with 
the stakeholders. The goal of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework which 
supports multi-agency collaboration in risk assessment activities. This framework 
consists of four views (Information view, Process/Activity view, User Interface view and 
Team Member view) each of which are described in-depth in this chapter, after an initial 
discussion of the two frameworks for describing system architectures which underpin this 
study’s framework. 
7.2 System Architecture Frameworks 
In recent years, Enterprise Architecture (EA) has become the established approach for 
managing organizations’ information systems and business processes (Franke et al., 
2009). EA can help an organization increase its effectiveness, efficiency, agility and 
stability via the information it collects (Van der Raadt, 2010). It is widely known as an 
essential mechanism in management, as it enhances collaboration within an organization. 
It is now implemented in private and voluntary sector organizations, including 
humanitarian relief agencies and public services such as the US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) (Hause, 2010). As indicated by Hause (2010), the most 
popular EA frameworks are The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) and the 
Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF). These were both designed to 
improve the collaboration, performance, planning and implementation of complex 
systems. As a result, most EA frameworks have accepted the practice of using several 
architectural layers and views to build their architecture system (Schekkerman, 2004; 
Tang et al., 2004). Furthermore, The Collaboration Oriented Architectures (COA) 
suggests that this approach supports collaboration through the design of system 
architecture. This is achieved by using an architecture view of the principal components 
that can be used to describe the concept (Jericho Forum, 2008). The COA framework has 
been put forward by The Open Group (OG) to allow computer scientists to describe their 
framework using a set of views. 
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7.2.1   TOGAF & COA 
TOGAF is an architecture framework that enables someone to design, evaluate and build 
the appropriate and right architecture for his or her organisation. It also enables an 
organisation to develop, maintain and employ enterprise architecture. Additionally, 
TOGAF has an open character; it pays attention to organisational commitment while 
other frameworks focus on the architecture itself and prescribe what to do. Producing an 
architecture is not the ultimate goal of TOGAF; it rather focuses on how an organisation 
benefits from the architecture (Van den Bent et al., 2007). TOGAF is based on 
highlighting ‘the central role of organisation’ (Desfray & Raymond, 2014). Desfray & 
Raymond, (2014) argued that TOGAF deals with subjects such as the collaboration 
between different people involved in enterprise architecture. Collaboration is based on an 
organised process wherein communication plays a crucial role. There should be an 
understanding of the targets and the aim of the enterprise architecture (Desfray & 
Raymond, 2014).  
The TOGAF features that this study has adopted are those relating to the study aim, the 
organisational commitment, the collaboration of teams and the significance of 
communication.  The aim of the study has been to develop, evaluate and build an 
appropriate interactive map for risk assessment. The architecture in this study is based on 
the organisational commitment of every individual within multi-team agencies. The 
designing of an interactive plan requires the commitment of the team members in all the 
agencies. Additionally, the goal of the study is not merely producing the interactive plan 
but also to benefit humanity via this design and reduce the destruction and loss caused by 
disasters. Collaboration is the pillar of the design in this study and the success of the plan 
is linked to the collaboration between all the agencies. Communication is vital in this 
study for understanding the targets of the design and the different views when evaluating 
the design. The COA framework is an information architecture which enables an 
organisation that adopts it to work securely in an environment (Jerisho Forum, 2008). 
COA also enables effective collaboration which is secure. The COA framework identifies 
all the components that contribute to creating a secure environment for a business. COA 
also provides IT systems which are secure within the global network and environment 
(Jerisho Forum, 2008).  
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7.3 Conceptual Framework Design  
In following the TOGAF framework and the COA framework, this research defines the   
collaborative risk assessment environment as a set of views namely: Team Member view, 
Information view, Process/Activity view, and User Interface/Workspace view as 
displayed in Figure 7. 1. These represent different viewpoints and are explained in detail 








Figure 7. 1: The conceptual framework views 
 
7.3.1 Team Member View 
The collaborative platform's Team Member view defines the team members’ profiles 
within a collaborative process. This view will be made up of representatives from the 
multiple agencies that are involved in the risk assessment process environment. This view 
would also allow all agencies to understand their role and responsibilities which are key 
in achieving successful risk assessment and preparedness (Table 7.1). Team members 
consist of representatives from the departments and agencies responsible for providing 
the assessments. This includes representatives of the local emergency planners and first 
responders such as the commanders of the police, fire and rescue and ambulance services 
as well as representatives from the local authority, the NHS, local transport operators and 
from the Environment Agency. They are engaged in this collaborative risk assessment 
process through a series of meetings involving assessment activities. These activities 
range from an initial presentation, and an analysis of threats/hazards, to a risk assessment 
process that collects information about threats and hazards and to assigning values to 
risks for the purposes of determining priorities, to collectively and individually exploring 
alternatives and to reaching a final agreement. The roles and responsibilities for each 
Information view Process/activity view 
Team member view 





disaster management  
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team member are shown in Table 7. 1 below. Ultimately, the conceptual design in this 
view aims to support team members to fully engage as a multi-agency team, enabling 
them to share their views, experiences and insights with their fellow team members in 
order to collectively explore and manage local risks. 







The police generally co-ordinate the activities of other responders, whilst 
ensuring that the scene is preserved and evidence safeguarded – particularly 
where terrorism is suspected.  They arrange for any victims to be removed 
from the area, and, if necessary, coordinate search activities.   
Commander of 
Fire & Rescue 
The main role of fire and rescue services in an emergency is the rescue of 
citizens trapped by fire or wreckage. They are also responsible for 
extinguishing fires and taking protective measures to prevent the fire from 
spreading. Moreover, they assist other agencies such as the ambulance 




The ambulance service is responsible for the on-site response to short or 
sudden emergencies, as well as taking the victims to different hospitals, 
depending on priority, and the types and numbers of injured. The Ambulance 
Incident Commander (AIC) is responsible at the scene of an emergency. 
Commander of 
NHS 
Responsible for the managing of hospitals which the ambulance service 
designate as receiving casualties in the event of a major emergency, as well 
as a range of health professionals who would be involved in the recovery 
phase of an emergency which would include general practitioners, 




Local authorities collaborate with a range of bodies to support emergency 
services during emergency response and recovery from disaster.  Services 





Responsible for managing traffic, providing information to road users, 
improving safety and tackling road traffic, overseeing public transport. Many 





The aim of the EA is to protect and improve the environment, dealing with 
many different types of incidents which affect the natural environment and 
human health or property. This may include issuing flood warnings, 






7.3.2 Information View  
The Information view of the collaborative platform allows for the presentation of multi-
agency data that has been collected from diverse sources including social information 
such as the demographic, ethnic and social composition of the community, the 
geographical distribution and identification of vulnerable groups, local infrastructure such 
as transport, building, utilities’ services (electrical substations, telecom hubs), the natural 
environment (such as the geographical characteristics of an area, the location and 
numbers of animals in an area, the plants, wildlife and sites of special environmental 
interest), the location and nature of hazardous sites such as chemical plants and university 
laboratories and the population around these sites. The collected data is brought together 
into a multi-dimensional data model and presented in the form of an interactive map that 
allows the user to view different layers of information over this map. This integrated 
model allows the team members to investigate various scenarios and visualise and 
analyse various risks’ issues within a collaborative environment. It enables users to focus 
only on the information that is relevant to them in any given situation. The Information 
view defines the type of data required for conducting various risks’ data assessment. This 
is best achieved through the combination of different kinds of data from various 
information sources.  
The type of data identified in the Information view is based on the feedback received 
during the interviews with members of the multi-agency teams. The information needs 
that were captured from interviewees can be categorised under four main themes: Social 
(S), Natural (N), Critical infrastructure (CI) and Hazard sites (HS).  Such information was 
identified as important by the interviewees, in order to enhance their decision-making 
processes, by giving an overview of the areas upon which they need to concentrate, 
including the natural geography, the areas’ vulnerabilities, risk and critical infrastructure 
and the location of the hazards.  
Table 6.1 in chapter 6 presents a detailed list of information that should be considered 
within the collaborative risk assessment environment. The first column presents aspects 
of social information, the second column presents aspects of the natural environment, the 
third column presents elements of critical infrastructure and the fourth column displays 
possible hazardous sites. This information is intended to be comprehensive, but not 
exhaustive; more aspects could be added.  
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7.3.3 Process/activity view 
The risk assessment process is reflected in the design of the platform. The process view 
addresses how information identified in section 6.3.2 can be used to support the risk 
assessment process. As previously noted, the risk assessment process has six stages, 
which are shown in Figure 7. 2 below. The discussion as to how these activities can be 
supported is based on the literature review. The author’s views are also brought into the 
discussion to offer a sensible narrative in describing a possible scenario. 
 
 
Figure 7. 2: The six-step risk assessment process 
 
The first stage involves multi-agency teams contextualizing social, natural, infrastructural 
and hazard site risks to fully understand the local area. This requires social information 
such as demographics, ethnical and social composition of the community, the 
geographical distribution, and identification of vulnerable groups. The system aims to 
provide useful social information to help multi-agency collaboration to identify local 
social risks. The contextualization stage also requires information on local infrastructure, 
such as information on an area’s critical supply network and the location of, and 
provision of, critical services such as telecommunication hubs, healthcare facilities and 
financial institutions. This information supports the contextualization process by 
providing information that is useful for the multi-agency teams in order to identify risks 
to local infrastructure. In addition, natural environment information is required in the 
step 1 
contexualisation  
step 2  
hazardous review  
 
step 3  
risk analysis 
step 4  
risk evaluation 
step 5 






contextualization process. This includes areas that would be affected by a potential dam 
failure, the location and numbers of animals in an area and the impact that a disaster 
could have on plants, wildlife and sites of special environmental interest. Again, such 
information supports the contextualisation step of the risk assessment process by 
providing multi-agency teams with the information they need to understand local risks in 
the natural environment. Finally, in this stage of the process, multi-agency teams require 
hazard sites’ information, such as the location of chemical plants and university 
laboratories and the population around these sites.  
The second stage of the process is Hazard Review, in which past experience, historical 
data, research or other information is used by multi-agency teams to collectively identify 
significant risks. The design of the platform supports this activity by assimilating data 
from past events and data from research from different sources and promoting the 
communication of this data to all members of a multi-agency team.  
The third stage is Risk Analysis, in which multi-agency teams seek to understand a local 
risk in terms of its likelihood, outcome and impact. The platform’s design aims to support 
this activity by providing users with heat maps, statistics and graphs to help users 
estimate the likelihood of a hazard occurring and to model its impact (for example, the 
number of people and the amount of critical infrastructure that would be affected) and its 
outcome (the size, scale and location of an event).  
The fourth stage is Risk Evaluation, in which multi-agency teams work together to 
produce a risk matrix which identifies and prioritises local risk hotspots. At this stage of 
the risk assessment process, the design of the platform aims to support the production of a 
risk matrix by providing a holistic view of the local area which can be accessed 
collectively. 
The fifth stage is Risk Treatment, in which existing capabilities are identified and gaps in 
these capabilities are discussed. The design of the platform addresses this part of the 
process by allowing members of a multi-agency team to share the location, types and 
number of their available resources on an interactive map.  
The final stage of the process is Monitoring and Reviewing, in which multi-agency teams 
seek to collaboratively update, review and maintain information regarding local risks. 
The design of the platform aims to address this aspect of the process by providing 
information that is easy to update and maintain, and which can be shared by all users.  
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7.3.4 Data visualisation view   
This section presents a possible interface view of the interactive map. The interface 
provided in the platform is based on the Model-View-Controller architectural pattern 
(Krasner and Pope, 1988) and users are presented with a mapping space on the left of the 
screen and a contextual menu on the right (which are shown in Figure 7. 3 below). The 
mapping space is a Google Earth plugin. To navigate the map the mouse is used. Holding 
the left mouse button allows the user to pan, holding the middle mouse button allows 
users to rotate the map and holding the right button allows the user to zoom in and out of 
the map. Different items on the map can be selected by clicking with the mouse, with 







Figure 7. 3: Mapping space & contextual menu   
 
The map can be overlaid with layers of social information, natural information, 
infrastructure, hazardous site, resources and flood information. The users can toggle 
between these layers and combine them by selecting them from the contextual menu 
using a mouse and keyboard, which alters the visualisation on the mapping view.  The 
two main aspects of the interactive map, the mapping space and the contextual menu, will 
now be described in greater detail, starting with the mapping space.  
7.3.4.1 Mapping Space (Interface) 
The information is presented in the mapping space via different visualisation metaphors. 
These metaphors are points (icons), heat maps, highlighted transport networks, boundary 













Points are used to visualise the location of people, buildings and hazard sites. Each aspect 
of this information is given a different visual symbol. In some cases, these points are 
circles with a letter inside. For example, the point for a hospital is a circle with a letter H, 
while the point for a pharmacy is a circle with a letter P. In other cases, these points are 
pictures. Fire engines, ambulances, traffic lights, elderly people, disabled people and 
others are displayed with small picture symbols. The reasons for using these kinds of 
visual metaphor are that they are easy for the user to understand, thus reducing stress and 
the level of effort they need to use to understand the context of the local risk. Moreover, 
these points allow the user to visualise a single location or multiple locations in relation 
to each other. This is in contrast to the use of heatmaps which are used differently. 
While points are used to visualise specific locations, heatmaps are used in the prototype 
interface as a visual metaphor for concentrations. For example, when visualising 
population density, a heatmap shows areas with high concentrations of vulnerable people 
with dark, warm colours like red and orange and areas with lower concentrations with 
colder colours like blue. A rationale for using heatmaps to visualise population density is 
that such maps allow decision makers to quickly identify the areas with the highest 
concentration of vulnerable people that may need to be evacuated. The prototype 
interface allows users to switch between visualisation metaphors; the user can toggle 
between viewing the same information with points or with a heatmap. Moreover, a 
heatmap can be combined with the use of points. For example, users can identify an area 
with a high concentration of vulnerable people with the heatmap, while also viewing the 
location of the nearest hospital visualised with a point. This ability to combine heatmaps 
with points allows decision makers to identify vulnerable people and locate the resources 
needed to help them. Using heatmaps to visualise population density also allows users to 
visualise changes in population density over time. For instance, areas with schools and 
workplaces will be densely populated during the day, while residential areas will be 
densely populated during the evening. Heatmaps allow this to be quickly understood by 
decision makers, in a way that points do not show.  
Heatmaps are not only used to visualise population densities. They are also used in the 
prototype as a visual metaphor for floods, with dark, warm colours like red and orange 
symbolising high depths of flood and cooler colours like blue showing low depths of 
flood. This allows users to visualise the size of an area affected by flood. Again, this can 
be combined with the use of points. For example, a flooded area could be shown using a 
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heatmap while the location of a chemical plant or electrical substation could be visualised, 
at the same time, with a point.  
Highlighted transport networks are also included in the prototype interface. Users can 
switch between viewing all roads, with the names of roads displayed on-screen or only 
viewing major roads. Major roads are highlighted in pink on the prototype. The reason 
for this visual metaphor is to enable decision makers to identify important routes that 
need to be clear or ones that can be used to transport equipment, people or resources to, 
or from, an affected area. This can be combined with the use of points to represent, for 
example, traffic lights or hospitals to which responders need access. 
Boundary maps also use colours to represent areas, but unlike heatmaps they use one 
colour and do not show concentrations. On the prototype boundary maps use a colour to 
define a certain area, such as a national park or an animal sanctuary. Moreover, boundary 
maps can show the buildings and houses that would be affected by the failure of a dam at 
a nearby reservoir. In addition, they show the buildings supplied by an electrical 
substation and, therefore, which buildings would have their electricity supply cut off if 
the substation failed. Again, this can be combined with the use of points to visualise the 
locations of, for example, hospitals and schools that would be in the affected area. This 
enables decision makers to understand how many people, buildings, hospitals and other 
aspects of key infrastructure would be affected in the event of damage to a reservoir or 
substation.  
Polygons are the visual metaphor that allows users to directly interface with the map. In 
the prototype, users can draw a polygon around an area of the map and give it a colour. 
Multiple polygons can be created with different colours. This is flexible, depending on 
the needs of the users. For example, polygons can simply be used to focus all team 
members’ attention and discussion on a particular area. On the other hand, they could be 
used to define areas of responsibility for different agencies. For instance, a polygon given 
the colour red could be the responsibility of the police, a green polygon could be the area 
for which the fire and rescue service takes responsibility and a yellow polygon could be 
used to define the area for which the ambulance services has responsibility. Related to the 
polygons are the markers which are visualised by the symbol of a pin. As with the 
polygon, the pin symbol has possible numerous uses. For example, each pin could 
represent the location of people from different agencies in the affected area, or could be 
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used to symbolise areas of high, medium and low risk when team members are 
prioritising risks. 
The Table below (Table 7. 2) summarises the type of information identified and the 
visualisation metaphors (eg, points (icons), heatmaps, highlighted transport networks, 
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Polygon As an example, 
polygons can 
simply be used to 
focus all team 
members’ attention 







Markers For example, each 
pin could represent 
the location of 
people from 
different agencies 










7.3.4.2 Contextual Menu 
The contextual menu allows users to control which aspects of information they see on the 
mapping view by clicking different options on the menu. This is a fixed menu on the right 
of the screen. The rationale for using a fixed menu is that it keeps the menu in view at all 
times, so users do not need to remember the contents of the menu. The menu has a 
vertical list of main information themes (flood visualisation, social information, natural 
environment, infrastructure, hazardous sites, resources and user defined data). When one 
of the themes is selected with the mouse, all the other themes remain at the bottom of the 
menu. This allows users to quickly switch between them. Clicking on a theme produces a 
vertical list of categories of related information and clicking on these produces a vertical 
list of subcategories.  
In the flood visualisation menu, the user is presented with the following categories: study 
area, river, historical flood data and buildings in flood. Each category can be turned on or 
off by clicking on the box next to it. Turning on the study area creates a green box on the 
mapping area, defining the area in which information is available. Selecting the river 
category highlights the river in dark blue, while turning on historical flood data produces 
a heatmap of previous floods. Finally, turning on the buildings affected by flood 
highlights buildings within the flooded areas in a colour that contrasts with the heatmap, 
depending on the colour of the heatmap. This stops the visualisation becoming too 
confusing for the user.  
In the social theme menu, the user is presented with the following categories: 
demographics, community, mobility needs, healthcare needs and buildings hosting 
vulnerable people. Under the demographics’ category, the user can select either 
population or population (night time) subcategories. These subcategories produce 
heatmap visualisations of the population density in either the day or night time. Under the 
community category, the user can select ethnic minority communities and transient 
population subcategories. The ethnic communities’ subcategory produces coloured 
boundary maps, with a point showing the location of a community leader in that area. 
Similarly, the transient population subcategory produces coloured boundary maps 
showing the location of these transient communities. The mobility needs’ category gives 
the user the option to view elderly people, people with disabilities, infants and pregnant 
ladies. Selecting any of these options populates the map with points (icons) or heatmaps 
depending on the choice of the user. The user can choose to view all people with mobility 
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needs or select from the individual subcategories. The healthcare needs’ category leads to 
subcategories listing serious medical needs, illness types and chronic health conditions. 
As in the previous category, the user has the option to view the locations of all people 
with healthcare needs by either points or by heatmaps, or they can select a particular 
subcategory in which they have an interest. The final category in the social information 
theme is buildings housing vulnerable people which leads the user to two subcategories: 
hospices and schools. Clicking on these options populates the map with points (in this 
case, circular symbols with the letters inside).  
The natural environment theme produces a vertical list of the following categories: 
reservoirs, landslide areas, national parks, forests and animal sanctuaries. Clickingon the 
box next to any of these populates the mapping area with coloured boundary maps 
showing the locations of these areas.  
The infrastructure theme leads the user to the following categories: utility services, 
transport and buildings. Under the utility services category, the user is presented with a 
list of the following subcategories: electrical substations, telecommunication substations, 
gas substations and water distribution points. Next to these options are points, visualising 
these as circles with different letters inside (eg, E for electrical substation). Clicking on 
the box next to any of these subcategories populates the map with these points. Under the 
transport category, bridges, roads, major roads, rail networks and traffic lights are listed 
in a vertical list. Clicking on the traffic lights’ option populates the map with points 
showing their location, while selecting any of the others highlights these on the map in 
different colours. Under the building category, the following subcategories are listed: 
major residential houses, financial institutions, shopping centres, universities, hospitals, 
GPs, pharmacists, police stations, train stations, fire and rescue stations and heritage 
buildings. Aside from residential buildings, which are highlighted on the map in a 
contrasting colour when selected, clicking on any of these options populates the map with 
corresponding circular icons with letters inside (eg, G for GP).  
The hazardous sites’ theme differs from the others by allowing the user to map a radius 
showing a possible affected area around a hazard site. The user can set a radius of their 
choice with produces a boundary map in a colour of their choice. The categories available 
within the hazardous sites’ theme are waste disposal site, chemical factory, chemical oil 
rich site, university biological lab and university radiological lab. Selecting any of these 
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options populates the map with points, again with circles and letters (F for chemical 
factory and so on).  
The resources’ theme shows the users the location of the resources of different agencies 
that can be used for different incidents. The categories in this theme are fire hydrants, fire 
trucks and ambulances. Selecting these categories populates the map with points with 
picture symbols showing their location.  
The final theme is user-defined data which gives the user two options. Firstly, they can 
draw, edit and save a polygon with a colour of their choice. Text boxes are available to 
label the polygon and give a description. This option is, therefore, flexible with users able 
to use it for various purposes, as previously noted. Users also have the option to add 
specific markers of various colours which can also be labelled and described. The 
markers are visualised by a symbol of a pin. The following Table, Table 7. 3, illustrates 




Table 7. 3: The design of the contextual menu for the main themes, categories and subcategories 























































































































































The design of the platform provides a collaborative space which is open to all users and is 
viewed on a single, large screen. Team members interact utilising this workspace, 
coordinated by a presenter. The platform facilitates discussion and collaboration within a 
multi-agency team, allowing exploration to enhance and support multi-perspective 
collaboration.  
7.3.5 Use of Views in Supporting Risk Assessment  
The tables below show how the information presented in the Information view links to 
the different steps of the risk assessment process, the objectives of the multi-agency 
teams in each of these steps and how the visualised information can help them meet these 
objectives.  
Table 7. 4: Social contextualisation: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 1: Social Contextualisation 
Objective: to allow users to explore and understand the context of varied social intelligence (such 
as the demographic, ethnic and social composition of the community, the geographical 
distribution, identification of vulnerable groups, level of community resilience) and an interactive 
spatial map that could help Category 1 & 2 responders to establish a collective understanding of 
the local risk level. 
Contextualisation Objectives Visualisation medium 
Social information 
(Social vulnerability) 
 To understand 
concentrations of 
vulnerable people 
within a city 
 Present the 
statistics of social 
vulnerability as a 
heatmap. 
Categorise  Sub categories 
 Demographics 
 
I. Population densities  To know the densities 
of an area's population 
in order to locate the 
resources to evacuate 
them. 
 View population 
densities across 
affected area(s) as a 
heatmap. 
 
II. Population changes 
daytime/night time  
 
 To know the location 
of population densities 
in daytime and night 
time within a  city in 
order to locate the 
resources and and 
have differing plans 
(depending on the 
disaster) to evacuate 
them. 
 
 View population 
changes in both 
daytime and night 
time across 




 Community  
I. Ethnic communities who 
are not well integrated 
with society generally 
and have language 
difficulties  
 To know how to reach 
communities’ leaders 
by the right channels 
in order to inform and 
warn the residents 
 View ethnic 
communities who 






  To know these 
leaders’ location and 




the affected area(s) 






    






 To know how to reach 
these communities by 
the appropriate 
channels in order to 
inform and warn them 
about emergencies. 





the affected area(s) 
as heatmap, plus 
relevant contacts. 
 Mobility needs  I. Elderly people  To determine the type 
of equipment and staff 
needed to evacuate 
them in a disaster, and 
to see where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 To know their location 
and contact numbers. 
 To prioritise the 
evacuation of these 
particular people.  
 View elderly 
people across the 
affected area(s) as 
a heatmap,  plus 
relevant contact 
details (database 
view) and location 
points. 
II. People with 
disabilities  
 To understand the 
support required (such 
as medical and 
transport support) and 
to know where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 To know their location 
and contact numbers. 
 To prioritise the 
evacuation of 
particular people.  
 
 View people with 
disabilities across 
the affected area(s) 
as a heatmap, plus 
relevant contact 
details (database 
view) and location 
points. 
III. Families with 
children 
 To determine the type 
of transport and staff 
needed to evacuate 
them in a disaster, and 
to know where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 View families with 
children across the 
affected area(s) as 
a heatmap, plus 
relevant contact 
details (database 
view) and location 
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 To know their location 
and contact numbers 
 To prioritise the 
evacuation of these 
particular people. 
points. 
IV. Pregnant ladies  
 
 To determine the type 
of equipment and staff 
needed to evacuate 
them in a disaster, and 
to know where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 To know their location 
and contact numbers 
 To prioritise the 
evacuation of these 
particular people. 
 View pregnant 
ladies across the 
affected area(s) as 




information will be 
found by clicking 
on the icon (this 





 Health care 
needs  
 





 To determine the type 
of specialist medical 
equipment and any 
special procedure 
required for 
evacuation, and to 
know where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 To know their location 
and contact numbers. 
 
 
 View serious 
medical needs 
across the affected 
area(s) as a 
heatmap if the 
population is large 
enough.  
Additional 
information will be 
found by clicking 
on the icon (this 









 To determine the type 
of special medical 
equipment and any 
special procedure 
 View specific 
types of illnesses 




   required for 
evacuation, and to 
know where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 To know their location 
and contact numbers. 
  as a heatmap if the 
population is large 
enough.  
Additional 
information can be 
found by clicking 









III. Those with chronic 
health conditions 
 
 To determine the type 
of specialist  medical 
equipment and any 
special procedure 
required for 
evacuation and to 
know where such 
people might need to 
be evacuated. 
 To know their location 
and contact  numbers. 
 View those with 
chronic health 
conditions across 
the affected area(s) 
as a heatmap if the 
population is large 
enough.  
Additional 
information can be 
found by clicking 











I. Hospice  To determine the best 
communication 
method to warn and 
instruct people to 
leave before they are 
affected by a disaster. 
 To determine the type 
of transport and staff 
needed to evacuate 
such people in a 
disaster, and to know 
where such people 




 View hospices 
across the affected 





 Schools  To determine the best 
communication 
method to warn and 
instruct those in 
schools to leave before 
they are affected. 
 To determine the type 
of transport and staff 
needed to evacuate 
those in schools in a 
disaster, and to know 
where such people 
might need to be 
evacuated. 
 View schools 
across the affected 






Table 7. 5: Natural environment contextualization: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 1: Natural Environment Contextualisation 
Objective: to allow users to explore the natural environment and understand the context of the 
natural resources’ vulnerabilities and an interactive spatial map that could help Category 1 & 2 
responders receive a better collective understanding of the likelihood of, and the impact of, an 





Natural environment information 
 
 To understand 
where there might 
be concentrations 
of natural spaces 





 To present any 
natural 
vulnerabilities as a 
heatmap. 
Categorise  Sub categories 
 Reservoirs   To assess and 
understand the 
aggregated risks 
that can be caused 
by the possibility 
of reservoir dams 
failing. This might 
pose a dangerous 
situation for 
people, for critical 
infrastructures and     
for the 
environment.   
 View reservoirs 
across the affected 
area(s) - click on 
an icon and view a 
heatmap of 
affected area or a 
boundary map. 
 
 Topography   To use 
information about 
 View topography 







 To predict how 
many homes will 
be protected by 
flood barriers. 
area(s) as a 
heatmap (for 
example using 
blue to green 
colours to show 
the areas most in 
danger of 
flooding). 
 Animal sanctuaries  
 
  To understand the 
requirements to 
feed, rehouse and 
move the animals.  
 View animal 
sanctuaries across 
the affected area(s) 









 To understand the 
ecology and 
natural resources 
of a national park 
area (eg sites of 
special scientific 
interest). 
 View national 
parks across the 
affected area(s) as 






Table 7. 6: Local infrastructure contextualization: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 1: Local Infrastructure Contextualisation 
Objective: to allow users to explore and understand the context of the local infrastructure (transport, 
utilities, businesses), the critical supply network and critical services (telecommunication hubs, health, 
finance, etc.) on an interactive spatial map that could help Category 1 & 2 responders receive a better 





Objectives Visualisation medium 
Local infrastructure information 
 
 
 To understand where 
there are concentrations 
in the area(s) concerned 
of infrastructure that 
may be vulnerable in the 




the affected area(s) 
as a heatmap & by 
icons showing the 
priorities within this 
sector 
 
Categories Sub categories 
 Electrical 
Substations 
  To understand the 
numbers of people and 
buildings that would be 
affected by the loss of a 
substation. 
 To identify key 
infrastructure that would 
 View electrical 
substations across 
the affected area(s) 
as icons. Click on 
the icons and view 
the affected area(s) 
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be affected by the loss 
of a substation. 
 To use this information 
to create priorities in 
planning, especially for 
evacuations. 
as a coloured area.  
 
 Telecom substations    To understand the 
number of key buildings 
and services that would 
be affected by the loss 
of a telecommunication 
substation. 
 To determine alternative 
communication methods 
for ensuring contact if 
there is a loss of a 
telecommunication 
substation and also 
determine how to 
provide the backup for 
this substation.  
 View telecom 
substations across 
the affected area(s) 
as icons. Click on 
the icons and view a 
boundary map of the 
affected area(s).  
 
 Water distribution 
point 
  To identify how many 
people, houses, 
buildings, hospitals and 
other key infrastructure 
would be affected by the 
loss of such a point. 
 To use this information 
to create priorities in 
planning. 
 Take protective 
measures. 
 View water 
distribution points 
across the affected 
area(s) as icons. 
Click on an icon and 
view a boundary 
map of the affected 
area(s).  
  
 Gas substations 
  To understand how 
many people, houses, 
buildings, hospitals and 
other key infrastructure 
would be affected by the 
loss of such a 
substation. 
 To understand the 
outcome of any 
explosion or damage in 





 View gas substations 
across the affected 
area(s) as icons. 
Click on the icons 
and view a boundary 
map of the affected 
area(s). 
  Health facilities; 




  To identify the location of 
health facilities within 
high-risk areas of 
flooding. 
 To identify the health 
 View health 
facilities across the 
affected area(s) as 
icons. Click on an 
icon and view a 
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Pharmacists facilities that could take 
casualties. 
 To use this information 
to create priorities in 
planning and 
evacuation. 
boundary map of the 
affected area(s).  
 Heritage buildings & 
sites  
  To identify intrinsically 
valuable heritage 
buildings and sites, and 
asses which are more 
vulnerable to risk.  
 To use this to create 
priorities in planning 
and protection. 
 View heritage 
buildings & sites 
across the affected 
area(s) as icons. 
Click on an icon for 
cost and heritage 
implications. 
 Major financial 
institutions 
  To identify which are 
vulnerable financial 
institutions and how to 
reach them in short time 
in order to protect them. 
 View financial 
institutions across 
the affected area(s) 
as icons. Click on 
the icons and view 
cost and service 
implications. 
 Road networks 
 
 
  To identify and prioritise 
roads which lead to 
critical facilities such as 
schools, hospitals and 
police stations.  
 To understand the 
economic impact of 
flooding on sections of 
the road network. 
 To use information 
about key roads to plan 
alternative ways to 
reach people who need 
to be evacuated. 
 View road networks   
across the affected 
area(s) as map 
overlays showing 
important routes that 





Table 7. 7: Hazards sites’ contextualization: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 1: Hazards Sites’ Contextualisation 
Objective: to allow users to explore and understand the context of potential hazardous sites and 
their relationships to communities or sensitive environmental sites on an interactive spatial map 
that could help multi-agencies to understand the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazardous 







 To understand concentrated hazards’ sites in a 
city and the aggregated risks that such a hazard 
might pose for people, critical infrastructure 
and the environment.  
 Present hazards’ 
sites across the 
affected area(s) 






priority has been 
given to them? 
 
 
 Chemical sites 
(Chemical storage 
sites, Chemical 
factories, Oil rich 
sites) 
 
 How to reach people living within the 
neighbourhood of a chemical site to 
communicate with them regularly and teach 
them what to do in emergencies.  
 To assess and understand the aggregated risks 
that such a hazard might pose for the 
environment.  
 To understand the types of material being used 
at the site to allow best planning for the 
emergency services. 
 




as icons. Click 




density (on a 
boundary map) 
and the potential 
risks (database 
information).  





 To identify the types of strains of bacteria and 
viruses and radiological risks within these labs 
and know what arrangements the staff have in 
place for evacuation. 
 To also assess the danger the above risks 
might pose to the animal, plant or human 
population. 
 
 To understand the types of material being used 
at the sites to allow best planning for 
emergency services. 
 View university 
labs across the 
affected area(s) 
as icons. Click 











Table 7. 8: Combination of contextualization (social, environmental, infrastructure, hazardous 
sites): objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 1: Combination of Contextualization (social, environmental, infrastructure, 
hazardous sites) 
Objective: to allow users to explore and understand the context of a combination of risks (social, 
environmental, infrastructure, hazardous sites) in an interactive map which could help Category 
1 and 2 responders build up an integrated view of the local risk context. 
Combination of  (social, 
environmental, infrastructure, 
hazardous sites) information 
Objectives Visualisation medium 
 Flood map with properties 
that are at risk overlaid with 
vulnerable groups and 
critical infrastructure. 
 To help practitioners to have 
a broader view and aid 
decision- making both prior 
to an incident for planning 
purposes and during an 
incident. To guide the 
allocation of resources to 
mitigate that risk. 
 Present flood map with 
properties that are at risk 
overlaid with vulnerable 
groups and critical 
infrastructure across affected 
area. Ability to turn on and 
off predefined layers of 






 Combination of river 
flooding and failure of 
reservoir dams and 
electricity substations. 
 To understand the impact on 
the human population, the 
natural environment and 
other infrastructure. To help 
professionals to prioritise the 
risks and to guide the 
allocation of resources.   
 View combination of river 
flooding and failure of 
reservoir dams and 
electricity substations and 
reservoirs across affected 
area. Ability to turn on and 
off predefined layers of 
information to make 
decision-making easier. 
 Combination of flood 
outcome and demographics  
 To understand population 
density within the area, and 
thus how this will affect 
evacuation plans and, in turn, 
how this will affect what 
resources that are required to 
mitigate risks.  
 To understand the 
concentration of population 
in areas of the city. To guide 
evacuation plans and the 
allocation of resources. 
 View combination of flood 
outcome and demographics 
across the affected area. 
Ability to turn on and off 
predefined layers of 
information to make 
decision-making easier. 
 
 Combination of flood 
outcome with infrastructure 
 To understand what could be 
damaged or destroyed by 
flooding and the cascading 
effects that could follow. 
 
 View combination of flood 
outcome and infrastructure 
across the affected area. 
Ability to turn on and off 
predefined layers of 
information to make 
decision-making easier. 
 Combination of flood 
outcome and population 
densities overlaid on a layer 
showing vulnerable people  
 To guide evacuation planning 
so that vulnerable people can 
be evacuated or given support 
if they are not able to be 
evacuated. To understand the 
range of evacuation support 
required (such as medical 
support) and to know where 
evacuated people would need 
to be sheltered. 
 
 View combination of flood 
outcome and population 
densities overlaid on a layer 
showing vulnerable people 
across the affected area. 
Ability to turn on and off 
predefined layers of 













Table 7. 9: Hazard review: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 2: Hazard Review  
Hazards that present significant risks are identified on the basis of experience, research or other 
information.  These hazards are shared and discussed at LRF meetings with a view to agreeing 
a list of hazards to be assessed. An interactive map could help Category 1 & 2 responders 
capture experience, intelligence and research data and communicate them to others during 
hazard review meetings.  
 





 To assess hazard sites which could 
pose a risk by showing them on a 
map and everyone sitting around a 
table studying the data, or exploring  
a site on the map from different 
points of view. Also assisting in 
giving a clear picture about 
priorities and hazards’ 
identification. 
 To understand the impact of similar 
emergencies in order to estimate the 
effect on human population (such as 
casualty numbers and incident size 
etc), the natural environment and 
other key infrastructure. Also  in 
order to learn from the actions and 
experiences of others. 
 The map will allow users to 
visualise past data, such as 
the effect of river heights or 
rainfall (flooding) on a 
populated area and its 
infrastructure.  This could 
be achieved through graphs 
or possibly through 
visualising the movement 
of the water level (up and 
down)in a river.  The map 
could be controlled using a 
time line allowing users to 
scroll through time and 
visualise the differing water 
levels. This same approach 
could be applied to other 
data sets such as fire, etc. 
 Research data such 





such as wildfire, 
flooding and 
volcanic ash, etc. 
 State-of-the-art studies and 
information involved in on such 
areas as: 
I. Climate change impact.  
II. Heat island effect.  
III. An aging population. 
IV. Social aspects (resilience, 
feedback). 
 Simulation.  Data 
visualisation through 
graphs and heatmaps.  In 
addition. hazards and risks 
could be visualised on GIS 
data geospatially.  
Providing users with 
location of potential 
problems overlaid onto 
mapping information 
allowing for incident 














Table 7. 10:  Risk analysis: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 3: Risk Analysis 
The purpose of Risk Analysis is to allow users to explore and understand the likelihood of, and 
the outcome and impact of, a hazard. Also the purpose of this section is to explore how the 
collaboration of both Category 1 & 2 responders could be enhanced in elaborating this 
assessment.  
Risk Analysis Objectives Visualisation medium 
Categorise  






information and the 
outcome of hazards 
 To understand which areas are at 
high and medium risk of flooding 
and help planners to analyse threats 
to population, key infrastructures 
such as electrical substations, 
telecommunication substations, the 
road network and health facilities. 
 To understand the economic impact, 
e.g how many houses and 
commercial buildings would be 
affected, the cost of restoring each 
house and buildings after the flood 
and the modelling of the impact that, 
for example, road closures would 
have on businesses in a given area. 
 To understand how the public’s 
access to the Internet can influence 
how well agencies are able to inform 
and warn the residents about 
emergencies 
 
 Simulation.  3d 
visualization of an 
appropriate area with block 
massing to represent 
buildings.  Overlaid on to 
this base model will be 
labels identifying important 
sites (hospitals, hazards 
etc.).  The model would 
also have the ability to 
overlay heatmaps or to 
visualize graphs to facilitate 
a better understanding of 
disaster management. 
 
 Cascading effects  To understand the cascading effects 
of floods on the human population, 
the natural environment and other 
key infrastructures (for example, the 
loss of a substation can cause the 
electricity supply to thousands of 
households to be cut off; also the 
loss of electricity can affect 
businesses and, therefore, the local 
economy). 
 
 Modelling cascading 
effects.  In the example of 
the flooding of a substation 
the loss of power would 
affect an area around the 
substation.  This could be 
visualised as a graphical 
overlay on a map.  Then 
any critical services that are 
supplied in this area could 
be identified (eg, a 
hospital).  This identified 
service may supply a larger 
area.  This could also be 
visualized.  This ripple 
effect could continue to be 
modelled as it gradually 
fades.  Colour mapping 






Table 7. 11: Risk evaluation: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 4: Risk Evaluation  
Allowing users to product a risk matrix which is an essential part of the risk assessment process. 
The notion of risk is divided into four risk ratings (very high, high, medium and low). These are 
used to indicate the risk level of a given hazard 
Risk Evaluation Objectives Visualisation medium 
Categorise  
 A risk matrix  Allow the practitioners to move 
between different views to evaluate 
and weigh the risks according to their 
potential environmental, economic 
and social impacts. This would help 
planners and policy makers in 
identifying and prioritising risk 
hotspots in the area.  
 
 
 Providing the ability to 
draw polygons 
indicating high risk, 
medium risk and low 
risk with traffic light 
colours.       
 
 
Table 7. 12: Risk treatment: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 5: Risk Treatment  
Allowing users to visualize the capabilities required and the capabilities in place on an 
interactive map would help agencies to collectively understand the capability gaps and address 
the additional treatments required to close the capability gaps and manage the risks more 
effectively. 




 Allow planners to share information 
relating to responders' capabilities, 
so that multi-agency teams have a 
clearer understanding of their 
collective capability. Also to 
identify the location of responders' 
resources which could be used to 
deal with, and mitigate, the impact 
of flooding (for example, the 
Environment Agency and a fire 
fighter can identify where the risk is 
then decide where they will put their 
pumps).  
 Allowing planners to use special 
tools such as animation, highlighting 
and markers to mark and point on an 
interactive map. The user can also 
use the distance-measure tool to 
estimate the distance between a 
building and the nearest shelter in 
order to evacuate people in case the 
building is at high risk. 
 Visualisation of the 
geospatial location of 
organizational resources 
allowing for a discussion 
of the best combined 
response. 
 Ability to drop down 
markers and notes to 







Table 7. 13: Monitoring and reviewing: objectives and visualisation medium 
Step 6:  Monitoring and Reviewing 
The availability of intelligence collected from Step 1 to Step 5 within an interactive map in an 
integrated form could help Category 1 & 2 responders to continuously improve risks’ 
management strategy and build resilient communities 
Monitoring and 
Reviewing 
Objectives Visualisation medium 
Categorise  
 Need to bring together 
comprehensive data 
on a single platform 
and ensure that the 
data is constantly 
updated.  
 The need for a comprehensive 
data system to be properly 
updated, reviewed and 
maintained. This data can then 
be monitored and reviewed on an 
ongoing basis which would help 
with the ongoing monitoring of 
risks. Having a comprehensive 
collection of data brought into 
one place would help planners to 
have access to visual information 
at any time, whenever it was 
needed.  
 
 For the system to run 
effectively it would need 
annual updating, the keeping 
of accurate data and it needs 
to allow for any infrastructure 
changes to be visualized.  
However, in some cases 
important changes would 
have to be implemented 
quickly. (such as new 
substations, hospitals, etc). 
 
7.4 Implementation of the Risk Assessment Environment 
Since the author is not a technical person, a senior software specialist in the Think Lab, 
University of Salford, conducted the implementation of the risk assessment environment. 
The author worked closely with the technical specialist to ensure the risk assessment 
environment was implemented with the appropriate functionality and user interface as 
described in the previous section.  The next section presents the design of the platform in- 
depth.  
7.4.1 Design of the Platform 
The interactive map prototype presents the user with a map of an area. Using an interface, 
a user can place different layers of information over this map. The layers of information 
are: social information, natural information, infrastructure, hazardous sites, resources and 
flood information. The system is designed using the Model-View-Controller architectural 
pattern (Krasner and Pope, 1988). Corresponding to this model, the system’s three key 







Figure 7. 4: System design 
 
Risk Model: this provides the core of the risk information on the system. This illustrates 
the types of information and the structure required for the platform. The Risk Model is 
constructed from the underlying database system running on the server side. 
Map Viewer: this is an interactive map which can present the risk models via various 
visual layers on top of it to the users. The map uses Google Earth as a plugin in a web 
browser that can run on the user’s computer. 
Map Controller: this provides the interface allowing users to configure the Risk Model 
for visualising results on the Map View and also to navigate within the Map View. The 
layers of information that were depicted are explained below. 
Within the risk model, the Risk information layer contains information such as social 
information, natural information, infrastructure information, hazardous sites’ information, 
resources and flood information. Map viewer retrieves and displays the data from the risk 
model.  The Map Controller is for controlling and navigating the Map Viewer. It can also 





Figure 7. 5: Flood area layer  
 
Figure 7. 5 shows the flood area layer used in this research to demonstrate the 
functionality of the overall interactive map and for the validation of the interactive map. 
This layer shows a flood scenario based on historical data from a flood that occurred in 
1947 which affected the local area. A heatmap method is used to present flooded area. 
Furthermore, flooding areas can be coloured based on their water depths. It can range 
from light blue, blue to green and from orange to red and dark red. The red or dark red 
colour would indicate a high value of water depth or a dangerous level and the light blue 
or blue colour would indicate a low value of water depth. 
 
Figure 7. 6: Social information: demographics layer 
216 
 
Figure 7. 6 shows the study area with a layer of social information, from the 
demographics category. In this layer, users can view the population demographics of day 
and night times. The heatmap method is used to show this information. Dark red indicates 
high population density, while blue indicates a lower population density.  
 
Figure 7. 7: Social information: community layer 
 
Figure 7. 7 shows the study area overlaid with the second category of social information. 
This category is community, which is made up of ethnic communities and transient 
populations. In this layer, users see the location of different communities, with the leaders 
of these communities identified. 
 
Figure 7. 8: Social information: mobility needs’ layer 
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Figure 7. 8 shows the study area overlaid with information from the third category of 
social information - mobility needs. This displays a heatmap showing the population 
density of people with mobility needs and also icons representing the location of these 
people. A different icon represents elderly people, pregnant women, disabled people and 
infants. Users can switch between these icons to display different layers and can also 
view the density of a particular group population using the heatmap.  
 
Figure 7. 9: Infrastructure information: utility services’ layer 
 
Figure 7. 9 shows the study area combined with the layer showing infrastructure 
information, from the category of utility services. This layer has icons showing the 
location of electrical, gas and telecommunication substations and water distribution 
points, as well as coloured areas displaying the areas that are serviced by these utility 
providers. Again, in this layer users can toggle between this information, showing this 




Figure 7. 10: Infrastructure information: transport layer 
 
Figure 7. 10 shows the study area combined with another layer of infrastructure 
information, from the category of transport relating to major road and rail infrastructure. 
Icons show the location of traffic lights, while major roads and railway lines are 
highlighted in colour. Again, in this layer users can switch between this information, 
showing this information in different combinations or all at once. 
 
Figure 7. 11: Infrastructure information: building layer 
 
Figure 7. 11 shows the study area combined with another layer of infrastructure 
information, relating to the location of different types of building in the study area. Icons 
show the location of residential houses, financial institutions, shopping centres, 
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universities, hospitals, local GPs, pharmacists, police stations, train stations, fire and 
rescue stations and heritage buildings. These symbols are viewed on a 3D map and users 
can switch between the different buildings they want to view or view all of them 
simultaneously.  
 
Figure 7. 12: Hazardous sites’ layer 
 
Figure 7. 12 shows the study area combined with a layer showing hazardous sites’ 
information. Icons show the location of waste disposal sites, chemical factories, chemical 
oil-rich sites, university biological laboratories and university radiology laboratories. The 
zones that have a high risk of being affected by an incident at these sites is also mapped 
with colour and users can alter the radius of the affected zones. Furthermore, the user can 
also view key information about these affected zones including the number of houses, 
people and critical buildings within them. Again, in this layer users can choose to view 





Figure 7. 13: Resources’ location layer 
 
Figure 7. 13 shows the study area combined with a layer of information showing the 
capabilities and resources of multi-agency teams. Symbols represent the location of fire 
hydrants, fire engines and ambulances. As with the other layers, users can toggle between 
this information, displaying part or all of it on the map.  
 
Figure 7. 14: User defined data layer 
 
The layer shown in Figure 7. 14 allows the user to mark an area of their choice and to 
write comments and make notes relating to the area. All users from the multi-agency 
teams can view this information.   
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In summary, an important part of this system is the ability of users to overlay and 
combine any of these layers to collectively understand the local risks and to see the 
connections between each layer of information. The system brings together, and visually 
represents, a range of information that users in multi-agency teams can customize to suit 
their situation, promoting visual thinking and enhancing strategic planning.  
7.5 Summary  
The collaborative design framework presented in this chapter is based on the 
requirements that emerged from the literature review and from interviews with the 
stakeholders. The system’s conceptual design consists of four views: Information view, 
Process/Activity view, User Interface view and Team Member view. This design aims to 
provide multi-agency team members with a variety of information from different sources 
and disciplines (Information view) that is directly linked to the stages of the risk 
assessment process (Process view), bringing this information together in an interface 
which incorporates a mapping view and a contextual menu (User Interface view). The 
overall goal of this conceptual design is to provide a collaborative space where a multi-
agency team can collaborate, visualise, discuss and understand all aspects of the local 
area’s risks. 
Following the well-established and successful COA and TOGAF frameworks has enabled 
the conceptual design to build on previous foundations for an effective and flexible 
collaborative environment that can support and enhance multi-agency collaboration in the 
risk assessment process. The next chapter presents the evaluation methodology of an 
interactive map prototype in order to test its ability in supporting collaboration and in 












Chapter 8 – System Evaluation Methodology  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the evaluation of the interactive map prototype that has been 
developed based on those characteristics that are captured through interviews’ analysis. 
This helps to test its ability in supporting collaboration and in enhancing multi-agency 
teams’ risk assessment process. The risk assessment process has six stages and the 
interactive map is intended to improve collaboration at each step. The first stage is 
Contextualization, in which multi-agency teams seek to understand the social, natural, 
infrastructure and hazard site risks in a local area. The second stage is the Hazard Review, 
in which multi-agency teams seek to collaboratively identify significant risks on the basis 
of past experience, historical data, research or other information. The third stage is Risk 
Analysis, in which multi-agency teams seek to collaboratively identify the likelihood, 
outcome and impact of, local risks. The fourth stage is Risk Evaluation, in which multi-
agency teams seek to collaboratively identify and prioritise local risk hotspots through the 
production of a risk matrix. The fifth stage is Risk Treatment, in which multi-agency 
teams seek to collaboratively identify existing capabilities to treat risks, to identify gaps 
in the capabilities available and to fill these gaps. Finally, the sixth stage is Monitoring 
and Reviewing, in which multi-agency teams seek to collaboratively update, review and 
maintain information regarding local risks. The collaboration within multi-agency teams 
is based on understanding local risk information, discussing it and then making a 
collective decision based on this information. This evaluation investigates the look, feel 
and functionality of the system, the information that the system makes available and, 
finally, it asks how well the system enhances collaboration throughout the risk 
assessment process.  
8.2 Evaluation Methodology  
The following section describes the methodology used to evaluate the interactive map 
prototype and outlines all the considerations and procedures involved in this evaluation. 
These considerations are: what to assess, the assessment criteria, assessment setting and 
assessment techniques and methods. What to assess relates to the risk assessment process 
and interactive and collaborative multi-agency decision-making. The assessment goals 
relate to the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of the potential of the interactive map prototype in 
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supporting risk assessment process activities and for strengthening the collaboration 
between multi-agency. The assessment setting describes the location of the assessment 
within the University of Salford Think Lab and includes the 23 subjects from the Greater 
Manchester LRF Development Group. Furthermore, it also describes the experimental 
prototype that was used and the flood scenario that the experiment was based upon. 
Finally, the assessment techniques will explain the workgroup that was conducted and the 
questionnaire which was designed to capture subjects’ views using open, closed and 
rating scales’ questions. This evaluation methodology is illustrated in Figure 8. 1. 
 
Figure 8. 1: Overview of the evaluation methodology 
8.2.1 What to Assess 
The purpose of the evaluation was to test if the prototype of the interactive map could 
enhance team collaboration in each step of the risk assessment process. This involved a 
number of related aspects. These included how well the interactive map presented 
information in a visual form that could be understood by all the members of a multi-
agency team, the map’s ability to combine information layers, and the ability of the users 
to interact with the map and navigate the information space in order to enhance their 






First Aspect: perceived effectiveness of the potential of the interactive map in supporting 
risk assessment processes.  
This involves assessing the map’s ‘perceived effectiveness’ in the activities carried out by 
multi-agency teams at each step of the risk assessment process. 
Step 1: Contextualization 
In this section the notion of “collective understanding” has been used. A group collective 
understanding is when the group members performing as a “we” and not an “it” (Holder 
& Reidy, 2013) hold something 'jointly’ as a ‘plural subject’. Collective understanding, 
simply, is about shared points of view about something (Skarzynski & Gibson, 2008). It 
can be measured using the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of the potential of the interactive 
map in supporting risk assessment processes. 
Question 1: Does the social information on the interactive map help multi-agency teams 
to collectively understand local social risks?  
This question measures the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of the interactive map in helping 
multi-agency teams in their collective understanding of local social risks. These risks are 
related to information such as the demographic, ethnic and social composition of the 
community, geographical distribution, and the identification of vulnerable groups. 
Question 2: Does the local infrastructure information on the interactive map help multi- 
agency teams to collectively understand local infrastructure risks?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams obtain a collective understanding of local infrastructure risks. This information 
concerns an area’s critical supply network and the location of, and provision of, critical 
services, like telecommunication hubs, healthcare facilities and financial institutions.   
Question 3: Does the interactive map help multi-agency teams to establish a collective 
understanding of important natural resources within that area that is being looked at?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams to a collective understanding of the important natural resources of the area that has 
been looked at. This relates to how the interactive map provides information on the areas 
that could be affected, for instance, by a potential dam failure, the location and numbers 
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of animals in an area and the impact that a disaster could have on plants, wildlife and 
sites of special environmental interest.  
Question 4: Does the hazardous sites’ information on the interactive map help multi- 
agency teams to collectively understand the local risks imposed by their hazardous sites?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams to a collective understanding of the local risks imposed by hazardous sites. This 
relates to how the interactive map provides visualised information about the location and 
nature of hazardous sites (such as chemical plants and university laboratories) and the 
population around these sites. The evaluation focused on how this information was useful 
to multi-agency teams in identifying local risks.  
Step 2: Hazard review  
Question 5: Does the interactive map help multi-agency teams capture experience, 
intelligence and research data and communicate them to others during hazard review 
meetings?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams capture experience, intelligence and research data and in communicating 
concerning them to others during hazard review meetings. This included an evaluation of 
the effectiveness of data obtained from past events and the data obtained from research 
for multi-agency teams in prioritising hazards in a local area.  
Step 3: Risk analysis 
Question 6: Does the interactive map help multi-agency teams estimate the likelihood, 
outcome and impact of hazards in the local area?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams estimate the likelihood, outcome and impact of hazards in the local area. This 
relates to how the interactive map allows multi-agency teams to estimate the likelihood of 
a hazard occurring and how well the map allows teams to model, for example, the 
number of people and the amount of critical infrastructure that would be affected (impact) 
by a hazard according to the size, scale and location of an event (outcome). 
Step 4: Risk evaluation  
Question 7: Does the visualisation on the interactive map help multi-agency teams to 
collaboratively identify and prioritise risk hotspots in the area to produce a risk matrix 
(very high, high, medium and low)?  
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This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams to collaboratively identify and prioritise risk hotspots in the area to produce a risk 
matrix. The evaluation investigated the extent to which the interactive map is effective in 
providing a holistic view of the local area, which enables multi-agency teams to identify 
and prioritise risk hotspots in the local area.  
Step 5: Risk treatment  
Question 8: Does the visualisation on the interactive map help multi-agency teams to 
collaboratively understand their current capabilities to treat risks and to identify gaps in 
these capabilities?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams to collaboratively understand their current capabilities to treat risks and to identify 
gaps in these capabilities. This relates to how well the interactive map allows members of 
multi-agency teams to share the location and level of their resources which could be used 
in the event of a disaster.  
Step 6: Monitoring and Reviewing 
Question 9: Does the interactive map help multi-agency teams to collaboratively update, 
review and maintain information regarding local risks?  
This question measures the effectiveness of the interactive map in helping multi-agency 
teams to collaboratively update, review and maintain information regarding local risks. 
This relates to how well the interactive map allows members of multi-agency teams to 
monitor risks continuously and to repeat the previous steps (1 -5) when new risks are 
identified.   
Second Aspect: perceived effectiveness of the potential of the interactive map for 
strengthening the collaboration between multi-agencies. 
This aspect assesses the interactive map’s perceived effectiveness for strengthening the 
collaboration between multi-agencies. Rather than specific risk assessment activities, a 
number of questions were included to capture how well the interactive map enhances the 
collaboration, decision-making, communication and coordination of multi-agency teams. 
This involved questions relating to numerous sub-skills, including the extent to which the 
interactive map enhances group reasoning, interpretation and assessment skills and the 
interactive map’s enhancement of a team member’s ability to express their views, ideas, 
information and agendas. Moreover, the responses to questions which were included to 
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explore how well the interactive map enhances the reasoning, assessment and 
interpretation skills of team members were also evaluated in the context of the complex 
situations multi-agency teams encounter in the area of risk assessment.  
8.2.2 Assessment Criteria 
The assessment criteria relate to the role of the interactive map prototype in supporting 
risk assessment process activities and the interaction and collaboration of multi-agency 
decision makers. The following are the two aspects that were tested during the 
evaluation: 
 Perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in supporting the risk assessment 
process  
 Perceived effectiveness of the interactive map for strengthening the collaboration 
between multi-agencies. 
8.2.3 Assessment Setting  
8.2.3.1 Experimental Platform 
The experiment involved the use of the prototype of interactive map that was described in 
detail in Chapter 6. As previously noted, the prototype presents a mapping area, based on 
a Google Earth plugin and a contextual menu. The map can be overlaid with layers of 
social information, natural information, infrastructure, hazardous site, resources and flood 
information, which users can toggle between and combine. To navigate through the map 
a mouse was used. The design of the platform provides a collaborative environment, open 
to all users. The environment is viewed on a single, large screen. Team members interact 
within this environment, coordinated by a presenter.  
The prototype interactive map was populated with data sets from a variety of sources. 
The locations of infrastructure, such as roads, railway lines and bridges, were already 
mapped. Some of the data, such as information on hazardous sites was randomly 
generated, while some of the social information came from existing projects undertaken 
by housing associations. Historical data, relating to a flood in the area in 1947, was also 
used to populate the prototype.  As only a prototype was being produced, the focus was 
on generating a hypothetical situation rather than a completely accurate one which would 




8.2.3.2 Pilot Study  
In order to test the quality and effectiveness of the evaluation study a "pilot" study was 
organised to check whether the interactive map prototype was functional, the scenario 
was clear and the questionnaire was going to work effectively. The pilot study helped to 
find out whether the questionnaire was rational, to find out whether its instructions were 
clear, to remove questions that did not add usable data and to test the total time needed to 
complete the questionnaire. Four subjects took part in the pilot study before the final user 
evaluations were conducted. The evaluation tasks and the questionnaire were refined and 
revised based on the outcome of the pilot study. 
8.2.3.3 Think Lab Setting   
The experiment took place in the Think pod in Think Lab, The University of Salford 
(pictured below Figure 8. 2). The Think Lab was created specifically for the purpose of 
exploring collaboration and multi-disciplinary thinking. The Think pod is a room 
specifically designed for collaboration, multi-disciplinary thinking and innovation. It has 
a focused layout, with chairs arranged in a horseshoe shape facing a large digital screen. 
This allows participants to see each other, to interact face-to-face and to view the 
interactive map on the large screen. Each chair is equipped with a small desk, allowing 














Figure 8. 2: The Think pod 
 
8.2.3.4 Subjects 
The subject group in the experiment was made up of stakeholder senior managers 
involved in the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum Development Group. The 
experiment was held in the Think pod in the Think Lab, the University of Salford. A total 
of 23 subjects took part in the evaluation experiment. The interactive map prototype was 
presented to members of this group which consisted of professionals from the University 
of Manchester, the Department of Communities and Local Government, the Ministry of 
Defence, British Transport Police, GM Fire and Rescue Service, the Association of 
Greater Manchester Authorities, GM Police, United Utilities, the North West Ambulance 
Service, the Highways Agency, Public Health England, the NHS, Transport for GM, the 
Environment Agency, BT and the Radio Amateur’s Emergency Network. After seeing 
the demonstration, participants gave their feedback using a questionnaire that included 
both open and closed questions, rating scales and observation. 
8.2.4 Data Collection Methods 
The approaches applied in this evaluation were a workgroup discussion and a 
questionnaire. In this experiment, the workgroup approach involved the participants 
being recorded while being presented with the interactive map and then discussing it as a 
group. To capture their feedback at this stage, video and voice recording were used as the 
participants had their discussion. The recordings were later used to analyse the collected 
data (Spagnolli et al., 2003). 
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In addition, a questionnaire was employed. The purpose of this exercise was to give 
individual participants the opportunity to express their preferences and opinions privately 
after the group discussion. These questionnaires included open and closed questions, 
rating scales and multiple-choice questions (Patel et al., 2006). The questionnaire method 
was selected on the basis that such a format focuses participants’ answers on very 
specific aspects of the evaluation. This is in contrast to other formats, which are good at 
providing general opinions but not as effective at gathering the specific data needed to 
evaluate a prototype like this in sufficient depth (Remenyi et al., 1998; Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2008). The open questions were specific, but allowed participants a chance to express 
opinions in a degree of depth, while the closed questions restricted their responses to a 
scale of satisfaction. This combination balanced the need for specific, quantifiable data 
with the usefulness of more open, qualitative data. Questions were related to each of the 
six stages of the risk assessment process and all focused on the extent to which the 
interactive map prototype enhances multi-agency collaboration in risk assessment. 
The rationale behind using these methods is that they combine together to provide the 
most useful data. The questionnaire method provided specific, restricted data. It was 
supported throughout the evaluation by the observation method allowing the participants 
to give feedback on the interactive map system. This method allowed participants to 
provide more open, free feedback than the tightly controlled feedback they gave in the 
questionnaire. As a result, the approach followed in this research combined the 
advantages of questionnaires and the advantages of a workgroup, with each making up 
for the other’s shortcomings.  
8.3 Procedure of the Experiment   
The next section describes the evaluation process of the experiment, beginning with the 
briefing of the subjects, the demonstration they received of the system prototype, the 
appointment of a chair person to lead the group of participants (before describing the 
flood scenario the participants were presented with), the group discussion that followed 
and the distribution of the paper questionnaires.  
8.3.1 Subject Briefing 
In order to maximise the validity and reliability of the findings of the research, a number 
of steps were taken. Firstly, the participants were given a summary of the objectives of 
the experiment in order to ensure that they understood the experiment and its context. 
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Secondly, all participants received a consent form explaining that they could withdraw 
from the study at any time and that their data would be stored indefinitely. This ensured 
that the participants gave fully informed consent to participate. An important aspect of 
the experiment was the commitment to maintain the anonymity of the participants, in 
order to allow for the participants to freely express their opinions. To do this, on the day 
of the experiment, each participant was given a number while they were receiving their 
consent form, objectives’ summary and questionnaires. Participants also received an 
identity badge showing the agency from which they came. This enabled the researcher to 
be aware of their background when responding to any queries/request for guidance. 
8.3.2 Demonstration of the Capability of the System 
The teams of participants were given a demonstration of all the aspects of the interactive 
map prototype. They were shown all the information included in the prototype, including 
all of the themes, categories and subcategories available on the contextual menu. Firstly, 
they were shown the flood visualisation theme and its related categories and 
subcategories. Secondly, they were shown the social information theme and its related 
categories and subcategories. Next, they were shown the natural environment theme and 
its related categories. Subsequently, the infrastructure theme and its related categories and 
subcategories were demonstrated. Then the hazardous sites’ theme and its related 
categories were demonstrated. Finally, the resources theme and its related categories were 
shown before the user defined data theme and its related categories were shown. 
Participants were then shown how the contextual menu allows users to select different 
categories and subcategories, switch between points and heatmaps for some layers and to 
add and remove different layers of information. The goal of this stage of the experiment 
was to give subjects a full understanding of the interactive map prototype and how it 
could be populated with various kinds of information, how this information is visualized 





Table 8. 1: A summary of the type of information demonstrated 






 Study area  
 River  



















who are not well 
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society in 
general and have 
language 
difficulties  









 Mobility needs 
 
1. Elderly people 
2. People with 
disabilities  
3. Families with 
children (infants) 
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 Reservoirs  
 Area with risks 
of landslide  
 Rivers 
 National parks  
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3. Road 
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8.3.3 Appointment of a Chairperson and Description of the Flood Scenario 
A chairperson, who had been appointed before the experiment, then began to manage the 
experiment. The chairperson was a local agent who had acted as a chairperson previously. 
She worked for Local Resilience Forums to support collaboration at the local level. The 
chair briefed the participants on the purpose of the experiment and presented the flood 
scenario to them. The flood scenario involved a hypothetical report of heavy rain from 
the Met Office which was used as a basis to simulate flooding in three locations. 
Visualisations of the flood scenario and the location of elderly and disabled people were 
Hazardous Sites 









    
Resources 






then shown. Next, critical infrastructure (electricity substations, telecommunications, 
major roads and traffic lights) was visualized on the map, as well as the areas that would 
be affected by the failure of this infrastructure. Hazardous sites and their affected areas 
(in the event of a flood) were then visualized, before the locations of fire and ambulance 
services’ resources were displayed. A screen shot of the flood scenario within the 
interactive map is shown in Figure 8. 3: A screen shot of the flood scenario within the 



















Figure 8. 3: A screen shot of the flood scenario within the interactive map 
 
The scenario presented is realistic from a number of angles. Firstly, the participants are 
real fire-fighters, policemen, a real local authority etc. and it involves workers from 
different agencies. Secondly, the sites are real and they represent real-world places and 
areas. Thirdly, the locations of fire and ambulance services’ resources were displayed. 
Fourthly, the participants’ responses and reactions are also real because they have 
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experience in dealing with situations similar to the one visualised on the interactive map. 
Every element in the experiment is real apart from the utilisation of a flood scenario 
which has to be created based on the historical data to find out the participants’ responses 
and comments.   
8.3.4 Discussion on the perceived effectiveness of the Interaction Map Prototype 
With this scenario established, the team of participants was shown a screen displaying the 
six stages of the risk assessment process. This was intended to remind the subjects of the 
process and to encourage them to keep it in mind while they discussed the usefulness of 
the prototype. Led by the chairperson, they were asked to discuss, as a group, the value of 
the prototype. They were asked to discuss the extent to which the interactive map would 
enhance risk assessment activities. A whole group discussion was conducted so as to 
reflect real-world multi-agency collaboration. Firstly, the chair instructed the participants 
to discuss the perceived effectiveness of the prototype in the contextualization of social 
information (vulnerable people, demographics), critical infrastructure (electricity 
substations, telecommunications stations and major roads), the natural environment 
(reservoirs, areas with possible risks of landslides, rivers, animal sanctuaries), hazardous 
sites (the locations of chemical factories, university labs (both biological & biometric)). 
Secondly, the chair instructed the subjects to discuss the value of the prototype at the 
hazard review stage. Participants discussed the scenario they had been given and the 
usefulness of the interactive prototype in prioritising hazards in this scenario. Thirdly, the 
chairperson told the subjects to discuss the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map 
at the risk analysis stage. Participants discussed the usefulness of the interactive map in 
estimating the outcome and impact of the hazards in the scenario. Next, subjects were 
asked by the chairperson to discuss the value of the prototype at the risk evaluation stage. 
Participants discussed how the interactive map could be used to collectively identify and 
prioritise risk hotspots in the scenario’s study area. Subsequently, the chairperson 
instructed subjects to discuss how useful the interactive map would be in risk treatment 
activities. Subjects then discussed how they would use the resources available in the 
scenario. Finally, participants were led in a discussion on the perceived effectiveness of 
the prototype in monitoring and reviewing risks continuously and in repeating the 
previous steps (1 -5) stage of the risk assessment. Throughout this process, participants 
were encouraged to share their views and insights.  
239 
 
Following this discussion, participants were given an individual paper questionnaire to 
complete and submit by the end of the experiment. Giving a paper questionnaire meant 
that participants could express their views privately using the questionnaire if they did not 
want, or did not feel able, to publicly share them in the discussion, thus increasing the 
reliability of the data collection.  
8.4 Summary  
The methodology employed to evaluate the interactive map system aimed to investigate  
its ability to support collaboration and enhance multi-agency teams’ activities in the risk 
assessment process. The employed methodology was divided into two areas of evaluation. 
Firstly, the perceived effectiveness and impact of the visualisation on the interactive map 
on risk assessment processes and, secondly, the perceived effectiveness of the 
visualisation on the interactive map for a successful interactive and collaborative 
environment were evaluated. This evaluation was achieved by using the system to 
demonstrate layers of information relating to a flood scenario. The scenario was based on 
historical data and the layers of information demonstrated to participants were layers 
showing social information, natural information, infrastructure, hazardous site, resources 
and flood information. 23 participants from the Greater Manchester Local Resilience 
Forum Development Group attended the experiment in the Think pod, within Salford 
University’s Think Lab. They were given consent forms, a summary of the objectives of 
the study and identity badges. The data they provided were kept anonymous. After 
viewing a demonstration of the system, participants were asked to discuss the platform 
and the scenario it presented as a group. The researcher observed this discussion, 
enabling the capture of freely given feedback. Subsequently, questionnaires which 
combined open, closed and rating scale questions were given to the subjects to capture 
more specific qualitative and quantitative feedback. The next chapter presents the 










Chapter 9 – Analysis of the Evaluation Results  
 
9.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the evaluation results collected during the 
evaluation experiment described in the previous chapter. Given that the strategy, which 
has been followed for this research work, is the interpretivist stance, the data collected 
from work group discussions and the open and closed ended questions were analysed 
qualitatively. However, some of the data that was collected from the rating scale 
questions was manipulated statistically for descriptive analysis. The outcome of the 
analysis process of the data was used to measure the ‘perceived effectiveness’ of (1) the 
potential of the interactive map in supporting risk assessment processes, and (2) the 
potential of the interactive map for strengthening the collaboration between multi-
agencies. 
9.2 Perceived effectiveness of the potential of the Interactive Map in supporting Risk 
Assessment Processes  
The first aspect (perceived effectiveness of the potential of the interactive map in 
supporting risk assessment processes) covers the stages of the risk assessment process. 
This includes questions on the following: Firstly, contextualization activities related to 
understanding social, natural, and infrastructural and hazard site risks in an area. 
Secondly, Hazard Review activities related to the identification of significant risks the 
based on experience, historical data, research or other information. Thirdly, Risk Analysis 
activities related to assessing the outcome and impact of a local risk. Fourthly, Risk 
Evaluation activities related to the identification and prioritization of local risk hotspots. 
Finally, Risk Treatment activities related to the identification of a multiagency team’s 
existing capabilities and the identification of gaps in the capabilities available. This part 
of the evaluation aimed to identify the extent to which the interactive map prototype 
enhances multi-agency teams’ understanding of local risk information, their discussion of 
this information and their collective-decision based upon it. It also aimed at evaluating 
the information that the system makes available and how well the system enhances 
collaboration throughout the risk assessment process. This process was broken into steps 





Step 1:  Contextualization of Local Risk 
Step 1 comprised the use of contextual information of the following types: social 
information, natural environment information, local infrastructure information and hazard 
site information.  
A. Contextualization of Social Information (CSI) 
The following statements were asked in order to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of 
the Visualization of Social Information on the interactive map: 
U1a1. The visualization of this social information on the interactive map helps 
multi-agency teams collectively understand local social risks. 
U1aa. The visualization of social information helps multi-agency teams understand 
areas in the city where the vulnerable are concentrated. 
U1ab. The visualization of social information helps multi-agency teams understand 
the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition of the community. 
U1ac. The visualization of social information helps multi-agency teams understand 
the geographical location of various communities within the local area. 
U1ad. The visualization of social information helps multi-agency teams understand 
the level of preparedness required for coping with demands arising from a 
potential disaster. 
U1ae. The visualization of population densities helps multi-agency teams place 
resources that can be used to evacuate residents. 
U1af. The visualization of population changes over daytime/night time helps multi-
agency teams  understand the varying demands in evacuation planning. 
U1ag. The visualization of ethnic communities who are not well integrated with 
society helps multi-agency teams identify community leaders who could be 
used to warn and inform their communities during emergencies. 
U1ah. The visualization of a transient population (travellers’ communities, students)   









Table 9. 1: Statistical summaries from the evaluation of the Visualisation of Social Information 
on the interactive map 
 U1a1 U1aa U1ab U1ac U1ad U1ae U1af U1ag U1ah 
Min 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Median 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 
Max 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Mean 3.82 4.08 4 3.86 3.17 3.6 3.73 3.39 3.26 
* Min – minimum, Max – maximum 
 
 
Figure 9. 1: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation for the Visualisation 
of Social Information on the interactive map  
 
Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation of 
the visualization of social information. On average, participants rated the social 
information provided by the interactive map to be good to excellent. The interactive 
map’s information relating to the concentrations of socially vulnerable people and its 
provision of demographic and ethnic information were rated particularly highly with an 
average of 4. For instance, Participant 7 suggested that this kind of information is useful 
for identifying possible “tensions within diverse communities” (GM Police). This was 
described in more depth by a participant, who claimed that: “Communication (with 
members of a community) could be concerned with language but could also be about 
what the tensions are in that area. So if we go in saying ‘come on now we’re evacuating’ 
and they just turn around and start turning guns on us”. However, the interactive map’s 
ability to help users understand the level of preparedness required was rated lower, at an 
































users becoming confused by too much information: “maybe to the point of (only 
including) population density, schools’ and hospital data” (United Utilities plc). On the 
other hand, Participant 17 claimed that multi-agency teams would benefit if the 
interactive map also showed the “mapping of social media/internet usage to help in 
determining the best methods of communciation with the public in emergencies” (GM 
Police). With this feedback established, all of the mean average scores for the statements 
relating to social information produced a rating of good satisfiaction.  
In terms of social information, the author takes the view that the interactive map should 
provide relatively simple social information. Providing data about population density and 
the locations of vulnerable people are the most useful for multi-agency decision makers. 
While they are well-intentioned, the suggestions of some of the participants that the 
interactive map could include information about internet and social media use or tensions 
between members of a community and the authorities are impractical. As each client 
requires different levels of detailed information, it is not feasible for an interactive map to 
include everything that would potentially be useful without it becoming too complicated 
and, therefore, difficult to use.  
B. Contextualization of Local Infrastructure (CLI) 
The following statements were asked in order to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of 
the Visualization of Local Infrastructure Information on the interactive map: 
U1b2. The visualisation of such local infrastructure information on the interactive 
map helps multi-agency teams to collectively understand local infrastructure 
risks. 
U1ba. The visualisation of electrical substation locations and associated colour map 
helps multi-agency teams understand the number of buildings that would be 
affected by the loss of a substation. 
U1bb. The visualisation of telecom substation locations and associated colour map 
helps multi-agency teams in determining the impact on buildings in the event 
of the loss of a telecommunication substation. 
U1bc. The visualisation of water distribution point locations and associated colour 
map helps multi-agency teams identify how many buildings and key 




U1bd. The visualisation of health facility locations helps multi-agency teams 
identify the health facilities that could be used in emergency situations. 
U1be. The visualisation of heritage buildings & similar sites’ locations helps multi-
agency teams to identify which of these are more vulnerable to risk and to 
consider protection measures. 
U1bf. The visualisation of major financial institution locations helps multi-agency 
teams identify critical financial institutions that could be placed in a 
vulnerable situation. 
Table 9. 2: Statistical summaries from the evaluation of the Visualisation of Local Infrastructure 
on an interactive map  
 U1b2 U1ba U1bb U1bc U1bd U1be U1bf 
Min 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Median 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
Max 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Mean 4.04 4.3 4.04 4.13 4.13 3.82 3.73 
















Figure 9. 2: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation for the Visualisation 
of Local Infrastructure on an interactive map  
Table 9.2 and figure 9.2 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation of 
the visualisation of local infrastructure information. On average, participants rated the 
infrastructure information highly, with most areas receiving excellent satisfaction. The 
only statements to receive less than a mean average score of 4 were statements relating to 
the information provided on vulnerable financial institutions and heritage sites. However, 
the median score of each of the statements was between 4 and 5 and the overall 
































“I get it in terms of infrastructure because it is pretty solid. You’ve got that data. You can 
usually use that.” However, Participant 10 was more critical of the system, suggesting 
that: “currently it does not reflect the ‘knock on’ consequences of certain infrastructure 
being impacted”. The need for the interactive map to visualise cascading effects was 
noted by a participant who, in the discussion, suggested: “As the level (of rainfall) is 
going up I’d be looking at what’s tipping over as a result of that heavy rainfall… If the 
electricity substation closes down, what happens? Then what happens to the local fire 
station? Etc.” (Highways Agency). 
Here, the author believes that the interactive map prototype’s visualisation should show 
the critical infrastructure that would have the biggest impact if affected, such as 
electricity, gas and telecommunication substations and water distribution points. 
Moreover, it should definitely include major roads because these are vital in dealing with 
disasters when they happen. The cascading effect needs to be modelled using different 
modelling technologies such as system dynamics and the Bayesian belief function. Once 
modelled the result could be incorporated into the map.  
C. Contextualization of the Natural Environment (CNE) 
The following statements were presented in order to evaluate the perceived effectiveness 
of the visualisation of natural environment on the interactive map: 
U1c3. The visualisation of the Natural Environment on the interactive map helps multi-
agency teams establish a collective understanding of the important  natural 
resources within the space viewed. 
U1ca. The visualisation of reservoir locations helps multi-agency teams assess and 
understand the area that would be affected by a potential dam failure. 
U1cb. The visualisation of animal sanctuary locations (and the type and number of 
animals there) helps multi-agency teams understand the numbers and types of 
animals that need rehousing. 
U1cc. The visualization of national park locations helps multi-agency teams       
understand the impact that a disaster could have on plants, wildlife and on sites of 











Table 9. 3: Statistical summaries from the evaluation of the Visualisation of the Natural 
Environment on an interactive map 
 
 U1c3 U1ca U1cb U1cc 
Min 2 2 2 2 
Median 4 5 4 4 
Max 5 5 5 4 
Mean 3.78 4 3.65 3.56 
* Min – minimum, Max – maximum 
 
 
Figure 9. 3: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation for the Visualisation 
of the Natural Environment on an interactive map  
Table 9. 3 and Figure 9. 3 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation 
of the visualisation of the natural environment information. The mean average score for 
each statement corresponds to a good level of satisfaction and the median score for all the 
statements was between 4 and 5. The statement that received the highest mean average 
score related to the interactive map’s information about reservoirs, while the statement 
with the lowest mean average score related to the map’s provision of national park 
information.  
In this area, the author assumes that the information provided by the interactive map 
should be prioritised according to its relevance to the protection of the public and 
































include the locations of reservoirs and rivers. Natural information could also include, for 
example, forests that could catch fire, or zoos and the types of animals they house. While 
including information about the location of rare species of plants or animals would be 
useful in order to protect them, this needs to be managed carefully in order to avoid 
overloading decision makers with information that might not be of great importance to 
them in an emergency situation that threatens human life.  
D. Contextualization of Hazardous Sites (CHS) 
The following statements were asked in order to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of 
the Visualisation of Hazardous Sites on the interactive map: 
U1b4. The visualisation of such hazardous sites’ information on the interactive map helps 
multi-agency teams to collectively understand the local risks imposed by the sites. 
U1ba. The visualisation of chemical site locations and the identification of the number of 
people that could be affected by hazards occurring on these sites helps multi-agency 
teams identify people living in proximity to a chemical site in order to 
communicate with, and inform, them. 
U1bb. The visualisation of university lab locations helps multi-agency teams            
understand the types of material being used on these sites and the potential impact 
during a disaster. 
Table 9. 4: Statistical summaries from the evaluation of the Visualisation of Hazardous Sites on 
an interactive map 
 U1b4 U1ba U1bb 
Min 2 3 2 
Median 5 5 5 
Max 5 5 5 
Mean 4.13 4.21 3.6 





Figure 9. 4: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation for the Visualisation 
of Hazardous Sites on an interactive map  
Table 9. 4 and Figure 9. 4 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation 
of the visualisation of hazardous sites’ information. Responses were generally positive, 
with all statements receiving a median score of 5, suggesting an excellent level of 
satisfaction.  Participants suggested that the system would support current risk assessment 
activities “in terms of… COMAH” sites (GM Fire and Rescue Service, Environment 
Agency, Association of Greater Manchester). In terms of mean average scores, the only 
statement to receive less than a mean average of 4 related to the interactive map’s 
visualization of the numbers of people living in the vicinity of a hazard site, which 
averaged 3.6.  
The author views the location and in-depth information about the nature of COMAH sites 
as being vital to an interactive map system because these sites pose significant risks and 
need to be approached in different ways and with different equipment depending on the 
type of site. 
9.2.1  Contextualization Average Result 
The overall average scores for each task are summarized below, based on the evaluation 
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Min 1.44 1.57 2 2.33 
Median 3.55 4.57 4.25 5 
Max 5 5 4.75 5 
Mean 3.65 4.02 3.74 3.98 
* Min – minimum, Max – maximum 
 
 
Figure 9. 5: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation for the 
Contextualization of local risk evaluation  
Table 9. 5 and Figure 9. 5present the statistical summaries of the evaluation of the 
interactive map for use in the contextualization stage of risk assessment. The highest 
scoring area, in terms of both median and mean average score, was contextualization of 
local infrastructure. Statements relating to this area produced a mean average of 4.02 and 
a median of 4.57. However, the information on hazard sites scored similarly highly on 
average, with the highest minimum score and a median average of 5. Overall, the results 
for contextualization suggested a good to excellent level of satisfaction among 
participants. Therefore, participants were generally satisfied with how the interactive map 
could support their risk assessment activities. Participant 6 argued that “if data was 
current and readily available this mapping tool will be very helpful in terms of risk 
assessment and planning” (Association of Greater Manchester Authorities). The nature of 











































supported by Participant 17 who claimed that the success of the system “would depend 
on the type and extent of the data” (GM Police). However, Participant 3 suggested that 
the interactive map visualised too much information, claiming that it could “overwhelm 
decision makers” (Ministry of Defence). Similarly, Participant 20 claimed that “a system 
with less information could be more useful and do-able” (BT).  
Overall, the author believes that a system which visualises a relatively small amount of 
important information in way that helps decision makers is preferable to a system which 
collects a huge amount of information but that, ultimately, is not useable. Moreover, it is 
vital that careful consideration be given as to what information is included, because it 
may need to be updated regularly. If this is not possible, then outdated information may 
be less useful than no information at all. This is particularly relevant to social information, 
because this information is very changeable. This is in contrast to infrastructure 
information, which is more fixed and takes longer to alter.   
Step 2: Hazard Review (HR) 
Hazard review involves multi-agency team members reviewing the contextualization 
information and, through a process of discussion, identifying the hazards that present 
significant risks and should, therefore, be assessed further. The following statements were 
asked in order to evaluate the usefulness of the interactive map for a Hazard Review: 
U25.  The interactive map helps multi-agency teams capture experience, 
intelligence and research data and to communicate them to others during 
hazard review meetings. 
U2a.  The visualisation of past data (such as the impact of previous floodings) helps 
multi-agency teams understand the impact of similar potential emergencies, 
and assists in learning from past actions and theexperience of others. 
 
Table 9. 6: Statistical summaries from the evaluation on the perceived effectiveness for Hazard 
Review of an interactive map   
 U25 U2a 
Min 1 3 
Median 4 4 
Max 5 5 
Mean 3.56 4 





Figure 9. 6: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation of the usefulness for 
a Hazard Review of an interactive map   
Table 9.6 and Figure 9. 6 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation of 
the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in a hazard review. Both statements 
received median average scores of 4 and maximum scores of 5. However, the first 
statement, relating to the system’s support for the capture of experience, intelligence and 
research data, attracted a very low minimum score of 1. At 3.56, the first statement’s 
mean score was slightly lower than the second statement, which had the highest mean 
average of 4. Overall, this suggests good to excellent satisfaction for the use of an 
interactive map in hazards’ review. For example, statement U2a was supported by 
Participant 3 who claimed that the interactive map is useful in a hazard review “through 
the display of the impacts and consequences of an emergency event” (Ministry of 
Defence). Similarly, statement U25 was supported by Participant 1 who praised the 
“communication” enabled by the system (University of Manchester). 
Step 3: Risk Analysis (RA) 
Risk Analysis involves multi-agency team members estimating the outcome and impact 
of hazards previously agreed and using the interactive map to justify their predications on 
the potential magnitude of the hazards identified (in terms of numbers of people, 
buildings and critical infrastructure affected). The following statements were asked to 
evaluate the usefulness of the interactive map for Risk Analysis: 
U36.  Visualisation on the interactive map helps multi-agency teams estimate the 
































U3a.  The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collectively understand the 
outcome of hazards (eg, in the case of a flood, the likelihood of certain 
hazards occurring and the likely magnitude of such hazards). 
U3b.  The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collectively understand the 
impact of hazards on people, such as the numbers potentially affected by the 
hazard. 
U3c.  The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collectively understand the 
impact of hazards on critical infrastructure, the number of buildings affected 
and on utility services and transport. 
U3d.  The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collectively understand the 
impact of hazards on plants, wildlife and on sites of special environmental 
interest. 
U3e.  The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collectively understand the 
impact of hazards on the economy of the area affected (e.g. the number of 
shopping centres unable to function because of the loss of electricity due to a 
substation failure). 
Table 9. 7: Statistical summaries from the evaluation on the perceived effectiveness for Risk 
Analysis of an interactive map  
 U36 U3a U3b U3c U3d U3e 
Min 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Median 4 4 3 4 3 4 
Max 4 5 5 5 5 4 
Mean 3.69 3.65 3.78 3.95 3.39 3.39 
* Min – minimum, Max – maximum 
 
 
Figure 9. 7: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation of the effectiveness 
































Table 9.7 and Figure 9.7 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation of 
the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in risk analysis. Each of the statements 
received a mean score corresponding to good satisfaction. U3C received the highest mean 
average score, at 3.95. Participant 14 suggested that “impact assessment and critical 
services’ mapping would be useful in conducting risk assessment”. This suggests that the 
interactive map is useful in visualising potential impacts on critical infrastructure, the 
number of buildings affected, and on utility services and transport. The lowest scoring 
statement in terms of mean average score was U3E, relating to the interactive map’s 
ability to help users understand the economic impact of hazards. This statement attracted 
a mean average of 3.39. Statement U36, which related to the interactive map supporting 
users in understanding the outcome and impact of events, received an average score of 
3.69 and was supported in comments by participants. Participant 10 claimed that the map 
“would assist in validating certain assumptions concerning threat impacts” (Highways 
Agency). In addition, Participant 12 suggested that the map “provides the ability to 
visually demonstrate different layers of risk and impact” (NHS England) and participant 
16 specified the map’s ability to depict “cascading/overlapping risk” as an advantage 
(Association of Greater Manchester Authorities).  
Step 4: Risk Evaluation (RE)  
 
Risk Evaluation comprises a multi-agency team collectively identifying and prioritising 
risk hotspots in an area, producing a risk matrix using a scale of very high to low risk. 
The following statements were asked to evaluate the usefulness of the interactive map in 
Risk Evaluation: 
U47. Visualisation on an interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collaboratively 
identify and prioritise risk hotspots in the area in order to produce a risk level matrix 
(high, medium and low risk). 
U4a. The system made it easy to identify risk hotspots in the local area. 
U4b. The system made it easy to prioritise these risk hotspots. 
U4C. The system made it easy to produce the risk level matrix (showing  high, medium    
and low risk) 
U4d. The system made it easy for the group to collaborate on this task.   




Table 9. 8: Statistical summaries from the evaluation on the perceived effectiveness for Risk 
Evaluation of an interactive map  
 U47 U4a U4b U4c U4d U4e 
Min 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Median 5 5 4 3 4 4 
Max 5 5 4 4 5 4 
Mean 3.43 3.91 3.3 3.08 3.47 3.26 
* Min – minimum, Max – maximum 
 
 
Figure 9. 8: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation on the effectiveness 
for Risk Evaluation of an interactive map 
Table 9. 8 and Figure 9.8 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation of 
the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in risk evaluation. Each of the 
statements received a mean score corresponding to good satisfaction, all between 3 and 4. 
The highest mean score was achieved by statement U4A. This is notable because this 
statement relates to the overall ability of the map to help identify risk hotspots which is 
the main goal of risk evaluation. Participant 2 suggested that the heat mapping on the 
system was “particularly helpful” (Dept of Communities & Local Government) and 
Participant 22 was positive about the interactive map’s use for “identifying areas of risks 
and influence by layering” (GM Fire and Rescue Service). The other statements attracted 
generally lower mean average scores, with the lowest one, U4C, achieving 3.08. While 
this still indicates good satisfaction, it does suggest that while the system helps in 
identifying risk hotspots, producing a risk matrix is not as easy. On the other hand, most 
of the statements in this stage related to the ease of use which was supported by a number 
































Participant 9 said that the layers of information were “simple to understand” (North West 
Ambulance Service). Participant 10 described the system as being “visually easy to 
interpret” (Highways Agency), while Participant 8 commended the interactiv map for 
being “user friendly with a clear and concise display of information” (United Utilities 
plc) and Participant 11 said it is “user friendly and very clear” (Public Health England).  
Step 5: Risk Treatment (RT)  
Risk Treatment involves a multi-agency team producing a plan for the use of the 
resources available to them in an area. The following statements were asked to evaluate 
the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map for Risk Treatment: 
U58. The visualisation on the interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collaboratively understand their current capabilities to deal with risks and to identify 
gaps in these capabilities. 
U5a. The system will make it easy to identify the number and the type of resources in 
the local area. 
U5b. The system will help in understanding the overall capability of multi-agencies in 
the local area. 
U5c. The system made it easy to keep track of the use of resources.  
U5d. The system made it easy for the group to collaborate on this task.   
U5e. The system made it easy to share ideas and to come to an agreement within the 
group. 
Table 9. 9: Statistical summaries from the evaluation on the perceived effectiveness for Risk 
Treatment of an interactive map  
  U58 U5a U5b U5c U5d U5e 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Median 3 4 3 2 3 2 
Max 5 5 4 4 4 4 
Mean 3 3.3 2.82 2.82 3.17 2.91 





Figure 9. 9: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation on the effectiveness 
for Risk Treatment of an interactive map  
Table 9. 9 and Figure 9. 9 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation 
of the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in risk treatment. Three of the 
statements suggested good satisfaction while, in contrast, three suggested low 
satisfaction. The three statements which attracted mean average scores of above 3 related 
to the overall usefulness of the system in helping to understand the current capabilities 
and gaps in an area, the map’s usefulness in identifying the number of specfic resources 
available and on the map’s ability to promote collaboration. The lower scoring 
statements, which received scores of 2.82, 2.82 and 2.91, related to the map’s usefulness 
in helping to understand the overall capability, how easily it allows users to keep track of 
resources and how easily it makes the sharing of ideas among team members. This is 
somewhat contradictary. This could be due to the difficulty in mapping and 
understanding ‘capability’. As Participant 2 pointed out, capability can be seen as “more 
than just… equipment displayed on a map” and that it also relates to “people, skills and 
training to deal with particular emergencies” (Dept of Communities & Local Govt).  
Step 6: Monitoring and Reviewing 
Monitoring and Reviewing involves a multi-agency team continuously monitoring risks 
and, if necessary, repeating the previous steps (1-5) when new risks are identified. The 
following statements were asked in order to evaluate the usefulness of the interactive map 
in Monitoring and Reviewing: 
U69.    The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collaboratively update, review        and 






























U6a.   The interactive map would help with the ongoing monitoring of risks. 
Table 9. 10: Statistical summaries from the evaluation on the perceived effectiveness for 
Monitoring and Reviewing of an interactive map  
 U69 U6a 
Min 3 2 
Median 4 4 
Max 5 5 
Mean 4 3.66 













Figure 9. 10: Clustered columns showing the distribution from the evaluation on the effectiveness 
for Monitoring and Reviewing of an interactive map  
Table 9. 10 and Figure 9. 10 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation 
of the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in monitoring and review. Both 
statements received median average scores of 4 and maximum scores of 5. However, the 
first statement, relating to the system’s support for collaboratively updating, reviewing 
and maintaining risk information scored a slightly higher mean average score of 4, 
compared to 3.66 for the question relating to continuous monitoring. There was broad 
support among interviewees for the creation of an interactive map that would, by nature, 
act as a reference for future risks. A number of participants pointed out that careful, 
consistent updating of the map would be required in order to support monitoring and 
reviewing. Participants 16, 13, 12 and 5 all suggested that the system would be an overall 
































9.3 Perceived effectiveness of the potential of the Interactive Map for strengthening 
the collaboration between multi-agenciess. 
The second aspect (the “perceived effectiveness” of the potential of the interactive map 
for strengthening the collaboration between multi-agencies) covers how well the 
interactive map enhances the decision-making, communication and coordination of 
multiagency teams. This relates to a range of sub-skills, such as the extent to which the 
interactive map enhances group reasoning, interpretation and assessment skills. It 
evaluates the interactive map’s enhancement of a team member’s ability to express their 
views, ideas, information and agendas. It also evaluates how well the interactive map 
enhances the reasoning, assessment and interpretation skills of team members when they 
are faced with the complex situations they encounter in risk assessment. The following 
statements were asked to evaluate the usefulness of visualisation on the interactive map 
for a successful interactive and collaboration environment: 
Ua. The interactive map enhances the interaction between multi-agency teams in 
terms of decision making, communication and coordination. 
Ub. The interactive map helps teams to take turns in expressing their views. 
Uc. An interactive map system is helpful for multi-agency teams to build up a 
common understanding of the potential local risks. 
Ud. An interactive map system can improve the efficiency of communicating 
ideas and information. 
Ue. An interactive map system has real value as a tool where there is a need to 
communicate complex agendas to multi-agency teams.  
Uf. An interactive spatial map enhances the interpretation skills between multi-
agency teams (such as breaking goals into sub-goals and questioning deeply). 
Ug. An interactive map enhances the reasoning skills between multi-agency teams 
in terms of a user’s ability to think logically, justify priority levels, etc.  
Uh. An interactive map enhances the assessment skills between multi-agency 
teams in terms of a user’s ability to rationally weight options. 
Ui. An interactive map enhances the meta-cognitive skills between multi-agency 
teams in terms of producing multiple ideas and dealing with the incident that 
has happened when making decisions. 
Uj. An interactive map enables users in multi-agency teams to look beyond the 
first obvious explanations to consider alternative interpretations. 
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Uk. An interactive map enables users in multi-agency teams to use mental 
imagery to evaluate plans. 
Table 9. 11: Statistical summaries from the evaluation on the effectiveness of the interactive map 
for successful, interactive and collaborative multi-agency decision making. 
 Ua Ub Uc Ud Ue Uf Ug Uh Ui Uj Uk 
Min 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Median 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 
Max 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Mean 3.52 3 3.95 3.69 3.69 3.13 3.21 3.34 3.13 3.3 3.78 
* Min – minimum, Max – maximum 
Figure 9. 11: Clustered columns showing the distribution on the evaluated 
effectiveness of the interactive map for successful, interactive and collaborative 
multi-agency decision making. 
 
Table 9. 11 and Figure 9. 11 show the statistical summaries of the participants’ evaluation 
of the perceived effectiveness of the interactive map in enhancing interaction and 
collaboration. The statements produced a consistent level of satisfaction with little 
variation between the statements. The mean average score for each statement was good, 
with all statements scoring 3 or above. The highest rated statement was Uc, which 
received an average of 3.95. The relates to the interactive map system’s helpfulness for 
multi-agency teams in building up a common understanding of the potential local risks. 
Similarly high scoring statements were Uk, Ud and Ue. This means that the interactive 
map was rated well for its ability to help team members to communicate ideas, 
information and complex agendas and to help team members use mental imagery to 
evaluate plans. The interactive map’s effectiveness in prompting debate and discussion 
































“provoked thinking” and “debate” (Association of Greater Manchester Authorities). 
Participant 13 was also positive about the system’s usefulness in reasoning, suggesting 
that it enabled “immediate reasoning” and “justification” of views and opinions (The 
Environment Agency).   
On the other hand, the interactive map received lower average satisfaction scores for 
statements Ub, Uf and Ui, which relate to its ability to help team members express their 
views, to support the interpretational skills between multi-agency teams (such as breaking 
goals into sub-goals and questioning deeply) and to enhance meta-cognitive skills 
between multi-agency teams (such as producing multiple ideas and dealing with the 
incident that has happened). Participant 3 suggested that there was a danger that the map 
could impede decision making by providing “too much information of too low a level, 
such that it may overwhelm decision makers” (Ministry of Defence). Participant 13 also 
suggested that the usefulness of the system in helping decision making would “depend on 
the range of data available” (The Environment Agency). Moreover, Participant 6 
suggested that, at this stage of its development, the interactive map is “too hypothetical” 
for its usefulness and effectiveness in collaboration to be judged (Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities). These comments suggested that the information provided by the 
system has to be carefully selected if it is to help collaboration between decision makers. 
However, it is notable that all of the statements still received a good level of average 
satisfaction for each statement.  
9.4 Summary  
This chapter described the evaluation of the interactive map for use in multi-agency 
collaboration during the risk assessment process. The method of evaluation and the flood 
scenario were described before the setting for the evaluation and its procedure were 
outlined. Finally, the results of the evaluation were presented.  
The results were analysed according to two different aspects. Firstly, perceived 
effectiveness of the potential of the interactive map in supporting risk assessment 
processes was analysed.  This covered all parts of the risk assessment process including 
contextualization activities (related to understanding social, natural, infrastructural and 
hazard site risks in an area) hazard review activities (related to the identification of 
significant risks), risk analysis activities (related to assessing risk outcome and impact), 
risk evaluation activities (related to the identification and prioritisation of local risk 
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hotspots) and risk treatment activities (related to the identification of a multi-agency 
team’s existing capabilities and the identification of gaps in them) and monitoring and 
reviewing (relating to a multi-agency team reviewing risks in the future and repeating the 
previous steps when new risks emerge).  
Secondly, perceived effectiveness of the potential of the interactive map for strengthening 
the collaboration between multi-agencies was analysed. This aspect related to the 
interactive map’s enhancement of decision making, communication and coordination 
within multi-agency teams. This relates to a range of sub-skills, such as group reasoning, 
interpretation and assessment skills, and each team member’s ability to express their 
views, ideas, information and agendas when faced with the complex situations they 
encounter in risk assessment.  
The overall results of the evaluation were positive and indicated a generally good level of 
satisfaction with the interactive map. This finding suggests that the interactive map 
platform is generally helpful both for the specific activities relating to risk assessment and 
for promoting collaboration in a multi-agency environment. The overall result suggests 
that professionals view the interactive map as having the potential to support multi-
agency teams in the planning and response phases of the disaster management cycle, but 
this finding will be discussed in greater depth and detail in the following chapter. The 
evaluation results were broadly positive with the participants, in general, being supportive 
of the interactive map prototype and positive about its use in supporting multi-agency 
collaboration and in enhancing the risk assessment process. The next chapter presents a 











Chapter 10 – Discussion 
 
10.1 Introduction  
The following chapter combines the insights gained from all of the previous parts of this 
research, bringing together and discussing the findings from the primary and secondary 
data.  It also presents the limitations of this study and suggests areas of future research. 
Firstly, however, it is useful to summarize the project as a whole. 
The purpose of this research was to identify the functional characteristics of an interactive 
map that can enhance multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in 
disaster management. The requirements for this interactive platform were gathered by 
working closely with the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum. Interviews were 
conducted with senior managers from various agencies involved in Category 1 responders 
in the Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum (LRF). They represented strategic and 
tactical levels within the police service, fire and rescue service, ambulance service, 
National Health Service, local authority, the Environment Agency and Transport for 
Greater Manchester. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to define the 
characteristics of a collaborative environment for risk assessment in disaster management. 
These characteristics were used to define user requirements for an interactive map system 
which was then developed according to these requirements. The interactive map 
prototype was then presented to the members of the Greater Manchester Resilience 
Forum Development Group. This group included Category 1 & 2 responders. Category 1 
responders comprised professionals from such agencies as the Department of 
Communities and Local Government, GM Fire and Rescue Service, the Association of 
Greater Manchester Authorities, GM Police, British Transport Police, the North West 
Ambulance Service, the Environment Agency, the NHS, Public Health England. 
Meanwhile, category 2 participants included representatives from The Highways Agency, 
Transport for Greater Manchester, BT and the Radio Amateur’s Emergency Network, 
United Utilities, the Ministry of Defence and from the University of Manchester. 
Participants from these organisations were presented with a scenario that demonstrated 
the prototype. They then participated in a group discussion in which they discussed their 
views on the prototype’s potential usefulness. This discussion was followed by the 
distribution of a paper questionnaire which included both open and closed questions and 
ratings’ scale questions. The questionnaire was used as a method of capturing the 
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individual views of participants. The findings collected from these questionnaires were 
presented in the previous chapter.  
10.2 Contextualization of Social Information 
The findings of this research were consistent with those of Peterson (1995) who 
suggested that interactive maps are a useful means of highlighting information in a visual 
form and, therefore, are easy to comprehend. The results of this study showed that the 
visual aspect of the interactive map was important for participants. The map was 
described as being useful for identifying affected populations visually and was identified 
as a good, useful visual tool. Awal (2003) suggested that providing overlays to visually 
identify areas of a community at risk from flooding was useful. This was supported by 
this research’s findings, in which the layering of social information was identified as 
being useful. The findings point to a lack of agreement on the question of which social 
information should be included, with participants differing on their preferences. The 
findings point to the need for simple social information (such as population density, 
ethnicity, vulnerable people, schools’ and hospitals’ data) to be displayed as percentages. 
On the other hand, the findings also point to a desire for the interactive map to include 
more complex factors such as the level of social media and Internet use in order to help 
the authorities decide the best way to communicate with the public. Communication and 
cooperation with the public emerged here as being important in evacuation situations, not 
only as a matter of language but also because there is distrust of authorities within certain 
communities.  
In terms of social information, the author takes the view that the interactive map should 
provide relatively simple social information. Aspects of social information such as 
population density, ethnicity, vulnerable people, schools’ and hospitals’ data are 
undoubtedly useful for multi-agency decision makers. This kind of data could be 
displayed as a percentage, rather than as raw numbers, so as to simplify the data for 
decision makers. Moreover, the combination of such data sets into hot spots is useful for 
multi-agency decision makers. Given the increasing use and importance of social media 
and the Internet in modern, developed cities, the author suggests that giving multi-agency 
teams access to information relating to the level of internet use, and to social network use 
by the public would also be useful. This kind of data would be reasonably easy to access 
and visualise as a layer on the interactive map. However, the suggestions of some 
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participants that the interactive map could include information about tensions between 
members of a community and the authorities, while being well-intentioned, are largely 
impractical. By its nature, this kind of information would be difficult to accurately collect 
and it also risks overwhelming users with overly complicated and difficult to use data.  
10.3 Contextualization of Local Infrastructure 
Understanding the information relating to infrastructure emerged as being extremely 
useful for the interactive map to display, which reflects the findings of past research 
(GISCaf, 2011, AAM Modelling Aids Brisbane Flood Crisis). Participants rated the 
interactive map’s provision of information relating to infrastructure as highly useful, 
reliable and easy to access. The following elements of the infrastructure were identified 
in the findings as being important and well visualised on the map: water distribution 
points, electrical substation locations, health facilities and telecom substation locations. 
These elements emerged as being more important for multi-agency decision makers than 
other aspects of infrastructure such as financial institutions and heritage sites. However, 
the findings indicate that the usefulness of the interactive map would be increased with a 
greater emphasis on cascading effects on infrastructure, such as the effect a flood would 
have on an electrical substation and what effect the substation’s failure would have on, 
for example, a local hospital.   
Here, the author feels that the interactive map prototype’s visualisation should include 
critical infrastructure that would have the biggest impact if affected, such as electricity, 
gas and telecommunication substations, water distribution points and health facility 
locations. It should also definitely include major roads because these are vital in dealing 
with disasters when they happen. The location of residential buildings like houses, flats 
and bungalows are also important because they may need to be evacuated. The locations 
of police, fire and ambulance stations are also vital, given that knowing the location and 
the level of current response capability is a key aspect of the risk assessment process. As 
for cascading effects, these can be visualised but only to a certain extent. The map allows 
users to visualise the number of houses that would lose electricity if a substation were lost, 
but to visualize a long list of possible knock-on effects would requires a simulation model 
that can handle complex cascading effects. This could be considered as potential future 




10.4 Contextualization of the Natural Environment 
The interactive map’s visualization of the natural environment reflected previous work by 
a number of writers (Gold and Condal, 1995; Goralski and Gold, 2007b) who suggested 
that 3D visualisations are helpful for assessing environmental impact, landscape planning 
and geology. The interactive map’s provision of this data was broadly rated as 
favourable, and it was argued that particular attention should be given to sites of special 
scientific interest (SSIs). As with social information, the choices relating to which data to 
include on the map again emerged as being critical.  
In this area, the author feels that the information provided by the interactive map should 
be prioritised according to its relevance to the protection of the public and property. The 
most obvious examples of natural environmental information in the map include the 
locations of reservoirs and rivers. Natural information could also include, for example, 
forests that could catch fire, or zoos and the types of animals they house. The author takes 
the view that including information about the location of SSIs, rare plants and animals on 
an interactive map would be useful in order to protect them. This information would, 
however, need to be managed carefully in order to avoid overloading decision makers 
with information that might not be of great importance to them in an emergency situation 
that threatens human life.  
10.5 Contextualization of Hazardous Sites 
The findings of this research are consistent with Dransch et al. (2005) and the Institute for 
Ocean Management (2007) who studied the use of interactive maps for mapping hazards 
for the visualisation of risk information and for communicating this information among 
team members. In this research it was reported that an interactive map system could 
inform current planning for hazards and the creation of support maps. Also a participant 
suggested that the system would support decision makers “in terms of…COMAH” sites. 
Experts in the field noted that the interactive map would be particularly useful in 
understanding the threat posed by COMAH sites, especially in mapping the effect that 
changes in wind direction could have on the surrounding areas if a COMAH site suffered 
a fire and emitted chemical smoke.  
The author views the locational information and detailed information about the nature of 
hazardous sites as being vital to an interactive map system because these sites pose 
significant risks and need to be approached in different ways and with different 
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equipment depending on the type of site. For instance, COMAH sites such as chemical 
storage facilities, chemical production factories and oil rich sites could affect their 
surrounding areas with plumes of dangerous smoke if they had a fire. Such sites pose 
different risks to those posed by university laboratories which may contain a range of 
biological, biometric and radiological risks for the surrounding area. Given the diverse 
nature of these threats it is, therefore, crucial that this hazard site information be available 
to decision makers in the context of an interactive map.  
10.6 Hazard Review 
The interactive map’s ability to act as a communicative tool in hazard review activities 
emerged from this research’s findings, supporting the views of Kolbe (2005), Marincioni 
(2007), Kemec et al (2010), and Zlatanova et al. (2002) who all noted the potential of 
interactive maps for this purpose. However, the findings in this study suggest that, in 
hazard review activities, the interactive map is more effective for visualising past data 
(such as previous floods) than it is for visualising less concrete information such as 
stakeholders’ experience, intelligence and research data. This suggests that although 
stakeholders feel that having access to data relating to experience, intelligence and 
research is desirable, it may be difficult to visualise this data in a useful way in practice.  
10.7 Risk Analysis 
Literature on interactive mapping suggests that 3D models are useful in identifying 
features such as the locations of vulnerable people? Buildings in a potential flood plain, 
commercial buildings, roads and natural features like rivers and green spaces (Alexander, 
1993; Shaluf, 2007).  Demirel (2004) also suggested that interactive map models were 
useful in understanding, and planning for, transportation. The findings from this study are 
consistent with these aspects distilled from past research, with the interactive map 
emerging as being useful in visualising the potential impacts of a disaster such as 
flooding on critical infrastructure, utility services, parts of the natural environment (like 
wildlife and plant life) and the number of buildings affected. Understanding and 
analysing potential risks to transport networks also emerged as another strength of the 
map, in line with the study of Demirel (2004). Moreover, the interactive map has been 
found to be useful in helping multi-agency teams gain a collective understanding of the 
impact of hazards on people in the area. Therefore, the layers of information provided by 
the interactive map have emerged as being useful in highlighting these specific areas that 
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could be impacted upon by hazardous events. However, the experts felt that the 
interactive map’s ability to help users visualise economic impacts is less strong. Similarly, 
experts commented that the visualisation of information such as experience and tacit 
knowledge is difficult to represent in on interactive map. Moreover, in contrast to the 
discussion on the contextualisation of local infrastructure, in a discussion on risk analysis 
the interactive map was found to be useful in depicting cascading effects. This suggests 
that the interactive map is useful in visualising some types of cascading effects, but 
perhaps not all. On the other hand, it could suggest that the map’s visualisation of 
cascading effects is more useful at certain stages of the risk assessment process, such as 
risk analysis, and not as useful at other stages, like contextualisation.  
10.8 Risk Evaluation 
The literature suggests that it is in the risk evaluation stage that the values and judgments 
of stakeholders start to have a large influence on the risk assessment process (UN-ISDR, 
2004). The findings of this research suggest that the interactive map supports 
stakeholders in expressing their opinions and in justifying their judgments, because it 
makes immediate reasoning and justification possible. Moreover, risk evaluation involves 
considering the social, environmental, and economic consequences of estimated risks 
(UN-ISDR, 2004). The findings of this research suggest that an interactive map supports 
risk evaluation by bringing all of this information together in a single platform. The key 
elements of this study’s findings indicate that layered information visually enhances the 
evaluation of risk hotspots. However, the experts felt that the right level of detail and 
range of this data is open for further debate.  
10.9 Risk Treatment 
The literature suggests that the most important aspect of an interactive map is how it can 
provide an accurate, up-to-date and comprehensive list of resources (MO-FEAT, 2008; 
CDC, 2015). Moreover, the literature relating to interactive maps suggests that they are 
useful in showing the location of available resources visually and that it is useful for the 
map to easily search for relevant resources (MO-FEAT, 2008; CDC, 2015). All of these 
aspects are key in the risk treatment stage of the risk assessment process. The findings 
from this study partially support the findings from the literature, because the interactive 
map was found to be helpful in understanding current capabilities and gaps in an area and 
in identifying the number of specfic resources available. Moreoever, the map was found 
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to promote collaboration in these activities, namely identifying available resources. 
However, this study also found that the interactive map was less useful in helping users to 
understand overall capability and to keep track of resources. This contradiction in the 
findings is arguably due to differences in how the term ‘capability’ is understood by 
stakeholders. Levels of resources, such as fire engines, ambulances and related 
equipment, are relatively easy to monitor and then visualise on a map. Numbers of 
emergency personnel are also relatively easy to keep track of. However, this study found 
that the understanding of capability involves more than just resources and also includes 
elements like the training the staff have had and their skills and experience. This is much 
harder to visualise on a map. Perhaps some stakeholders understand ‘capability’ in terms 
of physical resources and equipment, while others understand it in its broader sense. This 
could explain the apparent contradiction in the findings and the difference between the 
findings of this study and those presented in the literature.  
10.10 Monitoring and Reviewing 
The cyclical nature of the risk assessment process suggests the importance of constant 
monitoring and reviewing. Wisner et al. (2004) stated that stakeholders need to monitor 
risks in order to know whether their risk treatment activities have been successful. If risks 
persist then it is logical that they continue to be assessed. They suggested that 
stakeholders must investigate any changes to local risk, such as the emergence of new 
risks or changes in likelihood of a risk or a potential impact of a risk. The Australian 
guidelines place a similar importance on monitoring and reviewing and suggest that 
stakeholders periodically reassess all risks in-depth (Standards Australia/Standards New 
Zealand Standard Committee, AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009).  The findings of this research 
clearly indicate that, in order to be successful, an interactive map platform needs to 
enable users to update and maintain it in a systematic, thorough way. Moreover, such 
findings consistent with Alexander et al. (2011) who stated that keeping up-to-date 
information is a challenge, particularly when social data is usually collected periodically 
(using censuses for example) while hazards, on the other hand, can be dynamic and 




10.11 Interactive Map for Successful Interactive and Collaborative Multi-agency 
Decision Making 
Andrienko and Andrienko (1999) described maps as important tools in decision making, 
while Gold (1993) argued that interaction and communication should be kept as simple 
and as quick as possible in order to support decision makers. The usefulness of interactive 
maps as communication tools (in turn, supporting decision-making) has been suggested 
by numerous writers such Kolbe (2005), Marincioni (2007), Kemec et al (2010) and 
Zlatanova et al. (2002). On the one hand, the findings from this study can be seen to 
support the literature because it has found that the interactive map promotes debate and 
discussion and enables users to reason quickly and to justify their opinions. On the other 
hand, the level of information provided by the system and the effect that this has on 
decision making was controversial. It was suggested that too much information, or 
information of the wrong kind, could act to slow down decision-making.  
The findings of this study support the conclusions of Ramsey (2009), Couclelis and 
Monmonier, (1995) and Elwood (2006) that interactive maps enable users to perform 
tasks intuitively and efficiently because they allow users to visualize the outcomes of 
their decisions during the decision making process. This study found visualisation and 
communication to be key strengths of the interactive map. That said, again the level and 
nature of the information being visualised was found to be important, with stakeholders 
disagreeing on the level of information they feel they require.  
The literature points to the role of interactive maps in bringing together the complex 
agendas of numerous different organizations such as members of the local population, 
local government, non-governmental organizations and responders (Institute for Ocean 
Management, 2007). This is supported by the findings from this study which found that 
stakeholders felt that the interactive map was useful for this purpose.  
One of this study’s main interests has been to understand how an interactive map could 
support the critical thinking of its users and the overall findings support the map’s use for 
this purpose. Critical thinking can be broken down into a range of sub-skills. However, 
the existing literature relating to interactive maps tends to focus on one of these sub-
skills, mamely, reasoning skills. Writers such as Kraak (2006), Petrovic and Masera 
(2005), Andrienko et al. (2001) and Guo (2003) have found that interactive maps promote 
reasoning by enhancing a user’s spatial reasoning abilities while Adrienko and Adrienko 
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(1999) suggested that an interactive map can help users in finding information that may 
otherwise be overlooked when exploring data. The interactive map in this study was 
found to be useful in promoting visual thinking and efficient, quick reasoning among 
users. More generally, the interactive map was found to promote and provoke thinking by 
users. These findings are, therefore, consistent with the literature. However, this study 
also found that the interactive map could support a range of other, additional, critical 
thinking skills such as meta cognitive strategies (in which individuals reflect on their 
thinking strategies and assess them) because the map promoted the production of multiple 
possible ideas, deep questioning and the breaking down of goals into sub goals. In 
addition, visual thinking, producing alternative explanations, and planning and weighing 
ideas rationally, were all also found to be enhanced by the use of the interactive map.  
10.12 Importance of Interactive Maps for Risk Assessment 
This research has been based on the general premise, as suggested by Alphen et al. (2009), 
that interactive mapping is a “keystone” of risk assessment. The general support for the 
interactive map system that was developed for this study is consistent with this claim. 
The support for the interactive map system found among the stakeholders in this study 
supports the findings of Shen and Kawakami (2010) that such maps can improve the 
understanding of risk and can improve communication among planners and experts. In 
addition to asserting that interactive mapping helps planners and stakeholders, Shen and 
Kawakami (2010) found that such maps could enhance the understanding of members of 
the public. While this was not an aspect of this study, the findings do indicate that an 
interactive map can be used to guide stakeholders in how they can communicate with the 
public. For instance, it was suggested that, in the area of social information, the map 
could provide information about language use, internet access and social media use that 
stakeholders and planners could use to plan their communications with the public in times 
of emergency. This finding is consistent with the findings of past research (Marcus 2001; 
Shen et al. 2006; Edsall 2007) which suggested the need to investigate differences in the 
social conventions and interactions in diverse communities in order to communicate 
effectively with the members of those communities. Moreover, the findings suggest that 
information could be provided on the map in relation to the communities which are hard 
to reach, perhaps because of tensions and a lack of trust by those communities of the 
responders. More generally, the findings of this study suggest that the interactive map is, 
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indeed, helpful for risk assessment and that topographical information, impact assessment 
and critical services mapped on a system like this serves to help in risk assessment.  
10.13 Importance of Data: Choices, Visualisation, Security and Updating 
A reoccurring theme in the findings is the importance of the data in supporting a useful 
interactive map system. As such, the findings support the submission of Kemec et al. 
(2010), that interactive mapping is based on the capture, sampling and structuring of data. 
The literature suggests that the data utilised depends upon the approach taken by the 
systems, which can be a communicative approach or a visualisation approach. 
Maceachren and Gaunter (1990) suggested that a communicative approach demands that 
an interactive map should accurately represent and display the reality of an area, while 
the visualisation approach demands that a map be able to predict and simulate 
hypothetical situations. Some parts of the findings of this study suggest that the 
interactive map was useful primarily as a communicative map, displaying the reality of a 
given situation, but was not as useful as a predictive tool. However, there was some 
discussion among the participants about the nature of simulation and prediction, with 
some participants suggesting that the prediction algorithm built into the map could be 
useful during disaster when one needs to work with real-time data. The example given 
was that of rainfall. The interactive map shows the effects of different levels of rainfall on 
a given area. In doing so, it simulates a hypothetical event using historical data. The 
interactive map allows users to ask ‘what would happen if the river increased by 1 metre?’ 
This is different to a map that allows users to ask ‘what is going to happen to the river in 
1 hour”. In order to predict and not only simulate, the map would require real- time data 
about, for example, the level of the river and the current rainfall situation. The map would 
then need to predict the outcome of a continuation of this level of rain using a simulation 
environment. Such a map could be useful for the responding stage of the disaster 
management cycle. However, this research has focussed on the assessment and 
preparation stage in the context of Integrated Emergency Management. In short, the map 
created can simulate events, but not predict them in the way that some users may want.  
The distinction between prediction and simulation raises another issue that is central to 
this research and that is the nature of the data provided by the map. In order to predict in 
the way that some users would like, the map would require real-time data and simulation 
support. However, even without real-time data, the type of data to be included on the 
interactive map was a source of discussion and of different views between the 
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stakeholders. There is some contradiction in the findings, with a central theme being that 
too much information can overwhelm decision-makers. The findings suggest that some 
users find the interactive map to be too congested and that the data should be simplified 
to contain less personal data. On the other hand, some participants called for the inclusion 
of more data, such as level of Internet and social media use by members of a community. 
This study found that keeping the data provided up-to-date was important for the 
stakeholders. It was suggested by some stakeholders that the interactive map was too 
ambitious to maintain. This was felt particularly in relation to the social data which can 
change quickly. It is clear from the findings that, in order for an interactive map to be 
successful, then a detailed plan to gather, manage, secure and update the data would be 
required. Moreover, the legal aspects of data protection would need to be fully explored 
in order to reassure stakeholders that all data protection and confidentiality regulations 
were met. While the interactive map used in this research was designed according to the 
characteristics captured from stakeholders, there would have to be continuing discussion 
about the type of data that should be maintained in such a map. This could be the result of 
different stakeholders having different priorities depending on their needs and 
responsibilities.   
Another issue relating to the data is the best way to visualise it. Visualisation is a key 
aspect of mapping and the findings of this study reflect statements made by Andrienko 
and Andrienko (1999) and DiBiase et al. (1992) that interactive maps are crucial to the 
promotion of visual thinking. This study’s findings endorse this view, with the promotion 
of visual thinking emerging as a key strength of the system. This is important in light of 
suggestions made by McCarthy et al. (2007) that effective visualisation is a factor in 
encouraging users to make decisions and solve problems in a flexible way. Another 
element specified by McCarthy et al. (2007) is an effective user interface. This factor was 
supported by this study, in which the interactive map was found to be easy to use and 
interpret. The use of heat mapping and icons to visualise the population density of 
vulnerable populations emerged as a benefit. Moreover, the ability of the interactive map 
to provide layers of information emerged as an advantage, enabling users to switch 
between individual data sets and the overall, bigger picture of the local risks of an area.  
Aside from visualisation, the use of interactive maps to enhance collaboration within 
multi-agency teams is another core aspect of this research. As noted by writers like 
O’Brien (2000), Montague (2004) and Plapp (2001), collaboration is at the centre of the 
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risk assessment process, with stakeholders working together throughout. Collaboration 
depends on communication and this study partially agrees with numerous previous 
findings that interactive mapping is useful as an effective means of communication 
(Kolbe, 2005; Marincioni, 2007; Raper, 1989; Zlatanova et al., 2002a). In general, the 
findings from this study suggest that the interactive map has the potential to support 
collaboration. The system provided a visual stimulus that provoked discussion and debate 
among users, which is central to collaboration. The findings also suggest that the system 
provides opportunities to immediately justify views and opinions, which is central to 
collaboration. Moreover, it emerged that, in theory, the system could help multi-agency 
teams reach a collective understanding of risks. However, the system would need to be 
further tested, with teams of users given the opportunity to actually use the system in 
collaborative exercises, to truly test the system’s usefulness in this regard. 
Hypothetically, the system supports collaboration, but further research is needed to 
investigate this in practice.   
10.14 Use of an Interactive Map Before and After Disaster 
This research has operated within the context of Integrated Emergency Management 
which consists of six kinds of closely related, and sometimes overlapping, activities. 
These are anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response, and recovery 
management. This study has focused on the use of interactive maps in risk assessment 
activities and preparation activities. Dransch et al. (2005) suggested that interactive maps 
enhance the assessment, analysis and mitigation of risks, while Van Westen (2013) 
suggested that interactive maps are required in mitigation activities. However, there is 
some disagreement between writers over the use of interactive maps in the stages of 
emergency management. For example, Anwal (2003) suggested that interactive maps can 
be used in activities before an event (the assessment, prevention and preparation 
activities) and also in recovery activities after an event. The findings from this research 
contribute to this debate. The interactive map is commonly cited in the findings as being 
useful in planning activities. Therefore, in the Integrated Emergency Management model, 
the interactive map is useful in the pre-event stages and is consistent with the views of 
Dransch et al. (2005). The findings indicate the system’s usefulness at both a tactical and 
strategic level. However, the findings also indicate the interactive map’s usefulness in 
response activities, which was widely cited in the feedback. This finding is open to 
interpretation because ‘response’ is closely linked to planning; when stakeholders plan, 
274 
 
they plan what response they would initiate in the event of a certain occurrence. The 
feedback may simply indicate that the interactive map enhances planning which involves 
thinking proactively about responses. On the other hand, the feedback could suggest that 
the interactive map could be used in real time as a response is being carried out in 
reaction to an event. This is questionable, however, given the lack of real-time, live data 
in the system that has been previously described. One way to overcome this is to simulate 
such real-time data and provide an incident as if it is a real incident. This will allows 
agencies to use the interactive map as a training tool in the future and be prepared to 
respond to incidents. 
10.15 Evaluation of the Research Approach and the Validity of Data Collection in    
Relation to the Aim of the Research 
The aim of the research is investigate the nature of an interactive map that can enhance 
multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster management. 
The research philosophy adopted in this study is interpretivist and the research approach 
is inductive. The question to be answered here is how the research approach and 
philosophy support the achievement of the aim of the present research. The philosophy 
adopted in the current research is interpretivism. This philosophy is based on the 
assumption that reality is not objective; it is rather constructed by people who give it its 
meaning. The perspectives and the beliefs of the participants in an interpretive study are 
important in shaping and forming reality in the study. Other features of interpretive 
research are qualitative data collection and analysis methods, small samples and an in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
The other issue that intensifies the interpretivist nature of the current study is the adoption 
of the activity theory. The activity theory is a framework for the analysis and 
understanding of human interaction through the use of tools or artefacts. It is based on 
deriving qualitative data from participants in an interpretivist way. Additionally, the 
activity theory provides a general discovery method that can be used to support 
qualitative and interpretative research. Thus, the use of the activity theory lies at the heart 
of interpretive research that uses qualitative methods.  
The approach used in this research is inductive which is consistent with the adoption of 
the interpretivist philosophy. The research aims at investigating the nature of an 
interactive map that can enhance multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment 
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process in disaster management. The investigation started based on a cohort of 
assumptions and objectives regarding the development of an interactive map. 
The interviews conducted in the current study with senior managers from Category 1 
responders in The Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum yielded user requirements. 
These requirements can be categorised in order to define a set of characteristics for the 
collaborative environment for risk assessment in disaster management. Data collected 
from the interviews show that the information required by the interviewees can be 
categorized under four main themes:  Social (information relating to the human 
population of an area and its vulnerabilities), Natural (information relating to the natural 
environment of an area and its vulnerabilities), Critical infrastructure (information about 
the location and nature of key transport, communication and utilities in an area) and 
Hazard sites (information relating to the location and nature of sites in an area that 
present a hazard).  These themes need to be plotted on a map and visualised by the 
stakeholders. 
Therefore, the philosophy and the approach adopted supported the study in achieving its 
aim to investigate the characteristics of an interactive map that can be used in disaster 
management. These characteristics were derived from the data collected from interviews. 
The perspectives and beliefs of the participants played a crucial role in identifying the 
characteristics of the interactive map. Data collected qualitatively mainly contributed to 
shaping the interactive map and assessing how they could enhance collaboration  between 
multi-agencies in disaster management.  
10.16 Evaluation in Relation to the Use and Relevance of the theories and Models 
Used 
The method of evaluation in this study was undertaken by asking the participants 
questions about the effectiveness of potential of the interactive map  and its effectiveness 
from the participants’ perspectives.  
The main question is whether the evaluation method of the experiment has adopted the 
three models that have been summarised. The first model of the activity theory is used 
with its use of artefacts to stimulate the users’ understanding and analysis through the use 
of artefacts.  
The first evaluation (aspect) will measure perceived effectiveness of the potential of the 
interactive map in supporting risk assessment processes.  This is undertaken by assessing 
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the map’s effectiveness in the activities carried out by multi-agency teams at each step of 
the risk assessment process. The second evaluation (aspect) is perceived effectiveness of 
the potential of the interactive map for strengthening the collaboration between multi-
agencies. The assessment criteria relate to the effectiveness of the interactive map 
prototype in supporting risk assessment process activities and the interaction and 
collaboration of multi-agency decision makers. The following are the two aspects that 
were tested during the evaluation of the potential of the interactive map: 
 Perceived effectiveness in supporting the risk assessment process (first aspect)  
 Perceived effectiveness for strengthening the collaboration between multi-
agencies (second aspect) 
Features of critical thinking can be found in the two aspects and in the assessment criteria. 
For example, in the evaluation method, tasks and goals are divided in sub-sections. The 
questions on assessment are also based on the ability to understand and retrieve the gist of 
the material presented. The questions and the assessment criteria require the participants 
to question the subject matter deeply and to identify and challenge previously held 
assumptions. The criteria are also based on the ability to think logically, to apply general 
principles to specific cases and to determine if the evidence available is enough to justify 
the conclusions. The participants, when asked the assessment questions, must connect 
things logically and find evidence for the answers they provide. Overall, the assessment 
methodology used and the assessment criteria all require a type of critical thinking by the 
participants that enables them to connect different parts logically in order to make 
conclusions from the evidence and to challenge already existing assumptions and may be 
replace them with new ideas.  
Team Collaborative Model: the questions and the assessment criteria address the 
participants collaboratively as a team wherein they are required first to discuss the subject 
with each other and exchange comments and perspectives, then they have modelled a 
plan of a constructed project and then they return to communicating with the designers to 
give feedback. The participants communicated with each other while using the interactive 
map with its different layers and the information it provided. They were introduced to 
different patterns of information which either reinforced their already existing 
assumptions or challenged them. They also evaluated how effective the interactive map 
was for them and their jobs and whether it provided enough information to be applied in 
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the case of floods. All this activity required an ability to analyse, think and reflect as well 
as creating new ideas out of the available ideas.  
10.17 Limitations 
The main limitations of this study relate to the fact that it used a prototype interactive 
mapping system. The purpose of the experiment was to demonstrate the system itself and 
the categories of information included in it, rather than investigate the data within the 
system. As a result the situation presented to participants was based on both historical 
data and hypothetical data. This is a limitation of the research because some participants 
felt that this was too hypothetical. Others may have based their feedback on the potential 
usefulness of the system, rather than its actual usefulness in their local setting. 
This is a specific limitation in the study’s investigation into the interactive map’s 
enhancement of collaboration. Participants were given an introduction and a 
demonstration of the system and were asked to discuss and give feedback on its likely 
effect on collaboration. However, they were not asked to actually use the interactive map 
in a collaborative scenario. Again, this means that participants’ feedback about the 
collaborative aspect of the system was based on their thoughts about its potential, rather 
than in its actual ability to enhance collaboration. Another related limitation is that this 
study only gave participants one flood scenario. Showing participants multiple scenarios 
might have produced richer data and given them a greater understanding of the system.  
Another aspect of this research relates as to how the initial consultation with the 
stakeholders was conducted. Stakeholders were interviewed to capture the characteristics 
that they required as part of an interactive map system. These interviews were held with 
small groups of stakeholders from the same agencies, with representatives of different 
agencies interviewed separately. Another approach, which could have produced different 
characteristics that may support multi-agency collaboration, would have been to conduct 
interviews with representatives from the multiple agencies together. Representatives 
could then have discussed the characteristics that they would like in a collaborative 
setting. This could have ensured that the characteristics that emerged would support 
multi-agency collaboration to a greater extent. 
Finally, this study investigated the use of an interactive map in all parts of the risk 
assessment process. In doing so, it provides an overview of the map system’s use, but 
does not provide findings that apply to each aspect of the process in-depth. Each stage of 
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the process is complex, with numerous aspects and activities, and some of these aspects 
have not been considered in this study.  
10.18  Summary  
This study sought to develop an interactive map system that would enhance collaboration 
in multi-agency teams’ risk assessment activities. The system was developed based on the 
characteristics identified by the stakeholders themselves in interviews and was then tested 
by demonstrating the system and then capturing feedback from a larger group of 
stakeholders. The feedback was analysed according to two different aspects: firstly, the 
perceived effectiveness and impact of visualisation on an interactive map in supporting 
risk assessment processes, and secondly, the perceived effectiveness of visualisation on 
an interactive map for strengthening the collaboration between multi-agencies. 
There was broad satisfaction with the interactive map system. At the contextualisation 
stage of risk assessment, the map was found to be a good, useful tool identifying affected 
populations. Findings point to the need for simple social information (such as population 
density, ethnicity, vulnerable people, schools’ and hospitals’ data) to be displayed as 
percentages, while calls were also made for complex factors (such as the level of social 
media and Internet use in a community) to help with communication with the public. The 
map emerged as a useful tool for understanding information relating to local 
infrastructure, although it was found that a greater emphasis on cascading effects on 
infrastructure would improve the map. The map’s contextualisation of information 
relating to the natural environment was also rated highly, but it was found that 
information relating to sites of special scientific interest should also be included. The map 
was found to aid the understanding of hazard sites, including COMAH sites. 
In hazard review activities the map was found to be useful, although it was rated more 
highly for its visualisation of past data (such as historic floods) than for visualising  more 
abstract information such as stakeholders’ experience, intelligence and research data. In 
risk analysis activities, the map was found to be useful in visualising potential impacts on 
critical infrastructure, utility services, transport networks, parts of the natural 
environment (such as wildlife and plant life) and the number of buildings affected. At the 
risk evaluation stage, the interactive map was found to support stakeholders in expressing 
their opinions and in justifying their judgments, because it makes immediate reasoning 
and justification possible. In risk treatment activities the interactive map was found to be 
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helpful in understanding the current capabilities and the gaps in an area, in identifying the 
number of specfic resources available and in supporting collaboration in this area. 
However, it was found that the map was weaker in helping users understand the less 
concrete aspects of ‘capability’ such as the skills and training of responders. At the 
monitoring and reviewing stage, the interactive map was found to be useful as way of 
bringing together comprehensive information but, at the same time, concerns were raised 
over the difficulty of maintaining the information from a variety of sources.  
This research has found that the interactive map system promotes debate and discussion 
and enables users to reason quickly and to justify their opinions. The map was found to 
enable users to perform tasks efficiently. The map was found to promote visual thinking, 
efficient reasoning and communication among users. Moreover, the map was found to be 
useful in promoting meta-cognitive skills, use of mental imagery, producing alternative 
explanations and plans and weighing ideas rationally. On the other hand, the level of 
information provided by the system and the effect that this has on decision-making was 
controversial. It was suggested that too much information, or information of the wrong 
kind, hindered decision-making.  
The findings of this study point to the important of interactive mapping in risk assessment, 
suggesting that topographical information, impact assessment and critical services 
mapped on a system like this serves to help in risk assessment. The research also suggests 
that interactive maps have the potential to help stakeholders decide how best to 
communicate with the public. 
A reoccurring theme in the findings is the importance of data in supporting a useful 
interactive map system. The findings suggest that data security, maintaining and updating 
the data involved, and the legal issues surrounding data protection, present a challenge for 
the design and use of interactive maps. The study discovered that there was a desire by 
the participants for live, real-time data with the promotion of thinking enhanced by 
visualisation emerging as a key strength of the system. The use of heat mapping and 
icons to visualise the population density of vulnerable populations was found to be a 
strength, as was the ability of the interactive map to provide layers of information.  
In general, findings in this study suggest that the interactive map has the potential to 
support collaboration. The system was found to provide a visual stimulus for discussion 
and debate, and a method for users to immediately justify views and opinions. There was 
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broad support for the assertion that the interactive map helped teams to collectively 
understand risks.  
The interactive map was commonly cited in the findings as being useful in planning 
activities. However, the findings also indicate the interactive map’s potential usefulness 
in response activities, which was widely cited in the feedback. Given that planning 
activities often involve the creation of plans for certain responses, the finding of this 
study is that the interactive map is useful in proactive planning activities before an event. 
The next chapter presents the thesis’ summary, the research contributions, and suggests 
areas for future research.           
           

























Chapter 11 – Conclusion 
 
11.1 Introduction  
This final chapter starts with the thesis’ summary and is followed by an assessment of the 
research undertaken in order to understand its value and its success in addressing the 
research objectives. Then, the research contributions are introduced and areas for future 
research are suggested. 
11.2  Thesis’ Summary 
The aim of this research is to investigate the nature of an interactive map that can 
enhance multi-agency team collaboration in the risk assessment process in disaster 
management. This research started with a review of subjects such as definitions of 
disaster, definitions of disaster management, guidance to the comprehensive approaches 
to disaster management, the risk assessment process, disaster preparedness, multi-agency 
collaboration, collaboration challenges, multi-agency collaboration practices in the 
United Kingdom, interactive maps, GIS and 3D visualisation. Also investigated and 
assessed were the theories and frameworks that are useful in understanding, analysing 
and supporting collaboration among multi-agencies in disaster management such as the 
cultural-historical theory (CHT) (Engeström, 2001), the critical thinking model (Fischer 
et al., 2009) and the team collaboration model (Patel et al, 2011). While a large amount of 
secondary data was evaluated, the research collected primary data to capture the 
characteristics that multi-agency stakeholders require from an interactive map that would 
enhance their activities in the risk assessment process. 
This study sought to develop an interactive map system that would enhance collaboration 
in multi-agency teams’ risk assessment activities. The system was developed based on the 
characteristics identified by the stakeholders themselves in interviews (for the 
characteristics see table 6.1). Then it was tested by demonstrating the system and 
capturing feedback from a larger group of stakeholders. The new additional 
characteristics that were put forward as a result of the evaluation data analysis were also 
found to be important in supporting multi-agencies in the risk assessment process. The 
new characteristics included a request that social information (such as population density, 
ethnicity, vulnerable people, schools’ and hospitals’ data) should be displayed as 
percentages, while calls were also made for more complex factors (such as the level of 
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social media and Internet use in a community) to be shown to help with communication 
with the public.  
Consequently, the interactive map’s visualisation, and the manipulation through the 
different layers containing social information, and information on local infrastructure, 
natural environment and hazard sites, helped multi agencies to collectively understand the 
context of local risks.  As an outcome, there was broad satisfaction with the interactive 
map system. The map was found to be a good tool for identifying affected populations, 
understanding information relating to local infrastructure and understanding the 
dangers/locations of hazard sites including COMAH sites. In addition, the map was found 
to be very supportive for hazards’ review and risk analysis as well. It also supported the 
stakeholders in the expression of their opinions and in justifying their judgements at the 
risk evaluation stage. In addition, it was helpful in risk treatment activities. The map was 
found to promote visual thinking, efficient reasoning and communication among users. 
This research has found that the interactive map system promotes debate and discussion 
and enables users to reason quickly and to justify their opinions. Moreover, the map was 
found to be valuable in promoting meta-cognitive skills, in the use of mental imagery, in 
producing alternative explanations and plans and in weighing up ideas rationally.  
The findings of this study point to the importance of interactive mapping in risk 
assessment, suggesting that topographical information, impact assessment and critical 
services mapped on a system like this serves to help in risk assessment. The research also 
suggests that interactive maps have the potential to help stakeholders decide how best to 
communicate with the public. 
11.3 Research Assessment 
In order to assess this PhD research, the following objectives, identified in Section 1.2, 
were examined to determine as to whether the research aim has been achieved. 
Objective 1: To analyse the risk assessment process and capture key stakeholders’ 
views on the risk assessment processes.  
The objective was achieved in two ways. Firstly, the risk assessment process was 
analysed via an extensive literature review which contextualised risk assessment as one 
stage in the overall integrated emergency management context. The risk assessment 
process itself was broken down into activities. The first stage involves multi-agency 
teams contextualizing social, natural, infrastructure and hazard site risks in order to fully 
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understand the local area.  The second stage of the process is the Hazard Review, in 
which past experience, historical data, research or other information is used by multi-
agency teams to collectively identify significant risks. The third stage is Risk Analysis, in 
which multi-agency teams seek to understand local risks in terms of their likelihood, 
outcome and impact. The fourth stage is Risk Evaluation, in which multi-agency teams 
work together to produce a risk matrix which identifies and prioritises local risk hotspots. 
The fifth stage is Risk Treatment, in which existing capabilities are identified and the 
gaps in these capabilities explored. The final stage of the process is Monitoring and 
Reviewing, in which multi-agency teams seek to collaboratively update, review and 
maintain information regarding local risks. The literature review identified these stages 
based on the standard widely recognized as being the best in current practice, used by 
developed countries around the world (Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand 
Standard Committee, AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009).  
In this research, a Local Resilience Forum (LRF) in the UK was used as the main vehicle 
for capturing key stakeholders’ views on risk assessment. One of LRF’s key roles is to 
coordinate the risk assessment process in a local area. Therefore, LRF members were 
identified as key stakeholders in the risk assessment process and this research sought to 
capture their views. The collection of this primary data was conducted via interviews 
with representatives from the Category 1 responders that make up the Greater Manchester 
LRF. These subjects included senior managers from the fire and rescue service, the police, 
the ambulance service, the local authority, NHS England, the Environment Agency and 
the local transport authority. These subjects were asked for their views on the risk 
assessment process in semi-structured interviews. The outcome of their views was 
presented in chapters 3 & 6. 
Objective 2: To identify the key functional characteristics of an interactive map that 
can enhance multi-agency teams’ collaboration in the risk assessment process in 
disaster management. 
This objective was, again, achieved in two ways. As the risk assessment process is based 
on collaboration, the relevant frameworks and theories relating to collaboration were 
analysed. This theoretical study helped to understand the nature of collaboration, the 
nature of tension and the skills of critical thinking that should be considered when 
developing a collaborative risk assessment environment. The characteristics required in 
such an interactive map were captured from interviews with stakeholders. The interviews 
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were transcribed and analysed thematically to define the characteristics that stakeholders 
felt would enhance their multi-agency collaboration. The information required by 
interviewees emerged in four main themes: Social (S), Natural (N), Critical infrastructure 
(CI) and Hazard sites (HS).  A detailed analysis of the information and the interaction 
features were presented in chapters 2 & 6. 
Objective 3: To design the look and feel of an interactive map that can enhance 
multi-agency team collaboration in risk assessment processes in disaster 
management. This design specification will be used to implement a prototype of the 
interactive map with the support of a skilled IT person. 
This objective has been achieved based on the requirements that emerged from the 
literature review and from interviews with stakeholders. Following the well-established 
and successful COA and TOGAF frameworks, the system’s conceptual design integrates 
four views: Information view, Process/Activity view, User Interface view and Team 
Member view. This system aims to provide multi-agency team members with a variety of 
information from different sources.  
Furthermore, the interactive map prototype presents the user with a map of an area. Using 
an interface, a user can place different layers of information over this map. The layers of 
information are: social information, natural information, infrastructure, hazardous site, 
resources and flood information. The system was designed using the Model-View-
Controller architectural pattern (Krasner and Pope, 1988). The overall design of the 
interactive map was presented in chapter 7. 
Objective 4: To evaluate whether the enhanced features of the interactive map has the 
potential to strengthen collaboration between multi-agency teams in risk assessment 
processes. 
The objective above was achieved by an evaluation that involved 23 participants from the 
Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum Development Group who attended an 
experiment in the Think pod, within Salford University’s Think Lab. This evaluation was 
achieved by using the system to demonstrate layers of information relating to a flood 
scenario that was based on historical and hypothetical data. The layers of information 
demonstrated to the participants contained social information, natural information, 
infrastructure, hazardous site, resources and flood information. After viewing a 
demonstration of the system, participants were asked to discuss the platform and the 
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scenario it presented as a group. The researcher observed this, enabling the capture of 
feedback. The questionnaires hand to the participants after the demonstration combined 
open, closed and rating scale questions to capture more specific qualitative and 
quantitative feedback from participants. The findings of the evaluation were analysed 
according to two aspects: firstly, the perceived effectiveness and impact of the 
visualisation on the interactive map on risk assessment processes and, secondly, the 
perceived effectiveness of the visualisation on the interactive map for a successful 
interactive and collaborative environment. The overall results of the evaluation were 
positive with both aspects receiving good levels of satisfaction from stakeholders. This 
finding suggests that the interactive map platform is generally useful both for the specific 
activities relating to risk assessment and for promoting collaboration in a multi-agency 
environment. The overall result suggests that the professionals view the interactive map 
as having the potential to support multi-agency teams in the planning and response phases 
of the disaster management cycle. The outcome of the evaluation was presented in 
chapters 8 and 9.  
11.4 Research Contributions  
This research contributes to the new knowledge on collaborative working within disaster 
management. It specifically focuses on enhancing knowledge by the application of 
interactive maps in supporting the six-step risk assessment process and multi-agency 
collaboration. This research has conducted an in-depth analysis to identify the key 
stakeholders involved in the risk assessment process as well as the information required 
to and analyse in order to create a common understanding of the local risks by conducting 
a thorough risk analysis. This knowledge has been extracted from secondary data as well 
as primary data through interview of the Category 1 responders. This in-depth knowledge 
has been used to establish a viable interactive map that can visually present the risks that 
is required in the six-step risk assessment process. The overall construction of the 
interactive map is also a contribution to knowledge due to its design using different 
system views such as Team Member view, Information view, Process/Activity view and 
Data Visualisation view. 
Finally this research collected and analysed feedback from the Greater Manchester Local 
Resilience Forum development group to capture “perceived effectiveness” of such an 
interactive map in supporting the risk assessment process as well as its potential for 
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strengthening the collaboration between multi-agencies. Specifically, this research has 
contributed to knowledge as follows.  
 The identification of functional characteristics on interactive map this knowledge 
could be used by the researcher community to develop different type of 
interactive maps using other technology such as virtual reality (VR) to support 
collaborative risk assessment involving key agencies in a city. 
 The research conducted in this research has lead to the implementation and 
demonstration of an interactive map. The implemented interactive map illustration 
has the data required for the risk assessment could be combined, visualized and 
manipulated to build up a holistic view of local risk and help multi-agency to 
engage in decision during various stage of the risk assessment process.  
 Data an “perceived effectiveness” of an interactive map from category 1 
responder in supporting the six-step risk assessment process as well as multi-
agency collaboration.  This contribution gives confidence to the research 
community that the outcome is not just hypothetical but has been valid by the 
practitioners who are engaged in risk assessment in a major city. 
11.5 Future Research 
Further work could be conducted to build on the foundation laid in this thesis to further 
enhance knowledge in disaster management: 
 Testing in practice and getting objective results. Testing the use of the interactive map 
in real world risk assessment activities (or formal training exercises) involving a 
range of agencies and measuring the impact of the prototype on building resilience, 
enhancing preparation and supporting collaboration.  
 Integrating various simulations to assess flood propagation, fire propagation and 
chemical cloud propagation will allow agencies to explore a range of possible 
scenarios and consider risk mitigation. 
 Simulation of the cascading effect of a disaster event through disaster propagation 
models. The use of modelling technology, such as system dynamics and Bayesian 
belief functions, have been identified as possible approaches for modelling the 
cascading effects by an internal project within the Think Lab. 
287 
 
 Integrating the simulation of real-time events and data as a way of simulating hazards’ 
events could allow the interactive map to be used for testing the preparedness of 
multi-agencies. This could become a powerful tool for training multi-agencies’ staff 
in order to prepare them for responding to real events. 
 This use of this environment during the event itself is a possibility. Future research 
could be conducted to understand how real-time data and resources could be 
integrated into the map to support real-time response and also how teams could 
interact with the map in real-time. 
11.6 Summary  
This research has resulted in the creation of an interactive map designed to enhance 
collaboration among multi-agency teams in risk assessment activities. It has combined 
primary and secondary data to produce a theoretical framework, a conceptual framework 
and a collaborative platform in the form of an interactive map. This interactive map has 
been found to have the potential to support multi-agency teams in the planning phases of 






Abbott, L. (2002). Emergency Planning in Local Authorities. Municipal Engineer, 
151(4): pp. 245–247. 
Abowitz, D. A. & Toole, T. M. (2010). Mixed method research: fundamental issues of 
design, validity, and reliability in construction research. J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 136(1), 
108–116 
Achour, N., Pascale, F., Soetanto, R. & Price, A. D. (2015). Healthcare emergency 
planning and management to major hazards in the UK. International Journal of 
Emergency Management, 11(1), 1-19. 
 
Adey, P. & Anderson, B. (2012). Anticipating emergencies: Technologies of 
preparedness and the matter of security. Security Dialogue, 43(2), 99-117. 
Adger, W. N. (2000). Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Progress in 
Human Geography 24(3):347-364. 
Adger, W. N. (2006). Vulnerability. Global Environmental Change 16: 268–281. 
Alberts, D.S. and Hayes, R.E. (2006). Understanding Command and Control, Command 
and Control CCRP Publication. 
Aldunate, R. G., Pena-Mora, F. & Robinson, G. E. (2005). Distributed decision making 
for large scale disaster relief operations: Drawing analogies from robust natural systems. 
Complexity, 11(2), 28–38. 
Alexander, D. (1993). Confronting Catastrophe: New Perspectives on Natural Disasters. 
Natural Disasters, Chapman & Hall, Inc, New York, pp. 12-14.  
Alexander, D. (2002). Principles of Emergency Planning and Management. Oxford 
University Press. 
Alexander, D (2005). Towards the development of a standard in emergency planning. 
Disaster prevention and management, 2005; 14, 2. ProQuest Health and Medical 
complete, page 158 
Alexander, D. (2006). Globalization of disaster: trends, problems and dilemmas. Journal 
of International Affairs 59(2): 1-22 
Alexander, D. (2009). Principles of emergency planning. In U. Fra Paleo (ed.) Building 
Safer Communities: Risk Governance, Spatial Planning and Responses to Natural 




Alexander, M., Viavattene, C., Faulkner, H. & Priest, S (2011). A GIS-based Flood Risk 
Assessment Tool: Supporting Flood Incident Management at the local scale.  
Alphen, J.V., Martini, F., Loat, R., Slomp, R. and Passchier, R. (2009). Flood risk 
mapping in Europe, experiences and best practices. Journal of Flood Risk Management. 
1-8 
Alzahmi, M. Fernando, T. Ingirige, B. (2013). The role of technology in building the 
resilience of cities. The International Conference on Building Resilience 2013, 17th – 
19th September at Heritance Ahungalla, Sri Lanka. 
 
Anderson, B. & Adey, P. (2012) Governing events and life: ‘Emergency’ in UK Civil 
Contingencies. Political Geography, 31(1), 24-33. 
Andrienko G. L. and Andrienko N. V. (1999). Interactive maps for visual data 
exploration. International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 13(4), 355-374 
Andrienko N., Andrienko G., Voss H., Bernardo F., Hipolito J. & Kretchmer U. (2002). 
Testing the Usability of Interactive Maps in Common GIS. Cartography and Geographic 
Information Science, 29(4), 325-342 
Andrienko, N., Andrienko, G., Savinov, A., Voss, H. & Wettschereck, D. (2001). 
Exploratory analysis of spatial data using interactive maps and data mining. Cartography 
and Geographic Information Science 28 (3):151–165. 
Antony, J. & Banuelas, R. (2002). Key ingredients for the effective implementation of six 
sigma program. Measuring Business Excellence, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 20-7. 
Atkins and Partners Ltd (APL) (2006). Software for Emergency Planning and 
Management. Retrieved 15 November, 2013, from http://www.airport-
int.com/article/emergency-planning-and-management.html 
The Australasian Inter-Service Management System, (2004) Australian Fire Authority 
Council, 3
rd
 ed, version 1, pp 23 
Awal, R. (2003). Application of Steady and Unsteady Flow Model and GIS for 
Floodplain Analysis and Risk Mapping: A Case Study of Lakhandei River, Nepal. (M. Sc. 
Thesis), Water Resources Engineering, IOE, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu 
Awal, R. (2007). Floodplain Analysis and Risk Assessment of Lakhandei River. Applied 
Research Grants for Disaster Risk Reduction Rounds I and II (2003-2006), Innovative 
Initiatives in Disaster Risk Reduction - Applied Research by Young Practitioners in 
South, South East, and East Asia, pp.118-129. Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 
(ADPC), Thailand. 
Badger Software (2013). The UK's leading supplier of critical incident management 
systems.  Retrieved 15 November, 2013, from http://www.badger.co.uk/index.htm 
Ball, D. J. and Ball-King, L. (2013). Safety Management and Public Spaces: Restoring 
Balance. Risk Analysis, 33: 763–771. 
290 
 
Bannon, L. & Bødker, S. (1991). Beyond the Interface: Encountering Artifacts in Use, In 
J. M. Carroll (ed.), Designing Interaction: Psychology at the Human-Computer Interface, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 227-253. 
Barab, S. A., Kling, R. & Gray, J. H. (2004). Introduction: Designing for virtual 
communities in the service of learning. In S. A. Barab, R. Kling, & J. H. Gray (Eds.), 
Designing for virtual communities in the service of learning (pp. 3-15). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Basic, F. (2009). Geographic visualisation tools for communicating flood risks to the 
public (Doctoral dissertation, RMIT University, Melbourne). 
Benenson, I. & Torrens, P. M. (2004). Geosimulation: Auto-mata-Based Modeling of 
Urban Phenomena. John Wiley and Sons, London. 
Bernard, H. R. (2002). Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative 
methods. 3rd edition. AltaMira Press ,Walnut Creek, California. 
Bharosa, N., Lee, J. and Janssen, M. (2009). Challenges and obstacles in sharing and 
coordinating information during multi-agency disaster response propositions from field 
exercises. Inf Syst Front (2010) 12:49–65. Springer.  
Bharosa, N., Lee, J., Janssen, M. & Rao, H.R. (2012). An activity theory analysis of 
boundary objects in cross-border information systems development for disaster 
management. Secur Inform 1, 1–17. 
Bhattacharya, D., Ghosh, J. K. & Samadhiya, N. K. (2012). Review of geohazard 
warning systems toward development of a popular usage geohazard warning 
communication system. Natural hazards review, 13(4), 260-271. 
Bhattarai, K. & Conway, D. (2010). Urban vulnerabilities in the Kathmandu valley, 
Nepal: visualizations of human/hazard interactions. Journal of Geographic Information 
System, 2(02), 63. 
Bier, V. M. (2006). Hurricane Katrina as a bureaucratic nightmare. In Daniels, R. J., Kettl, 
D. F., & Kunreuther, H. (Eds.), On risk and disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina (pp. 
243–254). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Bigley, G. A. & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The incident command system: High reliability 
organizations for complex and volatile task environ-ments. Academy of Management 
Journal, 44(6), 1281–1299. 
Billen, R. & Zlatanova, S. (2003). D Spatial Relationships Model: A Useful Concept for 
3D Cadastre? Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 411-425.  
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I. & Wiser, B. (1994). At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability, and Disasters, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London. 
Bleisch, S. (2012). D Geovisualization-Definition and Structures for the Assessment of 
Usefulness. ISPRS Annals of Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information 
Sciences, 1, 129-134. 
291 
 
Bloom, B. S. (1956). Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I: The Cognitive 
Domain. NY: David McKay Co. Inc 
Bloor, M. & Wood, F. (2006). Keywords in qualitative methods: A vocabulary of 
research concepts. Sage. 
Booth, B. & Mitchell, A. (2001). Getting started with ArcGIS, USA, ESRI. 
Botterell, A. & Addams-Moring, R. (2007). Public Warning in the Networked Age: Open 
standards to the rescue Communications of the ACM, 50(3), 59-60. 
Brookfield, S. (1987). Developing Critical Thinkers. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. 
Bryman, A. (2008) Social Research Methods (3
rd
 Edition). Oxford University Press 
Buchanan, L. & O’Connell, A. (2006). A brief history of decision-making. Harvard 
Business Review, 84(1) 32–41 
Buck, D., Trainor, J. and Aguirre, B. (2006). A critical evaluation of the Incident 
Command System and NIMS. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management (Impact Factor: 0.55). 01/2006; 3(3). DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1252 





Cabinet Office (2010). Emergency Response & Recovery, Central Government 
Arrangements 
https://update.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Chapter%2013.pdf 
Cabinet Office (2010a). The role of local resilience forums: A reference document. 
London: HM Government.  
Cabinet Office (2010b). Responding to emergencies: Concept of operations. London: 
Cabinet Office (2012). Local responder risk assessment duty of Emergency Preparedness, 
Revised Version. HM Government. 
Cabinet Office (2013). Emergency Response & Recovery [pdf] London. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/E
mergency_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf 
Cabinet Office (2013a). The role of Local Resilience Forums: A reference document [on 
line], available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/110404-
v5-Final-Role-of-an-LRF-A-Reference-Document.pdf [accessed 8 September 2013) 
Cabinet Office (2013b). Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance 
accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A reference document [on line], 
available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/E
mergency_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf [accessed 8 
September 2013) 
Cabinet Office (2013c). Emergency preparedness Non statutory guidance accompanying 
292 
 
the Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A reference document [on line], available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness 
Cabinet Office, (2013d). Resilient communications: A reference document [on line], 
available: https://www.gov.uk/resilient-communications 
Carley, K. M. & Lin, Z. (1997). A theoretical study of organizational performance under 
information distortion. Management Science, 43(7), 976–999. 
Carpenter, S. R., Walker, B., Anderies, J. M. & Abel., N. (2001). From metaphor to 
measurement: resilience of what to what? Ecosystems 4:765-781 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2015). Planning for an Emergency: 
Strategies for Identifying and Engaging At-Risk Groups. A guidance document for 
Emergency Managers: First edition. Atlanta (GA): CDC. 
 
Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), (2006). Natural Hazards and Disaster 
Management. Delhi: Preet Vihar. 
Chaiklin, S. (2007). Modular or Integrated? - An Activity Perspective for Designing and 
Evaluating Computer-Based Systems, Human-Computer Interaction, 22(1-2), 173-190. 
Chaiklin, S. (2011). The role of practice in cultural-historical science, in Kontopodis, M. 
et al. (eds.) Children, Development and Education: Cultural, Historical, Anthropological 
Perspectives, Dordrecht: Springer, 227-246. 
Chance, P. (1986). Thinking in the classroom: A survey of programs. New York: 
Teachers College, Columbia University. 
Christie, R. D. (1994). Towards a Higher Level of User Interaction in the Energy 
Management Task, Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Humans, Information and 
Technology, IEEE International Conference on 2-5 Oct 1994 
Chesterton, S. 2011. Operation Bridge: Peer review into the response of Cumbria 
Constabulary following the actions of Derrick Bird on 2nd June 2010. West Mercia 
Police. 
Ciaovola, P., Armaroli, C., Perini, L. & Luciani, P. (2006) Evaluation of maximum storm 
wave run-up and surges along the Emilia-Romagna coastline (NE Italy): A step towards a 
risk zonation in support of local CZM strategies, in integrated coastal zone management, 
Research Publishing, The Global Challenge, Chennai, India, Chapter 16. Pp 1-12. 
Cimons. M. (2011). Geospatial Technology as a Core Tool. Available: 
http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2011/05/11/geospatial-technology-as-a-core-tool. 
Last accessed 20th October 2012. 
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA, 2004) Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of 
the Civil Contingency Act 2004, its associated regulations and non-statutory 
arrangements. Emergency Planning College; Easingwold: Crown Copyright  






Clement, A. & van den Besselaar, P. (1993). Participatory design projects: A 
retrospective look. Communications of the ACM, 36(6), 19-27. 
Clerveaux, V., Spence, B. & Katada, T., (2010) Promoting disaster awareness in 
multicultural societies: the DAG approach, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 19 
No. 2, pp. 199-218. 
Cohen, M. S., Adelman, L., Tolcott, M.A., Bresnick, T. A. & Marvin, F. F. (1994). A 
cognitive framework for battlefield commanders’ situation assessment. ARI Technical 
Report 1002. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute 
Col, J. M. (2007). Managing disasters: The role of local government. Public 
Administration Review, 67(s1), 114–124. 
Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). A cultural-historical approach to distributed cognition. 
In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognitions: Psychological and educational 
considerations (pp. 1-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Collis, J. & Hussey, R. (2003). Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate 
and Postgraduate Students, 2nd ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Collis, J. & Hussey, R. (2009). Business research: A practical guide for undergraduate 
and postgraduate students: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Comfort, L. K. (2007). ‘Crisis management in hindsight: cognition, communication, 
coordination, and control’. Public Administration Review. 67(S1). pp. 189–197 
Coppola, D. (2007). Introduction to international disaster management. Amsterdam; 
Boston: Butterworth Heinemann 
Couclelis, H. & Monmonier, M. (1995). Using SUSS to Resolve NIMBY: How Spatial 
Understanding Support Systems Can Help with the ‘Not in My Back Yard’ syndrome. 
Geographical Systems 2 (2): 83–101. 
Council, A. F. A. (2005). The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System: A 
management system for any emergency. AFAC. 
Crampton J. W. (2002). Interactivity types for geographic visualization. Cartography & 
Geographic Information Science, 29(2), 85–98 
Crawford, K. & Hasan, H. (2006). Demonstrations of the Activity Theory Framework for 
Research in Information Systems, Australasian Journal of Information Systems, 13, 49-68.  
Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design, 2nd ed., California: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W. (2012) Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating 
quantitative and qualitative research. 4th ed. Boston: Pearson.  
Cutter, S. L., Emrich, C. T., Adams, B. J., Huyck, C. K. & Eguchi, R. T. (2007). New 
Information technologies in emergency management, in Waugh, W., Tierney, K. (eds) 
294 
 
Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government, Second Edition. 
Washington, DC: ICMA Press. 
Davis, G. B. & Olson, M. H. (1985). Management Information System: Conceptual 
Foundation, Structure and Development (second ed.), McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Demirel, H. (2004). A Generic Data Model Proposal for Multi-Dimensional Road Object, 
International Archives of Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information 
Sciences, Vol. 35,  pp. 1312-1317.  
Denscombe, M. (2008). The Good Research Guide for small-scale social research 
projects. 3rd ed. Maidenhead: Open University Press 
Denscombe, M. (2010). The good research guide for small-scale social research projects 
(4th ed.) (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill). 
Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Introduction: The discipline and practice of 
qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of 
qualitative research (3rd ed., pp. 1–32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Department for Communities and Local Government, (2012). Department for 
Communities & Local Government Open Data Strategy April 2012 – April 2014. 
Retrieved from 
http://data.gov.uk/sites/default/files/DCLG%20Open%20Data%20Strategy_10.pdf 
Deshmukh, R., Rodrigues, L. L. R. & Krishnamurthy, G. R. (2008). Earthquake risk and 
knowledge management, Journal of Knowledge Management Practice, Vol. 9 No. 3. 
Desfray, P. & Raymond, G. (2014). Modeling Enterprise Architecture with TOGAF: A 
Practical Guide Using UML and BPMN. Morgan Kaufmann, 
DiBiase, D. A. M., Maceachren, A. M., Krygier, J. B. & Reeves, C. (1992). Animation 
and the role of map design in scientific visualisation. Cartography and Geographic 
Information Systems. 19. 201-214 
Dillon, B., Dickinson, I., Whiteford, F., and Williamson, J. (2009). Emergency planning 
officers' handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Dransch, D., Etter, J. & Walz, U. (2005). Maps for natural risk management. 
International Cartographic Conference (La Coruna, Spain 2005). Retrieved from 
http://www2.ioer.de/recherche/pdf/2005_walz_dransch_etter_icc2005.pdf 
Dykes J. A. (1997). Exploring spatial data representation with dynamic graphics. 
Computers and Geosciences, 23, 345-370 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. & Jackson, P. (2008). Management Research: Theory 
and Practice, 3rd ed., London: Sage 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. & Jackson, P. R. (2012). Management research. Sage. 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), (2012). ArcGIS for Emergency 
Management. Available:http://www.esri.com/library/whitepapers/pdfs/arcgis-for-
emergency-management.pdf. Last accessed 15th October 2012. 
295 
 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), (2010). What’s Coming in ArcGIS 10 
Desktop?  http://www.esri. com/software/arcgis/whats-new/index.html  
Edsall, R. M. (2007). Cultural factors in digital cartographic design: implications for 
communication to diverse users. Cartography and Geographic Information Science, 34 
(2):121–128. 
Egenhofer M. J. & Franzosa R. D. (1991). Point-set topological spatial relations. 
International Journal of Geographical Information Systems, 5(2), 161-176 
Eide, A. W., Halvorsrud, R., Haugstveit, I. M., Skjetne, J. H. & Stiso, M. (2012). Key 
challenges in multiagency collaboration during large-scale emergency management. In 
AmI for Crisis management, International Joint Conference on Ambient Intelligence, Pisa, 
Italy. 
Ellul C. & Haklay M. (2006). Requirements for Topology in 3D GIS. Transactions in 
GIS, 10(2), 157-175 
Ellwood, T. and Philip, M. (2013). Improving Efficiency, Interoperability and Resilience 
of our Blue Light Services. The APPG HS (Session 2013-14). 
 
Elwood, S. (2006). Critical Issues in Participatory GIS: Deconstructions, Reconstructions, 
and New Research Directions. Transactions in GIS 10 (5) (November 1): 693– 708. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9671.2006.01023.x 
Emergency Management Accreditation Program, (2007). Emergency Management 
Accreditation Program Standard. Lexington, KY: Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program. 
Engestro M. Y., Engestro M. R. & Karkkainen, M. (1995). Polycontextuality and 
boundary crossing in expert cognition: learning and problem solving in complex work 
activities, Learning and Instruction, 5(4), pp. 319–336. 
Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by Expanding: An Activity-Theoretical Approach to 
Developmental Work Research, Helsinki: Orienta-konsultit. 
Engeström, Y. (1993). Developmental studies of work as a test bench of activity theory: 
The case of primary care medical practice. In J. Lave & S. Chaiklin, (Eds.), 
Understanding practice: Perspectives on activity and context (pp. 64-103). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Engeström, Y. (1995). Objects, contradictions and collaboration in medical cognition: an 
activity-theoretical perspective, Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 7, 395-412.  
Engeström, Y. (1999). Innovative learning in work teams: analysing knowledge creation 
in practice. In Y. Engeström, R. Miettinen, & R-L Punamaki (eds.), Perspectives on 
Activity Theory: Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives. 
Cambridge University Press, UK: pp 377-404. 
Engeström, Y. (2000). Activity theory as a framework for analyzing and redesigning 
work. Ergonomics, 43(7), 960-974. 
296 
 
Engeström, Y. (2001). Expansive Learning at work: towards an activity theoretical 
reconceptualisation. Journal of Education and Work, Vol 14 no 1. 
Engeström, Y. (1997) Coordination, cooperation and communication in the courts: 
expansive transitions in legal work, in Coles, M. et al (1997) Mind, Culture and Activity: 
seminal papers from the laboratory of comparative human condition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 369-388. 
Engle, E. (2008). Ontology, epistemology, axiology: bases for a comprehensive theory of 
law. Appalachian Journal of Law. 
Eshghi, K. & Larson, R. C. (2008). Disasters: lessons from the past 105 years, Disaster 
Prevention and Management, 17, 62-68. 
Experian (2009). Improve outcomes through applied customer insight: Experian’s Mosaic 
Public Sector citizen classification for the United Kingdom. 
http://publicsector.experian.co.uk/Products/Mosaic%20Public%20Sector.aspx 
 
Fallesen, J. J., Michel, R. R., Lussier, J. W. & Pounds. J. (1996). Practical thinking: 
innovation in battle command instruction. Technical Report 1037. Alexandria, VA: U.S. 
Army Research Institute 
Fagel, M. (2011). Principles of emergency management and emergency operations 
centres (EOC). Taylor and Francis group: CRC press 
 
Faraj, S., and Xiao, Y. (2006). Coordination in fast-response organizations. Management 
Science, 52(8), 1155–1169. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0526. 
 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), (2008). Chemical Stockpile 
Emergency Preparedness Program Planning Guidance. Washington, DC: FEMA 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2013). Incident Command System 
(ICS). Available at: www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ Incident Command System. shtm. 
Accessed February 11, 2013 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), (2008). ICS Review Material. 
Retrieved from 
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/reviewmaterials.pdf 
Finlay, I. (2008). Learning through boundary-crossing: Further education lecturers 
learning in both the university and workplace. European Journal of Teacher Education, 
31, 73-87. doi: 10.1080/02619760701845024 
Fischer, S. C., Spiker, V. A. & Riedel, S. L. (2009). Critical thinking training for Army 
officers. Volume Two: Model of Critical Thinking. ARI Research Report 1882. Arlington, 
VA: US Army Research for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 
Fleischhauer, M., Greiving, S. & Wanczura, S. (Eds.) (2006). Natural Hazards and 
Spatial Planning in Europe. Dortmund 2006. 206 pp. 
Flin, R., O’Connor, P. and Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to 




Franke, U., Höök, D., König, J., Lagerström, R., Närman, P., Ullberg, J., & Ekstedt, M. 
(2009). EAF2 -A framework for categorizing enterprise architecture frameworks. In 
Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligences, Networking and Parallel/Distributed 
Computing, 2009. SNPD'09. 10th ACIS International Conference on (pp. 327-332). IEEE. 
Friedmannova, L., Konecny, M. & Stanek, K. (2007). An adaptive cartographic 
visualization for support of the crisis management. In XXIII International Cartographic 
Conference – Cartography for everyone and for you. Vyd. 1. Moscow, 2007. (1-9). 
Retrieved from http://www.google.com/search?sclient=psy- 
ab&hl=en&rlz=1T4SNNT_en___US423&source=hp&q=An+adaptive+cartograp 
hic+visualization+for+support+of+the+crisis+management+citation 
Fugate, W. C. (2010). Version 2.0 of Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101: 
Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.  
Flueler, T. (2006). Decision-making for complex socio-technical systems: Robustness 
from lessons learned in long-term radioactive waste governance. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Springer. 
Gallopin, G.C. (2006). Linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity. 
Global Environmental Change 16, 293-303.  
Gaist (2010). Emergency services: Commanders Resource Platform. 
http://www.gaist.co.uk/BusinessLines/EmergencyServices.aspx (accessed 20/1/2015) 
 
Gelenbe, E. & Gorbil, G. (2012). Wireless networks in emergency management. In 
Proceedings of the first ACM international workshop on Practical issues and applications 
in next generation wireless networks (pp. 1-6). ACM. 
 
Ghauri, P., Gronhaug, K. & Kristianslund, I. (1995). Research Methods in Business 
Studies: Practical Guide, New York and London: Prentice Hall. 
GISCafe (2011). AAM Modelling Aids Brisbane Flood Crisis. Available at: 
http://www10.giscafe.com/nbc/articles/1/912083/AAM-Modelling-Aids-Brisbane-Flood-
Crisis. Accessed 15th February 2014.  
Gold C. M. (1993). Forestry spatial decision support system classification and the `flight 
simulator' approach. Proceedings of the GIS'93, Eyes on the Future, Vancouver, BC, 
Canada, pp797-802 
Gold C. M. & Condal A. R. (1995). A Spatial Data Structure Integrating GIS and 
Simulation in a Marine Environment. Journal of Marine Geodesy, 18, 213-228 
Goralski I. R. & Gold C. M. (2007b). Maintaining the Spatial Relationships of Marine 
Vessels using the Kinetic Voronoi Diagram. Proceedings of the 4th International 
Symposium on Voronoi Diagrams in Science and Engineering (ISVD'07), July 9-12, 
Wales, UK, pp84-90 
Gordon, J. A. (2002). Comprehensive Emergency Management for Local Governments: 




Government Accountability Office (GAO), (2014). Emergency Preparedness: 
opportunities exist to strengthen interagency assessments and accountability for closing 
capability Gaps. United States Government Accountability Office. 
Guha-Sapir D., Hargitt, D. & Hoyois, P. (2004). Thirty Years of Natural Disasters 1974-
2003: The Numbers. Belgium: Presses Universitaires de Louvain. 188 pp 
Guha-Sapir, D., Vos, F., Below, R. & Ponserre, S. (2011). Annual disaster statistical 
review 2010. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 
Gummesson, E. (1991). Qualitative Methods in Management Research, London: Sage. 
Guo, D. (2003). Coordinating computational and visual approaches for interactive feature 
selection and multivariate clustering. Information Visualization 2 (4):232–246. 
Haddow, G. D., Bullock, J. A. & Coppola, D. P. (2008). Introduction to emergency 
management. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann 
Haddow G., Bullock J., and Coppola D. (2011). Introduction to Emergency Management. 
4
th
Edn: Butterworth-Heinemann publishers. 
Haddow, G., Bullock, J., & Coppola, D. P. (2013). Introduction to emergency 
management. Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Hadi, S., Nursantika, D. & Purwanti, I. (2012). Integrating Computer Vision Technique 
to Support Tsunami Early Warning System. International conference. 1 (1), p1951-1955. 
Haigh, R. & Amaratunga, D. (2010). Disasters and the built environment: towards a 
mature discipline. International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment. 
Vol 1. No 1.  
Hakkinen, H. & Korpela, M. (2006). A participatory assessment of IS integration needs 
in maternity clinics using activity theory, International Journal of Medical Informatics. 
Haklay, M., Ather, A. & Basiouka, S. (2010). How Many Volunteers Does It Take To 
Map An Area Well. 
Halcrow (2011). Instant insight into flood risk: FloodViewer. Available from 
http://www.halcrow.com/Documents/flood_alert/FloodViewer.pdf (accessed 20/05/2014) 
Hashim, N. H. & Jones, M. L. (2007). Activity Theory: A framework for qualitative 
analysis. 4th International Qualitative Research Convention (QRC), 3-5 September, 2007, 
P J Hilton, Malaysia. 
Hause, M. (2010). Model-Based System of Systems Engineering with UPDM. Omg. org. 
Henstra, D. (2010). Evaluating local government emergency management programs: 
What framework should public managers adopt? Public Administration Review, 70(2), 
236–246. 
 
Hewett, P. L. Jr., Mitrani, J. E., Metz, W. C. and Vercellone., J. J. (2001). Coordinating, 
299 
 
Integrating, and Synchronizing Disaster Response: Use of an Emergency Response 
Synchronization Matrix in Emergency Planning, Exercises, and Operations. International 
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 19(3): pp. 329–348 (August). 
Holling, C. S. (1973). Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics 4:1-23 
Howard, R. (1988). Panel remarks: CSCW: What does it mean? Proceedings of 
CSCW’88.  Portland, OR: Association for Computing Machinery. 
Huifen, W., Youliang, Z., Jian, C., Lee, S. F. & Kwong, W. C. (2003). Feature-based 
collaborative design. Journal of Materials Processing Technology, 139(1), 613-618. 
Husdal, J. (2001). Can It Really Be That Dangerous? Issues in Visualization of Risk and 
Vulnerability, www.husdal.com 
Hussey, J. & Hussey, R. (1997). Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate 
and Postgraduate Students, Macmillan Press, London. 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/definition-of-
hazard/ accessed September 2012 
International Organization for Standarization (ISO). 2009. Risk management – principles 
and guidelines. ISO 31000:2009(E), November. ISO, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Institute for Ocean Management, Anna University, Chennai. (2007). Training the trainers 
on community based hazard map development. Retrieved from 
http://www.adrc.asia/events/Chennai/Presentation/Final%20Report%20Tentative. Pdf 
Issroff, K. & Scanlon, E. (2002). Using technology in higher education: An activity 
theory perspective. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 18, 77-83. doi: 
10.1046/j.0266- 4909.2001.00213.x 
Jacobides, M. G. (2007). The inherent limits of organizational structure and the 
unfulfilled role of hierarchy: Lessons from a near-war. Organization Science, 18, 3, 455-
477. 
Jerisho Forum tm, (2008). Position Paper: Collaborative Oriented Architecture. 
https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/COA_v1.0.pdf   
JERICHO FORUM 2008. Collaboration Oriented Architectures. 
Jankowicz, A. D. (2005). Business research projects: Cengage Learning Business Press. 
JERICHO FORUM (2008). Collaboration Oriented Architectures.  
Johnson, P. & Duberly, J. (2000). Understanding Management Research, London: Sage. 
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP). (2013) [online]. 
Available at: http://www.jesip.org.uk/ 
300 
 
Jonassen, D. H. & Rohrer-Murphy, L. (1999). Activity theory as a framework for 
designing constructivist learning environments. Educational Technology Research and 
Development, 47(1), 61-79. 
Jones, S. (1985). The Analysis of Depth Interviews Pp.56-70 in Walker Robert (ed.), 
Applied Qualitative Research. London:Gower Punblishing Company.  
Jung, Y., Kim, D., Kim, D., Kim, M. & Lee, S. O. (2014). Simplified Flood Inundation 
Mapping Based On Flood Elevation-Discharge Rating Curves Using Satellite Images in 
Gauged Watersheds. Water, 6(5), 1280-1299. 
 
Kagioglou, M., Cooper, R., Aouad, G. & Sexton, M. (2000). Rethinking construction: 
The generic guide to the design and construction process protocol. Engineering 
Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. 7(2), pp. 141-153. 
Kamensky, J. M., Burlin, T. J. & Abramson, M. A. (2004). Networks and partnerships: 
Collaborating to achieve results no one can achieve alone. In Kamensky, J. M., & Burlin, 
T. J. (Eds.), Collaboration using net-works and partnerships (pp. 3–20). Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Kaptelinin, V. (1996). Activity Theory: Implications for Human-Computer Interaction, In 
B. A. Nardi (ed.), Context and Consciousness: Activity Theory and Human-Computer 
Interaction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 53-59. 
Kaptelinin, V., Nardi, B. A. & Macaulay, C. (1999). The Activity Checklist: A tool for 
representing the “space” of context. ACM Interactions, 6 (4), 27-39. 
Kapucu, N. & Garayev, V. (2011). Collaborative decision-making in emergency and 
disaster management. International Journal of Public Administration, 34(6), 366-375. 
Kapucu, N. & Van Wart, M. (2006). The emerging role of the public sector in managing 
extreme events: Lessons learned. Administration & Society, 38(3), 279–308. 
Kelman, I. & Pooley, S. (Eds), (2004). Disaster Definitions, available at: 
www.ilankelman.org/miscellany/DisasterDefinitions.rtf (accessed 10 September 2012). 
Kemec, S., Zlatanova, S. & Duzgun, H. S. (2010). A framework for defining a 3D model 
in support of risk management. In Geographic Information and Cartography for Risk and 
Crisis Management (pp. 69-82). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Kling, R. (1991). Cooperation, coordination, and control in computer-supported work. 
Communications of the ACM, 34(12), 83-88. 
Kapucu, N., & Garayev, V. (2011). Collaborative decision-making in emergency and 
disaster management. International Journal of Public Administration, 34(6), 366-375. 
 
Kolbe, T. H., Gröger G. & Pl mer L. (2005). CityGML-Interoperable Access to 3D City 
Models, Oosterom, Zlatanova, Fendel (Eds.): Proceedings of the Int. Symposium on Geo-
information for Disaster Management on 21-23 March 2005 in Delft, Springer Verlag 
Kontoes, C., Keramitsoglou, I., Papoutsis, I., Koubarakis, T.M., Kyzirakos, K., 
301 
 
Karpathiotakis, M., Nikolaou, C., Sioutis, M., Garbis, G., Manegold, S.S., Kersten, M. & 
Pirk, H. (2012). Operational Wildfire Monitoring and Disaster Management Support 
Using State-of-the-art EO and Information Technologies. FP7 projects TELEIOS and 
SAFER, Second International Workshop on Earth Observation and Remote Sensing 
Applications. Athens, 2012:IEEE. 
Korpela, M., Mursu, A. & Soriyan, H. A. (2002). Information Systems Development as 
an Activity. Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), 11, pp. 111-128. 
Korpela, M., Soriyan, H.A. and Olufokunbi, K.C. (2000). Activity analysis as a method 
for information systems development: General introduction and experiments from 
Nigeria and Finland, Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 12(1) 191-210. 
Koschmann, T., Kelson, A. C., Feltovich, P. J. & Barrows, H. S. (1996). Computer-
supported problem-based learning: A principled approach to the use of computers in 
collaborative learning. In T. Koschmann (Ed.), CSCL: Theory and practice (pp.83-124). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Kot, B., Wuensche, B., Grundy, J. & Hosking, J. (2005). Information visualisation using 
3D computer game engines case study: A source code comprehension tool. CHINZ 2005 
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCHI New Zealand Chapter’s International Conference 
on Computer-Human Interaction: Making CHI natural 
Koua, E. L. & Kraak, M.-J. (2005). Evaluating Self-organizing Maps for Geo-
visualization. 
Kraak M. J. (2006). Why Maps Matter in GIScience. The Cartographic Journal, 43(1), 
82-89 
Kraak M. J. & Ormeling F. J. (2003). Cartography: Visualization of Geospatial Data (2nd 
Edition). Prentice Hall 
Krasner, G. & Pope, S. (1988). A Description of the Model-View-Controller User 
Interface Paradigm in the Smalltalk-80 System. Journal of Object-Oriented Programming 
1.3 (1988): 26-49. <http://www.math.sfedu.ru/smalltalk/gui/mvc_krasner_and_pope.pdf> 
Kusumasari, B., Alam, Q. & Siddiqui, K. (2010). Resource capability for local 
government in managing disasters, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 19 No. 4, 
pp. 438-51. 
Kusumasari, T. F., Supriana, I., Surendro, K. & Sastramihardja, H. (2011). Collaboration 
model of software development. In Electrical Engineering and Informatics (ICEEI), 2011 
International Conference on (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
Kutti, K. (1996). Activity theory as a potential framework for human-computer 
interaction research, In B. A. Nardi (ed.) Context and Consciousness: Activity Theory 
and Human-Computer Interaction, Cambridge: MIT Press, 17–44. 
Kwan, M. P. (2002). Feminist Visualization: Re-Envisioning GIS as Method in Feminist 
Geographic Research, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 92, No. 
4,, pp. 645-661.  
302 
 
Lantolf, J. (2006). Sociocultural theory and L2 development: State of the art. Studies in 
Second Language Acquisition, 28(1), pp. 67-109. 
Lantolf, J. P. & Appel, G. (1994). Theoretical framework: An introduction to Vygotskian 
perspectives on second language research. In J. P. Lantolf & G. Appel (Eds.), Vygotskian 
approaches to second language research (pp. 1-32). Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex. 
Lee, A. (1999). Inaugural Editor’s Comments, MIS Quarterly (23:1), pp. v-xi. 
Lee, J. (2007). A Three-Dimensional Navigable Data Model to Support Emergency 
Response in Microspatial Built-Environments, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 97, No. 3,  pp. 512-529.  
Lee, C. P. & Paine, D.  (2015). From The Matrix to a Model of Coordinated Action  
(MoCA): A Conceptual Framework of and for CSCW.  
 
Leont'ev, A. N. (1978). Activity, Consciousness and Personality, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Leont'ev, A. N. (1981). The problem of activity in psychology. In J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), 
The concept of activity in Soviet psychology (pp. 37-71). Armonk, New York: Sharpe. 
Lewis, J. L. & Sheppard, S. R. J. (2006). Culture and communication: can landscape 
visualization improve forest management consultation with indigenous communities? 
Landscape and Urban Planning 77:291–313. 
Li, S.,Yang, M. & Xu, F. (2011). Techniques and Methods of Geological Hazard 
Monitoring Based on GNSS. IEEE . 1 (2), p3696-3699. 
Loo, G. S. & Lee, P. C. H. (2001). A Soft Systems Methodology, Model for Clinical 
Decision Support Systems, Medical Engineering & Physics, 23, 217-225. 
Lofstedt, R. and Boholm, A. (2009). RISK: The Earthscan reader on risk. Earthscan; 
London 
Lundgren R., and McMakin A., (2009). Risk Communication: Handbook for 
communicating environment, safety, and Health Risks. 4
th
Edn; Wiley-IEEE publishers 
 
MacEachren and the ICA Commission on Visualization. (1998). Proceedings of the 
Polish Spatial Information Association Conference, May, Warsaw, Poland. 
http://www.geovista.psu.edu/icavis/draftAgenda.html. 
 
MacEachren A. M., Robinson A., Hopper S., Gardner S., Murray R., Gahegan M. & 
Hetzler E. (2005). Visualizing Geospatial Information Uncertainty: What We Know and 
What We Need to Know. Cartography and Geographic Information Science, 32 (3), 139-
160 
MacEachren, A. M. & Ganter, J. H. (1990). A pattern identification approach to 
cartographic visualisation. Cartographica. 27 (2), 64-8 
303 
 
Marchuk, A. Marinin, I. Krivorotko, O., Komarov, V., Karas, A. & Khidasheli, D. (2012). 
3D GIS Integrated Natural and Man-made Hazards Research and Information System. 
HCCE 2012. 1 (1-5), p225-229. 
Marcus, A. (2001). International and Intercultural User Interfaces. In User Interfaces For 
All: Concepts, Methods, and Tools, edited by C. Stephanidis, 47–63. Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Marincioni, F. (2007). Information Technologies And The Sharing Of Disaster 
Knowledge: The Critical Role Of Professional Culture, Disasters, 31(4): 459−476. 
Blackwell Publishing, USA 
Mark, D. M., Chrisman, N., Frank, A. U., McHaffie, P. H. & Pickles, J. (1997) The GIS 
History Project. Retrieved December 3, 2006 from 
http://www.ncgia.buffalo.edu/gishist/bar_harbor.html 
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1970). The German Ideology. In C.J. Arthur (Ed.) W. Lough, C. 
Dun & C.P. Magill (trans.). New York: International 
Mastin, M.C., Gendaszek, A.S., and Barnas, C.R. (2010). Magnitude and extent of 
flooding at selected river reaches in western Washington, January 2009: U.S. Geological 
Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2010–5177, 34 p. 
 
Matejicek, L., Engst, P. & Jaňour, Z. (2006). A GIS-Based Approach to Spatio-Temporal 
Analysis of Environmental Pollution in Urban Areas: A Case Study of Prague’s 
Environment Extended by LIDAR Data, Ecological Modelling, Vol. 199, No. 3,  pp. 261-
277.  
Mayer, R. & Goodchild, F. (1990). The critical thinker. New York: Wm. C. Brown. 
May, T. (2011). Social research: Issues, methods and research. London: McGrawHill 
International 
McCarthy, S., Tunstall, S., Parker, D., Faulkner, H. & Howe, J. (2007). Risk 
communication in emergency response to extreme floods. Environmental Hazards.7 (3). 
179-192 
McDaniels, T., Chang, S., Cole, D., Mikawoz, J. & Longstaff, H., (2008) Fostering 
Resilience to Extreme Events Within Infrastructure Systems: Characterizing Decision 
Contexts for Mitigation and Adaptation, Global Environmental Change 18(2): 310-318 
McEntire, D. A. (2001). Triggering agents, vulnerabilities and disaster reduction: towards 
a holistic paradigm, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 189-96. 
McEntire, D. A. (2002). Coordinating multi organisational responses to disaster. Disaster 
Prevention and Management, 11(5), 369–379. 
McEntire, D. A., Fuller, C., Johnston, C.W. & Weber, R. (2003). A comparison of 
disaster paradigms: the search for a holistic policy guide, Public Administration Review, 
Vol. 62 No.3, pp.267-81. 
McEntire, D. A. (2008). Issues in disaster relief: progress, perpetual problems and 
304 
 
prospective solutions, Disaster Prevention & Management, Vol. 8, pp. 351-61. 
 
McEntire, D. (2008). A Critique of Emergency Management Policy: Recommendations 
to Reduce Disaster Vulnerability. The International Journal of Public Policy; 3(5/6): 302-
312. 
Mendonça, D., Jefferson, T. & Harrald, J. (2007). Collaborative adhocracies and 
mix-and-match technologies in emergency management. Communications of the 
ACM, 50(3), 44-49. 
Miettinen, R. & Hasu. M. (2002) Articulating User Needs in Collaborative Design: 
Towards an Activity Theoretical Approach, Computer Supported Collaborative Work 11 
(1-2), 129-151 
Miles, V. C., McCarthy, J. C., Dix, A. J., Harrison, M. D. & Monk, A. F. (1993). 
Reviewing Designs for a Synchronous-Asynchronous Group Editing Environment. In 
Computer Supported Collaborative Writing, ed. M. Sharples, 137-60. London: Springer-
Verlag. 
Miller, M. A. & Malcolm, S. (1990). Critical thinking in the nursing curriculum. Nursing 
and Health Care, 11(4), 67-73. 
 
Mishra, J. L., Allen, D. K. & Pearman, A. D. (2011a). Information sharing during multi-
agency major incidents. Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science 
and Technology, 48(1), 1–10. doi:10.1002/meet.2011.14504801039 
Mishra, J. L., Allen, D. K. & Pearman, A. D. (2011b). Activity Theory as a 
Methodological and Analytical Framework for Information Practices in Emergency 
Management, (May), 1–9. 
Moe, T.L., Gehbauer, F., Sentz, S. & Mueller, M. (2007). Balanced scorecard for natural 
disaster management projects, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 16 No. 5, pp. 
785-806 
Moellering H. (1975). Interactive cartography. Proceedings of the 2nd International 
Symposium on Computer-Assisted Cartography (Auto-carto 2), September 21-25, Reston, 
Virginia, USA, pp415-421 
Montague, P. (2004). Reducing the harms associated with risk assessments. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 24, 733-748 
Moore, B.N., Parker, R. & Rosenstand, N. (2003). Critical Thinking. McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Columbus, OH. 
Morss, R.E., Wilhelmi, O.A., Downton, M.W. & Gruntfest, E. (2005). Flood risk, 
uncertainty and scientific information for decision making: Lessons from an 
interdisciplinary project. American Meteorological Society. BAMS-86-11-1593 
Moynihan, D. P. (2008). Learning under uncertainty: Networks in crisis management. 
Public Administration Review, 68(2), 350–365. 
305 
 
Missouri-Families for Effective Autism Treatment (MO-FEAT), 2008. Missouri Families 
for Effective Autism Treatment Resource Directory [online]. Available from: 
http://www.mo-feat.org/files/Directory.pdf [Accessed 10 February 2014]. 
Musliman, I. A., Rahman, A. A. & Coors, V. (2008). Implementing 3D network analysis 
in 3D-GIS. International archives of ISPRS, 37(part B). 
Mwanza, D. (2001). Where theory meets practice: A case for an Activity Theory based 
methodology to guide computer system design. Proceedings of INTERACT 2001: Eighth 
IFIP TRC13 conference on Human-computer interaction, Tokyo, Japan, July 9-13, 2001. 
Nardi, B. (1996). Context and Consciousness: Activity Theory and Human-Computer 
Interaction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction. (2008) At: 
www.criticalthinking.org/assessments/a-model-nal-assessment-hot-cfm. 
National Education Goals Panel. (1991). The national education goals report. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
National Response Team (2001) NRT 1: Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning 
Guide. Washington, DC: National Response Team. 
NFPA - National Fire Protection Association, (2007) NFPA 1600, Standard on 
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (2007 Edition), 
Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association. 
Nielsen A. (2004). User-Centered 3D Geovisualisation. Proceedings of the 12th 
International Conference on Geoinformatics: Bridging the Pacific and Atlantic, June 7-9, 
University of Gavle, Sweden, pp412- 216 
Niranjan, R. & Ashok, T. (2011). A Framework for Disaster Management using Wireless 
Ad Hoc Networks. ICCCS 11 February 12-14, 2011, Rourkela, Odisha, India (1-5), p138-
141.) 
Norges offentlige utredninger (2012) NOU 2012: 14: Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen 
online: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/dok/nou-er/2012/nou-2012- 
14.html?id=697260, Accessed 25/10/2012. 
O'Brien, M. (2000). Making Better Environmental Decisions; An Alternative to Risk 
Assessment., MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. 
 
Ocker, R. J. (2001). The relationship between interaction, group development, and 
outcome: A study of virtual communication. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-34; IEEE Computer Society, CD 
ROM), Hawaii, January.  
O’Leary, M. (Ed.). (2004) The First 72 Hours: A Community Approach to Disaster 
Preparedness. New York, NY: iUniverse, Incorporated. 
Patel, H., Pettitt, M. & Wilson, J. R. (2012). Factors of collaborative working: A 
framework for a collaboration model. Applied ergonomics, 43(1), 1-26. 
306 
 
Patel, H., Stefani, O., Sharples, S., Hoffmann, H., Karaseitanidis, I. & Amditis, A. (2006). 
Human centred design of 3D interaction devices to control virtual environments. 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 6. 64(3): p. 207-220. 
Patel, H. Pettitt, M. & Wilson J. R. (2012). Factors of Collaborative Working: A 
framework for a collaboration model. Elsevier Ltd 
Parker, D. J. (1992). The Mismanagement of Hazards, in Parker, D. J. and J. W. Handmer 
(eds.) Hazard Management and Emergency Planning: Perspectives on Britain, London: 
James and James 
Paton, D. (2003). Stress in disaster response: A risk management approach. Disaster 
Prevention and Management, 12(3), 203–209. 
Paul, R. & Elder, L. (2005). The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and 
Tools. The Foundation for Critical Thinking. At: www.criticalthinking.org. 
Peer Review, United Kingdom (2013). Building resilience to disasters: Implementation of 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015), UNISDR, EC, OECD. 
 
Pegg, D. (2013). Design issues with 3D maps and the need for 3D cartographic design 
principles. 
Pelzer, P., Arciniegas, G., Geertman, S. & Lenferink, S. (2015). Planning Support 
Systems and Task-Technology Fit: a Comparative Case Study. Applied Spatial Analysis 
and Policy, 1-21Peng, Z. & Tsou, M. (2003). Internet GIS. New Jersey: John Wiley and 
Sons.  
Perry, R. W. (2003). Incident management systems in disaster management. Disaster 
Prevention and Management. 12(5). pp. 405–412. 
Perry, R. W. & Lindell, M. K. (2007). Emergency Planning. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
and Sons. 
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Perrow, C. (2011). The Next Catastrophe, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Peterson, M. (1999). Active Legends for Interactive Cartographic Animation. 
International Journal of Geographical Information Science 13 (4): 375–383. 
doi:10.1080/136588199241256. 
Peterson, M. P. (1995). Interactive and Animated Cartography. Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey. 
Pitt, M. (2008). Learning lessons from the 2007 floods. London : Cabinet Office, 1949-. 
2008. 
Pissinou, N, Radev, I. & Makki, K. (2001). Spatio-Temporal Modeling in Video and 
Multimedia, Geographic Information Systems, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 375-409. 
307 
 
Plapp, T. (2001). Understanding risk perception from natural hazards. In: RISK 21 - 
Coping with Risks due to Natural Hazards in the 21st Century, Amman, Dannenmann & 
Vulliet (eds). Taylor & Francis Group, London, 101-108. 
 
Pollock, K. & Secretariat, C. (2013). Emergency Planning College Occasional Papers 
New Series Number 6. 
Pullar, D. V. & Egenhofer, M. J. (1998). Toward Formal Definition of Topological 
Relations among Spatial Objects, Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on 
SDH, Singapore, pp. 225-241.  
Punch, K. (2005). Introduction to social research: Quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications. 
Quarantelli, E. L. (1995). Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil 
Protection: The Historical Development and Current Characteristics of Organized Efforts 
to Prevent and Respond to Disasters. Paper No. 227. Newark, DE: Disaster Research 
Center, University of Delaware. 
Raeithel, A. (1992). Activity theory as a foundation for design, In: Floyd C. Züllighoven, 
H., Budde, R. and Keil-Slawik, R. (eds.) Software Development and Reality Construction. 
Berlin: Springer, 391-415. 
Ramsey, K. (2009). GIS, Modeling, and Politics: On the Tensions of Collaborative 
Decision Support. Journal of Environmental Management 90 (6) (May): 1972– 1980. 
doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2007.08.029. 
Rao, R. R., Eisenberg, J. & Schmitt, T. (2007). The National Academies Press, 
Washington, DC.  
Rashed, T. & Weeks, J. (2002). Assessing Vulnerability to Earthquake Hazards through 
Spatial Multicriteria Analysis of Urban Areas, International Journal of Geographical 
Information Science, Taylor and Francis Ltd., London/Bristol,  
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals  
Rashed, T. & Weeks, J. (2003). Assessing Vulnerability to Earthquake Hazards through 
Spatial Multicriteria Analysis of Urban Areas, International Journal of Geographical 
Information Science, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 547-576. 
Rauschert, I., Fuhrmann, S., Brewer, I. & Sharma, R. (2002). Approaching a new 
multimodal GIS-interface. Pages 145–148 in Proceedings, GIScience 2002, Boulder, 
Colo., September 2002. 
Reddy, M., Pratt, W., Dourish, P. & Shabot, M. (2003). Sociotechnical Requirements 
Analysis for Clinical Systems, Methods of Information in Medicine, 42, 437-444. 
Regester, M. and Larkin, J. (2008). Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public 
Relations: A Casebook of Best Practice. 4
th
 Edn. Kogan Page publishers. 
Reis, M.T., Hedges, T.S., Williams, A. & Keating, K. (2006). Specifying seawall crest 
levels using a probabilistic method. Maritime Engineering Journal, Proc. ICE, Vol. 
159(4), pp. 137 145. ISSN: 1741-7597. 
308 
 
Remenyi, D., Williams, B., Money, A. & Swartz, E. (1998). Doing Research in Business 
and Management: An Introduction to Process and Method, London: Sage. 
Ribarsky W. (2005). Virtual Geographic Information Systems. In: Hansen C. D. and 
Johnson C. R. (Eds.) The Visualization Handbook. Elsevier, pp449-477 
Robbins, D. (2006). What is Vygotskian Cultural-Historical Theory? Presented at the 
2006 Int’l Vygotsky Conference, Moscow, Russia, Unpublished paper, 16th Nov. 
Robson, C. (2002). Real World Research, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell. 
Roth, R. E. (2012). Cartographic interaction primitives: Framework and synthesis. The 
Cartographic Journal, 49(4), 376-395. 
Sagun, A., Bouchlaghem D. & Anumba, C. J. (2009). A scenario-based study on 
information flow and collaboration patterns in disaster management. Disasters. 33(2). pp. 
214–238. 
Rubin GJ, Brewin CR, Greenberg N, Simpson J, Wessely S. (2005). Psychological and 
behavioural reactions to the bombings in London: cross sectional survey of a 
representative sample of Londoners. British Medical Journal 2005, 331: 606. 
 
Sahani, P. & Ariyabandu, M.M. (2003). Introduction: Disaster risk reduction in South 
Asia, Sahni, P. Ariyabandu, M.M., eds. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Private 
Limited, pp.1-25. 
Salas, E., Cooke, N. J.,& Rosen, M. A. (2008). On teams, teamwork, and team 
performance: Discoveries and developments. Human Factors: The Journal of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 50(3), 540-547. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A., (2007) Research Methods for Business 
Students (4th edition), Essex: Pearson Education Ltd. 
Saunders, M., Lewis P. & Thornhill, A. (2009). Research Methods for Business Students 
(5
th
 edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2012). Research Methods for Business Students. 
Harlow: Prentice Hall. Chapter 3. 
Schatzki, T. R. (1996). Social practices: a Wittgensteinian approach to human activity 
and the social, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Schekkerman, J. (2004). How to Survive in the Jungle of Enterprise Architecture 
Frameworks: Creating or Choosing an Enterprise Architecture Framework, 2nd Ed., 
Trafford Publishing, Victoria, British Columbia. 
Schilling A., Coors V., Giersich M. & Aasgaard R. (2003). Introducing 3D GIS for the 
Mobile Community - Technical Aspects in the Case of TellMaris. IMC Workshop on 
Assistance, Mobility, Applications, Rostock, Stuttgart 
Seattle, WA (PRWEB), (2009). Prepare for Winter Storm What-ifs with NOAA Weather 




software/prweb1919174.htm. Accessed 20th February 2014. 
Sekaran. U. (2009). Research methods for Business: A skill-Building Approach: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Sellnow, T. L., Seeger, M. W. & Ulmer, R. R. (2002). Chaos theory, informational needs 
and natural disasters. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 30(4), 269–292. 
Senior, A. & Copley, R. (2008). Developing a new system for recording and managing 
information during an emergency to aid decision making. Journal of Business Continuity 
and Emergency Planning. 
Shaluf, I. M. (2007). An overview on disasters, Disaster Prevention and Management, 
Vol. 16 No. 5, pp.687-703 
Shaluf, I. M. (2007). Disaster Types, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 16, No. 
5, 2007, pp. 704-717. 
Shaluf, I. M., Ahmadun, F. & Said, A. M. (2003). A review of disaster and crisis. 
Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp.24-32 
Shaluf, I. M. and Ahmadun, F., (2006) Disaster types in Malaysia: an overview, Disaster 
Prevention and Management, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 286-98. 
Shen, S.-T., Wooley, M. & Prior, S. (2006). Towards culture-centered design. Interacting 
with Computers 18:820–852. 
Shen, Z. J. & Kawakami, M. (2010). An online visualization tool for Internet-based local 
townscape design, Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 34(2), 104-116 
 
Sieber, R., Schnürer, R., Eichenberger, R. & Hurni, L. (2013). The Power of 3D Real-
Time Visualization in Atlases–Concepts, Techniques, and Implementation. In 
Proceedings of 26th international conference of the ICA, Dresden, August (pp. 25-30). 
 
Silver, M. S., Markus, M. L. & Beath, C. M. (1995). The Information Technology 
Interaction Model: A Foundation for the MBA Core Course, MIS Quarterly (19:3), 
September, pp. 361-390. 
Simon, H. A. (1996). The Sciences of the Artificial (third ed.), MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Sircar, I., Sage, D., Goodier, C., Fussey, P. & Dainty, A. (2013). Constructing Resilient 
Futures: Integrating UK multi-stakeholder transport and energy resilience for 2050. 
Futures vol. 49, 49-63. 10.1016/j.futures.2013.04.003 
 
Siriwardena, N.U., Haigh, R. & Ingirige, M. J. B. (2007). Disaster! In search of a 
definition: specific to construction industry, Proceedings of the 7th International 
Postgraduate Research Conference in the Built and Human Environment, University of 
Salford, 28-29 March 2007. 
Slocum, T. A., McMaster, R. B., Kessler, F. C. & Howard, H. H. (2005). Thematic 
Cartography and Geographic Visualization. Second ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: 
310 
 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Somekh, B. & Lewin, C. (2005). Research methods in the social sciences. London: Sage 
Spagnolli, A., Varotto, D. & Mantovani, G., (2003). An ethnographic, action-based 
approach to human experience in virtual environments. International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies, 2003. 59: p. 797-822. 
Staffordshire Prepared. (2013). Exercise TRITON. Available at: 
http://www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk/Home/News/Exercise-TRITON-Post-Exercise-
Report-Published.aspx 
Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Standard Committee, AS/NZS ISO 31000 
(2009) Risk Management-Principles and Guidelines, November 2009. 
Stetsenko, A. & Arievitch, I. M. (2004). The Self in Cultural-Historical Activity Theory: 
Reclaiming the Unity of Social and Individual Dimensions of Human Development, 
Theory and Psychology, Sage, 14(4), 475–503. 
Suzuki, R., Takahashi,T., Takizawa, O., Akioka, M. & Kondo, Y. (2011). Survivability 
application demonstrations via wideband internetworking engineering test and 
demonstration satellite, Elsevier.  (3), p206-211 
Tama, C. (1989). Critical thinking has a place in every classroom. Journal of Reading, 33, 
64-65. 
Tang, A., Han, J. & Chen, P. (2004). A Comparative Analysis of Architecture 
Frameworks, SUTIT-TR2004.01, Swinbourne University of Technology, Swinbourne 
Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, C. (Eds.). (2003a). Handbook of mixed methods in social & 
behavioural  research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Terzo, L., Mossucca, A., Albanese, R. & Vigna, N. (2011). A distributed environment 
approach for a worldwide rainfall hydrologic analysis. International conference IEEE, 1 
(1), p271-276. 
Tierney, K. & Cigler, B. (2009). Emergency management: principles and practice for 
local government. In B. Cigler (Ed.), (Vol. 69, pp. 1172-1175). 
Tomaszewski, B. (2008). Producing geo-historical context from implicit sources: a 
geovisual analytics approach. The Cartographic Journal 45, 165–181. 
Torrens, P. M. (2006). Simulating Sprawl, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 248-275. 
Travers, M. (2001). Qualitative Research Through Case Studies, Sage, London. 
Troy, D.A., Carson, A., Vanderbeek, J. & Hutton, A. (2007). Enhancing community-
based disaster preparedness with information technology. Disasters. 32(1). pp. 149–165 
Trochim, W. (2006). Research Methods Knowledge Base. Available online from 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualval.php   [Retrieved on 31/1/16] 
311 
 
Tucker, R. W. (1996). The editor’s desk: Less than critical thinking. The Phoenix 
Institute, VI (4) 
Tukey J. W. (1977). Exploratory data analysis. Addison-Wesley 
Tuomi-Gröhn, T., Engeström, Y. & Young, M. (2003). From transfer to boundary-
crossing between school and work as a tool for developing vocational education: An 
introduction. In T. Tuomi-Gröhn & Y. Engeström (Eds.), Between school and work: New 
perspectives on transfer and boundary-crossing (pp. 1-15). Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, (2002). Communicating in a Crisis: 
Risk Communication Guidelines for Public Officials, Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Health and Human Services 
UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) (2009). 
UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction. Geneva: UNISDR. 30 p. 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf Date of 
access: 8 February 2014 
UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) (2007). Words 
Into Action: A Guide for Implementing the Hyogo Framework 
United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
(UNDP/BCPR) (2010). Disaster Risk assessment. A global report, New York. 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP-APELL) (2003). UNEP-APELL 
Disasters Database, available at: www.unepie.org/pc/ 
apell/disasters/lists/disasterdate.html (accessed January 2003) 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), (2007). Enhancing Urban 
Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements, UN-Habitat, Published by 
Earthscan 
United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UN/ISDR) (2004). Living with Risk: A global review of disaster reduction 
initiatives. United Nations, Geneva. 
Van der Raadt, B., Bonnet, M., Schouten, S. & Van Vliet, H. (2010). The relation 
between EA effectiveness and stakeholder satisfaction. Journal of Systems and Software, 
83(10), 1954-1969. 
Van Westen, C. J. (2013). Remote sensing and GIS for natural hazards assessment and 
disaster risk management. Remote Sens GISci Geomorphol, 17(3), 259-298. 
Viseu, T. & Almeida, A.B. (2007). Flood risk assessment in dam’s downstream valleys: 
an approach for safety using numerical and physical models. Proceedings 75th Annual 
Meeting of the ICOLD Symposium “Dam Safety Management. Role of State, Private 
Companies and Public in designing, constructing and operating of large dams”, St. 
Petersburg, Russia. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological 
Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
312 
 
Van den Bent, H. et al. (2007). TOGAF™, The Open Group Architecture Framework, 
Van Haren 
Wang, X. H. & Kapucu, N. (2008). Public complacency under repeated emergency 
threats: some empirical evidence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 
18(1). p. 57. 
Warner, N., Letsky, M. & Cowen, M. (2005). Cognitive model of team collaboration: 
Macro-cognitive focus. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
Annual Meeting (Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 269-273). SAGE Publications.Waugh, W. L. Jr. 
(1995).  Geographic Information Systems: The Case of Disaster Management.  Social 
Science Computer Review 13 (4): 422-431. 
Warren, C. M. J. (2010). The facilities manager preparing for climate change, Facilities, 
Vol. 28 Nos 11/12, pp. 502-13. 
Waugh, W. L. Jr., & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective 
emergency management. Public Administration Review, 66(s1), 131–140. 
Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Wertsch, J. V. (1979). From social interaction to higher psychological processes: A 
clarification and application of Vygotsky's theory.  Human Development, 22, 1-22. 
Wertsch, J. V., del Rio, P. & Alvarez, A. (1995). Sociocultural studies: History, action, 
and mediation. In J. V. Wertsch, P. del Rio, & A. Alvarez (Eds.), Sociocultural studies of 
mind (pp. 1-34). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Whiteman, R. V. & Lagorio, H. J. (1998, 2001). The FEMA-NIBS Methodology for 
Earthquake Loss Estimation, FEMA Toshihisa Toyoda,  http:// www.nibs.org/ ha-
zus4a.html  
Williams, P. (2002). The Competent Boundary Spanner. Public Administration, (80) 1, 
103-124. 
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. & Davis, I. (2004). At Risk. Natural hazards, people’s 
vulnerability and disasters. Second Edition 2004, Routledge New York. 
WMO (World Meteorological Organization), (2002). Guide on Public Understanding and 
Response to Warnings, WMO, Geneva 
Yates, P. M. & Rosenberg, J. P. (2007). Schematic representation of case study research 
designs. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 60(4), 447-452.  
Yawut, C. & Kilaso, S. (2011). A Wireless Sensor Network for Weather and Disaster 
Alarm Systems. International conference . 6 (2), p155-159. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., California: Sage. 
Yusof, S. M. & Aspinwall, E. M. (1999). Critical success factors for total quality 
management implementation in small and medium enterprises, Total Quality 
313 
 
Management, 10, pp. S803± 809. 
 
Youssef, W. & Younis, M. (2008). Optimized asset planning for minimizing latency in 
wireless sensor networks. Springer. 1 (1), p65-78. 
Zheng, W. (2012). The Flood Monitoring Information System Framework Based on 
Multi-source Satellite Remote Sensing Data. International conference IEEE. 2 (1), p306-
309. 
Zlatanova, S. (2000). 3D GIS for Urban Development, Ph.D. Dissertation, International 
Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation (ITC), Enschede.  
Zlatanova, S. (2008). SII for Emergency Response: the 3D Challenges, In: J. Chen, J. 
Jiang and S. Nayak (Eds.); Proceedings of the XXI ISPRS Congress, Part B4-TYC IV, 
July 2008, Beijing, pp. 1631-1637. 
Zlatanova, S., Rahman, A. A. & Pilouk, M. (2002a). 3D GIS: current status and 
perspectives, in Proceedings of the Joint Conference on Geo-spatial theory, Processing 
and Applications, 8-12 July, Ottawa, Canada, 6p. CDROM 
Zlatanova S., Rahman A. A. & Pilouk M. (2002b). Trends in 3D GIS development. 



















Appendix A      Questions for semi-structured interviews to identify the 
characteristics of an interactive map environment 
 
Questions for semi-structured interviews 
 
Name: 
Job title:  
Company Name:  
Experience in Emergency Management:  
 
1. Background 
Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act 2004 establishes a consistent level of civil protection 
activity across UK.  This Act provides a basic framework defining what tasks should be 
performed and how co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders should be 
conducted.  It aims to ensure greater consistency and co-operation at local level.   The 
principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation under the Act is the Local Resilience 
Forum (LRF), based on each police area.  
 
Within the context of Integrated Emergency Management which defines six activities 
(anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery management), 
the Act focuses on risk assessment and preparation.   The purpose of the LRF is to 
ensure effective delivery of these two activities in a multi-agency environment.  
 
The purpose of this research is to identify the characteristics of an interactive map 
environment (based on a spatial map) that can enhance multi-agency collaboration in risk 
assessment.  This research uses the six-step risk assessment process proposed in the 
Emergency Preparedness report (Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act 
2004) as the basis for structuring the questionnaire.  
 
The key research question that we intend to investigate within this research exercise is: 
How can we enhance multi-agency risk assessment activities through an Interactive 
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Spatial Map that presents an integrated risk view of the local area?  
 
2. Brief Introduction to the Six-step Risk Assessment Process 
The six-step risk assessment process proposed in the Emergency Preparedness report is 
based on the standard used in Australia and New Zealand, which is widely recognized as 
being good practice.  Figure 1 below illustrates the six-steps. A brief description of each 
of these stages is presented in Section 3 before presenting the questionnaire.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Six-step Risk Assessment Process 
 
3. Questionnaire  
 
Step 1:  Contextualisation  
The Emergency Preparedness report suggests that Category 1 responders should describe 
the characteristics of the local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an 
emergency in the community. The following questions have been defined to explore if an 
interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders build up a common 




(eg. Hazard mapping) (eg. Demographics’ data) 
Interactive Map with Integrated Risks 
Step 1:  
Contextualisation  
Step 2:  
Hazard Review 
Step 3:  
Risks’ Analysis  
Step 4:  
Risk Evaluation 
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Q1.1:  An ability to explore various social intelligence (such as the demographic, ethnic 
and social composition of the community, the geographical distribution, identification of 
vulnerable groups, level of community resilience) in an interactive spatial map could help 
Category 1 responders to establish a collective understanding of the local risk level.  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What additional social data is important for you to be displayed on the 
map? How could such social data exploration on an interactive map be useful for multi-
agency teams?  
 
Q1.2:  An ability to explore the local environment and understand the local 
vulnerabilities, characteristics of the space (urban, rural, mixed), scientific sites, etc. on 
an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders to receive a better collective 
understanding of the likelihood of, and the impact of, an emergency in the community.  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What additional data on the local environment is important for you to be 
displayed on the map? In your view, how could such an interactive exploration of the 
environment on an interactive spatial map be useful for multi-agency teams?  
 
Q1.3:  An ability to explore the local infrastructure (transport, utilities, business), the 
critical supply network and critical services (telecommunication hubs, health, finance, 
etc.) on an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders to receive a better 
understanding of the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community.  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What additional data on the infrastructure is important for you to be 
displayed on the map? In your view, how could such an interactive exploration of the 
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local infrastructure be useful for multi-agency teams? 
 
Q1.4: An ability to explore potential hazardous sites and their relationships to 
communities or sensitive environmental sites on an interactive spatial map could help 
multi-agencies to understand the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazardous events in the 
local area. 
  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What hazardous sites are important for you to be displayed on the map? 
In your view, how could such an interactive exploration of hazardous sites be useful for 
multi-agency teams?  
 
Q1.5: An ability to visualize a combination of risks (social, environmental, 
infrastructure, hazardous sites) in an interactive map could help Category 1 responders 
build up an integrated view of the local risk context.  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What combinations of risks would be useful?  
 
Step 2: Hazard Review  
Hazards that present significant risks are identified on the basis of experience, research or 
other information.  These hazards are shared and discussed at LRF meetings with a view 
to agreeing a list of hazards to be assessed.  The following questions have been defined to 
explore if an interactive spatial map could help Category 1 responders capture 
experience, intelligence and research data and communicate them to others during hazard 






Q2.1:   Utilising your past experience, An interactive map with appropriate graphical 
illustrations could be used to represent the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazards?   
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What type of experiences would you like to present on the interactive 
map to enhance communication and discussion during hazard review meetings?  
 
Q2.2:  An interactive map with appropriate graphical illustrations could be used as a 
medium to present the likelihood of, and the impact of, hazards derived from research 
data?  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What type of research data would you like to present on the interactive 
map to enhance communication and discussion during hazard review meetings?  
Comment on other types of data that could be beneficial within an interactive map.  
 
Q2.3:  The use of an interactive map, integrated with hazard information, could help 
members of the Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) and the Local Resilience 
Forum (LRF) make careful judgments on which hazards should be included in further 
assessment.  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 







Step 3: Risk Analysis 
The purpose of this step is to consider the likelihood of, and the outcome and impact of, a 
hazard. The Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG) from central government should 
provide a basis for this work, but the local knowledge available within the Risk 
Assessment Working Group (RWAG) and other local organisations should allow the 
RAWG to elaborate on the assessment.  The purpose of this section is to explore how the 
collaboration of both Category 1 responders could be enhanced in elaborating this 
assessment.  
 
Q3.1:  The use of an interactive spatial map to present the local risks’ context (social, 
infrastructure, environmental, hazardous sites) and the outcome of a hazard (derived from 
computer simulation or experience) could help Category 1  responders to collectively 
elaborate the assessment of a hazard and measure its impact?  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:   What types of simulation data, historical data and experiences could be 
useful in visualizing on the interactive map and why?  How could the integration of the 
local risks’ context and the outcome of hazards be useful?  
 
Q3.2:  The use of an interactive spatial map to present the cascading effect would help 
Category 1 & 2 responders to build up a broader perspective of  the outcome of hazards 
and their impact?  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on: What types of cascading effects of hazards will be useful?  
 
 Step 4: Risk Evaluation  
The production of a risk matrix is an essential part of the risk assessment process.  Four 




Q4.1:   The representation of risks’ ratings on an interactive map could help agencies to 
have an holistic view of hazards in their local areas.  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  What additional information on the interactive map could be useful at the 
risk evaluation stage?  
 
 Step 5: Risk Treatment  
Risk treatment has a number of stages: assess the type and extent of the capabilities 
required to respond to hazards; identify capabilities in place, consider the capability gaps 
and the extent of the risks; rate the risk priority; identify additional treatments required to 
close the capability gaps and manage the risks more effectively; identify whose 
responsibility it is to provide treatment, etc.  
 
Q5.1:   The visualisation of the capabilities required and the capabilities in place on an 
interactive map would help agencies to collectively understand the capability gaps and 
address the additional treatments required to close the capability gaps and manage the 
risks more effectively. 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on: What types of capabilities should be modelled and visualized? How could 
the modelling and visualization of capability data on an interactive map be useful at the 
risk treatment stage? 
 
Step 6:  Monitoring and Reviewing 
This stage implies that risks should be monitored continuously and that the previous steps 




Q6.1:  The availability of intelligence collected from Step 1 to Step 5 within an 
interactive map in an integrated form could help Category 1 responders to continuously 
improve risks’ management strategy and build resilient communities.  
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
Comment on:  Potential advantages.  
 
Q6.2:   Having understood the risks, how do you check if you are prepared for disaster?  
 
Any other comments:  
 Potential use in emergency planning  






























Appendix B      Interactive Map Evaluation and Questionnaire 
 
Purpose of this interactive map evaluation 
 
This interactive spatial map aims to provide a collaborative environment to support multi-
agency collaboration in risk assessment processes. The purpose of this evaluation of an 
interactive map prototype is to determine the value of an interactive spatial map to 
enhance multi-agency risk assessment processes in the assessment & preparedness 
stages of the context of Integrated Emergency Management. This evaluation is about 
enhancing the risk assessment process, collaboration and multi-agency teams’ 
preparedness. 
  
Part 1: Demonstration  
 
 Objectives of this demonstration: Contextualization; The aim of this section is to 
demonstrate the system’s capabilities to contextualise information such as social, 
natural and critical infrastructural vulnerability as well as hazard risks’ sites in the 
local area. The system enables the visualization of these combined data sets in an 
effort to allow collaborative information sharing. 
 
 
Part 2: The Flood Scenario  
 
Part 3: Discussion  
 
The objective of this discussion is to test how the system could enhance the six-step risk 
assessment process 
 




Appendix B      Interactive Map Evaluation and Questionnaire 
 
Participant number  _______________________  
 
The interactive spatial map aims to provide a collaborative environment to support multi-agency 
collaboration in risk assessment processes. The following questions aim to determine the value of 
the interactive spatial map in enhancing multi-agency risk assessment processes in the 
assessment & preparedness stages of the context of Integrated Emergency Management.  
 
Score the following statements by giving a mark (1 – 5): 1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – 
Neutral, 4 – Agree, and 5 – Strongly agree. 
 
Part 1: “perceived effectiveness” and impact of the interactive in supporting the risk 
assessment process 
1.   Step 1:  Contextualization of local risk. 
 







Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1. The visualization of this social information on the 
interactive map helps multi-agency teams collectively 
understand local social risks  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
a) The visualization of social information helps multi- 
agency teams understand concentrated social 
vulnerable spaces in the city. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The visualization of social information helps multi- 
agency teams understand the demographic, ethnic and 
socio-economic composition of the community. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The visualization of social information helps multi- 
agency teams understand the geographical location of 
various communities within the local area. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The visualization of social information helps multi- 
agency teams understand the level of preparedness 
required for coping with demands arising from a 
potential disaster. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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e) The visualization of population densities helps multi- 
agency teams place resources that can be used to 
evacuate residents. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of population changes over 
daytime/night time helps multi-agency teams understand 
the varying demands in evacuation planning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of ethnic communities who are not 
well integrated with society helps multi-agency teams 
identify community leaders who could be used to warn, 
and inform, their communities during  emergencies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of a transient population (travellers’ 
communities, students)  helps multi-agency teams to 
identify and safeguard those communities during  
emergencies. 
 











Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
2. The visualization of this local infrastructure information on 
the interactive map helps multi-agency teams to collectively 
understand local infrastructure risks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
a) The visualization of electrical substation locations and 
associated colour map helps multi-agency teams 
understand the number of buildings that would be 
affected by the loss of a substation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The visualization of telecom substation locations and 
associated colour map helps multi-agency teams 
determine the impact on buildings in the event of the 
loss of a telecommunication substation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The visualization of water distribution point locations 
and associated colour map helps multi-agency teams 
identify how many buildings and key infrastructures 
would be affected. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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The visualization of health facility locations helps multi-
agency teams identify the health facilities that could be 
used in emergency situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The visualization of heritage buildings & site locations 
helps multi-agency teams to identify which of these are 
more vulnerable to risk and to consider protection 
measures. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of major financial institution locations 
helps multi-agency teams identify critical  financial 
institutions that could be placed in a vulnerable situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 







Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
3. The visualization of the Natural Environment on the 
interactive map helps multi-agency teams establish a 
collective understanding of the important  natural 
resources within the space viewed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of reservoir locations helps multi- 
agency teams assess and understand the area that would 
be affected by a potential dam failure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of animal sanctuary locations (and the 
type and number of animals there) helps multi- agency 
teams understand the numbers and types of animals that 
need rehousing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The visualization of national park locations helps multi-
agency teams understand the impact that a disaster could 
have on plants, wildlife and on sites of special 
enivronmental interest. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 









Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
4. The visualization of this hazardous sites’ information on 
the interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collectively understand the local risks imposed by the 
sites. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. The visualization of chemical site locations and the 
identification of the number of people that could be 
affected by hazards occurring on these sites helps multi-
agency teams identify people living in proximity to a 
chemical site in order to communicate with, and inform, 
them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The visualization of Universities’ lab locations helps 
multi-agency teams understand the types of material being 
used at these sites and the potential impact during a 
disaster.    
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Layers within the spatial map 
Information only: IDS for various visual features. 
 
 
Social information Natural    
Environment 
Infrastructure Hazardous Sites 
a. Population densities 
b. Population changes daytime/night time  
c. Ethnic communities who are not well 
integrated with the society and have 
language difficulties  
d. A transient population (travellers’ 
communities, students) 
e. Elderly people 
f. People with disabilities  
g. Families with children (infants) 
h. Pregnant ladies  
i. Serious medical needs (requiring 
special medical equipment for 
evacuation) 
j. Specific types of illnesses (needs 
special procedures for evacuation) 
k. Those with chronic health conditions 
l. Buildings which host vulnerable 







a. Reservoirs  
b. The topography 
c. Areas with risks of 
land slide  
d. Rivers 
e. National parks  
f. Forests  





a. Electrical substations (Electricity 
supply networks, Electricity 
transformers) 
b. Telecom substations (telecom 
supply networks, Green boxes, 
Mobile phone towers and masts, 
premises containing the data hubs 
of communications centres) 
c. Gas substations (Gas supply 
networks) 
d. Water distribution points (Water 
supply networks) 
e. Pumping stations (Waste water 
system, drainage system)  
f. Bridges  
g. Tram networks   
h. Rail networks  
i. Road networks (existing including  
high ways, major roads) 
j. Bus stations (bus stops) 
k. Traffic lights  
l. Airports 
m. Major financial institutions 
n. Shopping centres  
o. Health buildings; local GPs, Walk-
in clinics, Doctors, Nursing homes 
& Hospitals, Pharmacists 
p. Residential houses 
 
a. A recycling plant 
b. Waste disposal sites  
c. Chemical site (Chemical 
storage sites, Chemical 
factory, Oil rich sites) 
d. Universities’ labs 
Biological, Biometric & 







q. Buildings of interest; Police, 
Ambulance & Fire stations 
r. Heritage buildings & sites  
s. Universities  
 
 
Please specify which combinations of layers are useful to you/your organization  
 
Integrated Layers  The usefulness of the Integrated Layers that 
you have chosen.   
(i.e. why you have chosen these layers ) 
Social 
[a-l] 
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Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
5.  The  interactive map helps multi-agency teams 
capture experience, intelligence and research data and 
communicate them to others during hazard review 
meetings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The visualization of past data (such as the impact of 
previous floodings) helps multi-agency teams  
understand the impact of similar potential emergencies, 
and assists in learning from past action and the 
experience of others. 












Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
6. Visualization on the interactive map helps multi-
agency teams estimate the likelihood, outcome and 
impact of hazards in the local area. 
1 2 3 4 5 
a) The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collectively understand the outcome of hazards 
(eg, in the case of a flood, the likelihood of certain 
hazards occurring and the likely magnitude of 
such hazards). 
1 2 3 4 5 
The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collectively understand the impact of hazards on people,  
such as the numbers potentially affected by the hazard.  
1 2 3 4 5 
The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collectively understand the impact of hazards on critical 
infrastructure and on the number of buildings affected  
and on utility services and transport. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collectively understand the impact of  hazards on plants, 
wildlife and and on sites of special enivronmental 
interest.  
1 2 3 4 5 
The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collectively understand the impact of  hazards on the 
economy of the area affected (eg. the number of 
shopping centres  unable to function because of the loss 
of electricity due to substation failure). 











Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
7.  The visualization on the interactive map helps multi-
agency teams to collaboratively identify and prioritise 
risk hotspots in the area in order to produce a risk level 
matrix (high, medium and low risk) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The system made it easy to identify risk hotspots in the 
local area. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy to prioritise these risk hotspots. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy to produce the risk level matrix 
(showing  high, medium and low risk) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy for the group to collaborate on 
this task.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy to share ideas and to come to 
an agreement within the group. 














Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
8.  The visualization on the interactive map helps multi-
agency teams to collaboratively understand their 
current capabilities to deal with risks and to identify 
gaps in these capabilities? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The system will make it easy to identify the number and 
the type of resources in the local area. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system will help in understanding the overall 
capability of multi-agencies in the local area. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy to keep track of the use of 
resources.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy for the group to collaborate on 
this task.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The system made it easy to share ideas and to come to 
an agreement within the group. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 








Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
9. The interactive map helps multi-agency teams to 
collaboratively update, review and maintain information 
regarding local risks. 
 




a. The interactive map would help the ongoing 
monitoring of risks. 
 




Part 2: “perceived effectiveness” of the interactive map for successful interactive 







Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a) The interactive map enhances the interaction between 
multi-agency teams in terms of decision-making, 
communication and coordination. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b) The interactive map helps teams to take turns in 
expressing their views. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c)   An interactive map system is helpful for multi-agency 
teams to build up a common understanding of the 
potential local risks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) An interactive map system can improve the efficiency 
of communicating ideas and information. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) An interactive map system has real value as a tool 
where there is a need to communicate complex 
agendas to multi-agency teams.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) An interactive spatial map enhances the interpretation 
skills between multi-agency teams (such as breaking 
goals into sub-goals and questioning deeply). 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) An interactive map enhances the reasoning skills 
between multi-agency teams in terms of a user’s ability 
to think logically, justify priority levels, etc.  
1 2 3 4 5 
h) An interactive map enhances the assessment skills 
between multi-agency teams in terms of a user’s ability 
to rationally weight options. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
i) An interactive map enhances the meta-cognitive skills 
between multi-agency teams in terms of producing 
multiple ideas and dealing with the incident that has 
happened when making decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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j) An interactive map enables users in multi-agency 
teams to look beyond the first obvious explanations to 
consider alternative interpretations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
k) An interactive map enables users in multi-agency 
teams to use mental imagery to evaluate plans. 






Please answer the following questions about the system you have just used.  
 




















































































Project: PhD Project – Interactive map evaluation 
        
To be completed by the volunteers: We would like you to read the following questions 
carefully. 
  
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from this study:                          
• At any time                                                                                           YES/  NO 
• Without giving a reason for withdrawing                                            YES/  NO 
 
Do you agree to take part in this study?                                            YES/  NO 
 
Have you read the information sheet about this study?                                   YES/  NO 
 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?           YES/  NO 
 
 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?                       YES/  NO 
 
Have you received enough information about this study?                               YES/  NO 
 
Do you agree to the data being stored and used in the researcher’s ongoing 
research?                                                                                                          YES/   NO 
 
Do you agree to the data being stored indefinitely?                                        YES/  NO 
 
Do you agree to let us make transcripts of your answers and present them anonymously in 
printed publications?                                                                                       YES/  NO 
 
Do you agree to the questionnaire data being shared with academic collaborators on the 













Appendix B       Interactive Map Evaluation and Questionnaire 
 
The Flood Scenario 
1. We have had a report from the Met office that warns of heavy rain in the Salford 
area. 
2. When we compare the projected figures with the Environment Agency’s 
simulation data we detect that there is a potential issue. 
3. We will now visualise this data using our system. 
4. We can see from the heatmap representing the Environment Agency’s simulation 
data that there will be flooding in three locations. 
5. Using our systems social information we can now visualise vulnerable people in 
the affected areas such as the elderly and disabled. 
6. We now overlay critical infrastructure such as electricity sub stations, 
telecommunications, major roads and traffic lights. 
7. Then the areas that will be affected if these critical services fail.  Each area also 
shows critical statistics for each outage area. 
8. We now add hazardous sites and show their affected areas.  We can again access 
critical statistics. 
9. Resources in these areas can now be added such as Fire and Ambulance stations. 
10. Once we have all of this data visualised we have a possible worst case scenario. 
11. We can now examine the data for any potential issues or hotspots and create our 
own notes and markers on the map. 
12. The next step in our development will be to create a configuration file that can be 
passed between partners with visualised settings and notes saved allowing for a 






























































Contextual Menu Elements 
Layer Option 
Heatmap Options 
 Icon representing data type   
Data categorise  
Contextual Data 
Information 
Number of Person 
